

Consent and Compliance

Amy Yuen
Middlebury College
ayuen@middlebury.edu

ABSTRACT

Why do peacekeeping missions succeed or fail? Prior work has focused primarily on the organization supplying the mission, its tasks and characteristics of the conflict into which the mission is being sent. Missing from these analyses, however, is a consideration of how the belligerents help shape the peacekeeping mission that ultimately arrives in country and what those efforts mean for the mission's outcome. Peacekeeping missions always go to a conflict with at least one party's consent. In fact, the United Nations time and again has stressed that without permission, peacekeeping will fail. Thus policy-makers and scholars have worked from the assumption that consent is a signal of long-term peaceful intentions. The mixed record of peacekeeping, however, is evidence that presence or absence of consent is not a powerful enough indicator of intentions to settle. Starting from the perspective that consent is bargaining power, this paper argues that what belligerents try to negotiate with respect to the peacekeeping mission may serve as a clue to their true interest in committing to lasting peace. The expectation is that belligerents who try to negotiate weaker peacekeeping will be more likely to violate ceasefires and/or attack missions, with important consequences for the effectiveness of the mission. I demonstrate these dynamics with a discussion of cases and empirical tests on new data that capture the terms of consent for peacekeeping missions.

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Consent is one of the most basic, underlying principles of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. Hailed as a necessary component for mission success, consent is not only a goal that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations strives for in every case, it is considered to be one of the most important factors for peacekeeping success. In fact, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote in a position paper as a supplement to his landmark statements on UN peacekeeping responsibilities ("An Agenda for Peace", (United Nations Secretary-General, 1992)):

The United Nations can be proud of the speed with which peace-keeping has evolved in response to the new political environment resulting from the end of the cold war, but the last few years have confirmed that respect for certain basic principles of peace-keeping are essential to its success. Three particularly important principles are *the consent of the parties*, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence. Analysis of recent successes and failures shows that in all the successes those principles were respected and in most of the less successful operations one or other of them was not [Emphasis added] (United Nations Secretary-General, 1995, 9).

But the record of UN peacekeeping is mixed, dotted with both successes and failures based on a range of judgement criteria. As an institution with the stated goals of addressing threats to international peace and stability, which are generally interpreted to mean conflict management, UN peacekeeping is often judged by its ability to assist long-term peace before, during and following international and intrastate conflict. Scholars and policymakers have examined peacekeeping as a treatment to understand how to achieve durable peace. These studies, and others more directly concerned with peacekeeping strategies, have produced several conclusions about its effectiveness in conflict management, but all have expressly ignored the role belligerents play in peacekeeping efforts. This paper considers how belligerents shape peacekeeping missions and its effects

on mission outcomes by examining consent as a tool to gain bargaining leverage over both the peacekeeping institution and the other belligerents.

Why does peacekeeping succeed or fail? Given its mixed record, scholars have explored many hypotheses to explain why peacekeeping efforts to prevent the recurrence of conflict are successful or not. The most obvious focus has been on the size and content of the mission itself. Because peacekeeping missions have mandates that range from simply observing compliance with agreement obligations to enforcing those agreements with a military presence, a natural focus on the characteristics of the mission developed in the early explorations of peacekeeping success. Diehl (1994) identifies several aspects of missions that might affect outcomes. For example, he argues missions must be perceived as neutral to gain cooperation from the combatants. He also argues that clearer mandates are more likely to be successful, as are missions that do not suffer from uncertainties surrounding funding for the mission. Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) build a much more comprehensive understanding of missions, focusing on their “peacebuilding triangle”, which represents the three important factors for peace success: hostility, local capacity and international capacities. They argue that durable peace depends on the relative combination these three factors. Their perspective is that when local capacities are low and/or hostility is high, international capacities, which they measure as peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts can increase the overall potential for peace success. These studies systematically analyze the content of mission duties and mandates more precisely by measuring the duties and resources given to missions. They also test whether the amount of troops help peace efforts succeed. Contrary to intuition, they find that more troops do not necessarily mean a greater chance for success.

What Role Do Peacekeepers Play?

Peacekeeping, as an institution, is designed to help belligerents avoid a renewal of hos-

tilities. Early missions sent by the UN were intended to take up positions between two warring nations engaged in interstate conflict, though in the 1960s observer missions were also increasingly sent to civil conflicts. Their role was expected to be strictly impartial and generally to serve as a physical presence between warring factions to prevent hostilities and monitor compliance with ceasefires. But the role of peacekeeping has developed over time, particularly as the need for peacekeeping has shifted from interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts. The UN has taken on more tasks that mix peacekeeping with peacebuilding, though the two types of missions remain clearly defined and are even managed under different bureaucratic branches within the UN (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Goulding, 1993). The evolving role of the UN, its tasks and resources reflect the dynamic nature of the institution itself and its ability to learn and adapt from past experience (Howard, 2008).

While the “how” of peacekeeping has evolved into a more complex system of tasks, the “why” aspect has remained unchanged. The application of bargaining theory to the outbreak, duration and termination of war has generated substantial leaps in the theoretical and empirical literature on the role institutional and state interveners play in conflict termination (Fearon, 1995; Filson and Werner, 2002; Regan, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002; Slantchev, 2003*b,a*; Werner and Yuen, 2005; Lo, Hashimoto and Reiter, 2008). Walter (1997, 2002) provides the most compelling argument that is directly applicable to peacekeeping. She argues that in civil conflict, settlements that do not end in partition require one or more groups to disarm as part of the settlement. Disarming any groups creates a natural commitment problem, since, according to bargaining logic, the existing settlement is predicated on the pre-implementation distribution of forces. Disarmament alters the balance, which opens an opportunity for the side that does not disarm (usually the government) to gain an advantage that it could not gain on the battlefield. Walter argues that the commitment problem explains why it is so difficult to get civil war

belligerents to agree to and actually implement negotiated settlements. She argues that third-party security guarantees are the most effective way to ensure that a negotiated settlement is reached and implemented because they can eliminate the security dilemma that disarmament creates. Fortna (2004) applies this logic to the role peacekeepers play as security guarantors and compliance monitors.

Luttwak (1999) offers an important caveat on the role interveners in general, and peacekeepers in particular, play in war termination. He suggests that interveners may be doing more harm than good in some cases because they do not allow belligerents to face the possibility of defeat. In the language of bargaining, they interrupt the information updating process so that the belligerents may still be unsure over where the settlement should fall in the contract zone, leading them to be more likely to resume the war in the future (Werner and Yuen, 2005; Lo, Hashimoto and Reiter, 2008). Luttwak also argues that the basic functions of peacekeepers have, at times, created incentives to violate ceasefires and resume fighting, even as peacekeeping is ongoing.¹ Despite the fact that peacekeepers always pursue their tasks with the goal of maintaining peace, evidence suggests that they do have unintended consequences, just like many other forms of humanitarian intervention.²

The Peacekeeping “Treatment”

Recent work has also ventured to determine whether peacekeeping enhances the peace process. Scholars have conducted several studies that test the “treatment” effect of peacekeeping. These studies reflect an interesting debate over whether peacekeeping has the desired effect of lengthening the duration of peace after civil and interstate conflict. A general summary of this literature suggests that peacekeeping effectiveness is mixed,

¹Luttwak particularly mentions the “safe areas” created in Bosnia as contributing to the massacres that occurred there because they concentrated Bosnian Muslims, allowing the Bosnian Serbs to be much more effective in their efforts at ethnic cleansing.

²A large literature is developing on the consequences of humanitarian intervention. See Anderson (1999); Cooley and Ron (2002); de Waal (1998); Lischer (2005, 2003); Terry (2002).

depending on factors such as the organization sending the mission. UN-focused studies tend to find no discernible effect, while those that consider other institutions find positive results that are also conditional on the type of mission sent (Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel, 1996; Fortna, 2003, 2004, 2008; Hartzell, Hodie and Rothchild, 2001; Wilkenfeld and Brecher, 1984).

Related to the effectiveness debate, several scholars have focused on the supply of peacekeeping, particularly which factors are most important for determining where to send peacekeepers. Focusing on politics within the UN, several scholars have argued that the UN sends missions where it is advantageous to UN Security Council member interests, particularly the Permanent 5 nations (Bennis, 1996; Gibbs, 1997; De Jong Oudraat, 1996; Neack, 1995). Jacobsen (1996) hypothesizes a “CNN effect”, meaning conflicts with greater media coverage are more likely to get attention and peacekeeping from the UN. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) offer a systematic, quantitative analysis that suggests the UN goes to places where more people have died and wars have lasted longer, supporting need-based hypotheses of peacekeeping.

Related to need-based arguments, a subset of the peacekeeping literature has devoted some effort to selection issues. Do peacekeepers go to more difficult cases, reflecting a humanitarian motivation, or do they go to easier cases in which the conflict was on the verge of resolving itself? Using systematic tests and multiple methods, the consistent result seems to be that peacekeepers go to the more difficult cases. Difficult cases are defined as those that have more factions, stronger governments and previously failed attempts to terminate the war (Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008; Fortna, 2008). Naturally, if peacekeepers go to the difficult cases, then they choose conflicts in which failure is a strong possibility, which might underrepresent the effects peacekeeping has in conflict termination.

Peacekeeping and Consent

What none of the previous studies consider systematically is the demand for peacekeeping.³ Fortna and Martin (2009) is the first analysis of peacekeeping consent as a signal of peaceful intentions in civil conflict. Yuen and Wolford (N.D.) take up this question with an even broader analysis of the conditions under which peacekeeping is likely to be offered, either because the belligerents want peace or because they plan to regroup during a peace spell and resume fighting in a more advantageous position. The latter analysis suggests that the characteristics that make conflicts “hard” versus “easy” are the extent to which conditions inside and outside the conflict create regrouping opportunities. Further, the analysis shows that peacekeeping, rather than alleviating these concerns, may exacerbate them as a tool to induce the opponent to accept a false peace.

Why would belligerents consent to a costly peacekeeping mission if they do not have long-term peaceful intentions? Allowing a peacekeeping mission can guarantee a break in the fighting since missions are usually sent where ceasefires exist or are negotiated before and deploy after a signed ceasefire. Belligerents who want only a short-term peace are likely to need peacekeepers to get their opponent to agree to a ceasefire in the first place.⁴ Without peacekeepers, the opponent would be too suspicious of a bilateral settlement offer to agree to stop fighting. Thus, peacekeepers may make a regrouping strategy possible where none would exist without them.

The temptation to pursue a regrouping strategy may be particularly acute in civil war cases. Whether the conflict is between a government and a rebel group, a government and multiple rebel groups or among combatant groups in which the state has completely collapse, the struggle is for as much control of the new regime as possible. Because the stakes are so high, it is reasonable to expect that high risk strategies may be more

³Fortna (2008) is an exception, though she discusses it very briefly in her book.

⁴This reasoning is demonstrated in an equilibrium in the Yuen and Wolford model.

palatable.⁵

How can we determine whether a belligerent is sincerely interested in peace or planning to regroup? If we treat consent as dichotomous, then it is difficult to determine empirically whether a belligerent who consents to peacekeeping is offering a sincere overture towards peace or merely using a tactic to exploit a potential advantage gained during the break in fighting. If we consider consent as part of a negotiating *process*, however, then we can treat it as a more reliable information transmitter.

Negotiation and Information

As Slantchev (2003b) argues in his seminal work on information convergence in war, a great deal of information is revealed by the *strategic, manipulable* negotiating that occurs alongside battlefield outcomes. In his model, he demonstrates the conditions under which stronger and weaker belligerents will differentiate themselves based on their willingness to accept screening offers and by their settlement counteroffers, all of which depend on their patience (δ , discount factor), their opponent's beliefs and the outcome of past battles. The major thrust of his argument is that negotiations can reveal information, justifying closer study of negotiating behavior in war.

This framework, given in the context of war between two belligerents, is relevant for understanding how peacekeeping consent can transmit information in negotiations over the terms of peace. Both the Fortna and Martin signaling model and the Yuen and Wolford model assume the costs of peacekeeping are determined exogenously, meaning those costs are not influenced by the belligerents using consent as a signal to their opponent. Predictions from the signaling models would suggest that a belligerent considering a regrouping strategy would have to anticipate a sufficiently weak mission to opt for regrouping since they would have to bear the costs of the mission, any punishment

⁵This dynamic is similar in logic, though different in motivation, to Downs and Rocke (1994) and Goemans (2000) notions of “gambling for resurrection”.

for renegeing and the additional costs of continuing the war. What these models cannot incorporate are the patterns of behavior that peacekeeping institutions adopt, nor the influence belligerents have over the missions that are sent. A basic perusal of agreement texts negotiated to terminate civil conflict reveals that in most, if not all, cases where peacekeeping missions are sent, the mission itself is subject to bargaining between the belligerents and with the contributing institution.⁶

Observationally, wide variability exists from mission to mission on what the mandate, size and reach of each deployment will be. The peacekeeping literature attributes this variability to the politics within the peacekeeping institution, which is an implicit assumption that the belligerents have no say in the type of mission sent to their conflict.⁷ Shifting focus to belligerent influence over peacekeeping missions highlights another factor that is likely influence mission outcomes.

Belligerents have many ways available to them for shaping a potential peacekeeping mission because missions have evolved over the years to include a variety of tasks and can range from tens to tens of thousands of troops and observers. The multidimensionality of peacekeeping has complicated the process, exposed it to greater room for negotiation and ultimately created more options for belligerents to limit or encourage greater interference in their domestic affairs. The near-continuous character of peacekeeping missions and the fact that belligerents do negotiate over the size and scope of the mission suggests that a simple dichotomous treatment of consent is inadequate to capture the signaling capabilities of consent and arguably underplays what belligerents and organizations can learn from the negotiating process surrounding peacekeeping missions. The signaling models tell us that even when all parties agree to allow peacekeepers, they may not be interested in long-term peace on those terms. What the models do not tell is is how we

⁶This is particularly true for the UN.

⁷I do not expect the intra-institutional politics to be irrelevant to the mission, and have in fact written on this very issue (see Allen and Yuen (N.d.)); however, it is a reflection of the emphasis on *states* as the main actors in the international system that perpetuates the lack of research on belligerent negotiations with international organizations, an omission that I draw attention to here.

can tell a sincere peace overture from an insincere one when regrouping opportunities may exist (and realistically, they almost always do exist). What may be much more revealing is when belligerents take active measures to weaken a peacekeeping mission.

Belligerents have the opportunity to negotiate restrictions on mandates, troop movements, even the nations from which peacekeeping troops will be drawn because consent can be used as bargaining leverage, especially for institutions that treat consent as crucial to success. Given that belligerents know with greater certainty what their capabilities and opportunities for regrouping are, they have an informational advantage over the peacekeeping institution with respect to their regrouping opportunities. Belligerents have every incentive to try to limit the mission where they can because it translates into a direct reduction in costs of allowing the mission and makes the regrouping strategy more viable. Thus, missions that experience a great deal of negotiation and restrictions *imposed by one or more belligerent groups* should be much more likely to fail.

Research Design

To determine whether the negotiating process surrounding peacekeeping missions can be informative of belligerent intentions, I collected information on all UN peacekeeping missions sent to civil conflicts over the lifetime of the United Nations. While nothing about the signaling dynamics necessarily excludes interstate conflicts, I focused on missions sent to civil conflicts since, as Walter (2002) suggests, the security dilemma is heightened in these situations. Missions sent to interstate conflicts have a decidedly interpositional character to them, lacking the security and enforcement dynamics that are central to missions sent to civil war cases. The data cover a time period from 1960 to missions deployed in the last year. These data extend the existing data beyond the last end date in 2004 to 2011, increasing the total number of UN cases to fifty-two.

Dependent Variables

There are many ways to measure the success or failure of a mission. In the UN's case, the Secretariat have at times tried to redefine success as having carried out the mandate they were given, even if the war restarted.⁸ Ultimately, scholars of peacekeeping have held to the standard of whether or not these missions have actually kept the peace as a definition of success, which is the standard I use for this analysis.

There are also a variety of ways to measure peacekeeping success. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) use a measure of whether peace persisted until two years after the “peace stimulus”, meaning after the mission left the conflict, as their primary dependent variable.⁹ Others have opted for a more detailed study of peacekeeping and its effects on conflict by measuring the duration of peace after the end of a war or ceasefire (Fortna, 2003, 2004, 2008; Regan, 2002).

In deference to the variety of measurements of success, which each have their strengths and weaknesses, I use two different measures to capture whether the mission was successful or not. The first dependent variable follows Doyle and Sambanis' coding rule and records a mission success if peace has lasted two years after the peacekeeping mission exited the country. This measure introduces a natural limitation on missions that are currently ongoing or ended less than two years ago. Additionally, one criticism of the two-year time limit measure is that it sets an arbitrary date at which peace is hailed as a success when many peace processes may fall apart three or four or n years after the mission leaves.¹⁰ To address the possibility that violence may resume beyond the two

⁸See for example, Phillip Corwin's discussion of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia where he claims success for UNPROFOR in Bosnia and justifies that claim with the fact that humanitarian aid had been delivered, the violence remained contained to Bosnia and that the UN had some political successes in negotiating ceasefires (Corwin, 1999, 29).

⁹They use this measure to distinguish *peacebuilding* efforts from *peacekeeping* efforts; however, many of their cases are mission that the UN itself considers to be peacekeeping missions. I use the UN's classification of its missions since each one has primary elements of peacekeeping.

¹⁰Doyle and Sambanis do robustness checks with definitions that code peace success five years after the peace as well.

year limit set by the Doyle and Sambanis coding rules, I also code whether belligerents renew the war at *any* point during and beyond the mission. The variable is coded ‘1’ if violence among the same groups begins again. The level of violence must be severe enough to threaten the government or disrupt the existing peace on a wider scale. There must be multiple fatalities and a reaction by the interim or established government that reflects some threat to their authority.¹¹ These two variables together have the advantage of providing a strict definition of peace *after* the mission and a broader notion of peace success that captures failures that happen during the mission and long after.

Because I am interested in whether belligerents are signaling a willingness to cooperate with their opponents and peacekeepers, I also coded whether there were direct attacks aimed at peacekeepers during the mission. One of the ways belligerents can hasten the removal of a peacekeeping mission and reduce the costs of peacekeeping is by conducting direct attacks against them. This was done, for example, in Rwanda when members of the Rwandan military deliberately attacked a small contingent of Belgian peacekeepers in an effort to speed withdrawal of the UN mission (Barnett, 2002). Attacking peacekeepers is a clear sign that some belligerents are not interested in cooperating with the mission. Because it is a risky and severe step to attack peacekeepers, this variable represents a conservative test of belligerents’ willingness to cooperate. Codings required evidence that the peacekeepers were intentionally targeted with political motivations.¹²

Independent Variables

The primary concept of interest is consent and the limits belligerents choose to put on peacekeeping missions. To illustrate why measuring the presence of absence of consent is insufficient to capture how consent does or does not serve as a signal of peaceful intentions,

¹¹For example, a series of robberies targeting members of one group is not sufficient, but a large protest that results in clashes with military or police officials resulting in deaths is sufficient when the protesters are calling for changes to government policy or personnel.

¹²Examples of targeting peacekeepers without political motivations is a robbery against a peacekeeper in which the peacekeeper is ultimately killed.

I coded consent as a categorical variable with three values, or types, of consent. Consent type was coded ‘1’ if the mission did not have consent from all parties deemed by the UN to be crucial to the peace process. This value captures cases of ‘partial’ consent. Consent type was coded ‘2’ if all parties gave consent but some or all imposed some kind of restrictions on the UN mission, which are described in greater detail below. Finally, consent type was coded ‘3’ if the mission received full, unrestricted consent from all parties.

As part of the coding process, I collected information on the types of restrictions put on missions by the belligerents. The UN may also impose its own restrictions, but these are not included in the codings. To determine whether the belligerents were responsible for limitations on a mission, I consulted agreement texts, if they existed, and Secretary-General reports on the conflict. I coded whether belligerents limited the tasks the UN could perform, which represents restrictions on the mission’s mandate. I also coded whether the belligerents allowed the UN full access across their territory or confined their operations to specific areas. Finally, I coded whether the belligerents negotiated requirements on the number or source of troops. Using these variables, I also create a dichotomous variable capturing whether consent was restricted or not. Cases in which only some of the belligerents gave consent are coded as restricted consent since at least one major group did not want UN involvement at all.¹³

Differences among missions are important to capture since the argument suggests that they will look different based on belligerent negotiations. For comparability, I coded missions using the definitions specified in Fortna (2008), which is consistent with Doyle and Sambanis’ codings as well.¹⁴ I use two measures for this analysis. The first codes missions on a five point scale ranging from 1 to 5 with ‘1’ representing only a political mission to ‘5’, which represents an enforcement mission. I use a dichotomous variable capturing

¹³These cases are coded as missing for variables that measure specific restrictions on mandate, troops or location.

¹⁴Codebook available at <http://www.columbia.edu/vpf4/research.htm>.

whether the mission is a Chapter VI or Chapter VII mission. This variable is coded as Fortna codes it, with Chapter VII missions defined as ‘enforcement missions’, coded as ‘5’ in the ordinal scale variable. One difference is worth noting, in that Fortna does not include political missions with small numbers of observers as peacekeeping missions. I include those missions when the UN includes them as peacekeeping missions.¹⁵

Previous work on civil wars identifies many factors that are associated with renewed violence after breaks in the fighting. I include several variables that control for conditions that make settlement more difficult in general. One of the most important predictors of renewed violence is how the war ended. Prior theories have suggested that costly stalemates are crucial for getting belligerents to pursue peace. Following Licklider’s (1993) logic, belligerents caught in a costly stalemate will see peace as being more beneficial than returning to a war in which neither side can win. Others suggest that victory for one side means that losing side cannot challenge the winner, making peace much more likely to endure, albeit under conditions set by the winner (Fortna, 2008). Walter’s (2002) analysis of decisions to negotiate, sign and implement agreements provides a more nuanced analysis of what belligerents will do for different war outcomes. She demonstrates that stalemate is likely to bring parties to the negotiating table, but that it is indeterminate whether belligerents will choose to implement the agreement because it depends on whether the settlement addresses the commitment problem that demobilization creates. The discussion is further complicated by claims that wars end when the belligerents have learned enough about their opponent for their expectations to converge on a settlement that both prefer to fighting.¹⁶ If information is paramount, then the outcome of the war is at best a blunt instrument for capturing factors that influence the information and expectations of the belligerents.¹⁷ The relationship between war outcome and mission failures

¹⁵I also included missions that are missing from prior codings, such as UNAVEM I in Angola and UNOSOM I and II in Somalia.

¹⁶See the large literature developing around bargaining and information, including Fearon (1995); Filson and Werner (2002); Powell (2004); Reed (2003); Reed et al. (2008); Slantchev (2003a).

¹⁷See Werner and Yuen (2005) for a more detailed discussion.

or renewed violence will be negative if the dynamics are simple but indeterminate if the more complicated information convergence explanation is correct. Each outcome is coded as a dichotomous variable, and captures whether the war ended in victory for one side, a negotiated settlement or a truce, which captures cases in which there was neither victory nor negotiated settlement.¹⁸

To capture the costliness of the war, I use the natural log of battle deaths.¹⁹ Two expectations are possible for this measure. Battle deaths may be more likely to lead to lasting peace because the war has grown so costly that peace is a more desirable option. Conversely, more battle deaths may create resentments or mistrust that is likely to lengthen the war and make peace more fragile, reflecting a negative relationship. It is possible that costlier war and greater resentment push against each other, which would result in no discernible effect of battle deaths. I also use war duration as a proxy measure for the costliness of the war. Longer wars are more costly, but they may not generate the same resentment or mistrust that large numbers of battle deaths may create. The two have a correlation coefficient of .56.

Previous analyses have shown that peacekeeping missions are less likely to go to places where the government army is strong. I include this measure as an important factor that influences where peacekeepers are sent. It may have further relevance since stronger governments may have much more bargaining power with their opponents and with the peacekeeping organization. Additionally, they certainly have more capability to restart the war if peacekeeping is not producing the outcomes it prefers. Therefore, I expect governments with stronger armies may be more likely to resume violence in the presence of peacekeepers. I used the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities data to code the size of the government's military (measured in thousands of troops).²⁰

¹⁸I use the victory where possible for comparability; however, in some cases there is little or no variation between victory and the outcome variable, so I use truce to capture outcome instead.

¹⁹I extended the coding using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) data on battle deaths, which covers deaths measured annually for all conflicts up to 2008.

²⁰Note that Haiti is coded as having no troops (0) which some datasets code as missing, while others

Some conflicts may be more difficult to solve merely because there are more groups to satisfy. Previous analyses have suggested that more factions will make peace more difficult to achieve. This is likely true for several reasons. Bargaining between two actors is difficult under conditions of incomplete information. As the number of groups bargaining increases, the information and expectation problem grows, making it much more difficult to locate a deal that all groups would prefer to fighting. With more factions, it is also more likely that an important group is excluded from the negotiating process because they refuse to participate. As Doyle and Sambanis argue, spoilers can be very problematic to a peace process. They can disrupt the process with a few acts of violence that generate mistrust among the principal groups trying to negotiate a deal. Thus the greater the number of factions, the more likely the conflict is to return to violence. The number of factions is measured dichotomously, with '0' capturing conflicts with only two groups and '1' capturing conflicts with three or more groups.

Finally, I also include controls for major power intervention. This measure captures whether any permanent member of the Security Council intervened in the conflict in support of one group or another. When major powers intervene in civil conflicts directly, the expectation is that they exert considerable influence over the group for whom the intervene. This was true with France in Rwanda, in that they put enormous pressure on the Rwandan government to reform their political process, consolidate their political parties and agree to the terms in the Arusha Accords. There are two effects major powers may exert on the likelihood of renewed violence. First, they may reduce the chances of renewed fighting because when peacekeeping missions are sent, they usually come from organizations led by the major power in question and so pressure the belligerents to settle and cooperate with the mission. They also, however, usually promise aid for their protégé's cooperation, which may tip the balance in favor of renewed fighting under advantaged conditions. Thus major powers may be associated with increased chances of

describe the situation as Haiti having no standing military at all.

renewed violence. The next section includes a discussion of the methods used, followed by the results of statistical analysis of cases of peacekeeping success or failure.

Methods

The dataset includes all UN peacekeeping missions sent to civil conflicts since the beginning of the UN system. The number of cases included in this study is quite small, but the cases also represent the universe of cases for UN peacekeeping in civil wars. They do not, however, represent the universe of peacekeeping, broadly defined, nor even within the UN since the UN has previously sent missions to interstate conflicts as well. Given the many ways the universe of cases can be defined, I begin the analysis with the simplest methods, using descriptive statistics to establish details and relationships among the missions and variables of interest. I then perform logistic regressions under the assumption that the universe of cases is beyond these data because regional organizations and even individual states send peacekeepers to civil war torn regions.

It is worth noting that the most comprehensive studies of peacekeeping having taken the duration approach, measuring how long peace survives after the end of a conflict. This measure is particularly useful for questions of whether peacekeeping is actually helping to keep the peace. The question in this paper is related but slightly different in that I am interested in whether missions succeed or fail, accepting the results established by previous studies that peacekeeping is associated with longer peace. The advantage of focusing on missions only is that I can examine *each* mission. Analyses that use peace duration as the dependent variable also must use ceasefires as the unit of analysis. This means that multiple missions may be missed in the analysis if they are sent successively but without a new ceasefire or if more than one institution sends a mission. These analyses force scholars to choose the dominant mission for their analysis but cannot separate the different functions of the mission and their influence on peace nor whether belligerents

can manipulate missions as part of the peace negotiation process. This analysis attempts to capture important individual characteristics of each mission, particularly with respect to belligerent expectations and limitations to determine whether these missions are being used strategically.

Results

Tabulations

The problem addressed in this study is easy to identify by simply looking closely at the cases. Having the consent of the parties is not enough to ensure that they will cooperate with the mission. Table 1 shows how the consent types are distributed across outcomes as defined by Doyle and Sambanis. Because several missions are ongoing, they are not included in the sample since, by definition, they cannot be coded until the missions have ended. The table demonstrates that only 9% of missions are sent with partial consent. All others have the full consent of the belligerents. Table 2 shows the relationship between consent and renewed violence. Only five cases were missions that had partial consent. Ninety percent of UN mission in civil conflict have consent from all of the belligerent groups. These tables show that most missions have full consent.

The Doyle and Sambanis table also reveals some interesting patterns with respect to consent type and outcomes. Missions that fail tend to be missions that have partial consent or full, restricted consent. Out of the 43 cases of UN peacekeeping, 47% failed by the Doyle and Sambanis time limit of two years after the peace stimulus. Table 1 suggests, however, that there may also be some reason to expect information revelation to be useful when belligerents negotiate peacekeeping mission. While many missions failed if consent was partial or restricted, cases in which consent was full and unrestricted tended to fare better two years out. Table 2 suggests a different pattern. Across types of consent, missions experienced some form of renewed violence in 69% of

cases. Violence resumes much more often than not whether full consent was restricted or not. There are more cases in which violence did not resume for unrestricted consent, than for restricted consent.²¹ The pattern of consent and renewed violence is less clear.

The conclusion I make from these tables is that consent, without understanding the caveats that accompany them, can tell belligerents and peacekeeping institutions little about whether any or all groups are serious in their pursuit of peace. The patterns from the Doyle and Sambanis definition suggest that perhaps more useful signaling can happen when the belligerents take steps to negotiate, or more specifically, limit the peacekeeping mission in some way.

Statistical Analyses

I perform logistic regression analysis on three dependent variables to determine whether any relationship exists between belligerent bargaining behavior and their willingness to sustain peace during and after a peacekeeping mission. The consent type variable is ordinal, which is not problematic for logistic regression as long as the ordinal categories exert a generally linear effect, meaning that the “gaps” between each category are roughly the same. Tests of the gap between full, restricted and full, unrestricted consent suggest this assumption is valid; however, the occurrence of partial consent is so rare that there is not enough variation to include partial consent as a lone category. Thus, I cannot fully demonstrate with the current data that the gap between partial and full, restricted consent is consistent with the gap between full, restricted and full, unrestricted consent. The regressions using the dichotomous variable unrestricted consent help to bolster the results of the consent type regressions.²² The results are presented below.

Mission Success or Failure

²¹These cases are dominated by missions in Central America and the Balkans.

²²Though these results collapse partial and restricted consent into one category, which introduces some inefficiency of information into the models.

The first analysis uses mission success or failure as defined by the Doyle and Sambanis coding rule for a dependent variable. For this variable, it is clear that a statistical analysis is required because the coding rule creates a subset of cases (sample) that can be coded from the known UN peacekeeping missions. I conduct two separate tests using the consent type as the primary explanatory variable in the first and the unrestricted consent measure in the second. The two are highly correlated (coefficient .73).

In the consent type analysis, I included controls for factors that might make a conflict more difficult to resolve, such as the battle deaths, factions, whether the war ended in a truce, the strength of the government and whether a major power intervened. I also controlled for the mission mandate to capture the strength of the mission that ultimately went to the conflict. The results are presented in the first column of Table 3.²³ Only the consent type variable shows any statistically significant effect on whether the mission is a success or failure. The substantive effect of increasing consent type from partial to full, restricted consent is a 29% increase in the likelihood of success, whereas increasing consent type from full, restricted consent to full, unrestricted consent increases the chances of success by 37%, for a total increase of 66% from the lowest to highest type of consent.²⁴ The second column of Table 3 presents the results when the dependent variable is unrestricted consent. Unrestricted consent has similar effects as the consent type variable on the likelihood of mission success. Holding all discrete variables at their median and all continuous variables at their mean, missions that are granted unrestricted consent are 46% more likely to succeed.

What separates this analysis from the first is that other variables are also influential. Missions that go to places where war has lasted longer are more likely to succeed. Both greater numbers of battle deaths and stronger government armies make mission success less likely to succeed. In fact, increasing war duration from the shortest war to the longest

²³For the consent type analysis, including war duration does not change the results. I present the model that conserves degrees of freedom.

²⁴All substantive effects are calculated using Clarify.

makes success 55% more likely, *ceteris paribus*. Changing the number of battle deaths from least costly to most costly makes missions success 59% less likely, and changing the government army's strength from the weakest to the strongest value makes success 68% less likely.

These results contradict those presented in Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and are only consistent with Fortna (2008) across the war duration and measures of war fatalities. The difference with Doyle and Sambanis' results is puzzling since they have a much larger sample size and the mission outcomes in this model are directly comparable to those in their analysis. The discrepancies with Fortna's results are likely due to the small sample size and lack of direct comparability.

Renewed Violence

The next analysis uses the dichotomous measure of whether violence resumes after the mission deploys or exits the civil war country. This variable constitutes a more relaxed measure of success, allowing for renewed violence long after the two year limit. Because some missions happened long ago while others are fairly recent, this variable does introduce heterogeneity into the data because old missions have had more opportunity to resume violence than newer missions. I correct for this problem by using robust standard errors for this analysis. I also use the victory measure instead of truce for comparability when the victory variable does not perfectly predict success or failures.

Table 4 presents the models using consent type as the primary independent variable.²⁵ The first column shows a conservative list of controls, due to small sample size and is included because the results change slightly when more variables are included. Robust to a variety of specifications, consent type is negatively associated with renewed violence, meaning violence is less likely to begin again when belligerents impose fewer restrictions

²⁵The total number of cases is fifty-two, however one case (UNPREDEP in Macedonia) drops out because there were no battle deaths, so the natural log returns a mission value. I opt to drop this case rather than force an artificial solution (Zorn, et al. Peace Science).

on peacekeepers. The substantive effects, however, are much smaller than in the mission success models. A change from partial consent to full, unrestricted consent only makes renewed violence 42% less likely. Both battle deaths and government army size also influence the likelihood of renewed violence in this model. Battle deaths make violence less likely while stronger governments make a renewal of violence more likely.

The effect of battle deaths weakens when the model includes the measure of factions and major power interveners. Neither exert a statistically significant effect on the outcome, but they do result in a larger coefficient for consent type. More importantly they increase the overall model fit. For this model, the substantive effects of consent type are somewhat larger. Moving from partial consent to full, unrestricted consent decreases the chances of renewed violence by 50%. Consistent across these analyses is the fact that a more inclusive, longer-term measure of success or failure weakens the explanatory power of consent. The reason is likely because as time passes, conditions change that might encourage the resumption of war over the same issues long after a mission has exited. Long term peace can only persist if the parties to the original ‘deal’ do not think they can do better by renegotiating or, worse, fighting. Thus the signaling power of negotiating behavior may have short term value only.²⁶

Table 5 shows the results for unrestricted consent as the primary independent variable. Unrestricted consent is also systematically related to renewed violence, though the substantive effect is smaller, reducing the likelihood of violence resuming by only 22%. War duration and government army size also exert counterpressures on the chances of renewed violence, with longer wars reducing the chances by 66% while larger government armies increase the chances by 65%.

Attacks Against Peacekeepers

²⁶see Table 4, Column 3 for regression results when the sample is restricted to the Doyle and Sambanis cases only.

The final analysis focuses on a more direct measure of refusal to cooperate with peacekeeping. The previous measures both suffer, to some extent, from the chances that conditions change during or after the mission that motivate new violence. Coordinated, intentional attacks against peacekeepers is the most direct sign that at least one belligerent does not want to cooperate with peacekeepers. These models use truce as the measure for war outcome because victory completely determines several cases. Further, these models achieved better overall fit when using the dichotomous Mission Chapter variable to control for mission strength rather than the ordinal scale.

Table 6 shows the results of both the consent type regression and the unrestricted consent regression. In both models, the measures of consent suggest that fewer restrictions on consent makes attacks against peacekeepers less likely as well. For the consent type variable, the likelihood of attacks against peacekeepers decreased only 18% when changing partial consent to full, restricted consent. It decreased by 41% when changing from full, restricted consent to full, unrestricted consent. These results suggest that the fundamental difference is not in the presence or absence of consent but in the negotiating behavior of the belligerents.²⁷ The substantive effect of moving from restricted to unrestricted consent (column 2) is to reduce the likelihood of attacks against peacekeepers by 50%. This result suggests a much larger effect for consent, though attacks against peacekeepers can only occur while the mission is in country, confining the effects of consent to the period and conditions most immediately relevant to peacekeeping consent. In the second model, war duration also exerts a statistically significant, negative effect on the likelihood of attacks against peacekeepers. Changing values from the shortest war to the longest, peacekeepers are 48% less likely to be attack, an effect almost as strong as the nature of consent.

²⁷The results presented omit battle deaths; however, the results are robust to alternate specifications that include battle deaths. I present the simplest results in column 1.

Conclusion

Is consent for peacekeeping a signal of belligerent intentions to settle? The evidence in the paper suggests that consent is not a good signal of genuine, peaceful intentions to settle. A more informative signal of belligerent intentions is their negotiating behavior with respect to peacekeeping missions. Are they willing to allow unrestricted access, troops and tasks for the peacekeeping mission? Belligerents who try to restrict missions by using consent as bargaining leverage may be trying to weaken the mission intentionally because they plan to use the break in the fighting that peacekeeping creates to regroup and restart the war under more favorable conditions. The results in this paper point to two major gaps in the literature on civil war resolution and peacekeeping. The first is the near absence of any consideration of belligerent strategy and influence over mission. Scholars have consistently ignored the observable fact that the UN in particular *negotiates* the mission characteristics not just with troop contributing nations and the Security Council, but also with the belligerents who will receive the mission.

Second, both practitioners and scholars have consistently pointed out that consent is crucial to peacekeeping success because it signals a willingness to cooperate. These results suggest this is only partially true. The good news is, when consent comes without restriction, chances are stronger that the belligerents will cooperate and longer term peace is possible. The bad news is, these results also suggest that belligerents may be abusing peacekeeping to gain an advantage over their opponents. Consent alone is not informative enough to support optimistic expectations of mission success. Instead, whether and what restrictions the belligerents negotiate may be an *ex ante* clue that they intend to renege at some point during or after the peacekeeping mission.

These results also suggest some unexpected conclusions, particularly that consent, at best, can be a short term signal of intentions to settle, but the long term power of consent diminishes as time passes, likely due to changing conditions that may inspire desires to

renegotiate terms (Werner, 1999). Signals that may be useful in the short term are likely to be subsumed by other explanations for war (or peace).

These results do not have the ability to reveal what conditions are most conducive to regrouping or settling strategies. Additional data and analysis are necessary to determine whether belligerents will choose peacekeepers as part of a regrouping strategy or for benign reasons compared to choosing bilateral means of conflict resolution. These data also do not include non-UN missions. There is reason to believe that non-UN missions may be inherently different from UN missions. Considering, for example, the African Union, the sources for material, financial and troop support is much more limited than the UN, while NATO is much better endowed to handle conflicts with or without consent. Further data collection and analysis would determine whether different institutions behave different and further whether belligerents choose these institutions *because* of their relative abilities to deal with conflict.

Table 1: Consent Types and Outcomes (Doyle and Sambanis Definition)

Consent Type	D&S Success	D&S Failure	Total
Partial Consent	1	3	4
Full, restricted consent	4	12	16
Full, unrestricted consent	18	5	23
Total	23	20	43

Table 2: Consent Types and Outcomes (Violence Resumes)

Consent Type	Stayed Peaceful	Resumed Violence	Total
Partial Consent	0	5	5
Full, restricted consent	5	15	20
Full, unrestricted consent	11	16	27
Total	16	36	52

Table 3: Logistic Regression - Doyle and Sambanis Mission Success

	(1)	(2)
Consent Type	1.907** (0.691)	–
Unrestricted Consent	–	2.262** (0.873)
Truce	0.149 (0.845)	0.885 (0.929)
Peacekeeping Operation	0.192 (0.426)	-0.012 (0.438)
ln(Battle Deaths)	-0.142 (0.215)	-0.572* (0.286)
Government Army Size	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004* (0.002)
Factions	0.522 (0.889)	0.386 (0.998)
Major Power Intervener	0.874 (0.884)	0.378 (0.924)
War Duration	–	0.236* (0.104)
Constant	-4.618 (2.913)	2.358 (2.776)
N	42	42
χ^2	12.82	16.87
p	0.0767	0.0315

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4: Logistic Regression - Violence Resumes/Consent Type

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Consent Type	-1.234** (0.428)	-1.347** (0.456)	-1.506* (0.725)
Truce	-0.369 (0.828)	-0.605 (0.820)	-0.968 (0.858)
Peacekeeping Operation	-0.327 (0.269)	-0.557 [†] (0.296)	0.011 (0.367)
ln(Battle Deaths)	-0.475** (0.164)	-0.411* (0.207)	-0.407 [†] (0.242)
Government Army Size	0.004* (0.002)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)
Factions	–	0.115 (0.687)	-1.601 [†] (0.968)
Major Power Intervener	–	-1.512 [†] (0.840)	-1.784* (0.901)
Constant	9.208*** (2.362)	10.417*** (2.195)	11.157*** (2.973)
<i>N</i>	51	51	42
χ^2	23.05	50.86	30.01
<i>p</i>	0.000330	9.81e-09	0.0000947

[†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5: Logistic Regression - Violence Resumes/Unrestricted Consent

	(1)
Unrestricted Consent	-1.173* (0.529)
Peacekeeping Operation	-0.349 (0.256)
War Duration	-0.171* (0.066)
Government Army Size	0.006** (0.002)
Victory	-0.708 (1.396)
Major Power Intervener	-1.224 (0.819)
Factions	-0.109 (0.742)
N	51
χ^2	17.98
p	0.0121

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 6: Logistic Regression - Attacks Against Peacekeepers

	(1)	(2)
Consent Type	-1.922** (0.675)	–
Unrestricted Consent	–	-2.526** (0.823)
Truce	-0.831 (0.747)	-1.219 (0.834)
Mission Chapter	2.253† (1.340)	2.333† (1.410)
War Duration	-0.037 (0.061)	-0.190* (0.095)
Major Power Intervener	-0.331 (0.727)	-0.511 (0.809)
Government Army Strength	-0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Factions	0.006 (0.751)	-0.114 (0.862)
ln(Battle Deaths)	–	0.421 (0.257)
Constant	3.168 (2.224)	-2.957 (2.573)
N	52	51
χ^2	18.87	23.93
p	0.00860	0.00235

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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