

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION
030:362, SPRING 2011
W 1:30 –4:20 PM, 337 SH

INSTRUCTOR:

Professor Sara McLaughlin Mitchell
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Office Hours: Tuesday & Thursday, 2-3:30pm

Course Description

The purpose of this course is to analyze the most important theories regarding the causes of international war and conflict. This course will: (a) introduce students to a wide range of research on international conflict and (b) show students how to critically evaluate research and consequently how to design their own research projects.

Required Texts

Bennett, D. Scott and Allan C. Stam. 2004. *The Behavioral Origins of War*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. *The War Trap*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lemke, Douglas. 2002. *Regions of War and Peace*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. West Sussex, UK. Wiley-Blackwell.
Most, Benjamin A. and Harvey Starr. 1989. *Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
Reiter, Dan. 2009. *How Wars End*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Schelling, Thomas C. 1981 (1960). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Vasquez, John A. 2009. *The War Puzzle Revisited*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Book chapters marked with an * will be available on the content page of the ICON course site one week before class. All other readings should be located online using scholar.google.com or other library search engines. If you have trouble locating a reading, please let me know. I've posted copies of several other scholars' conflict syllabi on ICON as a source for additional readings. Jack Levy's 110 page (!) syllabus is a great resource for preliminary exam preparation.

Course Requirements

1) Research Paper (50%)

Choose a research question on international conflict for which a significant difference of opinion exists, and research this based on either the historical evidence of two or more interstate conflicts, or else on the basis of existing statistical data sets. The final product should take the form of a conference paper or journal article. The paper should be about 25-30 pages in length, contain a review of the relevant literature, and be written in the professional style of the American Political Science Association. You may use whatever methodology you feel is most appropriate to the issue and which you feel qualified to implement. I would like the papers for this course to focus on interstate conflict, thus you may only study civil war to the extent that you are linking it to interstate conflict.

The paper will be due in several stages:

Thursday, February 17th, Research Question (5%) (due in class): Submit a one page typed description of your research question, and explain how it fits into the general topical themes for the course. Provide an initial bibliography of at least 15 sources. I recommend searching for publications related to your topic on scholar.google.com.

Monday, March 21st, Research Design (10%) (due at 5:00p.m. in my mailbox in 341 SH): Submit five to seven typed pages with a bibliography in which you identify your research question, review the literature relevant to your question, discuss the method of analysis you intend to employ, and describe any data or historical sources you will use to evaluate your hypotheses.

Monday, April 18th, First Draft (15%) (due at 5:00p.m. in my mailbox in 341 SH): Submit the first complete draft of your paper, with all key parts of the paper included (introduction, theory, research design, analysis, references). Each draft will be read by the instructor and two other students in the class. Each student should submit three hard copies of the paper to the instructor, who will then assign the student discussants for each paper. The two papers each student will discuss will be distributed in each student's mailbox by Friday, April 15th.

Friday, April 29th, Reviews (20%) (due at 5:00p.m. in my mailbox): Each student will write a typed review commenting on two other students' papers in the class. The reviewers will be assigned "blindly", so that the authors do not know who reviewed their papers. The reviews should take the form of a journal review, where you make specific recommendations about how to improve the paper. More detailed instructions, along with examples of reviews, will be distributed later in class.

Wednesday, May 11th, Final Draft (50%) (due at 5:00p.m. in my mailbox in 341 SH): Submit your final paper along with a memo responding to the reviewers' comments in the previous round. I will take into consideration how well you responded to others' criticisms when assigning a final grade. I will not accept any late papers under any circumstances. The final paper grade is based on the weighted component grades for each portion of the paper (research question, research design, first draft, reviews, and final draft).

2) Class Participation and Attendance (25%)

The quality of a graduate level seminar depends to a large extent on the efforts of the students. I expect that you will come to class each week prepared to discuss the required readings. While you are reading the assigned course material, I encourage you to consider the following questions:

- a) What is the research question?
- b) What is the researcher's theoretical argument?
- c) What methods/approach does the author use to try to answer the question?
- d) Is this approach suitable for the question or theory?
- e) If the author provides empirical tests, are the operational measures of the concepts appropriate?
- f) What are the most significant research findings & how do these relate to other course readings?
- g) To what degree do you think the researcher has answered his/her research questions?

3) Weekly Quizzes (25%)

Each week at the beginning of class, I will administer a quiz with 5 multiple choice questions covering that week's readings. I will drop your two lowest quiz scores. Any missed quizzes will score a zero.

Course Schedule

Week 1, January 19th: Introduction

General Approaches to the Scientific Study of International Conflict

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell. Chapter 1.

Vasquez, John A. *The War Puzzle Revisited*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Introduction and Chapter 1

Ray, James Lee. 2001. "Integrating Levels of Analysis in World Politics." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13(4): 355-388.

Diehl, Paul F. 2006. "Just a Phase? Integrating Conflict Dynamics Over Time." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 23(3): 199-210.

Conceptualizing and Measuring War/Conflict

Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer. 1996. " Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15(2): 163-213.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Havard Strand. 2002. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

Gerner, Deborah J., Philip A. Schrodtt, Ronald A. Francisco, Judith L. Weddle. 1994. "Machine Coding of Events Data Using Regional and International Sources." *International Studies Quarterly* 38(1): 91-119.

Meredith Reid Sarkees, Frank Wayman, and J. David Singer. 2003. "Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution Over Time, 1816-1997" *International Studies Quarterly* 47(1): 49-70.

Week 2, January 26th: Methodological Issues in the Study of Conflict

Most, Benjamin A. and Harvey Starr. 1989. *Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics*. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press. Chapters 1-3, 5, 7

Bennett, D. Scott and Allan C. Stam. 2004. *The Behavioral Origins of War*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Week 3, February 2nd: Realist Theories of War I

Overview

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell. Chapter 2.

Vasquez, John A. *The War Puzzle Revisited*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3.

Neorealism

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1988. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18(4): 615-628.

Defensive Realism

Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power." 1985. *International Security* 9(4): 3-43.

Offensive Realism

*Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. W.W. Norton & Co. Chapters 2 & 6.

Offense/Defense Balance

Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War." *International Security* 22(4): 5-43.

Critiques/Evaluations

Legro, Jeffrey W. and Andrew Moravcsik. 1999. "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security* 24(2): 5-55.

Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson. 2010. "Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally Against the Leading Global Power?" *International Security* 35(1): 7-43.

Week 4, February 9th: Realist Theories of War II

Power Transition Theory

*Midlarsky, Manus I, ed. 1993. *Handbook of War Studies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Pages 171-194 (Kugler & Organski)

Lemke, Douglas. 2002. *Regions of War and Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 3-5, 7

Reed, William. 2000. "A Unified Model of Conflict Onset and Escalation." *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(1): 84-93.

Unipolarity/Hegemony/Long Cycles

*Thompson, William R. 1988. *On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. Chapters 3 & 9.

Wohlforth, William C. 1999. "The Stability of a Unipolar World." *International Security*, 24(1): 5-41.

Thompson, William R. 2006. "Systemic Leadership, Evolutionary Processes, and International Relations Theory: The Unipolarity Question." *International Studies Review* 8:1-22.

Women & Security

Hudson, Valerie M., Mary Caprioli, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Rose McDermott, and Chad F. Emmett. 2008/09. "The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States." *International Security* 33(3): 7-45.

Week 5, February 16th: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Races

Nuclear Weapons

Sagan, Scott. 1994. "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." *International Security*, 18(4): 66-107.

Asal, Victor and Kyle Beardsley. 2007. "Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior." *Journal of Peace Research* 44(2): 139-155.

Jo, Dong Joon and Erik Gartzke. 2007. "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(1): 167-194.

Tannenwald, Nina. 2003. "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use." *International Organization* 53(3): 433-468.

Furhmann, Matthew. 2009. "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Weapons Agreements." *International Security* 34(1): 7-41.

Fravel, M. Taylor and Evan S. Medeiros. 2010. "China's Search for Assured Retaliation." *International Security* 35(2): 48-87.

Arms Races

Charles L. Glaser, "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races." 2000. *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 251-276.

Wallace, Michael D. 1979. "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23(1): 3-16.

Diehl, Paul F. and Jean Kingston. 1987. "Messenger or Message? Military Buildups and the Initiation of Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 49(4): 789-799.

Sample, Susan G. 1998. "Military Buildups, War, and Realpolitik: A Multivariate Model." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(2): 156-175.

Diehl, Paul F. and Mark J. C. Crescenzi. 1998. "Reconfiguring the Arms Race-War Debate." *Journal of Peace Research* 35(1): 111-118.

Gibler, Douglas M., Toby J. Rider, and Marc L. Hutchison. 2005. "Taking Arms against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races during Periods of Rivalry." *Journal of Peace Research* 42(2): 131-147.

Week 6, February 23rd: Deterrence, Crisis Bargaining, and Reciprocity

Deterrence & Crisis Bargaining

Schelling, Thomas C. 1981 (1960). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapters 1-3, 5

Achen, Christopher and Duncan Snidal. 1989. "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies." *World Politics* 41: 143-169.

George, Alexander and Richard Smoke. 1989. "Deterrence and Foreign Policy." *World Politics* 41: 170-182.

Huth, Paul and Bruce Russett. 1993. "General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models." *American Political Science Review* 87(1): 61-73.

- Danilovic, Vesna. 2001. "Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(1): 97-125.
- Signorino, Curtis and Ahmer Tarar. 2006. "A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 585-605.
- Fearon, James D. 1994. "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(2): 236-269.
- Sartori, Anne E. 2002. "The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes." *International Organization* 56(1): 121-149.

Reciprocity

- Leng, Russell J. 1983. "When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27(3): 379-419.
- Goldstein, Joshua S. and John R. Freeman. 1991. "U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations: Routine, Reciprocity, or Rational Expectations?" *American Political Science Review* 85(1): 17-35.

Week 7, March 2nd: Expected Utility and the Bargaining Model of War

Expected Utility

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. *The War Trap*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapters 1-3, 5
- Bennett, D. Scott and Allan Stam. 2000. "A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War." *International Studies Quarterly* 44(3): 451-480.
- McDermott, Rose and Jacek Kugler. 2001. "Comparing Rational Choice and Prospect Theory Analyses: The US Decision to Launch Operation 'Desert Storm, January 1991.'" *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 24(3): 49-85.

Bargaining Model of War

- Note: if you have not already read Fearon's "Rationalist Explanations for War" (1995), you should.
- Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell. Chapter 3.
- Reiter, Dan. 2003. "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War." *Perspectives on Politics* 1: 27-43.
- Powell, Robert. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization* 60(1): 169-203.
- Branislav L Slantchev. 2003. "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States." *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 107-121.
- Reed, William, David H. Clark, Timothy Nordstrom, and Wonjae Hwang. 2008. "War, Power, and Bargaining." *Journal of Politics* 70(4): 1203-1216.

Week 8, March 9th: Steps to War: Territory, Contiguity, & Contentious Issues

Contiguity

- Vasquez, John A. 1995. "Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality." *Journal of Peace Research* 32(3): 277-293.
- Toset, Hans Petter Wollebaek, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Haavard Hegre. 2000. "Shared Rivers and Interstate Conflict." *Political Geography* 19(8): 971-996.
- Starr, Harvey and G. Dale Thomas. 2005. "The Nature of Borders and International Conflict: Revisiting Hypotheses on Territory." *International Studies Quarterly* 49(1): 123-140.
- Reed, William and Daina Chiba. 2009. "Decomposing the Relationship between Contiguity and Militarized Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1): 61-73.

Territoriality

- Vasquez, John A. 2009. *The War Puzzle Revisited*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 4 & 10.
- Senese, Paul D. and John A. Vasquez. 2003. "A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 47(2): 275-298.
- Carter, David B. 2010. "The Strategy of Territorial Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(4): 969-987.
- Simmons, Beth A. 2005. "Rules over Real Estate: Trade, Territorial Conflict, and International Borders as Institution." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(6): 823-848.

Contentious Issues

- Hensel, Paul R., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Thomas E. Sowers II, and Clayton L. Thyne. 2008. "Bones of Contention: Comparing Territorial, Maritime, and River Issues." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(1): 117-143.
- Huth, Paul K. and Todd L. Allee. 2002. "Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(6): 754-790.

Week 9, March 16th: No Class, Spring Break

Week 10, March 23rd: Steps to War: Alliances

Alliance Formation

- Morrow, James D. 1991. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science* 35(4): 904-933.
- Lai, Brian and Dan Reiter. 2000. "Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816-1992." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(2): 203-227.
- Gibler, Douglas M. 2008. "The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(3): 426-454.

Alliance Reliability & Deterrence

- Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(3): 427-439.
- Gibler, Douglas M. and John A. Vasquez. 1998. "Uncovering the Dangerous Alliances, 1495-1980." *International Studies Quarterly* 42(4): 785-807.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley, Andrew G. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2000. "Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(5): 686-699.
- Vasquez, John A. 2009. *The War Puzzle Revisited*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 5 & 11.
- Powers, Kathy L. 2006. "Dispute Initiation and Alliance Obligations in Regional Economic Institutions." *Journal of Peace Research* 43(4): 453-471.
- Mattes, Michaela and Greg Vonnahme. 2010. "Contracting for Peace: Do Nonaggression Pacts Reduce Conflict?" *Journal of Politics* 72(4): 925-938.

Alliance Duration

- Bennett, D. Scott. 1997. "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984." *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(3): 846-878.

Week 11, March 30th: Regime Type and War

- *Kant, Immanuel. 1991 [1795]. "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in Hans Reiss (ed.), *Kant Political Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rummel, R. J. 1985. "Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29(3): 419-455.
- Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett. 1993. "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 87(3): 624-638.
- Dixon, William J. 1994. "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 88(1): 14-32.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999. "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War." *International Organization* 53(2): 233-266.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. 2002. "A Kantian System? Democracy and Third Party Conflict Resolution." *American Journal of Political Science*, October, 46(4): 749-759.
- Boehmer, Charles. 2008. "A Reassessment of Democratic Pacifism at the Monadic Level of Analysis." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25(1): 81-94.
- Danilovic, Vesna and Joseph Clare. 2007. "The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited)." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2): 397-414.

- Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder. 2002. "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War." *International Organization* 56(2): 297-337.
- Peceny, Mark, Caroline C. Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry. 2002. "Dictatorial Peace?" *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 15-26.
- Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory." 97(4): 585-602.
- Caprioli, Mary and Peter F. Trumbore. 2005. "Identifying 'Rogue States' and Testing Their Conflict Behavior." *European Journal of International Relations* 9(3): 377-406.

Week 12, April 13th: Economics, International Organizations, and War/Peace

Economics

- Oneal, John R., Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce M. Russett. 1996. "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-1985." *Journal of Peace Research*, 33(1): 11-28.
- Barbieri, Katherine. 1996. "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research* 33(1): 29-49.
- Morrow, James D. 1999. "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research* 36(4): 481-489.
- Gartzke, Erik, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer. 2001. "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict." *International Organization* 55(2): 391-437.
- Crescenzi, Mark J.C. 2003. "Economic Exit, Interdependence, and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis." *Journal of Politics* 65(3): 809-832.
- Maoz, Zeev. 2009. "The Effect of Strategic and Economic Interdependence on International Conflict Across Levels of Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(1): 223-240.
- Lektzian, David J. and Christopher M. Sprecher. 2007. "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2): 415-431.
- Hegre, Havard. 2009. "Trade Dependence or Size Dependence? The Gravity Model of Trade and the Liberal Peace." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(1): 26-45.

International Organizations

- Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, Timothy Nordsrom. 2004. "Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?" *World Politics* 57(1): 1-38.
- Shannon, Megan, Daniel Morey, and Frederick J. Boehmke. 2010. "The Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Dispute Initiation and Duration." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(4): 1123-1141.
- Fausett, Elizabeth and Thomas J. Volgy. 2010. "Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and Interstate Conflict: Parsing Out IGO Effects for Alternative Dimensions of Conflict in Postcommunist Space." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1): 79-101.

Week 13, April 6th: Diversionary Theories/Inside the State

Theoretical Foundations

- Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell. Chapters 4-6.
- Ostrom, Charles W. Jr. and Brian L. Job. 1986. "The President and the Political Use of Force." *American Political Science Review* 80(2): 541-566.
- Enterline, Andrew J. and Kristian S. Gleditsch. 2000. "Threats, Opportunity, and Force: Repression and Diversion of Domestic Pressure, 1948-1982." *International Interactions* 26(1): 21-53.
- Tarar Ahmer. 2006. "Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War." *International Studies Quarterly* 50(1): 169-188.

Empirical Assessments

- Meernik, James and Peter Waterman. 1996. "The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents." *Political Research Quarterly* 49(3): 573-590.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley and David R. Davis. 1997. "Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(6): 814-834.
- Foster, Dennis M. 2006. "State Power, Linkage Mechanisms, and Diversion Against Nonrivals." *Conflict*

Management and Peace Science 23(1): 1-21.

- Arena, Philip and Glenn Palmer. 2009. "Politics or the Economy? Domestic Correlates of Dispute Involvement in Developed Democracies." *International Studies Quarterly* 53(4): 955-975.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Clayton L. Thyne. 2010. "Contentious Issues as Opportunities for Diversionary Behavior." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 27(5): 461-485.

Week 14, April 20th: Rivalry and Conflict Dynamics

Rivalry Measures

- Klein, James P., Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl. 2006. "The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns." *Journal of Peace Research* 43(3): 331-348.
- Thompson, William R. 1995. "Principal Rivalries." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39(2): 195-223.
- *Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Cameron G. Thies. Forthcoming. "Issue Rivalries." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*.

Rivalry Theories & Empirical Tests

- *Diehl, Paul F. and Gary Goertz. 2000. *War and Peace in International Rivalry*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Chapters 1-4, 8)
- Colaresi, Michael P. and William R. Thompson. 2002. "Hot Spots or Hot Hands? Serial Crisis Behavior, Escalating Risks, and Rivalry." *Journal of Politics* 64(4): 1175-1198.
- Senese, Paul D. and Stephen L. Quackenbush. 2003. "Sowing the Seeds of Conflict: The Effect of Dispute Settlements on Durations of Peace." *Journal of Politics* 65(3): 696-717.
- Goertz, Gary, Bradford Jones, and Paul F. Diehl. 2005. "Maintenance Processes in International Rivalries." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(5): 742-769.
- Rasler, Karen and William R. Thompson. 2006. "Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and Conflict Escalation." *International Studies Quarterly* 50(1): 145-167.
- Dreyer, David R. 2010. Issue Conflict Accumulation and the Dynamics of Strategic Rivalry." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(3): 779-795.
- Lektzian, David, Brandon C. Prins, and Mark Souva. 2010. "Territory, River, and Maritime Claims in the Western Hemisphere: Regime Type, Rivalry, and MIDs from 1901-2000." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(4): 1073-1098.

Week 15, April 27th: Expansion, Outcomes, and Consequences of War I

Expansion/Contagion

- *Midlarsky, Manus I, ed. 1989. *Handbook of War Studies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Pages 111-139 (Chapter 5, Most, Starr, and Siverson)
- Gartner, Scott Sigmund and Randolph M. Siverson. 1996. "War Expansion and War Outcome." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40(1): 4-15.
- Vasquez, John A. *The War Puzzle Revisited*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 7.

War Outcomes

- Reiter, Dan and Allan C. Stam III. 1998. "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory." *American Political Science Review* 92(2): 377-389.
- Reed, William and David H. Clark. 2000. "War Initiation and War Winners: The Consequences of Linking Theories of Democratic War Success." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(3): 378-395.
- Filson, Darren and Suzanne Werner. 2002. "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 819-838.
- Downes, Alexander B. 2009. "How Smart and Tough are Democracies? Reassessing Democratic Theories of Victory in War." *International Security* 33(4): 9-51.
- Sullivan, Patricia L. 2007. "War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(3): 496-524.

Consequences

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Randolph M. Siverson. 1995. "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability." *American Political Science*

Review 89:841-853.

Werner, Suzanne. 1999. "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(3): 912-934.

Chiozza, Giacomo and H.E. Goemans. 2004. "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still *Ex Post* Efficient?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 604-619.

Week 16, May 4th: Expansion, Outcomes, and Consequences of War II

Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Reiter, Dan. 2009. *How Wars End*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-6, 9-10.

**University of Iowa, Political Science Department, Professor Cameron Thies, Chair, 341 Schaeffer Hall,
335-2358, Spring 2011**

STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES: Website: <http://www.uiowa.edu/~sds/>

Instructors will make reasonable accommodations for students with physical, mental or learning disabilities. Students with disabilities which may require some modification of seating, testing, or other class requirements are to inform the instructor (after class or during the instructor's office hours) so that appropriate arrangements may be made. It is the student's responsibility to contact Student Disability Services, 133 Burge Hall (335-1462) and obtain a Student Academic Accommodation Request form (SAAR). The form will specify what course accommodations are judged reasonable for that student. An instructor who cannot provide the accommodations specified, or has concerns about the accommodations, must contact the Student Disability Services counselor who signed the request form within 48 hours of receiving the form from the student.

DEPARTMENTAL/COLLEGIATE COMPLAINT PROCEDURES: Website: <http://www.clas.uiowa.edu/>

(See "For Students") A student who has a complaint against any member of the college's teaching staff is responsible for following the procedures described in the Student Academic Handbook, which is available on the web site of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences: <http://www.clas.uiowa.edu/students/handbook/>. The student should attempt to resolve the issue with the faculty member or teaching assistant involved. Lacking a satisfactory outcome, the student can turn to the department chair, whose name is listed above along with contact information. (If the complaint concerns a teaching assistant, the student should contact the supervising faculty member first.) If a satisfactory outcome still is not obtained, the student can turn to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences. Complaints may concern inappropriate faculty conduct (including inappropriate course materials), incompetence in oral communication, inequities in assignments, scheduling of examinations at other than authorized and published times, failure to provide disability accommodations, or grading grievances. In complaints involving the assignment of grades, it is college policy that grades cannot be changed without the permission of the department concerned.

PLAGIARISM AND CHEATING: See Academic Fraud at <http://www.clas.uiowa.edu/students/handbook/> for the complete policy. You are expected to be honest and honorable in your fulfillment of assignments and in test-taking situations. Plagiarism and cheating are serious forms of academic misconduct. Examples of them are given in the Student Academic Handbook: <http://www.clas.uiowa.edu/students/handbook/>. The Department of Political Science works with individual instructors to detect plagiarism and cheating and to ensure that appropriately serious punishments are applied. An instructor who suspects a student of plagiarism or cheating must inform the student (preferably in writing) as soon as possible after the incident has been observed or discovered. Instructors who detect cheating or plagiarism may decide, in consultation with the departmental executive officer, to reduce the student's grade on the assignment or the course, even to assign an F. The instructor writes an account of the chronology of the plagiarism or cheating incident for the departmental executive officer who sends an endorsement of the written report of the case to Associate Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences. A copy of the report will be sent to the student.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT: You should familiarize yourself with the following web site link from the College of Liberal Arts: <http://www.uiowa.edu/~eod/policies/sexual-harassment-guide/>

YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES: Your responsibilities to this class-and to your education as a whole-include attendance and participation. This syllabus details specific expectations the instructor may have about attendance and participation. You have a responsibility to help create a classroom environment where all may learn. At the most basic level, this means you will respect the other members of the class and the instructor and treat them with the courtesy you hope to receive in return.

ENROLLED COURSES OUTSIDE YOUR COLLEGE: Taking a course outside the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences means that class policies on matters such as requirements, grading, and sanctions for academic dishonesty are governed by the College where the course resides. Students wishing to add or drop this course after the official deadline must receive the approval of the Dean of that College. Details of the University policy of cross enrollments may be found at: <http://provost.uiowa.edu/ucoll/students/registration.htm#cross>. Deadlines: See Registrar's Office web site: <http://www.registrar.uiowa.edu/>

PLUS-MINUS GRADING: All the department's instructors can append plus or minus grades to the letter grades they assign for the course. If the instructor does not specifically indicate in the syllabus that he or she will not assign plusses or minuses, students should assume that this form of grading will be used.

HOMEWORK EXPECTATION: For each semester hour of credit that a Political Science course carries, students should expect to spend approximately two hours per week outside of class preparing for class sessions. That is, in a three-credit-hour course, instructors design course assignments on the assumption that students will spend six hours per week in out-of-class preparation.

REACTING SAFELY TO SEVERE WEATHER: The University of Iowa Operations Manual section 16.14 outlines appropriate responses to a tornado (1) or to a similar crisis. If a tornado or other severe weather is indicated by the UI outdoor warning system, members of the class should seek shelter in rooms and corridors in the innermost part of a building at the lowest level, staying clear of windows, or large free-standing expanses such as auditoriums and cafeterias. The class will resume, if possible, after the UI outdoor warning system announces that the severe weather threat has ended. Web site: <http://www.uiowa.edu/homepage/severe-weather/>

Please visit the Political Science Department's web site: <http://www.polisci.uiowa.edu/>. It is frequently updated with new events and procedures in our department, changes in the Schedule of Courses, plus TA and faculty office hours when available. You also may find current information on pre-advising and registration. Our Vernon Van Dyke Computing Facility (Political Science ITC) is located in room 21 Schaeffer Hall. Available hours are listed at our web site and also posted outside room 21 SH.