Why the Academy Needs Female Political Scientists: Examples from International Relations

by

Valerie M. Hudson
Brigham Young University


“Hitherto institutions, laws, sciences, philosophy have chiefly borne the masculine imprint; all of these things are only half human; in order that they may become wholly so, woman must be associated in them, ostensibly and lawfully.”

Jenny D’Hericourt, 1864

“[W]ere more women to engage in science, a different science might emerge.”

Evelyn Fox Keller, 1983

Introduction

For the last quarter century, I have worked in a department with only two women out of thirty faculty members. Last year we hired the third woman in our history. We hadn’t hired a woman since 1987. This January, my department will be back to two women as I leave for another position (at an institution where a third of the faculty are women!). Along with a few other members of our department, I have consistently argued that we need more women on our faculty. I point to the fact that over half of our majors are women, yet there is only one course taught that in our department that even mentions that there are, in fact, women on the planet. I note that I am constantly having female students show up at my door, whom I have never met before, asking for advice on blending careers and family—because they know their male professors have nothing to offer them by way of advice in these matters. In other words, my arguments tended to be couched in terms of what our students needed from us, and how we were not meeting those needs.

Silly me. These types of arguments, centered as they are around students, fell on deaf ears. Most, though not all, of my colleagues agreed with Professor Sven Wilson that we should be hiring the “best minds,” regardless of whether they are male or female. After all, hiring the “best minds” is how a department increases its rankings, isn’t it? Of course, it will not come as a surprise that the “best minds” we hired all tended to look like the vast majority of my colleagues—young, white males from top-20 programs, doing whatever research is considered “cutting edge” at the moment at those institutions.
If you are sensing a bit of frustration in my authorial voice, it is by no coincidence. This paper is one that I have wanted to write for a long time. Since student curricular and mentoring needs clearly count for nothing in the calculus of most members of my department, and perhaps the larger academy, I intend to question the premise that my department is progressing intellectually through its hiring practices. This paper questions the operationalization of “best minds,” argues that there is an ontological irreducibility between the two sexes rendering notions of substitutability gravely suspect, offers examples of paradigm-shattering work in International Relations that was only possible because the authors were female, and, finally, offers some broader maxims concerning ways to strengthen the voice of women in the social sciences.

Foundational Matters

How are we to think about sexual difference? To my mind, there are essentially two possible responses, one based on what Agacinski calls “nostalgia for the one” and “the logic of the single sex,” and the other based upon the view that humanity has two irreducible faces, male and female (Agacinski, 2001).

The first strategy, which always hurts women, is that there is one form of humanity, that humanity is undivided. While this strategy has brought some gains for women, by insisting women are “people” and “individuals” in the same way that men are, the ultimate ramifications are not so progressive. If humanity is “one,” then the inescapable fact of sexual difference creates a problem. In very important and obvious ways, women are not men.

Two possibilities result. Because women are not men, women can be viewed as inherently defective in their humanity, justifying a hierarchy of men over women. As Aristotle put it, “The woman is as it were an impotent male . . . [because] the first efficient or moving cause, to which belong the definition and the form, is better and more divine in its nature than the material on which it works, it is better that the superior principle be separated from the inferior. Therefore, wherever it is possible, and so far as it is possible, the male is separated from the female.” If women are but deformed men, a hierarchy between them seems completely natural. Problem solved. Fortunately, in the Western world, we have largely moved past this approach.

Alternatively, because women are not men, we must pretend that this is not so, and that we are all but people. This view justifies the logic of the “even playing field” which is anything but even. After I received tenure, I sat down with the dean of my college and explained how the road to tenure was vastly different for mothers than for others, and how this was something that both the college and the university should begin to discuss. My dean smiled patiently, and told me that there was an even playing field for the men and women in his college because the standards for tenure were exactly the same for men and women. There have only been a few times in my life that I have been rendered completely speechless, and this was one of those times. If we are not men and women, but rather we are all “people,” then women will simply have to perform according to standards for “people,” which are always defined in terms of men. Want to be equal? Then be a man, live like a man,
perform like a man, reproduce like a man. Problem solved. To the extent that you cannot or will not do these things, too bad for you.

But there is a second strategy, and I would argue this is a much healthier approach for women. What if there is not one form of humanity, but two? What if there are no “persons”—what if there are only “males” and “females”? What if the only way to represent humankind is to represent it as a duality? For this line of reasoning, we turn again to Sylviane Agacinski’s key work, The Parity of the Sexes. Agacinski was pivotal in her advocacy for French laws ensuring the parity of candidacy within the political system. French political parties would have to put forward equal numbers of male and female candidates and interweave them 1-1 within their lists, or face punishment. (It should be noted that some have preferred to face punishment.) This call for parity was rooted within a deeper concept of the meaning of sexual difference. Because I am not a philosopher, I will quote from Agacinski to explicate this foundation more fully:

“[A]ndrocentrism obeys a metaphysical fear of division. Thought in general, and especially Western thought, experiences a nostalgia for the one . . . The one closes in on itself . . . Division, if it cannot be brought back to an originary unity, is, to the contrary, a structure that opens . . . The division of the species disturbs this demand for simplicity, and there is always the temptation to reduce the two to the one. Hence, Eve was made to derive from Adam, man alone has been thought to transmit the germ of life, or it has been assumed that there was only one sex, the phallus.” (2001: 11-12)

“Rethinking the mixity of man—and I expressly use this strange formulation—must then lead to the splitting into two of our representation of the essence of “man,” in such a way that women would no longer be a secondary being, that she might experience the pride of being what she is—woman—without having to identify herself with the male to appear as fully human. That she might finally be woman, knowing that she lacks nothing, except in that she know the universal finitude of every human being. Our finitude is revealed through the fact that we are all mortal and sexed, and not through the fact that we are women.” (17) “Neither man nor woman constitutes “the whole human” (33) because if humanity is mixed, and not single, all individuals are confronted with their own insufficiency and cannot fully claim to be full human beings . . . Such a consciousness implies the recognition of an originary division.” (39)

“Perhaps we would then discover a dissymmetry so profound that it would finally prohibit thinking of one sex as beginning from the other.” (xix) “What if sexual difference, instead of going back to the difference between two things of the same order, led us to discover that man and woman are not speaking of the same thing when they speak of the sexes? If the masculine and the feminine were not only the double form of the human but, beyond the symmetries and dissymmetries, and under the unifying category of sex, it were a question of two profoundly different human realities that, in the end, might be without exact equivalent? And moreover, isn’t it only in this way that there can be two sexes, and not just variations of one? (82) If this suspicion could be verified, that would mean that there is no shared measure
between the masculine and the feminine and that what is called sexual difference is to be considered an irreducible ontological duality, impossible to reconcile or synthesize.” (xix)

“Parity considers that the people and its representatives are sexed individuals, masculine and feminine, who, as such, should be equally in charge of the public domain. . . . [T]he will to share power between men and women can only be legitimate if we admit that sex is neither a social nor a cultural trait, nor an ethnic one, that it is not the common characteristic of some “community”—like a language, a religion, or a territory—but, rather, that it is a universal, differential trait. That is, humankind does not exist outside of this double form, masculine and feminine.” (xxxii-xxxiii)

“Conscious that we can transcend neither differences not disputes, we must now develop a way to think about universality that doesn’t lean to one side of the other but allows humanity its mixity and thus its internal alterity.” (24) “What is really universal in a logical sense—that is, what involves the totality of a whole—is not being male or being female (obviously one cannot say “all humans are female”) but, rather, the fact of being sexed: all humans are ‘either men or women.’ Taking sexual difference into account, theoretically and practically, does not mean abandoning the universal but, on the contrary, allows us to recognize the concrete and differentiated content of the universal.” (62)

I find Agacinski’s thought quite provocative, and ultimately convincing. If we accept her vision of the irreducible duality of humanity, then women are not the inferiors of men, nor do women have to become like men in order to be equal to them. Women can be women and simultaneously the equals of men. As she notes, difference is not the opposite of equality—inequality is.

Furthermore, women’s way of being is not only different than men’s, but offers an extremely valuable contribution. Calling upon what is known through women’s way of being provides all human endeavor, including academic thought, with a more fully human perspective. After all, humanity has a dual face: any human endeavor that erases one face has erased in a very profound way the full potential of that endeavor. Men cannot substitute for women, nor women for men, in fully human endeavor. Neither masculine nor feminine models of the world will suffice: we need mixed models (models constructed with our eye on mixity). As Agacinski puts it, “[G]iven equal competencies, comparable talents, it is good that we combine the differentiated experience of men and women in society and that most functions, tasks, and responsibilities are not locked up in a monosexual universe. . . . The ideal is not a confrontation between masculine and feminine claims but the shared recognition of the value of mixity.” (2001: 150-151) We should not hierarchize sexual difference, we should not neutralize sexual difference: rather, we should value sexual difference and all that it offers our human endeavors.
Engendered Social Science

It is much less controversial than it once was to state that science has been for the most part gendered male. This statement suggests far more than the assertion that for most of the history of science, and later, social science, scientists have been predominantly male. It also suggests far more than that these male scientists took a dim view of women and their capabilities. Darwin, for example, believed that characteristics acquired in adulthood were transmitted only to offspring of the same sex. “He also noted that it was very fortunate for females that most inherited characteristics are transmitted equally to offspring of both sexes, as ‘otherwise it is probable that man would have become as superior in mental endowment to woman, as the peacock is in ornamental plumage to the peahen.’” (Shields, 1987: 190)

No, in addition to these obvious exhibits of how science is gendered male, the processes and products of science are also deeply contaminated with masculine bias. The very questions we ask, the assumptions and concepts we use, the methods we deem most “rigorous,” the stance we take towards that which we study, the motivations behind knowledge-seeking, and perhaps even the very nature of our reasoning bear the mark of masculinism.

Feminist scholars addressing these issues point to a laundry list of culturally masculinist traits that tend to characterize scientific inquiry (see, for example, the two superb edited volumes, Harding and Hintikka, 1983 and Harding and O’Barr, 1987):

- A Cartesian detachment of subject and object, even when the object of study is other human beings. Furthermore, this Cartesian self is, as Jane Flax puts it, “completely self-constituting and self-sustaining. The self is created and maintained by thought. This view of the self entails a denial of the body and any interaction between body and self. Social relations are not necessary for the development of the self . . . It appears to come into the world while and complete” (1983: 259). Evelyn Fox Keller adds, “Masculine . . . connotes, as it so often does, autonomy, separation, and distance. It connotes a radical rejection of any commingling of subject and object, which are, it now appears, quite consistently identified as male and female” (1983: 191).

- Motivations for acquiring knowledge that include control over that which is studied, perhaps eliding into domination over that which is studied.

- Assumptions that accord more readily with cultural masculinity, such as ubiquitous competition instead of ubiquitous cooperation, scarcity instead of bounty, zero-sumness instead of non-zero-sumness.

- A veneer of value neutrality masking deeply masculinist values that, among other things, do not esteem life-sustaining work. These values “invisibilize” phenomena, providing a false sense of theoretical sight; such invisibilizing is
reinforced by the hierarchizing of public (male) versus private (female). As Naomi Scheman puts it, “There is every reason to react with alarm to the prospect of a world filled with self-actualizing persons pulling their own strings, capable of gutlessly saying “no” to anyone about anything, and freely choosing when to begin and end all their relationships. It is hard to see how, in such a world, children could be raised, the sick or disturbed could be cared for, or people could know each other through their lives and grow old together . . . [M]en have been free to imagine themselves as self-defining only because women have held the intimate social world together” (1983: 240).

More fundamentally, Marcil-Lacoste notes, “[V]alues are involved in the very choice among alternative theories, a normative act implying a conscious selection of a certain way of understanding and interpreting the world” (1983: 126).

- A veneer of objectivity and non-emotion masking deeply held subjective motivations, such as fear of humiliation and emasculation, as well as motivations of prestige-seeking and resource accumulation (resources of funding, authoritative positions, etc.) Evelyn Fox Keller points out, “[A]n adherence to an objectivist epistemology, in which truth is measured by its distance from the subjective, has to be re-examined when it emerges that, by this definition, truth itself has become genderized” (1983: 198).

- A willingness to harm, oppress, or even destroy the subject in order to obtain desired knowledge or control.

- Assumptions that what is “natural” is “moral” or “right,” and that what is natural is male experience and male superiority.

- A desire to study subjects in abstracted, not embodied or concrete form, and also to study them in discrete and isolated form, rather than in relationship; the strong tendency to impose a voice of interpretation rather than emancipate the subject’s voice.

- The understanding that science progresses best by the adversarial approach.

- Policy recommendations that tend to focus on how control may be maintained or increased over the subject, thus locking society into relations of control that may not be functional in the long run.

- All dualisms posited within masculinist thought become hierarchized, and those poles of duality associated with masculinity are held to be superior. There appears to be no capacity for non-hierarchizing difference, probably due to motivations of fear and humiliation, as discussed above.
• Solitariness is praiseworthy, because of an inability to achieve true cooperation with others. Relations always turn into a contest for power. (For example, why does a single-authored book count for more in academia than a co-authored book?)

It’s worth repeating at this point that knowledge about the world—useful knowledge that could, for example, send a man to the moon—can certainly be obtained through masculinist science. But it is also clear that a substantial amount of what is produced, especially that dealing with human beings and the societies they form, will be either incomplete or distorted, and a substantial amount of knowledge is just plain missing because important questions were not deemed worth asking. Policy recommendations developed upon this basis will not in the end benefit society. This paper argues that a more complete, less distorted, and larger knowledge base could be obtained if a mixed model of science were promulgated, valued, and indeed, viewed as indispensable.

But given its historically masculinist cast, should women engage in science? Yes, and for two very important reasons: truth and voice.

Evelyn Fox Keller is adamant that feminists should not relinquish science because objectivity serves emancipatory aims:

“The intellectual danger resides in viewing science as pure social product; science then dissolves into ideology and objectivity loses all intrinsic meaning. In the resulting cultural relativism, any emancipatory function of modern science is negated, and the arbitration of truth recedes into the political domain. Against this background, the temptation arises for feminists to abandon their claims for representation in scientific culture and, in its place, to invite a return to a purely “female” subjectivity, leaving rationality and objectivity in the male domain, dismissed as products of a purely male consciousness . . . By rejecting objectivity as a masculine ideal, it simultaneously lends its voice to an enemy chorus and dooms women to residing outside of the realpolitik modern culture; it exacerbates the very problem it wishes to solve. It also nullifies the radical potential of feminist criticism for our understanding of science. As I see it, the task of a feminist theoretic in science is twofold: to distinguish that which is parochial from that which is universal in the scientific impulse, reclaiming for women what has historically been denied to them; and to legitimate those elements of scientific culture that have been denied precisely because they are defined as female . . . [We need to] reconceptualize objectivity as a dialectical process so as to allow for the possibility of distinguishing the objective effort from the objectivist illusion . . . [R]ather than abandon the quintessentially human effort to understand the world in rational terms, we need to refine that effort” (1987: 237-8).

Addelson concurs:

“We can’t get along without science anymore. The corrective seems rather to ferret out all the irrationalities we can find in scientific activity and to expand our understanding of what science and scientific rationality are . . .
We should institutionalize this sort of criticism and make it an explicit part of “scientific method . . . Because they have cognitive authority, our scientists already are politicized. It is the unexamined exercise of cognitive authority within our present social arrangements which is most to be feared.” (1983: 182)

If we think of science as a method for obtaining knowledge and a language for communicating that knowledge, then there is no reason for science to be incapable of being compatible with the demand for mixity. Men and women could, over time, together share the search for knowledge and be capable of communicating with each other about the process and the result of that search. Nevertheless, what results from a mixed scientific endeavor would not be what would have resulted if each sex had worked alone—thank goodness.

And the result would be of great advantage to the feminist agenda. Sandra Harding states,

“Feminist inquiry represents not a substitution of one gender loyalty for the other—one subjectivism for another—but the transcendence of gender which thereby increases objectivity . . . [F]eminist appeals to truth and objectivity trust that reason will play a role in the eventual triumph of feminism, that feminism correctly will be perceived as more than a power politic—though it is that, too.” (1987: 289, 292; emphasis mine)

This brings us to the second point concerning why women should not abandon science: science provides voice, authority, and influence, three things that the structural inequality between men and women in most societies tends to prevent women from achieving. As Carol Gilligan and her co-author have put it, “To cede authority to women and draw on their experience as a basis for science is to go against the grain of a patriarchal culture.” (2008: 172) If we want to diminish patriarchy not only within science but within the larger society, one important path among many is to facilitate the granting of authority to women. At the beginning, women may have to partially disguise themselves as competent, if different, devotees of a masculinist science in order to advance to the positions where their understandings may be revealed in fuller form. Women must be at the table where the councils of humanity in all fields of human endeavor—politics, business, science, religion, and so forth—meet to determine priorities, allocate resources, and establish principles. In Western societies, the voice of scientists is important in establishing the empirical foundation for policy-making—and so women must have significant representation among the ranks of scientists.

As Agacinski puts it,

“[I]t is important that both men and women practice the social sciences. Because it would be naïve to believe in the existence of a sexually neutral scientific truth, independent of the perspective of the observer. Sexual difference is one of the “objects” studied in anthropology, psychoanalysis, and elsewhere, but it also affects the “subjects” of these sciences, who are not pure, disembodied thought but, rather, concrete individuals. Anthropology, history, psychology and psychoanalysis, economics, political science,
philosophy, etc. are not the work of neuter subjects but of men and women whose points of view depend in part on their own conditions and on their own experiences as sexed beings. Their points of view, at least on certain subjects, cannot be absolutely "objective." This may be why, until today, androcentrism has characterized most theories on the family, procreation, the social and economic orders, and the unconscious. Androcentrism reigns in philosophy as well. This is why, since it is impossible to escape our condition or the differential structures it generates, we must accept the always "political" dimension of these sciences, acknowledge this unconscious politics of the sexes, and avoid granting the masculine perspective a monopoly on the interpretation of all things human. Which means that women must actively contribute to the theoretical work in these fields, which they do remarkably well today, with no a priori, and without, of course, enclosing themselves within a militant bias. This is not the goal of knowledge. The shift in perspective should be achieved with the greatest integrity and by seeking to acknowledge sexual difference—in other words, by considering the duality of most human facts." (2001: 150)

What I’d like to turn to now are three examples from the field of International Relations where the fact that a woman was doing the research made all the difference in the world. I present these three examples as part of my claim that we can never have the benefits of a mixed science unless and until we hire women to become a significant proportion of our department faculties—not because of reasons considered “light” (i.e., diversity), but because we do poorer science when the scientific endeavor is not mixed. Our ability to excel intellectually as departments (an appeal to prestige-seeking motivations here, yes) is severely diminished to the extent that we do not understand that the “best minds” come in two irreducible forms, male and female. Given that science has traditionally been gendered male, it is predictable that we will continue to see the “best mind” among a field of candidates as a male mind. It is only when we consider that a department of political science will be intellectually inferior to the extent that there is not adequate representation of the best minds not gendered male that perhaps we can create enough emotional motivation to take the hiring of women as a heavy, not a light, matter. We can hope. After all, the first female Nobel Prize winner in Economics is actually a political scientist . . .

Corrective Lenses

Sandra Harding has written, “When we begin inquiring with women’s experiences instead of men’s, we quickly encounter phenomena (such as emotional labor or the positive aspects of “relational” personality structures) that were made invisible by the concepts and categories of theories [made by men] . . . Feminist inquiry represents not a substitution of one gender loyalty for the other—one subjectivism for another—but the transcendence of gender which thereby increases objectivity.” (1987: 284, 289) I’d like to show this process in action in the field of International Relations. What you see with each example is a two-step process:
first, a female says, “Hey, how come no one is seeing X? After all, X seems like a pretty important thing to be overlooking.” The field then starts seeing X a bit more. The second step comes when scholars (again, usually female), say “Gee, if we incorporate X, that means we’re going to have to go back to the beginning and ask whether our assumptions, concepts, methods—and even our research questions—still make any sense or not.” And those developments, dear readers, are the faint stirrings of a real human social science . . . Let’s see those stirrings in IR.

1) IR Theory

There are so many fine works by feminist scholars critiquing Western political theory that it almost seems a bit derivative to speak more specifically about IR Theory (see, for example, Okin, 1979, Hartsock, 1983, Elshtain, 1988, etc.) Nevertheless, I would contend that IR Theory pretty much dodged all of this work, continuing in its bliss of ignorance concerning the feminist critique of broader political theory. One could see this as leading to a case of arrested development in IR, theoretically speaking.

Until, that is, the late 1980s and early 1990s. During this period, several female scholars began a robust campaign to deconstruct mainstream IR theories such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism. While we could speak of any of several pathbreaking scholars, such as Christine Sylvester, Cynthia Enloe, Spike Peterson (and I would also include Sara Ruddick), the work of J. Ann Tickner will be highlighted for the purposes of this paper. Her 1992 book, *Gender in International Relations*, was a broadside against an IR Theory that had grown positively perverse during the Cold War era. This were the years of maxims such as “we must destroy this village to save it,” and “security is the sturdy child of terror,” and “only mutual assured destruction can make us safe.” Only a toxic masculinist approach to international affairs could make these “principles” sound sensible. To the rest of us, these are not life-affirming, but exterminatory exhortations. Tickner asserts, “the discipline of international relations, as it is presently constructed, is defined in terms of everything that is not female . . . The absence of women from the study of international relations has been so complete that the masculine orientation goes unnoticed by most scholars and students” (1992: 130, 144)

Of course, we could trace some of the bizarreness back to liberal conceptions of the social contract, particularly in the work of such philosophers as Hobbes and Rousseau. As Tickner notes, “[T]he introduction of women into our state-of-nature myths could change the way we think about the behavior of states in the international system. The use of the Hobbesian analogy in international relations theory is based on a partial view of human nature that is stereotypically masculine; a more inclusive perspective would see human nature as both conflictual and cooperative, containing elements of social reproduction and interdependence as well as domination and separation.” (1992: 63)

Jane Flax elaborates:

“Philosophy reflects the fundamental division of the world according to gender and a fear and devaluation of women characteristic of patriarchal attitudes . . . In Hobbes, the work that only women do (childrearing) and the qualities it demands—relatedness, sociability, nurturance, concern for
others—are not seen as part of human nature of the human condition. . . . Rousseau den[ies] any sort of primary relatedness, [and] establishes the Republic out of an impersonal, depersonalized interdependency (the social contract). The citizens are free precisely because they are not dependent on any person.” (1983: 267)

Rousseau’s natural man is “alone, idle, and always near danger.” He also has an intense fear of dependency. For Hobbes, Flax notes, “[h]umans are said to be motivated only by passion, especially far and the wish to have no impediments to the gratification of desire, which is insatiable and asocial . . . In other words, without infantile omnipotence once cannot be certain that one will continue . . . The state of nature seems to be primarily populated by adult, single males whose behavior is taken as constitutive of human nature and experience as a whole. . . . For both Hobbes and Rousseau, any social interaction inevitably leads to power struggles which ultimately result in either domination or submission . . . Aggression and separateness are viewed as innate in humans rather than as problems with social roots.” (1983: 267, 261).

IR Theory based on such state of nature myths, such as Kenneth Waltz’s Stag Hunt analogy, is clearly gendered. Scarcity, struggle, competition, fear, and threat rule the day—or are they a self-fulfilling illusion? Tickner states, “[A]utonomy and separation, importantly associated with the meaning of sovereignty, have determined our conception of the national interest . . . Feminist perspectives would assume that striving for attachment is also part of human nature.” (1992: 64)

Furthermore, other questions deserve to be asked. Might, in fact, nature be bounteous and not penurious? (Gross and Averill, 1983) Might other humans actually be the greatest joy of life? Might cooperation spring fairly effortlessly from this alternative view of others?

Tickner also has harsh words for the assumption of an instrumentalist conception of rationality that has underpinned game theoretic models of international conflict and cooperation, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Maximization of self-interest may be one definition of rationality, but it is by no means the only one used on earth. Indeed, the more we think about it, says Tickner, the more that the mainstream concept of rationality used in IR Theory appears . . . irrational:

“Feminists argue that, since it is men who have primarily occupied the public sphere, rationality as we understand it is tied to a masculine type of reasoning that is abstract and conceptual. Many women, whose lived experiences have been more closely bound to the private sphere of caregiving and child rearing, would define rationality as contextual and personal rather than as abstract. In their caregiving roles women are engaged in activities associated with serving others, activities that are rational from the perspective of reproduction rather than production. A feminist redefinition of rationality might therefore include an ethic of care and responsibility” (1992: 91).
Interest in the "survival and security of future generations" (1992: 92) would be a defining characteristic of rationality, according to Tickner. Thus, many short-term profit maximization strategies are, by definition, irrational: "feminist perspectives should place the production of life as the main goal of human activity and work." (93) To ignore reproductive work, subsistence labor, and caregiving is to ignore our own humanity. We should be striving to produce life, not striving to produce things or wealth that diminish our ability to produce life.

Once we see how gendered our ideas of security, power, national interest, rationality, etc. are, we can then begin to question what we mean by these terms, which is Tickner's second step. She suggests that a more useful concept of power is not one meaning "power over," but one that includes, perhaps even privileges, "power with." (65) Tickner then moves to the term "security," suggesting that a nation-state is not secure—even if it possesses thousands of nuclear weapons—if its women dare not walk home alone at night, or a quarter of its children suffer from food insecurity, as is the situation in the United States today. Security has to mean "the absence of violence whether it be military, economic, or sexual." (66) Thus, for Tickner, one of the key ingredients for world peace is not military invulnerability, but rather social justice, including gender equality: "the achievement of peace, economic justice, and ecological sustainability is inseparable from overcoming social relations of domination and subordination; genuine security requires not only the absence of war but also the elimination of unjust social relations, including unequal gender relations." (128)

Finally, Tickner notes the emancipation this feminist reformulation of IR theory offers: the straitjacket of neo-realism—or, as one of its foremost proponents terms it, "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics"—is actually a lie. The news isn't bad—the news is good: "[this approach] allows us to explain the international behavior of states, not as realists have portrayed it in terms of timeless practices that can be expected to repeat themselves indefinitely into the future, but as behavior constructed out of the value system of the modern West. This historical construction allows us to envisage possibilities for transcending the present system in ways that could offer more secure futures." (136) Thankfully for IR, reading Tickner is like taking the first step into a larger, more justifiably hopeful world.

2) IPE (International Political Economy)

Again, there are so many fine works in International Political Economy that my task can only be to point to the worldview-shattering work of pioneer female social scientists in that subfield. The choice here is very easy: Ester Boserup's 1970 volume, Woman's Role in Economic Development is that work.

It is almost impossible now to consider the field of international development without considering the role of women as subsistence providers, agricultural laborers, reproductive workers, major actors in the informal sector, and even as low-wage labor in the large multinational manufacturing plants. But yes, there was a time when women were invisible in discussions of economic development.
Development in those perverse old days consisted primarily of large scale
public works, such as the construction of the Aswan High Dam, or in providing
modern agricultural techniques and products to male heads of rural households, or
in encouraging male employment in enterprises funded by foreign direct
investment. Because the development sector was run by privileged European and
American males, that women had any important economic role to play in less-
developed economies did not occur to them, any more than the contributions of
their own mothers, wives, and daughters would have been visible to them at home.

Even within less-developed economies, men viewed the labors of their wives
as “natural,” and therefore not “work,” because women’s labors were simply
emanations of who women were. Emanations of one’s being, apparently, are
effortless in character.

Boserup, a Danish development expert (and economist by training), argued
in this densely empirical book that the very nature of agricultural production
depended upon women’s roles. She identified a particular brand of female-
dominated agriculture, epitomized by systems in sub-Saharan Africa, where
population density determines degree of male involvement, which in turn
determines yield. In areas where population density is low, women will do virtually
all of the subsistence agriculture.

This has ramifications for food security. European development planners
imperiled food security in sub-Saharan Africa by ignoring the fact that women were
doing the vast majority of food crop production. In moving property rights towards
a European model, women farmers were stripped of rights to land which they had
held in former times; the maxim, “the land belongs to the man; the crops to the
women,” meant that men could rent land out—or sell it—against the wishes of the
women who actually produced food from it to feed their children.

This also meant that the European myopia concerning whom should be
receiving agricultural training—the Europeans directed such training towards the
male “head of household”—meant that this training was, by and large, wasted. The
shift towards cash cropping, strongly encouraged by Western development
planners, over-extended the women while providing them little in the way of
benefit—the “cash” from the cash crops went to the men, who were far less likely to
use the money for food or for investment in the children.

She also identified how in many less-developed countries, the informal
marketplace was a far more important economic arena than the formal market, and
that in many such countries, it was women traders that provided the
entrepreneurial spirit and effort to dominate informal market activities. Again,
given the system of national accounts used by development planners after World
War II—created by men who did not “see” women’s labor (Waring, 1988) because it
did not take place in the formal economy and was not paid—the informal
marketplace was often not integrated into development plans. That the result was
much less in the way of economic development than planners predicted is utterly
unsurprising.

Marilyn Waring and others took up the baton to ask what “development”
actually meant, since it appeared to mean that men became even more dominant
economic actors, and basic parameters such as food security and life expectancy for
women and the children they maintain decreased as a result of development programs. I am a big fan of this research agenda, and books by Nancy Folbre, Shirley Burrgraf, Joan Williams, and others fill my shelves. But it was Boserup that first helped us to see how impoverished, incomplete, and even perverse major tenets of International Political Economy were, and for that, IPE should be grateful.

3) Security Studies

In this section, I’m going to highlight my own work and the work of one of my co-authors, Mary Caprioli. I feel reluctant to do so, because it seems to be placing our work on a par with that of Ester Boserup and Ann Tickner, when I honestly don’t feel that is justified. Nevertheless, since I am excited about the work we are doing in Security Studies, I do want to share it with you as another example of work that does the two step of “seeing what has been invisible,” and then “re-asking the foundational questions.”

Our work is as densely empirical as Boserup’s, because what we have discovered is that the lingua franca of male-dominated academic fields is expressed in terms of empirical findings. In modern-day IR, that also connotes the ability to demonstrate these findings in aggregate testing. This has been a bit of a stumbling block for feminist IR scholars, a significant number of whom feel that mathematical/statistical methods are anti-feminist—stripping human beings down to their attributes and imposing an interpretation upon subjects who have their own voice; a voice which should be respected. Mary and I and others have always felt that there is room for both types of analysis, and that if the aim is emancipatory, the result can credibly be called feminist. After all, how can you help someone see something that has been invisible to them using methods that are invisible to them, too? I think you have to start somewhere . . . you must meet in translation, despite the risks.

Mary Caprioli started by asking some questions that had not been asked before, using solidly mainstream statistical methods. Her work relates measures of domestic gender inequality to state-level variables concerning conflict and security, with statistically significant results. Caprioli shows that states with higher levels of social, economic, and political gender equality are less likely to rely on military force to settle disputes (2000) Caprioli and Mark Boyer show that states exhibiting high levels of gender equality also exhibit lower levels of violence in international crises and disputes (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001). Examining aggregate data over a fifty-year period (1954–94), they found a statistically significant relationship between level of violence in crisis and the percentage of female leaders. Caprioli extends this analysis to militarized interstate disputes, and finds a similar relationship: states with the highest levels of gender equality display lower levels of aggression in these disputes, and were less likely to use force first (Caprioli, 2003).iii Virtually the same pattern was found with respect to intrastate incidents of conflict (Caprioli, 2005). Caprioli and Peter Trumbore find that states characterized by norms of gender and ethnic inequality as well as human rights abuses are more likely to become involved in militarized interstate disputes and in violent interstate disputes, to be the aggressors during international disputes, and to rely on force when involved in an
international dispute (Caprioli and Trumbore, 2003a, 2003b, 2006). David Sobek and co-authors confirm Caprioli and Trumbore’s findings that domestic norms centered on equality and respect for human rights reduce international conflict (Sobek et al., 2006). In sum, this body of work demonstrates that the promotion of gender equality goes far beyond the issue of social justice and has important consequences for international security.

What still astounds me to this day is that no one had ever asked these questions before, nor answered them using conventional, mainstream methods. To her everlasting credit, Mary Caprioli did.

The work I co-authored with Andrea Den Boer called *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population*, was the first foray I had ever made into using a feminist perspective within Security Studies (Hudson and Den Boer, 2004). The argument was that a gendercide against women in Asia, primarily the result of sex-selective abortion, had not been seen for the grave national security threat that it represented. It still boggles my mind that the disappearance of over 150 million women from one continent in just the space of one generation was not being viewed, prima facie, as a matter of national interest. But it wasn’t. We actually had to assert that proposition and defend it empirically—and it was controversial. However, while this work was primarily qualitative process-tracing, it did have an influence, especially with the Chinese government, which began to address their nation’s abnormal sex ratios more vigorously in keeping with the notion that a real threat to national security was developing. Of course, as a first step to helping others (primarily masculine others) see this, we had to define the threat not in terms of the loss of these women per se, but rather in terms of what effect the loss of these women had on men. I still shake my head that this is what we had to do, but those were the constraints on the concept of “national interest” within which we had to work at the time. Well, maybe we are still working within those constraints . . .

But after completing this book, I began to think more broadly of the relationship between the security of women and the security of states, and it is at that point that I cam across Mary’s work. I cold-called her, and we determined to take this research agenda to a new level of sophistication.

Two years ago, Mary, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Chad Emmett, Rose McDermott and myself published a piece in *International Security* called “The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States” (Hudson et al, 2009). Using a N-size of 141 countries, we were able to show through polytomous logistic regression that the best predictor of a nation-state’s peacefulness is not their level of democracy, nor their level of wealth, nor whether the nation is predominantly Islamic or not. The best predictor is actually the level of violence against women within the society. Since then, various co-authors and I have broadened our efforts to show, for example, the linkage between gender subordination and suicide terrorism, the relationship between the prevalence of polygyny and the prevalence of inter- and intra-state conflict, and the association between highly inequitable family law favoring men and levels of violence against women. In other words, just as Ester Boserup made it impossible to continue talking about international development without talking about women, so, too, Mary and I and my other co-
authors hope that soon it will also be impossible to continue talking about national and international security without talking about women.

Creating a Mixed Social Science, Including Political Science and IR

I hope I have made a strong case for hiring differently than we have heretofore done in political science departments. We simply do poorer political science when it is not a mixed endeavor. Pressing questions go unasked; important phenomena go unprobed because they have been rendered “invisible;” our incomplete or distorted theories lock us into dysfunctional ways of being; our methods may cut us off from vital sources of information; we stand mute before questions linking our research to values and morality; our policy prescriptions do not produce the good that we desire for our society.

If we wish our departments to excel in the production of knowledge that is less incomplete and less distorted than what we hitherto have experienced, then we need to create a mixed scientific endeavor of political science. The only way to do that is to hire more of the best minds that are not gendered male—we need to hire more women. There should be adequate representation of both sexes within our departments of political science. (And, furthermore, all major research programmes should also have mixed lists of principal investigators, in my opinion. And women should not be brought in later as an afterthought; they must be involved in the formulation of the research question itself.)

As we all know, there are real barriers to entering the field that affect predominantly women. There are significant challenges in staying once a woman has entered. And there are tangible glass ceilings that prevent women from obtaining meaningful authority and resources in the field, both of which are needed to create real voice and influence. At minimum, three broad areas of change must be undertaken:

--affirmative action in hiring
--work/family policies for retention
--rock-solid female solidarity—implying the ability to make a big, collective stink—when women who deserve markers of authority, including resources, do not obtain them.

Because others, especially Kristen Monroe’s APSA committee, have written in more detail about these issues (Monroe et al, n.d.), I will not adumbrate those here. Rather, I’d like to turn my attention to how female scholars can help turn political science and IR research into a more fully human endeavor by “doing” it.

Some Thoughts on Moving Social Science to a More Mixed Standpoint: Research Strategies

Since being asked to write this paper, I have thought a lot about how to place IR (and social science more generally) on a more mixed foundation, and what responsibility I have as a female scholar in IR to make this happen. What follows are
merely some personal reflections. If any of these strike a chord, so much the better. And if they don’t, no worries.

   a) First, I have come to the conclusion that while deconstructive and postmodernist approaches are very insightful and a useful source of “seeing,” ultimately one can’t become so relativist that one cannot critique misogyny anymore. As Sandra Harding has said, “The feminist standpoint must be analytically impartial and epistemically non-relativist” (1983: 321). The feminist must retain the ability to make judgments about women’s exclusion and devaluation.

   b) Second, pace my departmental colleagues, the real action at the department level is with the students. Active, engaged mentoring of both undergraduates and graduates, including mentoring in the value of mixed human endeavor, is crucially important. Students are not the least important members of a department; they are the most important. One day they will populate the faculties of political science and international relations.

   c) Next, at the beginning of mixed social science, some of the most important work we can do as women scholars is the “two step”: asking why certain things are invisible, and asking what would happen to our constructs if they were visible. That means that once past tenure, the best contributions we as females could be making are not in normal science but in thinking outside of an important mainstream box. While we are slogging through tenure, we should be developing plans for what box we’d tackle as soon as we got tenure.

   d) A real pet peeve of mine is the culture of adversarial academic encounter. My department gets into this in a big way: we have a weekly faculty research meeting, which is sometimes referred to as a “roast,” and other times is characterized as “ganging up” on someone, or “trying for the dunk tank.” After 20-odd years of this, I finally just stopped going. I couldn’t stomach it any more. It was like some kind of ritual “counting coup,” played with relish by the men in the department. I found it counterproductive, to say the least.

   I’d like us as females to find alternatives to the adversarial approach. Is it possible to explore the strengths and weaknesses of another’s work without going after it with a 2x4? And why would developing an alternative be important? Addelson asserts that the adversarial method colors our worldview, affecting the theories we build. For example, she says: “[Scientists] like in societies marked by dominance of group over group. As specialists, they compete for positions at the top of their professional hierarchies, which allow them to exercise cognitive authority more widely….. It is no wonder that our specialists continually present us with metaphysical descriptions of the world in terms of hierarchy, dominance, and competition. The wonder is that we get any development of our understanding at all” (Addelson, 1983: 181).

   Along the same lines, Janice Moulton asks: Can our aim be not to rebut, but to show people how to think for themselves? (Moulton, 1983) She continues, “It may seem that aggression is essential where there is competition, but people who just
try to do their best, without deliberately trying to do in the other guy may do equally well or even better” (1983: 151). Similarly, Gross and Averill note that “[G]oing on as efficiently as possible about one’s business, in the patriarchal mentality, does not mean doing well for its own sake but striving to excel specifically at the expense of one’s colleagues (read: competitors)” (1983: 79). Is this likely or unlikely to provide us with the best results? And since when does aggression equate to competence?

Moulton explores other negative effects of this manner of “engagement” with another’s ideas: “the adversary paradigm prevents us from seeing that systems of ideas which are not directed to an adversary may be worth studying and developing, and that adversarial reasoning may be incorrect for nonadversarial contexts” (1983: 161). And that’s not all, according to Moulton: “Philosophy, by attention to extreme positions because they are extreme, presents a distorted picture about what sorts of positions are worthy of attention, giving undo attention and publicity to positions merely because they are those of a hypothetical adversary’s and possibly ignoring positions which make more valuable or interesting claims . . . The adversary paradigm [allows] only systems of ideas that can be advocated and defended, and denying that philosophy might examine a system of ideas for its own sake, or for its connections with other systems” (158).

Indeed, we may get so caught up in maneuvers of offense and defense that we let the city we are defending fall into decay: “Some programmatic claims that were once quite popular are now in disrepute . . . not because they were disproved, perhaps more because they failed to succeed—no one ever worked out the details” (Moulton, 1983: 155). I agree with Moulton’s conclusion that, “If the [Adversary method] were merely one procedure among many for philosophers to employ, there might be nothing worth objecting to except that conditions of hostility are not likely to elicit the best reasoning. But when it dominates the methodology and evaluation of philosophy, it restricts and misrepresents what philosophic reasoning is” (153).

e) I also think female scholars can lead the way in bridging more detached and more involved methodologies. Interestingly, given the terminology used by Agacinski, this is often called the “mixed method” approach. I think we as female scholars should be as capable of running a multiple regression as doing an ethnographic field study and vice versa.

f) I think female scholars also have a special responsibility to bring the moral back in our fields of study. As noted by Tickner (above) that may mean introducing an ethic of care into our scientific method. Moulton notes, “The reasoning needed for people who care about others will be different than for people who do not care about others at all” (Moulton, 1983: 164). And Palmeri rightly states, “[T]he progress of human civilization depend[s] on our interest in the reproduction of mothering and the mothering of reproduction” (1983: 115). As female social scientists, we must favor all that is life-affirming and life-sustaining, and we must retain our respect for the other’s will. This is not to say that our efforts in this respect should let our male colleagues off the hook, but rather that since our culture may have taught our male colleagues that morality and science don’t mix, we must
be prepared to offer our work as an example of why this cultural tradition is not beneficial either to science or to the society in which science is taking place. As Flax puts it, “In philosophy, being (ontology) has been divorced from knowing (epistemology) and both have been separated from either ethics or politics. . . . [T]here is a rigid distinction between fact and value which has had the effect of consigning the philosopher to silence on issues of utmost importance to human life” (Flax, 1983: 248). This should not be; we must help dismantle those barriers.

Part of this effort will be continual reminders by female social scientists that human beings are not billiard balls, but agents. Crafting methods that allow us to see and study agency in action becomes part of the mandate, then. Critiquing methods that obscure agency likewise. This also implies that we must retain the ability to trace agency to outcomes in order to support a vision of meaningful accountability within the realm of international affairs. Not only must we be mindful of the accountability of our subjects, we must be mindful of our own accountability for the world our research helps to create.

g) Uncomfortable with the work in your field? One way of probing your discontent is to apply the work to a female context. For example, picture a group of women nursing their babies together. Will it be a “war of all against all” in that context? Will life be nasty, brutish, and short amongst those mothers? Will they resent the dependency of their babies, and only feed them if the babies agree to enter into a social contract first? Gynecentric models make great counterfactuals to uncover theorizing based on hidden androcentric models (Longino and Doell, 1987).

And don’t forget to look at language being used—discourses create rather than reveal truth. Look at how the data are described and interpreted; indeed, look what data is sought to answer a particular question. As Keller and Grontkowski note, “Underlying assumptions escape our attention by virtue of being too familiar. Unnoticed, they can form both our concepts of knowledge and the language in which those concepts are formed” (1983: 208).

h) Train conventionally, then question the limitations of those conventions from within. Take all that you can from your educational experience, even if it is unabashedly masculinist. And then, as Scheman suggests, “Women who have been allowed and trained to “think like men” are using that training to think more clearly—which means more radically—like women, that is, like people who are living real, embodied lives” (Scheman, 1983: 240). Conventional training can be a real asset precisely to the one who sees problems with it.

i) Let’s face it, the only way to do mixed science is to live mixity. That may mean changing relations within our own families and within our own departments; as Donna Haraway says (231), “As we transform the foundations of our lives, we will know how to build natural sciences to underpin new relations with the world” (1987: 231). Social sciences, as well.

This means that our best efforts will be grounded in experience. Nancy Hartsock states, “Feminist theorists must demand that feminist theorizing be grounded in women’s material activity and must as well be a part of the political
struggle necessary to develop areas of social life modeled on this activity... The experience of continuity and relation—with others, with the natural world, of mind with body—provides an ontological base for developing a non-problematic social synthesis, a social synthesis which need not operate through the denial of the body, the attack on nature, or the death struggle between the self and other” (1987: 304, 303). This means we must be wary of any attempts by men to take from us our female bodily experiences, as men have done fairly successfully with the female experience of childbirth. Our groundedness rests in good part upon our bodily, lived experiences as women. These are not to be relinquished lightly.

Grounded theory, or concrete theory, should be something that female social scientists are known for. As Nancy Hartsock has expressed, “If humans are not what they eat but what they do, [then] in any society with systematically divergent practical activities, one should expect the growth of logically divergent worldviews... Thinking is a form of human activity which cannot be treated in isolation from other forms of human activity including the forms of human activity which in turn shape the humans who think. Consequently, philosophies will inevitably bear the imprint of the social relations out of which they and their creators arose” (1987: 286, 248). Our work should bear the imprint of our lived female ground.

j) This means, then, that female social scientists would do well to bring the body back into social science. What is interesting is how much of the new work in neuropolitics, the study of emotion in decisionmaking, the study of hormones in choice, is being done by women. I think here of all the pioneering work done by scholars like Rose McDermott and Neta Crawford, among others.

k) In my opinion, female social scientists should be vigilant concerning the appearance of dualities in the theorizing of our fields. Women know where these dualities are typically headed—straight to hierarchy. If a duality is posited, we should be consistently guarding against the shift towards privileging one of the two over the other. In typical masculinist thought, “other=threat=bad=subordinate it to neutralize the threat.” If we see this little dance beginning, we must try to nip it in the bud. We must model seeing difference without hierarchizing it.

l) Female social scientists should attempt to move social science past a purely instrumentalist notion of cooperation. We who have nursed children at our breast know that other human beings are not simply means to our self-interested ends; they are ends in their own right. Instrumental rationality is simply not a description of the real world, if that world includes females. It is time to re-define rationality along lines that a mother could recognize. Scheman offers a corrective, suggesting that, “[Women] are less likely to speak naturally in voices at once abstractly disembodied and autonomously self-defining... I would urge us to speak out of [women’s] experience, in part as a way of changing it, but also out of a recognition of what there is to learn from the perspectives on human life that have been distinctively ours... [We must] look at the practices that form our lives as women, by taking them seriously, listening to what we do, and finding the voices with which to speak what we hear” (Scheman, 1987: 242, 241).
m) Last, but not least, as female social scientists, we must become conscious of our important role in changing the academy for the better. We may think of ourselves as less powerful or more marginalized than our male colleagues, and on one level that might be true. But in terms of real transformative potential, female social scientists have the power, because of their lived, embodied experience, to make a big difference in their disciplines. They have the power to transform their disciplines into truly human endeavors, with a more complete and less perverse knowledge base. As Jill Johnston famously put it, “until recently very few of us realized we were women.” And very few realized that women, qua women, could be powerfully transformative within the academy.

And that means women have to speak up. Yes, it is quite possible that you will be ignored, or resented, or ostracized if you speak up. But as George Bernard Shaw famously said, “Reasonable people adapt themselves to the world. Unreasonable people attempt to adapt the world to themselves. All progress, therefore, depends on unreasonable people.” It’s time for women to be purposefully unreasonable (at least after they get tenure). After all, since Aristotle and well before, women have simply been assumed to be unreasonable (when in fact the patriarchal system could not have endured if women were so). It is time for women to be unreasonable for the sake of mixed human endeavor; it is time for them to be unreasonable for the sake of all their children, sons and daughters alike, and for our common human future.

And it is my hope that female social scientists would be among the most unreasonable women of all . . .


Monroe, Kristen and others (n.d.) “Ad Hoc Committee on Workable Solutions to Advancing Women in the Profession,” American Political Science Association, [http://www.apsanet.org/content_75309.cfm](http://www.apsanet.org/content_75309.cfm), accessed 23 August 2011.


NOTES

There are some other great quotes about classical political theory that didn’t quite fit, but are so good I am typing them into this endnote:

Nancy Hartsock: “[T]he male experience when replicated as epistemology leads to a world conceived as, and (in fact) inhabited by, a number of fundamentally hostile others whom one comes to know by means of opposition (even death struggle) and yet with whom one must construct a social relation in order to survive” (1983: 298).

Naomi Scheman: “Classical liberal social theory gets off the ground with the observation that individuals . . . are in need of being enticed—or threatened—into enduring and stable association with one another. The societies thus envisioned aim at maximally respecting the separateness of their members by providing mechanisms for adjudicating the claims that one member may make against another, while leaving as intact as possible the rights of each to be self-defining” (1983: 231).

I look back with amusement at the first time I encountered Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), back when I was an undergraduate in an IR theory class taught by Richard Beal. I was the “prisoner” sent outside the classroom, while the rest of the class got to hear the other prisoner make his choice (yes, his). In my young mind, the dilemma was no dilemma—if you were innocent, as I supposed I was, then you would not confess. I wondered how anyone could not see through this “dilemma” transparently. I came back into the classroom with “the” answer, and the other prisoner had also chosen not to confess, which I viewed as only sensible. For years, then, I couldn’t see much of a dilemma at all. Then, in graduate school, I began to “see” the dilemma because of my masculinist training. I wondered how I could have been so naïve not to have seen it in Beal’s class. Now that I am older and have engaged in feminist research, I think my younger self had the right handle on PD, and once again I don’t see the dilemma.


To facilitate research on women’s situation, my colleagues and I have created the WomanStats Database, the largest compilation of information on the situation of women in the world today. Coding for over 315 variables for 175 countries, we add to the database every day, and currently have over 120,000 data points. Our variables include qualitative information on laws and practice on the ground, as well as incidence data (which tends to be quantitative), and we also develop innovative
ordinal scales of important phenomena related to women. Please visit http://womanstats.org: the data is freely accessible to anyone with an internet connection.

I recently made my own small stand on this issue. The Foreign Policy Analysis Section of the International Studies Association (my professional association) has given out a Distinguished Scholar Award since 1990. Only one woman has ever won the award—in 1994, seventeen years ago! I mentioned this fact to two eminent male scholars in my field whom I thought would “see” what I saw, and thankfully they did. For next year, the three of us are nominating a woman whose work has clearly been very important in the formation of the subfield.

This is the reason my primary research field is Foreign Policy Analysis, which is, in a very real sense, the actor-specific theory of the field of International Relations (Hudson, 2006).