

**Mediating Interstate Conflicts:
Regional vs. Global International Organizations**

Holley Hansen
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell
Stephen C. Nemeth

Department of Political Science
University of Iowa
341 Schaeffer Hall
Iowa City, IA 52242
holley-hansen@uiowa.edu
sara-mitchell@uiowa.edu
stephen-nemeth@uiowa.edu

Abstract: Regional and global intergovernmental organizations have grown both in number and scope, yet their role and effectiveness as conflict managers is not fully understood. Previous research efforts have tended to categorize organizations solely by the scope of their membership, which obscures important sources of variation in institutional design at both the regional and global levels. International organizations will be more successful conflict managers if they are highly institutionalized, if they have members with homogenous preferences, and if they have more established democratic members. The theory is evaluated with data on territorial (1816-2001), maritime (1900-2001), and river (1900-2001) claims from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and the Middle East. Empirical analysis suggests that international organizations are more likely to help disputing parties reach an agreement if they have more democratic and homogenous members and if they are highly institutionalized and employ binding management techniques.

We thank Terry Chapman, Mark Crescenzi, Erik Gartzke, Emilie Hafner-Burton, Joe Hewitt, Jana von Stein, and participants in the workshop on “A New Science of International Organizations” for useful comments on an earlier draft. This research was supported by National Science Foundation grants SES-0079421 and SES-0214447.

Regional and global intergovernmental organizations have grown both in number and scope, yet their role and effectiveness as conflict managers is not fully understood. While some scholars are critical of the ability of regional IGOs to effectively manage interstate and intrastate disputes (e.g. Meyers, 1974; Haas, 1983), others point to the increasing frequency and success of conflict resolution by regional IGOs (e.g. Chigas et al, 1996). From their early history (Pinder, 1996) and particularly since the end of the Cold War, European regional organizations have taken an active role in managing regional conflicts (Chigas et al, 1996). Regional organizations have become increasingly likely to develop mechanisms for handling domestic and interstate disputes, even in regional organizations focusing primarily on economic issues, (e.g. Peck, 2001; Powers, 2004). For example, the treaties and protocols of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) establish numerous provisions for conflict management, including the creation of an institutional cease-fire monitoring mechanism (ECOMOG). Global organizations, on the other hand, are typically more centralized, institutionalized, and resource-rich, which may enhance the success of their conflict management activities. The United Nations, one of the most highly institutionalized and funded organizations, has been the most frequent (non-state) mediator of interstate and intrastate conflicts since WWII (Bercovitch and Schneider, 2000). However, conflict management efforts by global organizations may be hampered by conflict between major powers (Ingram, 2006), as illustrated by the significant increase in the peace keeping missions following the end of the Cold War (Fortna, 2003).

Furthermore, there is considerable variance in the institutional design of regional and global IGOs, including differences in scope, membership, centralization, and institutionalization. The scope of an institution and its membership requirements produce variance in the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity of member states' preferences. Institutions that are widely

inclusive and that are very broad in their scope, such as the United Nations or League of Nations, are likely to have more heterogeneous members than exclusive and narrowly focused organizations, such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). IGOs with more heterogeneous members may be less effective at managing conflicts compared with more homogenous IGOs. IGOs that are highly institutionalized, especially with respect to dispute resolution mechanisms, will be more effective at promoting cooperation among members, and will have greater tools at their disposal for managing conflicts among member states. IGOs may also be more active conflict managers in world politics if their membership is more democratic because democracies are amenable to using peaceful and third party methods of conflict resolution (Dixon, 1993, 1994; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Raymond, 1994; Mitchell, 2002).

In this paper, we compare the effectiveness of conflict management efforts by regional and global organizations. We argue that international organizations (global or regional) will be more effective conflict managers if they are highly institutionalized, if their members have similar foreign policy preferences, and if they have more democratic members. We test our theory with data on territorial (1816-2001), maritime (1900-2001), and river (1900-2001) claims from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project in the Western Hemisphere, Western and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. We find that international organizations are more likely to help disputing parties reach an agreement if they have more democratic and homogenous members and if they are highly institutionalized and employ binding management techniques. The success of conflict management by global organizations stems primarily from their higher levels of institutionalization and use of particular types of conflict management tools (arbitration and adjudication), while the success of regional organizations' mediation efforts can be attributed primarily to their homogenous and democratic nature. Our theory and empirical

analyses demonstrate problems with using a simple global/regional dichotomy in conflict management studies and identify a variety of institutional characteristics that can help guide further exploration.

Conflict Management by Regional and Global Organizations

The use of regional commissions and global organizations to resolve interstate conflict has a long history. A number of independent commissions were formed during the 1800s and early 1900s, including the Central Rhine Commission (1816), the US-Canada International Joint Commission (1909), and the US-Mexico International Boundary Commission (1889). The Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine was established in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna to mediate conflicts and negotiate agreements regarding trade and use of the Rhine; this early organization has been one of the most enduring regional organizations and has been central in the establishment of waterway regimes (Miller, 1919).

Early literature suggested that regional organizations help reduce conflict by isolating and dividing local conflicts before they become intractable global issues (Burton, 1962; Fisher, 1964). While regional organizations lack the perceived impartiality global organizations gain from distance, cited as necessary for viable mediators (Moore, 1987), regional organizations may be more effective at mediating conflict because their member states share common interests that make their actions more timely and effective. Wehr and Lederach (1988) argue that mediators who are “closer” to the disputants are more likely to promote trust-based mediation, which may be effective at creating more binding agreements.

A number of studies has questioned the accuracy of these claims and instead caution that regional organizations have only limited success at resolving the issues behind disputes (Nye, 1971; Meyers, 1974; Haas, 1983). Nevertheless, regional organizations continue to increasingly

participate in conflict mediation and prevention (Pinder, 1996), and arguably have shown increasing success (Chigas et al, 1996). ASEAN, an organization in which the membership explicitly chose not to include conflict management in its charter,¹ added conflict mediation to the organization (consultation and arbitration responsibilities) during the 1976 Bali Summit.

Like global organizations, regional organizations are likely to be most effective as conflict mediators when they are independent from their member states, they have sufficient resources to accomplish their goals, and their organizational charter includes more stringent methods of conflict mediation. Taking each of these factors in turn, Meyers (1974) has argued that a lack of centralized authority is a principal reason why the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is only marginally successful at mediating conflict. This lack of independence has made the OAU dependent on member states voluntarily complying with agreements, and because of this, the OAU is only effective when both disputants in a conflict were member states, and when leaders' positions were not threatened by rulings of the OAU.²

Organizational resources may include material (money, peace-keeping troops), informational (expertise or a centralized bureaucracy), or ideational (legitimacy and impartiality) resources (Nye, 1971; Meyers, 1974). While regional organizations often possess less material or ideational resources than many global organizations, they do have an advantage in

¹ According to Sabur and Kabir (2000), the founding ASEAN members blamed the earlier failures of the ASA (Association of Southeast Asia) and MAPHILINDO on member state conflicts. Because of these earlier failures, the ASEAN members developed a norm of resolving conflicts among member states by bilateral negotiations outside of ASEAN.

² Nye (1971) provides an interesting contrast between the OAS and the OAU. The OAS is comprised of one hegemon and a number of fairly wealthy states that are able to provide funding and experts for organizational work, as compared to the OAU, which has no hegemon and includes some of the poorest states in the world. Alternatively, the OAU has prestige and status among African leaders (Meyers, 1974), and is seen as a legitimate forum for mediation of interstate conflict between African leaders. This perceived legitimacy is lacking in the OAS, which has sometimes been viewed as a tool for U.S. foreign policy. However, as Meyers (1974) points out, the OAU's ability to provide "good offices" and legitimacy in its dealings does provide some benefit, but is unable to overcome the material and informational resource shortage. OAS dispute settlement is in many ways advantaged by the material and informational resources of the organization.

information. As Peck (1998) discusses, regional organizations, due to their proximity to the conflict and to the disputants, are able to more efficiently assess potential conflicts and direct their limited organizational resources to more effectively prevent and mediate conflict. The similarity of preferences between regional disputants and regional IGO mediators enhances the credibility of informative signals sent by the IGO (Thompson, 2006:7). Organizations will be most successful at resolving disputes if they can provide expert knowledge, an experienced diplomatic corps, and can process information from a variety of sources (i.e. states, NGOs, research institutions) to make more effective recommendations. Further, organizations can increase compliance with agreements if they can more effectively monitor disputant behaviors and offer advice to the parties in the dispute (Peck, 1998).

Finally, organizations with charters that include binding methods of conflict mediation, such as arbitration, are often more effective at resolving disputes (Nye, 1971; Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, 2004; Mitchell and Hensel, 2006). Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991) find that the more active a role the mediator takes in dispute resolution, the greater the chance of success of the mediation attempt. Organizations like the OAU may be able to provide “good offices” and act as a forum for state leaders and resolve interstate disputes in that matter, but they are likely to meet less success in creating and enforcing agreements than organizations such as the European Union, which can initiate binding adjudication between member states – with or without member state approval. Mitchell and Hensel (2006) find that active conflict management efforts by IGOs are significantly more likely to produce successful agreements if they involve binding techniques, such as arbitration or adjudication. Compliance rates with agreements brokered through non-binding IGO techniques (e.g. mediation, good offices) are less successful than the parties’ own bilateral efforts to resolve contentious issues.

Institutional Design and Third Party Conflict Management

Our theoretical approach builds upon recent work that emphasizes the rational design of international institutions. Institutions vary along several dimensions including rules for membership, scope of issues covered, centralization of tasks, rules for controlling the institution, and flexibility of arrangements (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, 2001). The efficacy with which IGOs can promote cooperation between their member states depends to some degree on these design features of institutions. The debate over the efficacy of regional vs. global IGO conflict management efforts has tended to categorize organizations solely by the scope of their membership (global or regional). This dichotomization is problematic because it black boxes other important sources of variation in institutional design at both the regional and global levels.

Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) focus on several institutional design variables in their model linking international institutions and interstate bargaining. They argue that “IGOs will have the greatest impact on dispute behavior in a limited number of ways related to mandate, member cohesion, and institutional structure (p. 7).” Like Fearon (1995), they develop a bargaining model that emphasizes information, concluding that information asymmetries are best reduced by IGOs that have clear mandates for security, strong internal member cohesion, and strong institutional mechanisms for sanctioning and enforcement. In other words, private information about competitor states is best revealed by IGOs that can employ effective costly signaling, which they argue is strongest in cohesive, security-based IGOs that are highly institutionalized. Dyadic analyses from 1950-1991 show that interventionist IGOs significantly reduce the onset of militarized disputes, while minimalist and structured IGOs have no effect. They also find that greater preference heterogeneity among IGO members increases the likelihood for militarized conflict. Boehmer et al’s theoretical argument and supporting

empirical evidence is important because it suggests that the effect of IGO memberships on cooperation varies depending on institutional structure.

We build upon Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom's (2004) model by identifying three important characteristics of international organizations that influence the success of their conflict management activities: 1) institutionalization, 2) members' preference homogeneity, and 3) members' democracy levels. Our analyses focus on *direct* attempts by IGOs (global and regional) to resolve contentious interstate issues, rather than the passive influence of shared IGO memberships on conflict management activities (Mitchell and Hensel 2006). Focusing on variance in these institutional design features gives us greater leverage for explaining differences in success rates between conflict management efforts by global and regional organizations.

Institutionalization

First, international organizations with higher levels of institutionalization are more proactive and effective at managing interstate conflicts, especially conflicts between members.

Boehmer et al (2004:18) create a three point scale to capture an IGO's institutionalization level.

1. *Minimal organizations* contain plenary meetings, committees, and possibly a secretariat without an extensive bureaucracy beyond research, planning, and information gathering.
2. *Structured organizations* contain structures of assembly, executive (non-ceremonial), and/or bureaucracy to implement policy, as well as formal procedures and rules.
3. *Interventionist organizations* contain mechanisms for mediation, arbitration and adjudication, and/or other means to coerce state decisions (such as withholding loans or aid), as well as means to enforce organizational decisions and norms.

Interventionist organizations by their very nature are more active as global and regional conflict managers due to their explicit focus on peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms. These organizations' charters often include multiple provisions for dispute settlement procedures. For example, the charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) emphasizes the peaceful

settlement of disputes in Article 3 (controversies are to be settled peacefully) and Article 24 (encourages use of direct negotiation, good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial settlement, and arbitration to resolve conflicts). Similar articles can be found in numerous charters or treaties associated with both regional and global institutions, ranging from the League of Nations and United Nations to the Arab League, African Union, and ASEAN.

In addition to promoting dispute resolution actively through the very design of their treaties, interventionist organizations are typically resource-rich and have highly centralized and extensive bureaucracies (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). These executive and bureaucratic branches give them better leverage for revealing disputants' private information (which impedes peaceful settlement) and help parties carry out agreements that are reached. The UN Secretary General, for example, played an important role in helping Nigeria and Cameroon carry out the terms of the Bakassi peninsula territorial settlement reached by the International Court of Justice (Mitchell and Hensel, 2006). Global organizations, like the UN, are often highly structured and institutionalized, which may give them an advantage for brokering durable peace settlements.

Table 1 compares all global and regional organizations that have intervened actively to help resolve territorial, maritime, or river claims in the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Middle East from 1816-2001.³ We can see that the mean institutionalization score for global organizations (2.62 of 3) is significantly higher than the mean level for regional organizations (1.98; $F = 170.2$ ($p < .001$)). If institutionalization is a key design feature for conflict management success, then global organizations have an edge.

Hypothesis 1: *Conflict management efforts by highly institutionalized international organizations are more likely to be successful than conflict management efforts by less institutionalized international organizations.*

³ The ICOW dataset is described in more detail in the research design section below. For the difference of means tests, the unit of analysis is the IGO year spanning all years of the IGO's existence. A complete list of IGOs is provided in Appendix 1.

As noted above, the types of conflict management techniques employed by IGOs may produce varying success rates. We expect binding settlement efforts to be more successful because they raise the reputational costs for reneging, they mitigate informational asymmetries more easily, and they are often carried out with institutional assistance (Mitchell and Hensel 2006). To account for this possible relationship, we create an interaction term for an IGO's institutionalization level and the use of binding conflict management (arbitration, adjudication).

Preference Homogeneity

Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) also argue that informational asymmetries in bargaining are better addressed by IGOs that are comprised by members with more homogenous preferences. As preferences diverge among IGO members, individual state members have incentives to reveal information selectively to favored disputants, which reduces the chances for successful intervention (Touval, 1982; although see Kydd, 2003). In other words, organizations with fairly homogenous members can provide unbiased information more easily than organizations with diverse preferences among their membership. This fits with earlier arguments about regional organizations being more effective conflict managers because their member states share common interests and because they can "understand" conflicts in their neighborhood (Moore, 1987). Such preference similarity minimizes the distance between the IGO and disputants' preferences, and enhances the possibility for trust-based mediation (Wehr and Lederach, 1988).

Hypothesis 2A: *As the average preference similarity among international organization members increases, conflict management efforts by the organization are more likely to be successful.*

A competing perspective is offered by scholars who focus on the advantages of preference diversity within an organization for creating issue linkages. Koremenos, Lipson, and

Snidal (2001) argue that an IGO's issue scope increases when there is greater heterogeneity among members, which typically occurs in organizations with a large number of members. "When actors have heterogeneous interests, issue linkage may generate new opportunities for resolving conflicts and reaching mutually beneficial arrangements...Linkage not only allows states to increase efficiency but may also allow them to overcome distributional obstacles" (Koremenos et al, 2001:786). Focusing on the informational properties of IGOs, Thompson (2006) makes a similar argument about the advantages of heterogeneous preferences among IGO members. He argues that IGOs can provide two types of information, intentions information and policy information. Intentions information serves to reduce uncertainty about disputants' preferences, consistent with Boehmer et al's (2004) model. Policy information, on the other hand, refers to "the production of policy information by specialized agents" (Thompson, 2006:5). IGOs typically collect detailed information when they serve as conflict managers, especially when binding procedures such as arbitration and adjudication are employed (Mitchell and Hensel, 2006). Like congressional committees with specialized policy information, international organizations with more heterogeneous members are better able to transmit credible information to disputants, which "explains why regional organizations, with less diverse memberships and more parochial interests, produce a legitimation effect of lesser magnitude" (Thompson, 2006:9). According to this view, international organizations with more diverse member states are perceived more credibly as neutral and fair mediators, and experience greater mediation success.

Hypothesis 2B: *As the average preference similarity among international organization members decreases, conflict management efforts by the organization are more likely to be successful.*

In Table 1, we can see that global organizations in our sample have significantly lower mean levels of member preference similarity (0.69) than regional organizations (0.72, $F = 219.37$

($p < .001$)).⁴ Both group means are closer to one than zero, which implies that most organizations that actively manage interstate conflicts have fairly similar members, although there is quite a bit of variance in these scores, ranging from -.09 to 1.0 for global organizations and .16 to .97 for regional organizations.

Democracy

Democracies behave differently than non-democracies, from fighting wars to negotiating treaties (Towle, 2000). The democratic peace literature has spent considerable time exploring the reasons behind these differences focusing on democratic institutions (Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Leeds and Davis, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al 2005) and democratic norms (Dixon, 1993, 1994; Raymond, 1994; Mitchell, 2002; Risse-Kappen, 1996). The normative approach suggests that democratic dyads are more likely than other types of dyads (non-democratic or mixed dyads) to resort to third-party mediation to help resolve disagreements. Simmons (1999) argues that democracies subscribe to a common tradition of legal principles that make them more likely to accept the role of an outside mediator in resolving international disputes. Pennock (1979) contends that democratic political culture promotes norms of tolerance and compromise as a way of resolving disagreements, a value that democracies then extend to the international arena in dealings with other democracies. Democracies' legalistic culture may also translate into greater acceptance of binding forms of third party conflict management, such as arbitration and adjudication (Raymond, 1994; Russett and Oneal, 2001). Democracies may turn to international organizations for binding settlement at least partially because democracies accept the norm that disputes should be resolved through legalistic channels, and international organizations are viewed as bodies representing

⁴ We employ the S measure of alliance portfolio similarity developed by Signorino and Ritter (1999), which ranges from -1 (divergent preferences) to +1 (similar preferences). For each pair of states in each IGO, we calculate the annual dyadic preference similarity score, and then aggregate these by IGO year.

international law (Treves, 2002). Regardless of the specific norms being transmitted, the general explanation is that democracies accept third-party dispute resolution when dealing with other democracies, but not autocracies, because democracies can trust each other to abide by agreements struck (Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, 1999; Pevehouse & Russett, 2005; Weinstein, 1969).⁵

International organizations play an essential role in the liberal peace process (Russett and Oneal, 2001). First, global and regional organizations help promote democratization in their member states. International organizations that list domestic liberalization as a condition of membership – and enforce these conditions – bind new elites to democratic reform, and communicate this willingness to other actors in a society, thereby promoting democratization (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006). IGOs provide resources that can be used by elites to “bribe” opposition groups to democratic government by offering incentives for cooperation (Pevehouse, 2002). In addition, regional organizations, such as the OAS’ Unit for the Promotion of Democracy and the Council of Europe’s Programmes for Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, provide technical assistance to develop democratic institutions and offer assistance in running elections (Peck, 2001). Regional organizations serve to promote democracy in their member states, which indirectly contributes to a more peaceful region as these democratic states are more likely to pursue forms of peaceful conflict resolution in their dealings with each other.

Second, and of more interest to this study, democracies have increasingly turned to regional organizations to resolve disputes (Pinder, 1996). Over time, regional organizations have developed mechanisms for handling domestic and interstate disputes including providing good offices and serving as mediators. As Peck (2001) discusses, the OAU at a 1993 summit in Cairo established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. This included

⁵ Lipson (2003) offers a contrasting viewpoint, arguing that the transparency of democratic regimes allows them to bargain more efficiently which should enhance the parties’ own efforts to resolve their disputes bilaterally (see also Dixon 1998).

forming a Central Organ⁶ to respond to crises and a Conflict Management Center to provide information on the threats of conflict. While the OAS has more recently focused on programs such as ProPaz to resolve internal disputes (www.oas.org), its charter includes a number of mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution among its membership as noted above.

How does the democratic make-up of an IGO influence conflict management success? First, international organizations may become more likely to become involved in settling disputes in response to *demands* from democratic member states. As discussed previously, democracies are more likely than non-democracies to turn to more legalistic third-party mediation to resolve claims (Pennock, 1979; Raymond, 1994; Simmons, 1999). Democracies that belong to a common organization, therefore, may turn to this organization to provide resources and a forum for more legalistic dispute resolution.

Second, democratic members may also promote more active IGO conflict management through their socialization of non-democratic IGO members. International organizations play an important role in norm socialization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), and strongly democratic organizations may perform a key role in transmitting norms of peaceful dispute resolution techniques among their member states (Mitchell, 2002; Dixon and Senese, 2002). Key democratic states may act as norm entrepreneurs to promote the use of third-party mediation as an acceptable form of dispute resolution within their region. As these norms become more accepted, they become institutionalized in international and regional organizations. These institutions can create a norm cascade by socializing other states to the norm behavior; overtime, norms become internalized by all actors in the system.⁷ International organizations created by

⁶ The Central Organ functions as a "...kind of Security Council of the OAU." (Peck, 2001, 575).

⁷ Mitchell (2002) has traced the role that democracies played in promoting the norm of third-party conflict management. Initially, the United States and Great Britain practiced arbitration as a way to settle disputes, and later offered services as mediators for disputes between other states. The United States turned to arbitration in settling

democratic entrepreneurs may have design features that are democratic. Risse-Kappen (1996), for example, argues that NATO's procedures for military cooperation are very democratic because most NATO members were highly institutionalized democracies when the treaty was signed. Democracies are more likely to develop highly institutionalized agreements as a way to lock-in long term commitments (Ikenberry, 2001). Regime similarity may also enhance the constitutive effects of IGOs, producing a convergence of member states' interests and identities over time and reducing the heterogeneity of member states' foreign policy preferences. In the long run, this reduces the number of new contentious issues that arise between member states.

Democracies have greater credibility in making agreements and so as an organization has more democratic members, these members are more likely to accept decisions made by this body. Second, an increase of democracies may have an indirect affect on compliance among non-democratic members. In line with Mitchell (2002), as democracies become more predominant in an international organization, then democratic norms of dispute resolution become the typical behavior in the organization, and so even non-democratic members are more likely to behave like their democratic counter parts. Organizations formed by democratic states with longer democratic histories should be more likely to create mechanisms for third party conflict management in the charter. Well-established and more powerful democracies are better able to act as norm entrepreneurs, and thus as IGO members' history of democratic government grows, the organization should mediate conflicts more frequently and experience greater conflict management success.

Hypothesis 3: *Conflict management efforts by international organizations with more established democratic members are more likely to be successful.*

boundary water disputes with Canada and later Mexico, and served an important role in the creation of the Pan American Conference, which in 1928-29 took an active role in preventing conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay (Murdock, 1929; Woolsey, 1929). Interestingly, at that time, both Bolivia and Paraguay were non-democracies.

Table 1 compares global and regional organizations with respect to the average number of years that IGO members have been democratic states (six or higher on Polity IV democracy scale). In our sample, regional organizations have more seasoned democratic members with an average democracy life of 36 years, compared to 9 years for members of global organizations ($F = 746.89, p < .001$). If organizations with more democratic members are advantaged for successfully managing interstate conflicts, then regional organizations may succeed more often.

Research Design

Our analyses focus on the *success* of regional and global IGO conflict management efforts, although we employ selection models to address the question of when IGOs choose to get involved as conflict managers. The data analyzed in this paper is compiled by the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project,⁸ which includes data on interstate claims over territory, maritime zones, and cross-border rivers.

The ICOW project is engaged in collecting data on contentious territorial, maritime, and river issues, with information on the salience of each issue and on attempts to settle each claim peacefully or through militarized force. Territorial claims involve questions of sovereignty over a specific piece of land (including islands), maritime claims occur when states disagree about the ownership or usage of a maritime area, while river claims arise over the usage and/or navigation of a river that crosses state boundaries. Territorial claims are coded by the ICOW project from 1816-2001, while maritime and river claims are coded from 1900-2001.⁹ The most important requirement for systematic data on issues is explicit evidence of contention involving official representatives of two or more nation-states over the issue type in question. With the ICOW

⁸ Version 1.0 of the ICOW data is available at <<http://www.icow.org>>. The website also provides documentation describing the data, as well as working papers employing the data.

⁹ Analyses employ the most recent version of the ICOW data, which includes territorial claim data for the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe, maritime claim data for the Western Hemisphere, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe, and river claim data for the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, and the Middle East.

territorial claims data, for example, this means evidence that official representatives of at least one state make explicit statements claiming sovereignty over a specific piece of territory that is claimed or administered by another state. It is also important that official government representatives or individuals authorized to speak for the government initiate the claim.

The ICOW data is well suited for testing our hypotheses because it provides information about different types of conflict management strategies (e.g. bilateral talks, good offices, inquiry, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication), information about any third party actors involved (states, IGOs), as well as information about the outcomes of each peaceful attempt to settle the issue. Even though the data set focuses on issue disagreements, it also provides information about the ability of claimants to reach cooperative bargains peacefully, as well as substantive information about the type of agreement that is reached (functional, procedural substantive)¹⁰, and information about who gets what in the agreement (challenger gets more, even concessions, target gets more). ICOW also collects information on the outcomes of peaceful attempts to settle contentious issues, coding whether agreements are struck, whether claimants ratify and/or comply with the agreements' terms, and if the agreement ends the overall issue at stake.

Our primary unit of analysis is a peaceful settlement attempt, such as a mediation effort or bilateral talks. In the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Middle East, ICOW has recorded 1690 peaceful settlement attempts over territorial, maritime, and river claims. International organizations have been involved actively as conflict managers in 179 (10.6%) of these attempts.

¹⁰ The coding of *peaceful* attempted settlements includes negotiations meant to settle part or all of issue under contention ("substantive" settlement attempts), negotiations over procedures for future settlement of the claim ("procedural" settlement attempts, such as a treaty submitting the claim to arbitration by a specific third party or an agreement to meet for new negotiations at some specific time), and negotiations over the use of the claimed area or river without attempting to settle the question of ownership ("functional" settlement attempts, such as a treaty of free navigation along a disputed river border). Any other types of negotiations (e.g., talks over a ceasefire to stop an ongoing crisis or war that do not include any functional or procedural elements beyond stopping the fighting) are excluded.

It is possible that IGOs intervene in the most salient issue claims, which could reduce the chances for successful settlement. Conversely, states may turn to IGOs when the conflict is ripe for resolution and the parties are ready to settle the issues at stake. In the latter case, IGOs would have an advantage in producing successful settlements. To account for these potential selection effects, we employ a two stage Heckman model that captures both conflict management activities by IGOs and their success rates. The Heckman (censored probit) model employs a two-stage estimator to account for non-random selection procedures (see, e.g., Heckman 1979; Reed 2000). The model estimates the effect of each covariate on the selection process and the outcome process, and calculates the correlation, ρ , between the two processes' disturbances.

The dependent variable for the first stage equals one if an IGO served as a third party conflict manager (179 of 1690).¹¹ The dependent variable for the second stage, designed to capture success, equals one if the parties reached an agreement in the negotiations (100 of 179, or 56%). We also conduct separate logit analyses to determine whether agreements reached with IGO assistance end the overall issue claim or not (41 of 100, or 41%).

IGO Institutionalization

We created a list of all international organizations that have actively intervened in ICOW issue claims and coded each organization's institutionalization level on a three point scale from low (minimalist) to medium (structured) to high (interventionist). If the IGO was included in Boehmer et al's dataset, we employed their institutionalization coding; if not, we made a judgment call based on our own research. There are a total of 23 IGOs (excluding the Vatican) that served as conflict managers in the two datasets. Four of these 23 IGOs are minimalist, seven are structured, while twelve are interventionist. Eleven of the total 23 IGOs are global

¹¹ Several of these IGO attempts involve the Vatican, which we do not include in the analyses below, which reduces our sample size of IGO settlement attempts. For an analysis of the indirect network effects of IGO membership, see Dorussen and Ward (2006).

organizations (no minimalist, four structured, and seven interventionist), while 12 are regional (four minimalist, three structured, and five interventionist). As noted above, we interact institutionalization with a measure for binding settlement attempt because IGOs have much higher levels of success with binding techniques (Mitchell and Hensel, 2006). As expected, all binding attempts have been carried out by IGOs that have some degree of institutionalization (2 or 3 on the institutionalization scale). Our combined measure equals zero for non-binding attempts by IGOs scoring one on the institutionalization scale, one for binding attempts by IGOs scoring two on the institutionalization scale, and two for binding attempts by IGOs with the highest level of institutionalization.¹²

IGO Democratic History

We use member states' democracy scores from Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005) to measure the democratic nature of an international organization. This variable is an eleven point (0-10) scale evaluating each state's competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. To generate the organization's democracy level per year, we first created a case for every IGO state member in each year the IGO was in existence. We then recorded the number of years each state had a democracy score six or higher, which we refer to as democracy life. We then collapsed these democracy life scores by identifying the minimum score for each IGO year. The minimum score is used to reflect the weakest link principle (Dixon, 1993; Russett and Oneal, 2001), namely that IGOs with more established democratic members should actively promote norms of third party conflict management. The mean for the minimum democracy life score for the entire sample of IGO years is 22.3 with a standard deviation of 36 years.

¹² Inclusion of the institutionalization measure alone produces insignificant results because binding IGO attempts are more successful while non-binding IGO attempts are less successful.

IGO Member Preference Similarity

To assess the similarity of IGO member preferences, we use the weighted global S measure of alliance portfolio similarity (Signorino and Ritter, 1999). This measure employs the Correlates of War alliance dataset and records the existence of shared alliance partners for each pair of states in a given year employing the COW typology of alliance types (defense pacts, non-aggression/neutrality, entente, no alliance). This variable measures the extent to which two states share similar alliance portfolios, with higher S values representing more similar preferences. As noted above, we aggregate this measure using a dyad-year IGO dataset. As the average dyadic S score for an IGO moves towards one, this indicates a greater homogeneity of preferences among member states. The average dyadic S score for all IGO years is 0.71 with a standard deviation of 0.22; the range is -0.09 to 1.0.

Control Variables

We employ several control variables to model the selection of IGOs as conflict managers (stage one in the Heckman model). The first variable is the *salience*, or importance of each issue claim to the claimants. Conflicts that are highly salient to one or both claimant states are more difficult to resolve and more likely to lead to militarized conflict (Hensel 2001; Hensel, Mitchell, Sowers, and Thyne, 2006). In the territorial, river, and maritime claims data, salience is measured through a variety of indicators, each addressing an aspect of the claimed issue that should increase its value to one or both sides. We combine six dichotomous indicators of salience for each issue type to create an overall index. Each indicator contributes up to two points to the salience index, one point per claimant state for which the indicator is present,

producing a total range from zero to twelve.¹³ More salient issues should attract more frequent settlement attempts by IGOs.

Our next control variable addresses the extent of the settlement attempt. The ICOW project codes four specific topics covered by peaceful attempted settlements. Two comprise efforts aimed at general settlement –negotiations meant to settle the entire claim and negotiations over a smaller part of the claim. The other two constitute procedural and functional efforts– negotiations over procedures for future settlement of the claim,¹⁴ and over the use of the claimed territory, river, or maritime area without attempting to settle the question of ownership.¹⁵ We create a dummy variable, *Procedural/Functional*, representing whether the settlement attempt was procedural or functional. Our expectation is that because these settlements do not resolve the larger issues at stake, they should be less likely to involve IGOs.

How states bargain over contentious issues might be influenced by their capabilities, with more powerful states having stronger bargaining power. As the challenger’s relative capability increases, it should be less likely to accept IGO involvement in the settlement process because it

¹³ For territorial claims, the six indicators used to construct the general measure of territorial claim salience include (1) territory that is claimed by the state as homeland territory, rather than as a colonial or dependent possession, (2) territory located on the mainland rather than an offshore island, (3) territory that is contiguous to the nearest portion of the state, (4) territory that is known or suspected to contain potentially valuable resources, (5) territory with a militarily or economically strategic location, and (6) the presence of an explicit ethnic, religious, or other identity basis for the claim. The six indicators used to measure river claim salience are (1) river location in the state’s homeland territory rather than in colonial or dependent territory, (2) navigational value of the river, (3) level of population served by the river, (4) the presence of a fishing or other resource extraction industry on the river, (5) hydroelectric power generation along the river, and (6) irrigational value of the river. The six indicators for maritime claim salience are (1) maritime borders extending from homeland rather than colonial or dependent territory, (2) a strategic location of the claimed maritime zone, (3) fishing resources within the maritime zone, (4) migratory fishing stocks crossing into and out of the maritime zone, (5) the known or suspected presence of oil resources within the maritime zone, and (6) relation of the maritime claim to an ongoing territorial claim (involving maritime areas extending beyond either claimed coastal territory or a claimed island).

¹⁴ We refer to these as procedural settlement attempts. For example, the parties may agree to submit the claim to third party arbitration as Chile and Argentina did in 1979 when accepting Papal mediation of the Beagle Channel dispute.

¹⁵ We refer to these as functional settlement attempts. For example, Britain and Argentina have signed a number of functional agreements related to fishing and oil off the coast of the Falkland Islands, but these agreements do not resolve the sovereignty issue.

can achieve better bargaining outcomes in a bilateral negotiation setting.¹⁶ We measure the level of power parity between the challenger and target as a dummy variable that equals one when the weaker side has 80% of the stronger side's total capabilities and zero otherwise. Our capabilities measure comes from the Correlates of War Project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972) and captures each country's global share of demographic (total & urban population), military (spending & personnel), and economic capabilities (iron & steel production, energy consumption). Our expectation is that IGOs are more likely to serve as third party conflict managers in situations of power parity because the parties will have more difficulties reaching agreements on their own. This expectation finds support in mediation research, which demonstrates that disputants find mediation more acceptable when they are evenly matched (Wall and Lynn, 1993).

We also control for a more passive effect of IGO memberships, using a count of multilateral treaties and institutions calling for the peaceful settlement of disputes that both states in a claim have signed and ratified (Mitchell and Hensel, 2006). Peaceful conflict management practices should be influenced most strongly by IGOs that explicitly promote such practices in their charters. Membership in qualifying institutions is measured through the ICOW Project's Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement (MTOPS) data set, which records the signature and ratification of all multilateral treaties and institutions (at either the global or regional level) that explicitly call for the pacific settlement of political disputes among members.¹⁷

¹⁶ The challenger is the state challenging the existing territorial, river, or maritime status quo, or what is typically referred to as the revisionist state in the IR literature.

¹⁷ Relevant global treaties include the charters of the League of Nations and United Nations, declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice or International Court of Justice, the 1899 and 1907 Hague treaties on the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Relevant regional treaties in the Western Hemisphere include the charters of the Organization of American States and the Rio Pact (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) as well as the 1902 Treaty on Compulsory Arbitration, 1923 Gondra Treaty, 1929 General Convention on Inter-American Conciliation and General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, 1933 Saavedra Lamas Pact, 1936 Treaty on Prevention of Controversies, 1936 Inter-American Treaty

Finally, we control for the claimants' democracy scores with the expectation that IGOs will manage conflicts more actively as the lowest democracy score in the dyad increases. We calculate the challenger and target's democracy minus autocracy score (-10 to +10) using the Polity IV data set and record the lowest regime score in the dyad. We turn now to a discussion of our empirical analyses.

Empirical Analyses

We begin with a simple comparison of efforts by global and regional organizations to manage contentious issue claims, employing the ICOW dataset. In Table 2, we utilize all 1,690 settlement attempts for our analyses (1816-2001).¹⁸ In this analysis, we report information on four measures of conflict management success for a given settlement attempt: 1) whether a given settlement attempt produced an agreement (939 of 1688, 56%), 2) whether the two sides carried out the agreement in five years or within the time frame stipulated in the agreement (714 of 939, 76%), 3) whether the agreement reached ends the overall issue claim (220 of 939, 23%), and 4) whether the challenger state made greater concessions than the target state in the agreement (143 of 939, 15%). We then separate organizations into global and regional groups based on the scope of membership (inclusive versus exclusive).¹⁹

We can see that in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and the Middle East, global organizations generally have better success rates than regional organizations. IGO involvement (global or regional) does not improve the prospects for reaching agreement, but global IGO involvement clearly produces more successful agreements. Claimants are more likely to comply

on Good Offices and Mediation, and 1948 American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá). This data set is available at <<http://data.icow.org>>, including documentation that lists the excerpts of the treaty or charter that call for the pacific settlement of disputes.

¹⁸ Two cases are missing information on agreement because the settlement attempt is ongoing.

¹⁹ If members of the IGO come from more than one region, we consider the organization to be a global one. Based on our criteria, NATO is a global organization (see Appendix 1).

with agreements brokered with global IGO assistance (89% compliance rate, $p < .05$), the agreement is more likely to end the overall issue claim (50% claim end, $p < .001$), and the challenging state is more likely to make minor or major concessions to the target state (41%, $p < .001$). Regional organizations also experience success in enhancing compliance rates (86%, $p < .10$) and producing agreements that end the issue at stake (36%, $p < .05$). The rate for agreements that end an issue claim is lower for regional organizations than global organizations (36% vs. 50%), although both are more successful than bilateral or non-IGO third party settlement attempts. As noted earlier, we believe that these differences between global and regional IGO conflict management success can be attributed to the three theoretical variables we identified: institutionalization, preference similarity, and democracy. Global IGOs have higher levels of institutionalization, but lower average democracy and preference similarity mean scores compared to regional organizations.

Our main empirical model is presented in Table 3, Model 1. The first stage of the model codes whether the peaceful settlement attempt actively involved an IGO conflict manager. All of the control variables are significant predictors of IGO conflict management, demonstrating that IGOs are more likely to get involved in more salient issue claims between relative equals, and that democracies and IGO members are more likely to turn to IGOs for assistance. Shared IGO memberships in peace-promoting organizations have the largest substantive effect (Table 5), more than quadrupling the probability of IGO involvement (from .04 to .18). Issue salience is also relevant, as the most salient contentious issues are three times more likely to experience IGO conflict management (from .03 to .10).

In the second stage of the model, we use the indicator of reaching agreement to evaluate success of IGO management.²⁰ Hypothesis 1 finds empirical support, with binding conflict management efforts by highly institutionalized IGOs significantly more likely to produce agreements over territorial, maritime, and river claims than management efforts by minimalist IGOs. Table 5 shows that the least institutionalized IGOs have a rate of success for reaching agreements (0.51 that is not far away from the entire sample of agreements reached in peaceful settlement attempts (0.56). Structured organizations with assemblies, bureaucracies, and formal rules experience greater success in their conflict management efforts, raising the likelihood of agreement from 0.51 to 0.76. The most institutionalized IGOs, or interventionist organizations, are extremely successful as conflict managers producing a very high rate of agreement at 0.92. While Mitchell and Hensel (2006) find a distinction between binding and non-binding efforts by IGOs, our results demonstrate that the institutional characteristics of the organization influence their success rates. Even when focusing on binding techniques, less institutionalized IGOs experience significantly lower rates of success in producing agreements. Thus among potential IGO conflict managers, the most highly institutionalized organizations have a clear advantage for getting disputing parties to reach agreement, especially when they employ binding techniques.

Recall that two competing hypotheses were presented with respect to the effects of preference homogeneity in an IGO. Hypothesis 2A predicted that increasing levels of homogeneity or preference similarity among member states would enhance the success rates of IGO conflict management efforts because they could provide unbiased information more easily and they had a better understanding of conflicts in their neighborhood. Hypothesis 2B, on the

²⁰ In Table 2, there was not a significant relationship between global IGO involvement and agreement, nor regional IGO involvement and agreement. Thus we think using this measure of success makes sense because the global/regional dichotomy is not picking up differences in success rates across IGOs, which our theoretical variables are designed to capture.

other hand, predicted that more heterogeneous organizations were better suited to managing conflicts because their diversity improves the credibility of information sent by the IGO to disputants. The results in Table 3, Model 1 provide support for Hypothesis 2A, showing that increases in the average IGO dyadic preference similarity score significantly improve the chances that the IGO's effort to resolve an issue claim will produce an agreement. Table 5 shows that the substantive effect is quite large as well; IGO conflict managers with the lowest level of preference similarity have a much lower success rate (probability of agreement = 0.31) compared to the entire sample of peaceful settlement attempts (0.57 agreement). Increasing IGO member preference similarity to the mean more than doubles the chances for IGO conflict management attempts to produce agreements (from 0.31 to 0.66), while the IGOs with the most similar preferences have a fairly high rate of agreements brokered (0.79). Given that regional organizations tend to have member states with more closely aligned foreign policy preferences, they experience greater success in helping local disputants reach agreements over contentious issues. Evidence for this claim is provided in Table 3, Model 3, where the variables that proxy regional effects (IGO democratic history, IGO preference similarity) are removed and a regional dummy variable is included. The regional IGO dummy variable is positive and significant as expected, demonstrating that democratic history and preference similarity help to account for the success of regional IGOs' conflict management efforts.

Hypothesis 3 also finds empirical support in Table 3, Model 1. As the IGO members' minimum democratic history increases, peaceful settlement attempts by IGOs are significantly more likely to produce agreement. If the minimum democratic history is zero, meaning one or more IGO members is autocratic, the probability of reaching agreement is 0.57, a rate identical to the overall sample. If the minimum democracy history is 15 years, this improves the chances for

agreement by 8.8% (0.57 to 0.62). The most democratic organizations in the sample almost always produce agreements, with a probability of 0.96. As noted above, the dummy variable for regional IGOs seems to proxy this effect when this variable is removed in Table 3, Model 3. Regional organizations that experience more successful conflict management efforts are those that are highly democratic and have members with similar foreign policy preferences.²¹

In Table 3, Model 2, we conduct a similar exercise to examine the effects of global organizations by removing the key variable associated with global IGOs, the interaction of institutionalization and binding management techniques. In this model, inclusion of the global dummy variable actually washes out the effect of all other variables, and the global dummy variable is not significant. This suggests to us that institutionalization is not the only factor that helps to account for successful conflict management by global IGOs. However, the three theoretical factors we have identified give us quite a bit of leverage for explaining why some IGO conflict management attempts succeed more than others. Binding attempts by highly institutionalized IGOs are more successful, and IGOs that are more democratic and more homogenous experience more success on the interstate conflict management scene.²²

Discussion

Our empirical findings suggest that it is fruitful to move beyond a regional/global IGO categorization and to identify institutional characteristics that vary across organizations. Our

²¹ When looking at the mandate of the IGOs that serve as active conflict managers, the vast majority of global organizations have multiple mandates, such as security and economic mandates. Among regional organizations, the majority are coded as having neither security nor economic mandates (Boehmer et al, 2004). Only one IGO has a pure economic mandate (CARICOM). Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) find that stable democracies tend to join political and standards-based IGOs, while democratizing states prefer joining economic IGOs. The lack of management by economic IGOs in our data explains why democratic history has a strong effect on conflict management success. In other words, more mature democracies tend to be members of IGOs with multi-issue mandates and these organizations manage conflicts more frequently.

²² The *rho* parameter is not statistically significant in any of the models estimated in this paper, suggesting that there is no systematic relationship between the unobserved factors that influence both IGO conflict management and reaching agreement.

results demonstrate that IGOs are not uniformly suited to promote cooperation and manage interstate conflict. More highly institutionalized and democratic IGOs with similar members experience greater success in brokering agreements over contentious issues. While we focus on these three theoretical factors, other scholars have identified variance in the relationship between shared IGO membership and cooperation as well. Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2006) find that members of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) often impose economic sanctions on other PTA members. Gartzke et al (2006) find that IGOs reduce the chances for militarized conflict only if they are highly institutionalized and have a security mandate (see also Boehmer et al, 2004). Ingram (2006) argues that the durability of IGOs depends on major power contention, institutionalization, size, and age. In short, the relationship between IGOs and cooperation is more nuanced than the liberal peace literature suggests (Russett and Oneal, 2001).²³

Factors other than institutionalization, democracy, and preference similarity may influence the success rates of conflict management by IGOs. In Table 4, we examine the robustness of our results to the addition of variables capturing major power contention, IGO age, and IGO power. Model 1 replaces the dyadic preference similarity score with a measure of preference similarity between the IGO's major power members. This variable has a similar effect to preference homogeneity for all IGO members; conflict management attempts by IGOs are more likely to produce agreements if the major power members of the organization share similar foreign policy views. These results are somewhat at odds with Gartzke et al's (2006) finding that major power contention increases the chances for interstate conflicts, although our analyses focus on peaceful attempts to manage conflicts, not militarized ones. Model 2 presents another measure of major power influence in an IGO, the number of major power members. The

²³ von Stein (2006) examines the effect of flexibility provisions on treaty ratification, showing that treaty design influences the likelihood that states ratify the treaty's terms.

effect of this variable is not statistically significant, although the population of IGOs with many major power members is smaller because these IGOs tend to fail more quickly (Ingram, 2006). Only sixteen of the total conflict management attempts by IGOs in the ICOW dataset involve IGOs with more than five major power members.

Model 3 enters the effect of IGO age to account for the possibility that global organizations have had more frequent opportunities to serve as conflict managers. In our model, IGO age is not significant, which suggests that even though some organizations are more likely to persist after decades of existence, their increased age does not give them additional advantages for successfully managing conflicts. Model 4 controls for the average capabilities of IGO members, recoding the median CINC score for IGO members. More powerful IGOs may experience greater conflict management success, although the analysis shows no significant effect of IGO median CINC score. Regional IGOs have significantly higher member capabilities (mean = .02) in comparison to global IGOs (mean = .002, $F = 306.4$, $p < .001$). In other words, the institutional characteristics of the IGO, rather than the capabilities of its members facilitate agreement. The negative sign and the weakness of this finding may indicate support for Ingram's (2006) contention that multiple major powers negatively affect the durability of IGOs. The more major powers within the organization, the more likely their extant rivalries play out within the organization, and, the more likely excluded major powers are to attempt to undermine the institution. These conflicts are likely to be particularly intractable.

Conclusion

Our paper addresses a long standing debate in the conflict management literature about the efficacy of international organizations as mediators and the differences in success rates between regional and global organizations. We assert that it is problematic to use a

global/regional dichotomy because it obscures other sources of institutional variance within and across global and regional IGOs. We compare the success of regional and global organizations in their roles as third party conflict managers focusing on three key IGO characteristics: institutionalization, average dyadic member preference similarity, and average member democracy history. Using a two stage Heckman model for IGO conflict management (stage one) and reaching agreements (stage two), we find that IGOs are more likely to get involved in more salient issue claims between relative equals, and that democracies and IGO members are more likely to turn to IGOs for assistance. With respect to success, we find that IGOs are more likely to help disputing parties reach an agreement if they have more democratic and homogenous members and if they are highly institutionalized and employ binding management techniques.

Our theory and analyses demonstrate the advantages of creating a virtuous cycle between theory and evidence in the study of international organizations. Much of the debate about global vs. regional IGOs stems from empirical evidence about specific institutions (e.g. UN, OAS, OAU), while our analyses focus on a broad set of IGO conflict management cases. This gives us greater leverage for measuring institutional features that vary across IGOs, and also keeps the analysis fairly simple by focusing only on two dozen institutions. Rational design theoretical models tend to focus on a broad class of IGOs and examine multiple forms of interstate cooperation. We apply the logic of these models to a specific function that IGOs perform as conflict managers, which helps to refine the conceptualization and measurement of cooperation and be more precise about the complex contingencies of causes and effects. The results demonstrate the advantages of resolving puzzling findings by thinking more carefully about the sources of variance across cases theoretically and moving towards a more complete science of international organizations.

References

- Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why States Act through Formal International Institutions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1):3-32.
- Bercovitch, Jacob, J. Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette L. Wille. 1991. Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations. *Journal of Peace Research* 28(1):7-17.
- Bercovitch, Jacob and Gerald Schneider. 2000. Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict Management. *Journal of Peace Research* 37(2):145-165.
- Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace? *World Politics* 57(1):1-38.
- Burton, John. 1962. *Peace Theory*. New York: Knopf.
- Chigas, Diana, Elizabeth McClintock, and Christophe Kamp. 1996. Preventive Diplomacy and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation. In Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes (Eds.) *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
- Dixon, William J. 1993. Democracy and the Management of International Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(1):42-68.
- Dixon, William J. 1994. Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict. *American Political Science Review* 88(1):14-32.
- Dixon, William J. and Paul D. Senese. 2002. Democracy, Disputes, and Negotiated Settlements. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(4):547-571.
- Dorussen, Han and Hugh Ward. 2006. Intergovernmental Organizations and the Kantian Peace – A Network Perspective. Paper presented at “A New Science of International Organizations” conference, August 30th, Philadelphia, PA.
- Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52(4):887-917.
- Fisher, Roger. 1964. Fractionating Conflict. In Fisher, Roger (ed.) *International Conflict and Behavioral Science: The Craigville Papers*. New York: Basic Books.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2003. Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars. *International Studies Review* 5(4):97-114.

- Gartzke, Erik, Timothy Nordstrom, Charles Boehmer, and J. Joseph Hewitt. 2006. Disaggregating International Organizations in Time and Space. Paper presented at “A New Science of International Organizations” conference, August 30th, Philadelphia, PA.
- Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. 1996. Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations. *International Organization* 50(1):109-139.
- Haas, Ernst B. 1983. Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945-1981. *International Organization* 37(2):189-256.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. and Alexander H. Montgomery. 2006. Power or Plenty: How Do International Trade Institutions Affect Economic Sanctions? Paper presented at “A New Science of International Organizations” conference, August 30th, Philadelphia, PA.
- Heckman, James J. 1979. Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. *Econometrica* 47 (1):153-162.
- Hensel, Paul R. 2005. Codebook for Territorial Claims Data Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project (version 1.0). <http://www.icow.org>.
- Ingram, Paul. 2006. Nasty, Brutish, and Long: The Survival and Failure of Inter-Governmental Organizations, 1815-2000. Paper presented at “A New Science of International Organizations” conference, August 30th, Philadelphia, PA.
- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization* 55(4):761-799.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley. 1999. Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation. *American Journal of Political Science* 43(4):979-1002.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley and David R. Davis. 1999. Beneath the Surface: Regime Type and International Interaction, 1953-78. *Journal of Peace Research* 36(1):5-21.
- Mansfield, Edward D. and Jon Pevehouse. 2006. Democratization and the Varieties of International Organizations. Paper presented at “A New Science of International Organizations” conference, August 30th, Philadelphia, PA.
- Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. 2005. Polity IV Dataset version p4v2002.2e. Computer File. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.
- Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett. 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace. *American Political Science Review* 87(3):624-638.
- Meyers, B. David. 1974. Interregional Conflict Management by the Organization of African Unity. *International Organization* 28(3):345-373.

- Miller, David Hunter. 1919. The International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways. *The American Journal of International Law* 13(4):669-686.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. 2002. A Kantian System? Democracy and Third Party Conflict Resolution. *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4):749-759.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Paul R. Hensel. 2006. International Institutions, Cooperation, and Compliance with Agreements. Working paper.
- Moore, Christopher W. 1987. *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Morgan, T. Clifton and Sally Howard Campbell. 1991. Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(2):187-211.
- Murdock, James Oliver. 1929. Arbitration and Conciliation in Pan America. *The American Journal of International Law* 23(2):273-291.
- Nye, Joseph S. 1971. *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Peck, Connie. 2001. The Role of Regional Organizations in Preventing and Resolving Conflict. In Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Eds.) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Pennock, James Roland. 1979. *Democratic Political Theory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002. With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy. *American Journal of Political Science* 46(3):611-626.
- Pinder, John. 1996. Community against Conflict: The European Community's Contribution to Ethno-National Peace in Europe. In Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes (Eds.) *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
- Raymond, Gregory A. 1994. Democracies, Disputes, and Third-Party Intermediaries. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(1):24-42.
- Reed, William. 2000. A Unified Statistical Model of Conflict Onset and Escalation. *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1):84-93.

- Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1996. Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO. In Peter J. Katzenstein (Ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Russett, Bruce and John Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
- Sabur, A.K.M. Abdus and Mohammad Humayun Kabir. 2000. *Conflict Management and Sub-Regional Co-operation in ASEAN: Relevance for SAARC*. Dhaka, India: Academic Press and Publishers in association with Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies.
- Signorino, Curtis S. and Jeffrey M. Ritter. 1999. Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions. *International Studies Quarterly* 43(1):115-144.
- Simmons, Beth. 1999. See You in Court? The Appeal to Quasi-Judicial Legal Processes in the Settlement of Territorial Disputes. In Diehl, Paul F. (Ed.) *A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. Stuckey. 1972. Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965. In Russett, Bruce (Ed.) *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Touval, S. 1982. Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations. *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1(1):51-69.
- Towle, Philip. 2000. *Democracy and Peacemaking: Negotiations and Debates 1815-1973*. New York: Routledge.
- Treves, Tullio. 2002. International Organizations as Parties to Contentious Cases: Selected Aspects. in Boisson de Chazournes, Laurence, Cesare Romano, and Ruth Mackenzie (Eds.) *International Organizations and International Dispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects*. Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers.
- von Stein, Jana. 2006. The International Law and Politics of Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. Paper presented at "A New Science of International Organizations" conference, August 30th, Philadelphia, PA.
- Wall, James A. Jr. and Ann Lynn. 1993. Mediation: A Current Review. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(1):160-194.
- Wehr, Paul and John Paul Lederach. 1991. Mediating Conflict in Central America. *Journal of Peace Research* 28(1):85-98.
- Weinstein, Franklin B. 1969. The Concept of a Commitment in International Relations. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13(1):39-56.

Woolsey, L.H. 1929. Editorial: The Bolivia-Paraguay Dispute. *The American Journal of International Law* 23(1):110-112.

Young, Oran R. 1967. *Intermediaries: Third-Parties in International Crises*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Table 1: Comparison of Regional and Global Organizations

Characteristic	Global Organizations	Regional Organizations	Oneway Anova Test
Democracy Life (years > 6)	9.4	36.4	F = 746.89 (p<.001)
Preference Similarity (Dyadic; -1 to 1)	0.69	0.72	F = 219.37 (p<.001)
Institutionalization (1 to 3)	2.62	1.98	F = 170.2 (p<.001)

Table 2: The Effectiveness of Conflict Management by Regional and Global Organizations, 1816-2001

	<u>Global Organizations</u>			<u>Regional Organizations</u>		
	Yes	No	X ² (p-value)	Yes	No	X ² (p-value)
Reach Agreements (939 of 1688, 56%)	44 (54%)	37 (46%)	0.059 (0.808)	56 (58%)	41 (42%)	0.185 (0.667)
Comply with Agreements (714 of 939, 76%)	39 (89%)	5 (11%)	4.021 (0.045)**	48 (86%)	8 (14%)	3.060 (0.080)*
Agreement Ends Issue Claim (220 of 939, 23%)	22 (50%)	22 (50%)	18.027 (0.000)***	19 (36%)	34 (64%)	4.762 (0.007)**
Greater Concessions by Challenger (143 of 939, 15%)	18 (41%)	26 (59%)	23.582 (0.000)***	11 (20%)	45 (80%)	0.899 (0.3431)

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 3: Selection Models, IGO Conflict Management and Reaching Agreements

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
Reach Agreement	<i>Minimum IGO Democracy History</i>	0.009 (0.004)**	0.000 (0.002)	
	<i>Mean IGO Preference Similarity</i>	1.766 (0.91)*	-0.219 (0.44)	
	<i>Institutionalization*Binding</i>	0.643 (0.180)***		0.220 (0.060)***
	<i>Global IGO</i>		-0.069 (0.14)	
	<i>Regional IGO</i>			0.221 (0.099)**
	Constant	-2.172 (1.065)**	0.852 (0.487)*	0.178 (0.289)
IGO Conflict Management	<i>Shared IGO Memberships</i>	0.073 (0.014)***	0.075 (0.015)***	0.069 (0.015)***
	<i>Issue Saliency</i>	0.046 (0.023)**	0.048 (0.022)**	0.051 (0.022)**
	<i>Power Parity</i>	0.292 (0.142)**	0.291 (0.149)*	0.324 (0.138)**
	<i>Minimum Democracy-Autocracy</i>	0.024 (0.007)***	0.024 (0.0087)***	0.0274 (0.007)***
	<i>Procedural/Functional</i>	-0.532 (0.112)***	-0.506 (0.118)***	-0.528 (0.111)***
	<i>rho</i>	0.387 (0.457)	-0.082 (0.394)	0.251 (0.315)
	Constant	-1.854 (0.195)***	-1.888 (0.186)***	-1.857 (0.194)***
<i>N</i>	1453 (116)	1453 (116)	1453 (116)	

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 4: Selection Models, Alternative Explanations

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	
<i>Minimum IGO Democracy History</i>	0.002 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)*	0.003 (0.001)**	0.003 (0.002)*	
<i>Mean IGO Preference Similarity</i>		0.646 (0.422)	0.613 (0.351)*	0.633 (0.345)*	
Reach Agreement	<i>Institutionalization*Binding</i>	0.189 (0.053)***	0.236 (0.061)***	0.229 (0.062)***	0.234 (0.061)***
	<i>Major Power Preference Similarity</i>	0.329 (0.149)**			
	<i>Number of Major Powers in IGO</i>		0.000 (0.027)		
	<i>IGO Age</i>			-0.001 (0.002)	
	<i>IGO Median CINC Score</i>				-0.293 (1.871)
	Constant	0.050 (0.305)	-0.292 (0.559)	-0.223 (0.470)	-0.277 (0.429)
	IGO Conflict Management	<i>Shared IGO Memberships</i>	0.069 (0.014)***	0.073 (0.014)***	0.073 (0.014)***
<i>Issue Salience</i>		0.043 (0.023)*	0.046 (0.023)**	0.046 (0.023)**	0.046 (0.023)**
<i>Power Parity</i>		0.305 (0.143)**	0.288 (0.144)**	0.289 (0.143)**	0.288 (0.144)**
<i>Minimum Democracy-Autocracy</i>		0.024 (0.007)***	0.024 (0.0087)***	0.024 (0.007)***	0.024 (0.007)***
<i>Procedural/Functional</i>		-0.538 (0.114)***	-0.532 (0.113)***	-0.531 (0.113)***	-0.532(0.112)***
<i>rho</i>		0.274 (0.294)	-0.082 (0.394)	0.252 (0.305)	0.272 (0.289)
Constant		-1.829 (0.199)***	-1.854 (0.194)***	-1.858 (0.195)***	-1.855(0.194)***
<i>N</i>	1453 (116)	1453 (116)	1453 (116)	1453 (116)	

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 5: Predicted Probability of IGO Settlement Attempt and Reaching Agreement

Variable	Probability of IGO Settlement Attempt Prob. (Change)	Probability of Reaching Agreement Prob. (Change)
Minimum IGO Democracy History:		
0 (minimum)		.57
15.3 (mean)		.62 (+ .05)
173 (maximum)		.96 (+ .39)
Mean IGO Preference Similarity:		
.341 (minimum)		.31
.793 (mean)		.66 (+ .35)
1 (maximum)		.79 (+ .48)
Institutionalization*Binding:		
0 (minimalist, non-binding)		.51
1 (structured, binding)		.76 (+ .25)
2 (interventionist, binding)		.92 (+ .41)
Shared IGO Memberships:		
0 (minimum)	.04	
2.7 (mean)	.06 (+ .02)	
11 (maximum)	.18 (+ .14)	
Issue Salience:		
0 (minimum)	.03	
7.3 (mean)	.06 (+ .03)	
12 (maximum)	.10 (+ .07)	
Power Parity:		
0 (preponderance)	.06	
1 (parity)	.105 (+ .045)	
Minimum Democracy:		
-10 (minimum)	.04	
0.04 (mean)	.065 (+ .025)	
10 (maximum)	.10 (+ .06)	
Functional/Procedural:		
0 (no)	.098	
1 (yes)	.034 (- .064)	

Note: This table shows marginal effects on the probability of IGO involvement in a peaceful settlement attempt and the probability of reaching an agreement in the second stage of the model, given that an IGO was selected in the first stage. These calculations are based on Model 1 in Table 3. For purposes of calculation, all other variables are held at their mean or modal values, using Stata's MFX command after HECKPROB.

APPENDIX 1: IGO LIST

Global Organizations

League of Nations
League of Nations Council
League of Nations Judicial Committee
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
United Nations
United Nations Secretary General
United Nations Security Council
United Nations Peacekeeping Organization
International Court of Justice
Judicial Committee of the Imperial Privy Council
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

Regional Organizations

Organization of American States (OAS)
Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC)
Inter-American Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration
US-Canada International Joint Commission (IJC)
US-Mexico International Boundary Commission (IBC)
Central American Court
Central American Court of Justice (CACJ)
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Paris Peace Conference I
European Economic Community/European Union (EEC/EU)
European Court of Justice (ECJ)
Central Rhine Commission