Are Needs Negotiable?
The Role of Participation, Security and Recognition in Keeping the Peace after Civil Wars End

Faten Ghosn
&
Christina Sciabara
University of Arizona
School of Government and Public Policy

Abstract: The main aim of this paper is to investigate the human needs theory, which maintains that intrastate conflict will recur unless basic needs are met. Much of the literature on civil war recurrence has focused on how previous civil wars end (e.g. Wagner 1993), private incentives (e.g. Walter 2004), third-party commitments (e.g. Walter 1999), as well as power-sharing agreements (e.g., Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). However, human needs theorists, most notably Azar (1991) and Burton (1990), have maintained that irrespective of how civil wars end or the type of agreement that is reached, unless basic human needs such as participation, recognition and security are explicitly dealt with, it is only a matter of time before civil conflicts re-emerge.

Testing the human needs arguments, we have begun coding all peace agreements in identity civil conflicts between 1989 and 2005. We focused on how they dealt with three main categories: participation, recognition, and security. Findings demonstrate that peace agreements that substantively dealt with these categories were more likely to sustain the peace than those that either did not mention them or where there were no specific provisions in how they would be dealt with.
Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War intrastate conflicts have amplified worldwide. In fact, today we are more likely to witness an armed conflict within a state than between states. Of the 128 conflicts identified in the Armed Conflict Dataset as occurring between 1989 and 2008, 93 (72%) were internal conflicts, while only 8 (6%) were interstate conflicts (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2009: 578). A number of these intrastate conflicts can be considered identity based, or using Edward Azar’s term, “protracted social conflict” (PSC). For Azar, the critical characteristic identifying PSCs such as those that have occurred in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Sudan, Cyprus, or Nigeria, is “the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation” (Azar 1991: 93). A major issue facing policymakers today is the resurgence of conflicts centered on identity claims, and in many cases the same conflicts as before.

One mechanism by which policymakers attempt to resolve civil conflict is through the establishment of peace agreements. However, not all peace agreements have been successful despite the fact that in many cases peacemakers have utilized various resources to make the agreements work. That is, they have attempted to include all actors in the conflict, set up ceasefires to build confidence between groups, divide the issues and deal with them one at time, yet despite all of this peace still seems to be elusive. Let us take the following example.

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1 The date is produced by the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo and the Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution at Uppsala University.
2 For an evaluation of the theory of ‘protracted social conflict,’ see Ramsbotham 2005.
On August 4, 1993 the president of Rwanda and officials from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) signed the Arusha Peace Accords. This agreement was over 100 pages long and was negotiated over a period of two years through the establishment of partial agreements that began with the N'SELE Ceasefire Agreement of 29th March, 1991, and culminated in the Arusha Peace Accords. Its main aim was to end a three year civil war that had taken the lives of thousands, mainly innocent civilians. However, eight months later violence broke out and in 100 days over 800,000 people were killed in what has become one of the shortest, deadliest conflicts in the twentieth century. This continuation of violence demonstrates the complete failure of the Arusha Peace Accords.

On paper, the six partial agreements that make up the Arusha accords seem very detailed, attentive and flourishing with concepts of human rights, democracy and security; but, if we look closely we find that the agreement does not bring the two communal groups, the Hutus and Tutsis, any assurances of group security. That is, one of the first clauses of the agreement was in fact to eliminate and deny the groups their communal identity for it states in Chapter 1, Article 1:

> National unity implies that the Rwandese people, as constituent elements of the Rwandese nation, are one and indivisible. It also implies the necessity to fight all obstacles to national unity, notably, ethnicism, regionalism, integrism and intolerance which subordinate the national interest to ethnic, regional, religious and personal interest (Arusha Accords 1993: 9).

While this is ideal in the long-run, it does not calm the communities down especially when each fears that the other wants to eradicate it. Moreover, since the conflict has been defined as an ethnic conflict, for peacemakers to remove it only makes the communities
more defensive about their identity, and allows ethnic entrepreneurs to capitalize on the fears of the groups and rally them to rise to defend their community.

This case leads us to ponder some very important questions: is the situation in Rwanda unique? Or are human needs theorists (e.g., Davies 1971; Azar and Burton 1986; Burton 1990; and Azar 1991) correct in their argument that unless basic needs such as recognition, security and participation are truly addressed than identity conflicts, or as they are called by Azar PSCs, are bound to repeat themselves? In this paper, we attempt to carry out the first empirical study to test this human need argument. To do this, we code all peace agreements in identity civil conflicts between 1989 and 2005. We focus on how they dealt with three main categories: recognition, security, and participation. Findings demonstrate that peace agreements that substantively dealt with these categories were more likely to sustain the peace than those that either did not mention them or where there were no specific provisions in how they would be dealt with.

The paper is divided into four sections. The first section provides an overview of the current literature on civil war recurrence and the durability of peace. In the second section, we present the human needs argument and derive three testable hypotheses. In the third section we present the research design and findings, and last but not least in the fourth section, we present our conclusion.

Civil War Recurrence and the Durability of Peace

There are a number of factors which contribute to how a civil conflict will end including the duration, severity, and nature of the conflict. Civil wars typically end in either a military victory for one side or a negotiated settlement. Conflicts that end in the early stages usually result in a military victory (Mason et al, 1999) while protracted
conflicts which devolve into mutually hurting stalemates (Zartman, 1989, 1993) or last longer than five years usually require some kind of negotiated settlement to bring an end to the violence (Mason and Fett, 1996; Mason, Weingarten and Fett, 1999; De Rouen and Sobek, 2004; Fearon, 2004). Third party intervention is often required for an agreement to be reached because they can offer compliance guarantees, maintenance of the peace through peacekeepers, and a solution to commitment problems (Fortna, 2004, 2010; Walter, 1997, 2002; Enterline and Kang, 2002). The mere fact that a state has experienced conflict also indicates that it is more likely to experience it again, making resolution that much more difficult. While military victories are common, it is those conflicts which are resolved through some kind of agreement which require more attention because of the bargaining and security issues which might lead to a recurrence of the conflict.

The negotiated settlement is a more precarious form of conflict resolution because of the continued ability to fight on both sides, which does not exist when one military defeats another. For this reason, settlement stability is impacted by a number of factors including specific provisions for power-sharing, type of conflict, presence of a third party, and the inclusion of a transitional justice mechanism (Licklider, 1995; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Fortna, 2004; Walter, 2002; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). As a form of conflict resolution, peace agreements are varied in their scope, language, and objectives. There are a number of design features including specificity, commitment signals, rewards and punishments for compliance, and role of third party guarantors, all of which play role in the strength of the agreement and its ability to sustain the peace (Werner 1999; Hampson 1996; Sisk, 2009; Licklider, 2006, Fortna, 2004; Walter, 2002).
Implementation is equally important, but difficult to assign causality for the continuation or loss of peace because of environmental factors, inability to implement all of the agreement provisions, approach to commitment problems, and actual creation of institutions which may occur as a result of the process (Stedman, 2001; Bekoe, 2003, 2004; Mattes and Savun, 2009; Jarstad and Sundberg, 2008).

The provision of power-sharing has often been viewed as a key solution to civil conflicts in general, and identity conflicts in particular, as they ensure rights and protections of all groups, especially of minorities. The inclusion of specific power-sharing provisions increases the likelihood that peace will continue (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). Power-sharing institutions ensure that identity groups have some form of control or monitoring capability over the state’s coercive powers defined as political, territorial, military and economic factors (Hartzell and Hoddie, 1999, 2003, 2005, 2007). Military and territorial power-sharing provisions are the most likely to lead to lasting peace as they send costly signals and indicate a high commitment level (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2005, 2007). There is great disagreement in the literature regarding what impact power-sharing has and which particular provisions are most likely to lead to the maintenance of peace. Military and territorial power-sharing are often viewed as the most likely to reduce recurrence of conflict as they are the most costly and therefore send the largest commitment signal (Mukherjee, 2006; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2005; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). However, another argument posits that low cost provisions are more likely to have a positive impact on peace. Political power-sharing is extremely costly as governments attempt to move forward as it requires cooperation and coordination within the government between the different parties and this can prove to be extremely difficult
(De Rouen, Lea, Wallensteen, 2009; Rothchild, 2005). The overall impact of power-sharing remains unclear as it may be needed in order to secure peace, but could lead to violence in the long run. If trust has not been built between the groups, power-sharing could hinder government function and make transitions to democracy and the consolidation of peace very difficult (Rothchild, 2005). Implementation of power-sharing agreements suggests that it may reduce violence, but so few have been fully implemented, it is difficult to determine what the final outcome of the provision is on conflict recurrence (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2005; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008).

The role of power-sharing in resolving identity conflicts remains even less understood as other factors must be considered. For example, power-sharing may disarm some combatants, but could lead others to arm out of fear of physical threat without internal acceptance of the agreement (Jarstad, 2008). It has also been argued that power-sharing forces identity to be relevant to all policy decisions which increases the incentive to escalate demands by ethnic leaders (Roeder, 2005). By consolidating a large amount of bargaining power in the hands of identity elites, they are given the opportunity to continue escalation tactics, thereby creating dysfunction in the government. Finally, power-sharing can be viewed as inauthentic by the rebel populations and while it may secure peace for a short time, the realities of trying to function within such a structure can be too difficult for groups to overcome (Rothchild 2003). A shared institution is meant to provide security guarantees for minority and rebel groups, but much of the work has failed to consider its actual impact on the security environment.

One of the most difficult and yet most important aspects of the process is the recreation of the state security forces. A gap exists between the agreement and its
implementation in the security sector as agreements may vaguely describe integration or military power-sharing, but almost never provide details as to how security should be rebuilt. Scholars have demonstrated that rebel military integration is costly and should extend the life of an agreement, but due to poor implementation this has yet to be proven (Glassmeyer and Sambanis, 2008). Also, in a civil conflict, warring parties are likely to avoid settlements because there is no legitimate government in place to regulate behavior and no security force to enforce the terms of the agreement (Walter, 1997). In contradiction with earlier theorists, Walter argues that simply resolving underlying issues may create a credible agreement, but because security remains a concern parties will not be willing to sign or abide by the agreement (Walter, 2002). The more secure groups feel about the demobilization process and the consolidation of the military, the more likely they are to sign and implement the agreement (Walter, 1999). In addition, peace agreements focus on security for ex-combatants, but often fail to ensure the security of civilians which requires groups to accept the assurance of security without any real guarantees or changes (Call and Stanley in Stedman, 2001).

Agreements typically focus on demobilization and demilitarization with scant or vague attention to rebuilding security forces and how that will be accomplished (Toft, 2010). Toft argues that this lack of attention to security forces is a main cause of recurrence of violence because it is the most important aspect of the agreement in the short term. Agreements need to address the rebuilding and training of the military and police forces in addition to the integration of rebel forces into the state security system. While security sector reform is found to reduce the likelihood of conflict recurring, the numerous studies and differing outcomes offer many conflicting explanations as to why it
may work. The need to provide guarantees instead of signals of group security demonstrates why the current literature has failed thus far to implicitly prove what works and doesn’t in peace agreement design and implementation. The vague manner in which agreements are written makes measuring implementation almost impossible. Additionally, the non-specific ways in which security and group identity are addressed demonstrate that there is more to understanding peace agreements and power-sharing than has been studied thus far.

Identity³ Conflicts: Importance of Needs

Scholars of civil war have argued that some types of conflicts are more difficult to resolve than others. In fact, civil wars that are fought between opposing identity groups are believed to be particularly intractable since, as Gurr (2000: 66) has maintained, “cultural identities – those based on common descent, experience, language, and belief – tend to be stronger and more enduring than most civic and associational identities.” In addition, “once war breaks out, ethnic identities and hatreds tend to become cemented in ways that make cooperation and coexistence between the groups even more difficult…” (Walter 2004: 372-373). Therefore, these types of conflicts result not only in physical destruction, but also destroy the societal infrastructure as well. As a result, it is important to understand the dynamics of such conflicts and their impact on conflict management efforts.

Until the end of the Cold War, identity conflicts received little attention within the conflict management literature. However, several studies (e.g. Azar and Burton 1986; 1991; Burton 1987; 1990; Miall 1992; Licklider 1995; Rothman 1997, to name a few)

³ For this paper identity conflicts encompass ethnic conflicts but also include conflicts over religious or racial lines.
demonstrated that traditional conflict management techniques, were not effective in dealing with identity based conflicts, as they do not address the underlying issues pertaining to a group’s needs such as security, development, political access as well as identity (e.g. cultural and religious recognition).

There are several arguments and theories about the origins and causes of identity conflicts. While the debates pertaining to the nature of identity are beyond the scope of this study, it is imperative we understand the cause of identity conflict. According to Lake and Rothschild (1998), identity conflicts are not caused by intergroup differences, but by collective fears of the future. They maintain that as “groups begin to fear for their physical safety, a series of dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise…[And] as information failures, problems of credible commitment, and the security dilemma take hold, the state is weakened, groups become fearful, and conflict becomes more likely” (1998: 4). In identity based conflicts insecurities are heightened as threats are perceived to be existential. A major impasse in such conflicts is the security dilemma that characterizes the dynamics of the interaction between groups. Posen maintains that once a multi-ethnic, or a multi-identity, state collapses, the situation within the country simulates the emergence of an anarchic environment (Posen, 1993: 27). Therefore, the absence of a strong central government means that various groups within the state are forced to provide their own security. As a result, “the actions of one society, in trying to increase its own societal security (strengthen its own identity), causes a reaction in a

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5 For additional information on causes of identity conflicts see Lake and Rothschild 1998, Walter and Snyder 1999, and Collier and Sambanis 2005.
6 Snyder and Jervis (1999) define security dilemma as a “situation in which each party’s efforts to increase its own security reduces the security of the others” (15).
second society, which, in the end, decreases the first society's own societal security (weakens its identity)” (Roe 1999: 194). This is due to the fact that when groups make judgments about the others' intentions they will rely on past encounters with the group. However, most often the historical views that groups have of one another are usually inaccurate and misleading. This is due to a number of reasons but mainly in multi-identity states the regime usually suppresses or manipulates historical records and as a result most of the information that groups have of another is passed down rather than a proper written history (Roe 1999: 188). As groups vie to protect their own security, they end up denying another group a basic need. That is, one group ends up maintaining its own security at the expense of another group’s security. As a result, the dispute is framed into a zero-sum situation leading both sides to believe that there is nothing to trade (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987: 245).

Rothman (1997) maintains that identity based conflict resolution can be juxtaposed against resource based and interest based conflicts. This is not to say that identity based conflicts do not contain issues of resources or other tangible interests; however, when identity is the prominent element of a conflict it overrides other issues. When faced with resource based or interest based conflicts, traditional methods of negotiations can be applied as the main aim here is to find some formula of distribution or power-sharing agreement that will satisfy both sides. That is, with a resource based conflict the most common bargaining game is one of distribution with each side attempting to gain as much as possible, but also where compromise is viewed as acceptable (Rothman and Olson 2001: 293). As for interest based conflict, parties need to move away from viewing the conflict as one of incompatible positions “to explore ways
in which their core concerns, perhaps stemming from fundamental ‘needs’ such as security, welfare, or self-actualization, can be fundamentally linked through ‘integrative’ bargaining rather than domination or compromise” (Rothman and Olson 2001: 293). That is, finding creative solutions that would satisfy both parties or at least focus on common goals is more effective than simply working to secure power for one side by removing it from the other.

However, when it comes to identity based conflicts the main concern is collective identity in general, and group security in particular. Therefore, the main goal of any agreement should be to provide reassurance to all the affected parties by addressing and resolving their fears. Even if concrete resource based issues emerge (e.g. control over territory) it is important that we deal first with the identity issues before we attempt to resolve the former ones (Rothman and Olson 2001: 295). Nevertheless, the result of a majority of the identity based conflicts is that each group frames the conflict in its own sense of self and priorities in mutually exclusive terms or in terms of mistrust. Moreover, groups end up denying each other’s claims even if they were legitimate, as they fear “that acknowledging an opponent’s right to exist is a denial of one’s own... [Hence,] in these conflicts, not only do the substantive constitutional and material issues that divide the parties require attention, but in addition symbolic and ritual expressions surrounding identity also can play a crucial role in bridging former opponents who remain wary of each other” (Bates et al 2007: 12).

In addition, as ethnic activists and elite make “blatant ethnic appeals” in order to mobilize members, this in turn leads to the polarization of society and magnification of the intergroup dilemmas (Lake and Rothschild 1999: 8). Such appeals usually rely on
drawing up violent memories, myths and enemy images. According to Stein, embedded enemy images can be a serious obstacle to conflict management as they are deeply rooted and resistant to change even if the adversary has changed (1996: 93).

Going back to the definition of PSC at the beginning of the paper, Azar and Burton (1986), Burton (1990) and Azar (1991) have all maintained that since the underlying concern behind such conflicts is the denial of basic human needs, such as identity, security, recognition and acceptance, unless these needs are met the conflicts are bound to return since such needs are non-negotiable. Gurr (1994:365) goes on to argue that while the needs may be non-negotiable, “the means by which they are protected can be and have been the subject of creative compromises.” As a result, we need to refocus the conflict management efforts on satisfying the underlying needs of all parties involved without denying any group its basic needs. In other words, since identity conflicts arise from groups’ concern over their security, a key element to the success of negotiations is whether an agreement addresses the issues of identity. Therefore, there must be a “mutual understanding and acceptance of each side’s concerns about survival, status, legitimacy, and cultural and political rights” (Pearson 2001: 278). These arguments lead to the following testable hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 1: if basic needs pertaining to recognition are included in an agreement, the peace agreement is more likely to be durable and conflict is less likely to reoccur.*

*Hypothesis 2: if basic needs pertaining to security are included in an agreement, the peace agreement is more likely to be durable and conflict is less likely to reoccur.*

*Hypothesis 3: if basic needs pertaining to participation are included in an agreement, the peace agreement is more likely to be durable and conflict is less likely to reoccur.*
An Empirical Test: Data and Findings

In order to look at whether or not issues pertaining to the recognition of identity, security and participation are included in peace agreements we began with a list of all civil war conflicts with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year identified in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Dataset. We then identified whether the conflicts involved identity issues by checking both UCDP descriptions as well as other civil war datasets primarily Regan (2009) and Correlates of War data. Next, we looked at whether any agreements were signed in these conflicts utilizing the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh, 2006; see also Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen 2006). To be included in the data, the agreement had to be signed between at least two opposing warring parties active in a conflict between 1989 and 2005, and had to solve, regulate, or outline a process for resolving the conflict (Högbladh 2006: 2). Therefore, the analysis includes 23 identity conflicts and 60 peace agreements between 1989 and 2005. Our set up is quite similar to the study by DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen (2009) as we have similar data and dependent variable however, we are only in agreements that were negotiated in identity conflicts, and not all agreements signed

Key Variables

The main dependent variable is the duration of the peace agreement, which is measured as the number of months the treaty was in effect. Similar to DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen (2009) we code the duration as ending when “violence erupts, demonstrating that at least one party has walked away from the agreement or a new agreement has been signed” (371). The Uppsala Peace Agreement Dataset codes whether the civil war peace agreements end as a result of one or more parties withdraw from the agreement or when
violence clearly show that the parties have left the agreement. Out of the 60 peace agreements in our dataset 26 end either due to parties abandoning the agreement or violence erupts while 34 agreements do not end that is, they are still ongoing at the end of the period of study (December 31, 2005).

At the focal point of this article are the provisions of agreements and whether or not they address the basic needs as discussed within the human needs literature. To begin with variables that may capture recognition we coded whether peace agreements recognized/acknowledged specifically the different identity groups in the conflict, their right to their own language, and whether the agreement provided for cultural freedoms. For example, in the Good Friday Agreement, which ended the conflict in Northern Ireland (also known as the Belfast Agreement), the agreement recognized the right of the people in Northern Ireland to “identify themselves as Irish or British or Both and hold both citizenship” (Good Friday Agreement 1998: 4). It also maintained that the government would fully respect the identity and ethos of both communities, promote the Irish language, and help in creating social and cultural institutions that would help to ensure the usage of symbols and emblems in a manner that would promote mutual respect rather than division. Therefore, a binary variable recognition was then created to identify whether the peace agreement had any provisions pertaining to identity, language or cultural freedoms.

A second important factor is the issue of security. We attempted to capture this through several mechanisms. First, similar to the majority of studies on peace agreements (e.g., Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen 2009) we include whether the agreements provided for either the creation of
a new national army or the integration of rebels into the army. Integration into army is a binary variable coded using the Uppsala Peace Agreement Dataset, which took a value of 1 when peace agreements included a provision for the integration of rebels into the existing army or creating a new national army that included all parties. Second, we coded whether peace agreements provided for any institutional reform to public institutions such as the police, military and judiciary. Since most of these institutions are often the instruments of repression for the regime, many of the groups may not trust them. However, if they see that these institutions have been reformed to include marginalized groups, are transparent, and accountable to their constituents than they are more likely to feel safe and secure. For example, in the Northern Ireland case many of the Catholics did not trust the military and police forces as they were seen as biased against them and in fact, in 1973 the Ulster Defense Regiment included less than 4% Catholic members. However, in the Good Friday Agreement it was made clear that there will be a reform to the security institutions including the police force and the judiciary system. In fact, they highlighted that the policing would be designed in such a way that would ensure that the “composition, training, culture, ethos, and symbols are such that in a new approach Northern Ireland has a police service that can enjoy widespread support, and is seen as an integral part of, the community as a whole” (Good Friday Agreement 1998: 28).

Therefore, we created a binary variable reform that took on a value of 1 if the peace agreement included any judicial, military or police reform.

Third, we looked at the level of participation that agreements provided for the different groups. As was mentioned earlier, many within the peace agreement literature

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7 In 2004 a public document was released titled “Subversion in the UDR,” which was a secret document prepared by the UK military intelligence in 1973 and revealed what was happening in Northern Ireland at the time. [http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/publicrecords/1973/subversion_in_the_udr.pdf](http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/publicrecords/1973/subversion_in_the_udr.pdf)
look at the extent of power sharing within peace agreements, particularly through political sharing of government and territorial autonomy (see Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen 2009;). Similar to these previous studies we include two variables to capture such levels of participation utilizing the Uppsala Peace Agreement Dataset. A political power sharing variable was coded as 1 if there are extensive provisions indicating an agreement to share ruling power. Also, a territorial autonomy was coded as 1 if the agreement provided for “an arrangement of self-government which includes control of a specific territory, the power of primary and secondary legislation, the power of executive authority and the power of fiscal matters” (Högbladh 2006: 7). Since we are dealing with groups that do not trust one another and are constantly worried about one group dominating the other we also looked at whether the agreements provided safeguards and consultation measures which would help ease the insecurities that they may have about the other group using the political institutions to pass resolutions not in their favor. So a variable safety mechanism was coded as 1 if the agreement provided safeguards for the different identity groups or called for consultation on key issues. Again looking at the Good Friday Agreement they ensured that the elected Assembly was subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides. For instance, the agreement called for arrangements to ensure key decisions are taken on a cross-community basis by:

(i) either parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting; (ii) or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting (Good Friday Agreement 1998: 7-8).
Control Variables

Following DeRouen, Lea, and Wallensteen (2009) we introduce a number of control variables that could also impact the duration of a peace agreement.8 Two important structural factors that could be determinants of agreement duration are whether the agreements contain process provisions and whether they reaffirm a prior agreement. With respect to process provisions, these by definition should be short-lived as they are part of the peace process and replacement by future agreements is expected. Therefore, process agreement variable is coded as 1 if the agreement is part of a process that will be finalized in later agreements ((DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen 2009: 372). Also, if a treaty reaffirms earlier agreements, this is another procedural element of an agreement and may be part of the confidence building between the two sides. DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen (2009) find that agreements that reaffirm prior ones increased the duration of the agreements indicating that follow-up agreements may have benefited from prior experiences and learning (382). As a result, we coded a similar variable that takes on the value of 1 if the agreement reaffirms earlier ones.

Another essential control variable to take into consideration is the nature of the government. Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) find that agreements that were negotiated by governments with previous experience of democracy were more likely to

8 Since we have a smaller number of peace agreements (60 in comparison to their 135) we could not include all control variables and had to think about which ones were essential. In addition to the variables we include, DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen (2009) include Real GDP/Capita, intensity of the conflict, whether the agreement was a comprehensive one, and whether it included an implementation commission. However, none of these were significant in their models. When we attempted to include Real GDP/Capita this dropped the number of observations to 33, almost by half, due to missing values. Also, with respect to intensity all of these conflicts are identity conflicts which parties experienced high levels of military and civilian deaths. Moreover, when we included whether the agreements were comprehensive or included an implementation commission the variables were not significant and did not change the significance of our variables and therefore decided not to include them. We also controlled for the impact of third-parties, particularly the deployment of peace keeping operations, on agreement durability and it was not significant in all four models and did not change our results.
endure. However, DeRouen, Lea, and Wallensteen (2009) maintain that while democracy scores prior to the breakout of civil wars are important, the level of democracy in a country at the time of the signing of the agreement will have an impact on the durability of peace as democratic governments are more credible in abiding by the agreements they sign. Moreover, democracies have been found to have a huge impact on the post-war environments. That is, the higher the level of democracy we are less likely to see war recurring (Hegre et al 2001) as they are better able to address grievances and are more inclusive (Gurr 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). *Democracy* is measured using the polity2 variable taken from the Polity IV dataset and ranges from 0 to 20.

**Method**

Given that we are interested in looking at the duration of peace agreements, we test our arguments using duration analysis. Duration analysis is utilized when the focus is on the duration of time until the event of interest takes place, and in our case until the peace agreement is abrogated or violence occurs. We employ a Stratified Cox duration model as we have no reason to expect the hazard rate to take on a specific function and the Cox model makes no such assumption.\(^9\) Also, we believe that the peace agreements within the same conflict are interconnected, and as a result we stratify by conflict to take this into account (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2002). Moreover, DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen (2009) maintain that prior agreements affect subsequent ones since if an

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\(^9\) We test for robustness using a Weibull specification, which assumes a monotonic decay function, and find similar results. While the significance level did drop for some variables, most of the variables remained significant and in the expected direction.
agreement breaks down we should expect future ones to be designed with the prior failings in mind (381).\textsuperscript{10}

\textit{Findings}

The results of the analyses suggest that peace agreements that address the recognition of identity and provide security as well as safety mechanisms for the different identity groups are more likely to endure and keep the peace. The coefficient results are summarized in Table 1 as they are easier to interpret than hazard ratios. Model 1 presents the main three factors that have been utilized in the peace agreement literature as important indicators for the durability of peace and they are military power-sharing (i.e. integration into the army), political power-sharing (i.e. shared government) and territorial autonomy, in addition to the control variables that are included in all the models. In Model 2 we introduce our recognition variable and in Model 3 we introduce our reform variable. Finally, Model 4 includes all the variables.

While the power-sharing variables are in the expected direction, they are not significant. However, if we look closely at the territorial autonomy variable we find that in the 10 agreements that provided territorial autonomy, 9 endured and only 1 failed. The failed agreement was the Wye River Memorandum signed by the Israelis and Palestinians in 1998 and provided the Palestinians with arrangements for self-governance over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The only variables that are significant in Model 1 are two control variables. The democracy variable is significant, implying that as a state becomes more democratic it is more likely to abide by the peace agreement and violence is less likely to recur. While democracy was not significant in the DeRouen, Lea and

\textsuperscript{10} We also conducted a variance inflation factor (VIF) test and the results did not reveal significant multicollinearity. In addition, we tested for violations of the proportional hazards assumption, and found no evidence for such violation.
Wallensteen article it was in the expected direction, but another finding, which was significant in both our models and theirs, is that agreements that contain process provisions were less likely to fail, i.e. parties did not annul the agreement nor did violence break out in such a way to indicate that the parties have left the agreement. Upon closer look at this variable, there are only 5 agreements that were process agreements and only 2 end. In general, these two control variables remained significant in all the models. However, while the reaffirm variable maintained its expected direction in all of the models, it was only significant in two of them, implying that agreements that tend to reaffirm previous ones also increase the duration of the agreement, a finding similar to DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen (2009).

In Model 2, we introduced one of our newly coded variables, recognition. What was interesting is that recognition was highly significant and in the expected direction indicating that agreements that recognized the identity of the different groups either through acknowledging the different groups, their language or culture is more likely to endure and keep the peace. Another interesting finding is that agreements that provided security through military power-sharing is also significant. That is, agreements that integrated the rebels into the army or created a new national army is also more likely to endure as they provide security guarantees for the different groups. This is similar to findings by DeRouen, Lea, and Wallensteen (2009) as well as Hoddie and Hartzell (2005). Again political power-sharing and territorial power-sharing are not significant

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11 I ran the models without process and while the variables remained in the same direction, the significance level dropped and in the full model recognition became significant at the one-tail test. Also, the significance of the Wald Chi(2) dropped to 0.01, indicating to some extent that the model without process is less of a fit. I also re-operationalized the variable to include cases where there was an outline of the peace process but also included negotiations on incompatibility, which in many cases led to partial agreements, and I found similar results.
although the latter is in the expected direction and the former is similar to the finding by DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen. That is, political-power sharing increases the risk that an agreement will fail for such agreements are more costly than military and territorial power-sharing agreements.

In Model 3 we introduce our second variable, reform and again this variable is in the expected direction and significant. That is, agreements that tend to provide military and police reform as well as judicial reform seem to decrease the risk that the agreements will fail. This seems to suggest that groups are worried about their physical security in the post-conflict phase and since these institutions are usually corrupt and typically used by the regime to defend the state and suppress the population, groups may not be as willing to trust them to maintain their security unless there are guarantees for their reform. However, integration into the army is no longer significant, yet still in the expected direction.

We also attempted to introduce our third variable, safety mechanisms however, it dropped out of the model as it was a perfect predictor. That is, the 10 cases (i.e., 17% of the agreements) that provide safeguards and consultation guarantees on key issues for the different identity groups never failed during the period of study. This seems to suggest that we need to take into consideration not only the recognition and security of the different groups but also provisions that empower them and make them feel that there are guarantees that will prevent the stronger or dominating party from backing down or using the system against the groups.

Model 4 combines both recognition and reform. While recognition is still significant and in the expected direction, reform is no longer significant, but in the
expected direction. Moreover, integration into the army is significant while the remaining variables still maintain their expected direction and not significant. A closer look reveals that we have 9 cases where an agreement provides both recognition and reform, 78% of the agreements do not end during the time period of the study. Also, in 37 agreements where both recognition and reform were absent, 57% of the agreements failed.

To sum up our findings, the results indicate that our hypotheses do receive support. That is, agreements that provided recognition, security and participatory guarantees to the groups were more likely to endure.

Conclusion

This article set out to explore the human needs argument, which maintains that identity conflicts will reoccur unless basic needs such as recognition, security and participation are provided for the different identity groups. To do this, we gathered new data pertaining to identity recognition, security measures as well as participation by looking at all peace agreements within identity conflicts between 1989 and 2005. Our central finding is that human needs theorists are correct, needs are non-negotiable and unless we provide for these basic needs, violence will recur and peace agreements will fail.

Referring back to the Rwandan Arusha Accords discussed in the introduction, the agreement did not recognize the two main groups (i.e. Hutus and Tutsis), provided very weak security measures, and while it did stipulate political power-sharing provisions it did not offer any safeguards or consultation guarantees. As a result, Hutu leadership was able to capitalize on the fears of the Hutu community by presenting the agreement as part of the grand scheme of the Tutsis to take over once they are in power.
On the other hand, if we look at the Northern Ireland Good Friday agreement we find that it provided extensive provisions in recognizing the different identity groups, their language along with providing them with cultural freedoms. It also, detailed the reforms that would be conducted in the police and judiciary system and provided safeguards and consultation guarantees in addition to autonomy. Therefore, when the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), a splinter group of the Provisional Irish Republic Army, carried out an attack three months after the agreement was signed and led to the deaths of over 29 individuals and injured over 200 people, Sinn Féin leaders as well as the Catholics in Ireland quickly condemned the attack and the party itself (BBC August 16, 1998). Also, if we compare the Northern Ireland agreement to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, we notice that this latter agreement focused more on political traditions and not national identity, was vague when it came to cultural freedoms for it only promised to consider them in the future, provided no judicial or security reform, and safeguards for the different communities were rejected. As a result, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was rejected by the Unionists and did little to appease the nationalist, and therefore it is no surprise that it failed.

Surveying the peace agreements in identity conflicts reveal a gloomy picture for while many peacemakers do want to bring the conflicts to the end, most of these agreements contain no provisions on how to bring ease and confidence to parties of a conflict. When parties have been fighting for the right to belong to their community or feel that they have been targeted as a result of their ancestry, and when their rights have been denied or in many cases abused, unless the agreements address the issues that are tangible and meaningful to the parties involved than we should not be surprised when the

12 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/northern_ireland/latest_news/151949.stm
groups annul the agreements and return to conflict in an attempt to attain victory for their community. Therefore, we should design peace agreements by keeping the needs of the groups in mind, and while needs may not be negotiable the mechanisms by which they are provided are and that is what we need to focus on.
Table 1

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Robust standard errors in parenthesis

***p<.005, **p<.05, *p<.10; two-tailed test.
References


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