What Motivates Peace Operations in Complex Emergencies?
Explaining Contributions by Highly Capable Democracies

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Abstract: Where civilians are threatened by large-scale violence, the quality and quantity of troops who participate in peace operations help determine their capacity to meet civilians' security needs. Through the extent of their own involvement, a few highly capable Western democracies have considerable influence over the resources available for these missions. Yet existing literature has done little to explain individual states' levels of participation, while disagreeing about the importance of strategic relationships and pressure by a concerned public in motivating their efforts. I argue that public concern and strategic incentives can both encourage contributions, but in different ways. Leaders facing public pressure for humanitarian action can respond with various kinds of contributions to peace operations, and in general an increase in public concern should encourage more extensive commitments. In contrast, I expect strategic relationships to promote involvement in peace operations less consistently. When they do, however, they should primarily encourage the most extensive of troop contributions. Analysis of an original dataset of the most devastating post-Cold War conflicts (*complex emergencies*) and commitments to peace operations by the US, UK, France, and Australia supports the argument.

1. Introduction

In conflicts that severely disrupt civilian life and where the local government is unable or unwilling to protect civilians, improvements in security for vulnerable people often depend on the deployment of international forces. Civilians' most pressing needs in these especially devastating conflicts – or complex emergencies – include an end to the fighting, access to relief aid, and protection from any attacks against them. While violence continues, they face both its direct effects and the indirect scourges of starvation, disease, and displacement.

Recent studies have found that international peace operations' prospects for meeting the security and protection needs that civilians face in complex emergencies depend on whether forces deploy in a timely fashion, with appropriate political goals and military strategies, and

with sufficient and well-trained personnel and equipment.[1] Although traditional peacekeeping can save lives by helping to keep a fragile peace,[2] operations that focus on civilian needs during ongoing violence by providing security for aid operations and affected populations are more targeted toward saving lives in immediate danger. Such operations, however, typically require high-quality troops, high-end equipment, and a degree of force projection capacity possessed by only a few Western democracies. These states are unique in that they regularly possess both the political clout and military capacity to substitute between sending their own military assets to participate in a peace operation and supporting forces from the UN or regional organizations. In brief, the more they do themselves and the less they hide behind financial or logistical support for less capable actors, the better are the chances that any peace operation they support will have the capacity to address civilians' security needs.

Yet while scholars debate whether leaders are motivated to contribute to peace operations mainly by strategic considerations or public pressure for humanitarian action, we know relatively little about how leaders choose *among* possible levels of commitment to these missions. Most scholars have focused on broad patterns in whether states contribute or, at most, the size of their financial commitments.[3] At the same time, and presumably for lack of data, quantitative studies have neglected the influence of public concern that has featured prominently in qualitative work on humanitarian military action. This article builds on the existing literature in two ways.

First, it analyzes the nature and extent of the most highly capable democracies' contributions to peace operations in complex emergencies. I contend that the ways that states contribute to these missions should reflect their leaders' reasons for doing so. Specifically,

[1] Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Holt and Berkman 2006; Krain 2005; O'Hanlon 1997; Seybolt 2008.
[2] Fortna 2004, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006.
[3] Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu 2009; Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998; Lebovic 2004; Neack 1995; Perkins and Neumayer 2008. A notable exception to this pattern is Bellamy and Williams 2009.

leaders motivated by strategic considerations are beholden to a different audience with different expectations than those motivated by public pressure, and their contributions should reflect this. Leaders motivated by public concern typically face competing political demands that they may resolve through either limited or more extensive contributions to peace operations. In contrast, leaders motivated by strategic relationships that provide an incentive to promote peace and security are unlikely to satisfy their broader audience unless they are perceived to effectively safeguard the relevant strategic interests. Yet peace operations only sometimes represent the most appropriate means to pursue such interests. Thus, key strategic relationships should tend to be associated with an 'all or nothing' approach to contributing to peace operations. That is, leaders may not always contribute to peace operations in complex emergencies that invoke such relationships, but when they do, they should be especially likely to make extensive commitments that improve the odds of achieving their strategic goals.

Second, I test the argument with innovative original data on post-Cold War complex emergencies, contributions to relevant peace operations by the US, UK, France and Australia, and related public concern in these states. The results provide important support for the theoretical claims. The measure of public concern – based on elite news coverage of the complex emergencies – is consistently associated with more extensive commitments and indeed helps to motivate multiple kinds of contributions. In contrast, but as expected, strategic relationships have much more mixed effects. To the extent that they encourage involvement in peace operations, they encourage only the most extensive contributions. In some cases, moreover, they actively discourage less extensive involvement or even discourage contributions altogether. These results both shed new light on contemporary debates about leaders' motives

for humanitarian action and improve our understanding of the forces that hinder and encourage robust international efforts to aid threatened civilians.

The article proceeds as follows. First I review the substantive debate and develop the theoretical argument. Then I justify and describe core aspects of the research strategy, describe the data and variables, and present the empirical analysis.

2. Explaining Leaders' Motivations

Existing scholarship has focused primarily on two reasons why leaders might pursue military actions with the capacity to provide security and protection for conflict-affected populations. First, much of the traditional peacekeeping literature credits the strategic interests of the UN Security Council's Permanent 5 members for these operations. Scholars have claimed that peacekeeping is more likely when a conflict invokes these states' core interests, where interveners may exploit the target's natural resources, and when a conflict represents a threat to international peace and security.[4] Several scholars also highlight a state's core strategic relationships – such as those based on regional or colonial ties – to explain its contributions.[5]

Such arguments are also common in accounts of more ambitious and coercive humanitarian interventions. Snyder offers strategic justifications for nearly all recent operations that have been touted as such.[6] Similarly, MacFarlane and Weiss claim that a humanitarian impulse can encourage leaders "'to do something,' but rarely 'to do enough,'" while suggesting that the risk of refugee flows or having security stakes in the outcome of a conflict may create a real commitment to addressing a humanitarian disaster.[7] And according to Seybolt, only when states have strong interests involved will they design interventions with adequate resources and

[4] Bennis 1996; de Jonge Oudraat 1996; Diehl 1993, 86; Durch 1993, 22-23; Gibbs 1997; Schachter 1974.
[5] Bellamy and Williams 2009; Neack 1995; Perkins and Neumayer 2008.
[6] Snyder 2008.
[7] MacFarlane and Weiss 2000, 126.

military strategies appropriate to meeting civilian needs.[8]

On the other hand, a number of scholars and observers argue that pressures associated with public and media concern for civilian conflict victims best explain ambitious, civilian-focused operations by generating domestic political costs for leaders who fail to respond. George Kennan, for example, deplored what he saw as the inappropriate influence of media-driven public pressure in prompting US intervention in Somalia.[9] Jakobsen asserts that the lead state in a peace enforcement operation is likely to be "the power most susceptible to domestic pressure."[10] Kaufmann and Pape argue that states take "costly international moral actions" when the minority group that advocates for them at home is relatively powerful.[11] Bass has chronicled how press reporting of some of the 19th and early 20th centuries' most devastating conflicts led to the emergence of politically potent constituencies for humanitarian intervention.[12] Samantha Power offers a parallel but more pessimistic perspective, arguing that the United States does not stop genocides because the American public does not care about their victims.[13] Yet another view suggests that while public concern has some influence, it may depend on the presence of additional motivations for action. Wheeler, for example, suggests that such concern primarily enables interventions that leaders already wish to undertake.[14]

According to these arguments, both strategic incentives and public concern for civilian conflict victims can motivate the most ambitious sorts of humanitarian military action, while strategic considerations may also explain broad patterns in the incidence of peace operations. But important questions remain. Do these different motives work in the same ways? If they

[8] Seybolt 2008, 20.
[9] Kennan 1993.
[10] Jakobsen 1996, 213; see also Jakobsen 2002.
[11] Kaufmann and Pape 1999.
[12] Bass 2008.
[13] Power 2002.
[14] Wheeler 2000.

function differently, how does this affect contributions to peace operations where civilians are most threatened? Do contributions arising from different motivations vary systematically?

I argue that, as reasons to promote peace or respond to civilians' security and protection needs, strategic considerations and public pressure should indeed function in different ways. First, the structure of the domestic audiences to which leaders are accountable varies across these different motives for action. Second, the nature of success is more malleable when the point of contributing to a peace operation is to promote peace or save lives for their own sake than when doing so furthers some other agenda. These differences generate divergent incentives for leaders that should be evident in their contributions to peace operations.

First, a leader who faces public pressure for humanitarian action typically has competing incentives to be *seen* to contribute to effective efforts to meet civilians' security needs, and also to limit the costs and risks of doing so. On the one hand, the groups and individuals responsible for pressuring her to act want to see evidence that her efforts are helping to save vulnerable civilians' lives – preferably, as many as possible. On the other hand, the broader public is likely to hold her accountable for the *costs* of her efforts to do so, but not to punish her for failing to do more. Moreover, because people tend to estimate these costs largely through their impressions of casualties among their own state's troops,[15] leaders especially concerned about costs have incentives to seek ways of contributing that limit the risks to their own military personnel.

A leader who seeks to balance these competing incentives may find a variety of ways to do so, depending on the strength of the pressure she faces and the existence of opportunities to contribute at an acceptable cost. If she faces limited pressure to act, for example, the prospect of broader public disapproval of an ambitious, potentially costly commitment may well outweigh

[15] eg, Gartner and Segura 1998; Mueller 1973, 1994; Larson 1996; Russett 1990, 46.

the political benefits. Still, some more restricted involvement might provide at least some satisfaction to concerned citizens, while limiting exposure to costs and risks.

Alternatively, public pressure might be very powerful, with influential groups and individuals expressing support for humanitarian action. While this might sometimes justify the risks of a robust effort, at other times challenges such as a dangerous operational environment could limit the leader's opportunities to make a major contribution at an acceptable cost (even if what she considers acceptable is relatively high). Here, too, she may be best off with some kind of limited contribution that balances the desires of concerned citizens with the need to avoid catastrophic costs. Limited American support for African Union and UN peace operations in Darfur, despite unprecedented public concern about the conflict, is an obvious example.

In each of these situations, public pressure motivates the leader's response, but variation in its intensity and in expectations about the costs and risks of contributing determine how much she is willing to do. Logistical or financial support for troops from other countries or a limited contribution of the leader's own military assets can help to keep her state's soldiers out of harm's way. At the same time, as long as the leader can claim to help save some lives or make some contribution to peace, she can hope to receive some political credit for her contribution. Thus, she benefits from the fact that even these relatively restricted forms of involvement may still do some good, even if they address civilians' security and protection needs less fully than a more extensive contribution would.

In sum, there are clear reasons why a leader motivated by public concern might make either a limited or an ambitious commitment to a peace operation in response to a particular complex emergency, and why the commitment she makes is likely to depend on both the level of public pressure she faces and the expected costs and risks of deployment. In particular, while

accounting for these other considerations, I expect greater public concern about a complex emergency to encourage more extensive contributions to peace operations in response.[16]

In contrast, when a leader perceives a strategic incentive to help create peace or provide for civilians' security needs in a particular conflict, the broader public – rather than a limited number of concerned citizens – could potentially be harmed by a failure to safeguard the relevant strategic interest.[17] Likewise, this audience typically has considerable capacity to punish her for a policy that fails to defend an important strategic interest. These realities change the political dynamics involved in contemplating a contribution to a peace operation, and in particular, should create an incentive for the leader to take on more of the burden herself. In an important sense, it is simply too risky to trust other actors to do the job by providing only logistical or financial support or a minimal number of her state's own troops. By making such a limited contribution, the leader limits the prospects for her involvement to effectively address the security deficit that constitutes a strategic threat. She thus increases the chance of the worst possible outcome: that her commitment does not achieve the strategic goal, but still involves some costs. By this logic, where a leader genuinely perceives a strategic reason to care about peace and/or security for civilians and to pursue this goal through a peace operation, she should be more likely to make a relatively ambitious commitment.

At the same time, however, and just as importantly, complex emergencies that invoke important strategic concerns by no means always provide an incentive to contribute to a peace

[16] Of course, citizens concerned about the victims of a complex emergency do not always demand immediate military action. Sometimes, the message leaders hear is simply that they need to 'do something.' They may decide to send aid or to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict. But in the especially treacherous context of complex emergencies aid often cannot be successfully delivered without military protection, and peace deals often lead to the deployment of traditional peacekeeping operations. Overall, therefore, there is good reason to expect that in these conflicts, public demands for a leader to 'do something' should be on average more likely to lead to some kind of involvement in a peace operation, whether during or immediately after the complex emergency.

[17] In addition, international audiences – both allies and adversaries – might make inferences about the leader's resolve or commitment to a strategic partner that could, in turn, influence other important relationships. In this way, failure to address a significant strategic threat might have an additional, indirect effect at home.

operation or to help meet civilians' security needs. As Fortna has pointed out, strategic interests are difficult to measure and may reflect a variety of factors such as geographic proximity or political, historical, or alliance ties between states.[18] Perhaps even more problematic, however, is the fact that these kinds of relationships can encourage Western leaders to pursue wildly different kinds of responses to conflicts in strategically important states.

In some instances, a leader might well perceive a strategic incentive to help create peace or provide for civilians' security needs. American, British, and French leadership of Operation Provide Comfort, an ambitious mission to protect Iraqi Kurds from attacks by Saddam Hussein following the 1991 Gulf War, illustrates this dynamic. According to high-level officials in the George H.W. Bush administration, the operation was driven primarily by concerns about Turkish security. Turkey, a NATO ally, faced unrest among its own Kurdish minority, and feared that Iraqi refugees fleeing Hussein's attacks would add to this problem. Protecting the Iraqi Kurds so that they could live peacefully within Iraq without threatening Turkey's internal security was therefore a strategic interest for Turkey's allies, with public and media pressure to save the Kurds playing a supporting role in motivating the intervention.[19] In this instance, as the argument laid out above would predict, the US, France, and the UK each made a considerable commitment of their own ground forces to the operation.

In other cases, however, similar strategic relationships can prompt completely different policy incentives, ranging from clear reasons to stay out of a conflict to equally strong reasons to intervene on the side of one belligerent in a non-peace operation capacity. American military support for the government of the Philippines in its fight against the Abu Sayyaf over the past decade provides an example of the latter pattern. Thus, it is by no means clear to what extent

[18] Fortna 2008, 33.
[19] Livingston 1997, 9-10; Natsios 1996, 156-57.

these kinds of strategic relationships should be associated with involvement in peace operations. In the context of the severe security deficit generated by a complex emergency, public pressure to save lives generates a limited number of policy options that can reasonably help to do so, most of which are likely to lead to at least some form of peace operation at some point in time. With strategic relationships, this is simply not the case.

These arguments generate very different expectations about the associations we should expect to observe between important strategic relationships and major Western democracies' involvement in peace operations than those associated with public concern as a motive for action. Specifically, *if* an important strategic relationship provides an incentive for a leader to help promote security and protect civilians through a peace operation, I expect that she is likely to do so in a robust way. At the same time, such relationships often do not generate these incentives, and so consistent evidence of this mechanism at work may be difficult to pin down. Indeed, this expectation is entirely consistent with the existing literature's contradictory and ambiguous findings on the impact of strategic ties on peacekeeping contributions. For example, Gaibulloev et al find evidence that states' economic interests in a conflict-affected region increase their financing for peacekeeping there.[20] Perkins and Neumayer find mixed results for state-to-state ties on peacekeeping participation: while regional proximity and former colonial ties raise the likelihood of participation, they find that bilateral trade and joint participation in intergovernmental organizations have no effect.[21] Fortna, in contrast, finds that neither alliance ties, nor colonial ties, nor political affinity between a war-affected state and a permanent UN Security Council member encourage the deployment of peacekeeping operations.[22]

In sum, I expect that variation in leaders' incentives for contributing to peace operations

[20] Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu 2009.
[21] Perkins and Neumayer 2008.
[22] Fortna 2008.

should influence patterns in their commitments. On the one hand, I expect greater public concern for complex emergency victims to promote more extensive involvement in peace operations across the board. On the other hand, where a complex emergency threatens important strategic relationships, evidence that these relationships drive peacekeeping contributions is likely to be mixed and contextual. To the extent that they do promote involvement, however, they should primarily encourage the most extensive contributions.

3. Method

I employ an innovative empirical strategy to test these arguments. This approach is unique both because it focuses on the extent of contributions, and because it is, to my knowledge, the first statistical effort to account for both strategic incentives and public concern in motivating peace operations. A suitable research strategy thus required some novel choices.

First, I focus on complex emergencies as the universe of conflicts. Because of their severity, these conflicts are comparable in important ways that others are not. Critically, it is here where public pressure for humanitarian action could most plausibly emerge to motivate peace operations, and thus where the substantive debate about the roles of strategic interests and public concern is most salient. While a state might have strategic interests in helping to resolve any conflict, severe civilian suffering is typically a prerequisite for morally motivated public pressure to respond.

The literature, however, typically focuses on certain kinds of conflicts, such as civil wars (some of which are relatively low-level) or genocides.[23] This approach is inappropriate given my substantive concerns. Therefore, building on its use by the humanitarian relief community, I define a complex emergency as *an episode of political violence that severely disrupts civilian*

[23] eg, Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Krain 2005; Fortna 2004, 2008; Power 2002.

life, killing or threatening the survival of a large number of civilians; and in which the government responsible for public welfare is unable or unwilling to shield the population from the consequences of violence or facilitate outside efforts to do so. This definition focuses on the human consequences rather than the political structure of violence, and thus includes the worst wars, atrocity crimes, and instances of inter-communal violence. As a result, the analysis below is not directly comparable with studies of traditional peacekeeping in internal conflicts. It is, however, uniquely suited to shed light on leaders' motivations to accept the costs of providing peace and security where civilians need them most.

Second, I limit the analysis to commitments by four Western democracies with extensive influence over peace operations' incidence and design – the United States, United Kingdom, France and, in its region, Australia. This has two advantages. Substantively, it means that my results can help explain why some complex emergencies benefit from more extensive efforts to meet civilians' security needs than others. Methodologically, it ensures that I compare apples to apples. Because of these states' political clout and military capabilities, their commitment decisions typically occur both prior to and under a different set of constraints than those of other actors. Thus, the ways that they substitute between the different contributions I identify and seek to explain have unique substantive implications.

First, focusing on decisions by actors with the capacity to shape the resources available to peace operations allows me to speak to the important question of why some conflicts benefit from greater efforts to meet civilians' security needs than others. In complex emergencies, civilians are consistently threatened by both the direct and indirect effects of violence. Thus, peace operations are unlikely to meet their needs without providing, at least, a secure environment for the delivery of emergency aid, and where civilians are intentionally targeted,

offering more explicit protection. But the goals most suited to these purposes – defeating perpetrators of violence against civilians, defending non-combatants directly, and protecting aid operations – involve difficult, expensive work that requires considerable intelligence and surveillance capacity and advanced technologies.[24] Thus, troops' preparation and equipment help determine which goals they can pursue successfully.

In addition, earlier intervention during a conflict can help prevent more deaths where civilians are the victims of mass violence, reduce the likelihood that food will become a weapon of conflict, and improve the prospects for reconciliation.[25] By waiting for a cease-fire or agreement to attain consent for an operation, however, interveners avoid the period when civilians are in greatest danger and run the risk "that much of an entire country will be destroyed in the meantime."[26] But acting during ongoing violence – especially against those intent on victimizing civilians – is also more difficult and requires more highly trained troops.

These findings beg for an explanation of why states with the capacity to lead robust operations geared toward civilians' security needs sometimes instead make choices that result in no operations or operations with very restricted capacity – that is, why they substitute among relatively ambitious and limited contributions of their own resources as they do.[27]

The states I focus on here have a unique capacity to affect these outcomes and to lead peace operations. Significant troop contributions by the US, UK, or France are usually necessary for any sizeable, ambitious operation because most other comparably trained militaries lack the strategic air and sealift to transport and sustain many troops far from home.[28]

[24] see eg, Zenko 2004; O'Hanlon 1997; Seybolt 2008.
[25] Zenko 2004, 5; Seybolt 2008, 183; Natsios 1994, 134.
[26] O'Hanlon 1997, 5.
[27] On policy substitution, see eg, Most and Starr 1984; Regan 2000.
[28] Holt and Berkman 2006, 74; O'Hanlon 1997, 11, 2003; Zenko 2004, 15.

These states also play a key role in helping to bring about many other operations. As permanent Security Council members, they authorize all UN operations and approve their timing, goals, and resources. In recent years they have committed few troops to these operations, instead sending them primarily to so-called 'hybrid' missions in support of the UN, or to operations outside the UN umbrella.[29] Yet their authorizing votes imply financial – and often logistical – support to UN operations, which often deploy after a conflict and do not address civilians' most pressing security needs. Because they could do more – either within or outside the context of the UN – decisions to contribute only financial or logistical support reflect limited willingness to bear the costs of providing security and protection. Similarly, these states provide critical financial and logistical support to operations by regional organizations, helping determine both when they can deploy and the availability of critical military equipment. Decisions not to send more of their own forces instead similarly reflect the costs they are willing to bear.

In the Southwest Pacific and parts of Southeast Asia, Australia has comparable influence over the incidence and design of peace operations. It has led operations in East Timor and the Solomon Islands, and its financial and logistical contributions have enabled missions conducted mainly by regional actors (as in Papua New Guinea in the 1990s). Its proximity to many conflicts differentiates it from states with similar military capacity, such as Canada and the Netherlands, because limited air and sealift capabilities act as less of a constraint close to home.

Thus, the extent of these states' involvement is a good indicator of a peace operation's potential to address civilians' security needs. Although sending their own troops does not guarantee that they will choose appropriate operational goals, it at least offers the hope of success if they do. Explaining variation in the resources they contribute, therefore, promises to shed light on why some complex emergencies benefit from more extensive efforts than others.

[29] Bellamy and Williams 2009.

At the same time, these states' considerable political and military clout distinguishes them in ways that affect the interpretation of their commitments to these missions. In particular, most contributors to peace operations have limited – if any – control over their timing, goals, and other characteristics. Typically, they make their commitments once an operation's leader(s) or the UN Security Council has already made these operational design decisions. Thus, whatever these states' motives, the proper place to study them is the universe of peace operations, rather than the conflicts where they might deploy. In addition, the distinction I make between logistical or financial contributions and troop commitments often does not have the same meaning for such states, which are less likely to fundamentally alter an operation's potential to meet civilian needs by sending their own troops. Finally, because non-Security Council states foot a predetermined portion of the bill for the UN's annual peacekeeping costs, their financial contributions often do not reflect unique choices about how much they are willing to do in response to individual conflicts. Thus, I leave the investigation of the extent of others states' contributions to future research. In the next section, I describe the dataset I have constructed around these choices.

4. Data and Variables

Observations

The observations consist of 181 dyads defined by one highly capable democracy (the 'potential intervener') and one complex emergency. They are based on an original list of 61 complex emergencies that were ongoing at some point between 1989 and 2009, but exclude any dyads in which the potential intervener clearly lacked the capacity to lead a peace operation or in which its military actions helped generate the complex emergency. These restrictions help ensure that the potential intervener is responding to an independently generated conflict and can

substitute among a wide range of possible responses. There are 57 dyads involving the United States, 58 involving the UK, 59 involving France, and 7 involving Australia.[30]

Each complex emergency meets numerous quantitative and qualitative criteria. In brief, each displaced at least 500,000 or killed 20,000 civilians within a 5-year period, including at least 10% of this amount in the first year and 6% in each subsequent year until the violence dropped below this threshold. Following Valentino's work on mass killings, I employ these high thresholds to forestall debate about whether the complex emergencies truly involve large-scale civilian suffering.[31] This excludes some short but intense episodes of violence and severe conflicts in small communities, but results in greater conceptual clarity.[32]

Finally, because some of the Cold War's worst conflicts continued afterward and inspired peace operations in the 1990s, I follow Gilligan and Stedman's logic and include all conflicts that meet the operational criteria as long as they were ongoing in 1989 or later.[33] Thus, of the complex emergencies examined below, 18 began before 1989 and 9 were ongoing at the end of 2009. While most affected an entire country, a number were limited to a region such as a province or island. Several countries experienced multiple complex emergencies.

[30] More specifically, the US, UK, and France can deploy enough forces to lead a peace operation (though, in some instances, of limited size) anywhere in the world. In contrast, Australia can do so only in its own region, and so I include dyads involving Australia as the potential intervener only for complex emergencies that occur there. In addition, each of the potential interveners directly participated in generating the complex emergency that began in Afghanistan in 2001, and so these dyads are excluded. Likewise, the US and UK helped create the complex emergency in Iraq beginning in 2003, and I exclude these dyads as well. Finally, the US also played a direct role in the complex emergency in Pakistan from 2004-2009, which I also exclude. In addition, although Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 met the criteria for a complex emergency, the subsequent involvement of the potential interveners in the Persian Gulf War does not meet my definition of a peace operation. I exclude these dyads from the analysis, but including them did not alter the results.

[31] Valentino 2004, 10-12; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004, 378.

[32] Most of the data come from the U.S. Committee for Refugees' annual *World Refugee Report*. Given the difficulty of obtaining accurate annual figures on death and displacement, each complex emergency – and each year within it – is also coded according to the author's confidence that it meets the quantitative guidelines. Of the 61 events, there is some uncertainty about whether 11 of them meet all operational criteria. Dropping observations associated with these events did not materially impact any of the findings discussed below.

[33] Gilligan and Stedman 2003.

Dependent Variable

Peace Operation Commitments is an ordered categorical variable that reflects the extent of the potential intervener's contributions to peace operations in each complex emergency.[34] At minimum, a peace operation involves the deployment of military personnel to help ensure peace and security for local actors and begins no later than the year after the end of the complex emergency. Operations to evacuate foreign nationals, protect national assets, or intervene on behalf of one side in a conflict are excluded, unless they also meet these criteria. Peace operations may be multilateral or unilateral, and include UN-led and UN-sanctioned missions as well as missions not sanctioned by the UN. Personnel need not be deployed to the territory where the complex emergency occurs, as long as they respond to its effects. For example, because it was deployed partly to help protect Darfuri refugees, the EU's 2008-9 mission in Chad/CAR counts as a response to the war in Darfur. Finally, sometimes a peace operation is already deployed at the outbreak of a complex emergency (in response to previous violence). Such operations count as long as they encourage peace and security in response to the changing circumstances.[35]

Peace Operation Commitments equals 0 if the potential intervener made no commitment to a peace operation; 1 if it at most made a logistical or financial contribution; 2 if it committed non-ground-based military assets or less than 1,000 of its own ground forces; and 3 if it committed at least 1,000 of its own ground forces.[36] These distinctions reflect the arguments

[34] Sources include *The Military Balance*, the *UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*, the *Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping* (Mays 2004.), and various case studies.
[35] Specifically, such an operation counts if it continues to try to perform the tasks for which it has been mandated, or receives a new mandate. For example, MONUA was deployed in Angola when renewed war broke out in 1998. Because the UN renewed its mandate and kept the force in place until 1999, MONUA counts as a relevant peace operation in 1998 and 1999.
[36] When a potential intervener contributes to more than one operation, *Peace Operation Commitments* records the most extensive of these commitments. Financial and logistical commitments occur both when a potential intervener

about leaders' political concerns presented above. First, relative to offering financial/logistical support, deploying one's *own* forces is costly and risky but can allow a peace operation to pursue more ambitious goals and, potentially, save more lives. In addition, *more* soldiers can carry out more tasks and deploy over a larger area, and provide greater leeway to focus on a combination of civilian protection and other goals. Yet more troops cost more to send, and expose more soldiers to deployment-associated dangers. Third, ground troops typically provide better opportunities for protecting civilians than air or sea-based forces because they can interpose themselves between perpetrators of rights abuses and their victims. Yet they also make easier targets for actors who oppose their presence. In sum, sending one's own troops is generally both a more promising and more risky choice than supporting troops from elsewhere, while more troops and ground-based forces each add to the costs and risks leaders can expect to endure.[37]

Of the 181 observations, *Peace Operation Commitments* equals 0 in 95 cases; 1 in 39 cases; 2 in 26 cases; and 3 in 21 cases. Figure 1 shows the distribution by potential intervener.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Independent Variables

Public Concern

As noted above, one reason that quantitative studies have ignored the influence of public concern in motivating peace operations despite its importance in qualitative work has been a lack of appropriate data across many conflicts. Although organizations like the Pew Research Center conduct polls on attitudes toward the use of force in particular conflicts, such polls are only

assists an operation whose deployment did not require its consent – as when the US supported AMIS in Darfur – and when its authorization is required, as with all UN missions for the permanent Security Council members.

[37] While it is possible for a state to contribute its own troops to a peace operation in ways that limit their exposure to risks, this exposure nevertheless remains higher than when they support troops from other countries. As long as the broader public is more attuned to casualties among their own state's troops than the financial costs of a contribution, committing the state's own troops is more politically risky.

available for conflicts that attract considerable public and media attention and therefore do not provide a good source of data on the true range of variation in public concern across conflicts.

I seek to rectify this problem by developing a new measure of attentive public concern based on media coverage of complex emergencies, while attending to important methodological concerns. In brief, the literature on media, public opinion, and the use of force emphasizes that when foreign conflicts are covered in the news, this coverage can reflect one of two basic patterns. First, media coverage may reflect official policy or interest among elite decision-makers.[38] In a complex emergency, then, significant news coverage may even reflect a leader's efforts to generate public support for a peace operation she already plans to undertake.

Second, and in contrast, under certain conditions groups and individuals who are opposed to official policy can use the media to advocate for their own preferences. For example, armed with substantial credible information about a conflict, they may be able to challenge a leader inclined toward intervention.[39] Opportunities to do so are greatest when journalists are able to frame the issue in a compelling and culturally resonant way, such as when the policy issue is ambiguous and when opponents of official policy are motivated and politically influential.[40]

These arguments similarly imply that when leaders face pressure to intervene in a complex emergency where they are otherwise reluctant to act, informed and motivated activists and journalists can use the media to make a case *in favor of* a vigorous response. Indeed, Entman sees such conflicts (citing Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo as examples) as precisely the kind of ambiguous issues where opportunities for non-governmental actors to oppose official policy through the media are relatively great.[41] Moreover, Bass has documented this very pattern

[38] eg, Mermin 1997.
[39] Powlick and Katz 1998; Western 2005.
[40] Entman 2004, 18.
[41] Entman 2004.

of media coverage in some of the 19th and early 20th centuries' worst humanitarian crises.[42] American advocacy on Darfur provides a more recent example. As Hamilton points out, the growth of US media coverage of Darfur tracked the mounting strength and outreach efforts of the Darfur advocacy movement, peaking well after the worst of the violence.[43] These findings also resonate with various claims that media coverage is an important indicator of public concern about foreign conflicts,[44] and that leaders perceive them as such.[45]

In sum, where a government plans to contribute to a peace operation, news coverage is likely to reflect its efforts to generate public support. But when morally motivated journalists, activists, and concerned citizens are mobilized in response to a particular complex emergency, we should see more media coverage that reflects pressure on a reluctant government to act. Using media reporting to measure public concern about a conflict thus depends on the ability to separate these two patterns of coverage. This is precisely what my measure – *Complex Emergency News Coverage* (or simply *CE News Coverage*) – seeks to do, isolating news coverage during periods when it is likely to reflect public concern and not a leader's efforts to generate support for interventionist policy.

Specifically, I use headline news searches from one major elite newspaper in each potential intervener to measure the natural log of the ratio of news coverage during a complex emergency (*but before any decision to intervene*) to news coverage of the same place over the five years *before* the complex emergency. Insofar as possible I exclude coverage during the lead-up to a decision about contributing to a peace operation, eliminating periods during which the possibility of military action was actively discussed. At the same time, I try to include

[42] Bass 2008.
[43] Hamilton 2011, 101-2.
[44] eg, Regan 2000.
[45] La Balme 2002, 86-90, 96; Kull and Ramsay 2000, 105; Entman 2000, 21; Holsti 2004, 302.

coverage from key periods in a complex emergency that might have influenced public concern.[46] In addition, by using the ratio of coverage during a complex emergency to coverage beforehand, I seek to account for the likelihood that complex emergencies that occur in geopolitically important locales attract more attention overall than those that occur in less important places.[47]

CE News Coverage thus reflects public concern generated by the violence associated with a complex emergency while taking significant precautions against reflecting the influence of leaders' efforts to influence public opinion, coverage of ongoing operations, or the geopolitical importance of the place where a complex emergency occurs. If anything, this measure likely under-estimates public concern about complex emergencies by excluding news coverage that actually reflects such concern in order to avoid also including coverage that might reflect official policy. A more detailed discussion and some specific examples are available in Appendix B.

CE News Coverage appears to do a good job of distinguishing between public concern about a complex emergency and various other strategic and geopolitical considerations that might also influence news coverage of a conflict before any decision to intervene. Table 1 presents the correlation coefficients for *CE News Coverage* and several strategic relationships that might also prompt a leader to contribute to a peace operation (discussed in greater detail below), as well as for news coverage before the outbreak of a complex emergency. As the table shows, in no case are these correlations especially high and in several cases they are actually negative. In particular, if we believe that a strategically or otherwise geopolitically important place is likely to receive more overall news coverage than a less important place, then the

[46] In a few cases balancing these competing demands required including coverage during periods shortly before the announcement of a contribution to a peace operation. In particular, this applied where a peace operation occurred quite quickly in response to the outbreak of a complex emergency. Thus, as a robustness check I ran the statistical analyses presented below without the observations involving these complex emergencies – East Timor, Côte d'Ivoire, Lebanon III, Iraq/Kurds II, Bosnia, and Croatia. For results and more details see Appendix C, Table 6.
[47] As a robustness check I also used the numerator of the ratio to measure public concern and the denominator (or pre-Complex Emergency news coverage) as a control. This had no noticeable effect on the results discussed below.

negative correlation between *CE News Coverage* and pre-complex emergency coverage should provide confidence that the former is not picking up on a complex emergency's strategic or geopolitical significance.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Finally, *CE News Coverage* passes what might be called the 'eyeball' test. Figure 1 shows all observations involving the United States as the potential intervener. Many of the complex emergencies known for attracting extensive interest and generating pressure on leaders to respond – including in Darfur, Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor, and Northern Iraq in 1991 – appear toward the top of the list. While Northern Iraq also invoked important strategic interests for the US, several other places where such interests were also at stake – as in Turkey and the Philippines – rank relatively low. Similar patterns are evident for the other potential interveners.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Strategic Relationships

As discussed above, the existing literature employs a litany of measures to represent strategic relationships that might promote peace operations. Of these, I focus on several that seem likely to generate an interest in stability and thus potentially provide a motive for helping to promote peace and/or provide security and protection for civilians.

First, *Former Colony* indicates whether the country where the complex emergency occurs received its independence from the potential intervener.[48] Second, *Region* indicates whether a complex emergency occurs in the same region as the potential intervener.[49] Third, *Alliance*

[48] Data are from Hensel 2006.

[49] Regional definitions are from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, with one exception. The UN considers Asia and Oceania separate continents, which places Australia outside the same region as the complex emergencies for which it is a potential intervener. But given Australia's immediate proximity to much of Southeast

indicates whether the potential intervener and the state where the complex emergency occurs share – at any time during the complex emergency – an alliance identified by the ATOP project as, at minimum, a defense pact.[50] Fourth, *Contiguous Ally* is a new variable coded by the author, which indicates whether the potential intervener has an ally contiguous to the complex emergency that might provide an interest in regional security and stability. The author coded this variable again from alliances recorded by the ATOP project as, at minimum, defense pacts in force at any point during the complex emergency, and using COW's Direct Contiguity Data version 3.1.[51] Finally, *Any Strategic* is an indicator variable that combines *Former Colony*, *Region*, and *Contiguous Ally*. It is coded 1 when any of these three relationships are present.[52]

Controls

I include a broad range of controls. First, *Mass Killing* is an indicator of whether any year of the complex emergency was part of an episode of mass killing as coded by Valentino, with missing observations filled in according to his guidelines.[53] Such episodes involve the intentional killing of at least 50,000 civilians within 5 years. While all complex emergencies involve major security and protection threats to civilians, significant involvement by the most highly capable states in peace operations may be even more critical in these conflicts. Thus, controlling for *Mass Killing* accounts for the possibility that these states may act in part because – compared to other conflicts – they have fewer opportunities to support other actors.[54]

Asia and historical tendency to see the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia as its strategic 'backyard,' I code Australia as in the same region as the complex emergencies for which it is a potential intervener. Results were consistent when estimated with the UN's original version.

[50] Leeds et al. 2002. Data from version 3.0 of the ATOP dataset, May 2005, at http://atop.rice.edu/home. Accessed June 15, 2010. Alliances not known to have expired since then were considered in force for the ensuing years.

[51] Leeds et al. 2002; Stinnett et al. 2002.

[52] I include these three variables but not *Alliance* because *Alliance* has a very different relationship with *Peace Operation Commitments* than any of the other three strategic relationships. See further discussion below.

[53] Valentino 2004.

[54] As an additional robustness check, I also tried a variable called *Genopoliticide,* which records whether the

Second, several scholars claim that states contribute to peace operations to promote democratization in conflict-ridden countries.[55] Thus, I also control for the level of democracy of the state where each complex emergency occurs, using the Polity IV Project's *polity2* variable, measured the year before the complex emergency begins.[56]

Third, a number of variables reflect aspects of complex emergencies that might increase the costs of contributing to peace operations, and especially of deploying a state's own troops. For example, existing work has found that states with stronger militaries and conflicts in or next to Security Council P-5 members or major powers are less likely to receive peacekeepers.[57] Thus, *Army* is the natural log of the size of the army in the country where the complex emergency occurs, during the year it begins.[58] Likewise, *Russia/China Contiguity* indicates whether a complex emergency occurs in, or in a state contiguous to, Russia or China.[59] Based on Perkins and Neumayer's finding that greater distance between a potential contributor and a conflict limits peace operation contributions, *Distance* measures the natural log of the kilometers between the capital cities of the potential intervener and the complex emergency state.[60]

Furthermore, O'Hanlon argues that high casualties are likely in peace operations responding to "revolutions, guerrilla struggles, and highly ideological conflicts."[61] More casualties can also be expected if the target state has "reasonably well-equipped armies, difficult terrain, or dedicated fighters," while it is more challenging to provide security for a larger

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complex emergency was part of a genocide or politicide as coded by the Political Instability Task Force (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2010.). This did not affect the core results.

[55] Andersson 2000; Fortna 2008; Marten 2004; Paris 2004.

[56] Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010.

[57] Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005.

[58] Data are from *The Military Balance,* International Institute for Strategic Studies. Where prior conflict made it impossible to identify a single national force at the beginning of the complex emergency, I used the earliest available army size during the conflict.

[59] Data are from Stinnett et al. 2002.

[60] Perkins and Neumayer 2008. Data for *Distance* are from Gleditsch and Ward 2001. They are available at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data-5.html

[61] O'Hanlon 1997.

population.[62] Thus, *Guerrilla* indicates whether a complex emergency is characterized by guerrilla war, as coded by Valentino et al, with missing observations filled in using their operational guidelines.[63] *Population* is the natural log of the population (in thousands) of the complex emergency-affected region or country, measured where possible as the complex emergency begins.[64] *Mountains* accounts for the mountainousness of the terrain in the state where the complex emergency occurs.[65]

Fourth, the type of political violence that generates a complex emergency might also influence contributions. Thus, I divide complex emergencies into five categories based on the primary political dispute that provokes the violence. These distinctions are based on the variable '*type*' in UCDP/PRIO's Armed Conflict Dataset, with the addition of categories for one-sided and inter-communal violence.[66] Wherever possible and sensible, I use UCDP/PRIO's coding.[67]

Finally, *Pre-1989* indicates complex emergencies that began during the Cold War. Such conflicts, to the extent that they were associated with core East-West tensions, might have made

[62] O'Hanlon 1997, 12, 51.
[63] Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004, 383-4, 389. Data at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/huth/data_sets.html. Accessed June 15, 2010.
[64] These data come primarily from the UN's *World Population Prospects*, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2009. Where *World Population Prospects* was missing data, I use the World Bank's 2010 *World Development Indicators*. For complex emergencies in sub-national regions, I used a variety of other sources.
[65] Data are from Fearon and Laitin 2003.
[66] Gleditsch et al. 2002. I use Version 4 (2009), at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conflicts-Version-X-2009/. Accessed June 20, 2010.
[67] I code a complex emergency as *International Conflict* if the violence is either inter-state war, or is carried out primarily by an actor in one state against an entity in another state. In *Internationalized Internal Conflict*, the primary parties to the violence are located in the same state, but there is extensive international military intervention in a non-peace operation capacity. *Internal Conflict* involves the state and at least one organized opposition group and does not involve substantial external intervention. *Inter-communal Violence* identifies conflicts where the primary fault line reflects inter-communal tension. Here, 1) the government is not a primary party to the violence, 2) victims are chosen based on their perceived membership in a religious, ethnic, or kinship group, and 3) members of at least two communities participate in the violence. Finally, a complex emergency is primarily *One-sided Violence* against civilians if it occurs without ongoing concurrent conflict among at least two organized parties. In a few cases I adjusted UCDP/PRIO codings. First, I did so to reflect conflicts that were primarily inter-communal or one-sided violence against civilians. Second, for internal conflicts coded by PRIO as internationalized armed conflict because of the actions of any of the potential interveners in a peace operation (Bosnia, Kosovo, Croatia, and Sierra Leone), I simply coded internal conflict. Finally, I coded Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon in 1996 and 2006 as internationalized conflict (PRIO codes them as internal), because the shelling's effects occurred in another state.

it more difficult for major Western democracies to contribute to peace operations, regardless of their motives for doing so.

5. Analysis and Findings

Model Choice

I use two main statistical models to assess the arguments developed above. First, given the ordered nature of the dependent variable and my expectations about the impact of increasing public concern on contributions to peace operations, I use ordinal probit regression. This model assumes that a change in a covariate has the same effect on the size of the probit coefficient for each category of the dependent variable (the so-called 'parallel lines' assumption).

Second, if as I expect any positive influence of strategic relationships on leaders' contributions to peace operations is evident only for the most extensive commitments, a simple ordinal probit may obscure evidence of this effect. Therefore, I also present several generalized ordered probits and logits that relax the model's standard parallel lines assumption for some of the variables representing core strategic relationships.

If one set of considerations determines the costs a leader is willing to accept to help provide security in a complex emergency, and these acceptable costs determine her policy choice, then these models make sense. This, I have argued, is not the case for less capable states without the capacity to lead a peace operation, but is a reasonable assumption for the highly influential potential interveners considered here. These states were selected precisely because of their unique capacity to determine how much they wish to do in response to a complex emergency and to decide on that basis whether they prefer to support an operation that uses troops from other countries or to play a more direct role themselves.

Results

Table 2 presents the results of a series of ordinal probits. Given the limited number of observations, these models include different subsets of the controls. Additional combinations produced comparable results and did not affect the main variables of interest. Model 3 excludes one of the core strategic variables, *Alliance*, in order to include one of the controls, *Russia/China Contiguity*. Both of these variables lack observations in categories 2 and 3 of *Peace Operation Commitments* and thus cannot be included in the same model. Model 4 includes complex emergency type, omitting observations involving inter-communal violence because there were no peace operation contributions in these cases. Internal conflict (civil war) is the reference category. Table 3 presents the generalized ordered probit and logit models. Tests of the parallel lines assumption on the models in Table 1 indeed indicate that several of the strategic relationships violate the assumption, suggesting the appropriateness of these alternate models.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

These results are strongly supportive of the theoretical expectations developed above. First, *Complex Emergency News Coverage* has a consistent and statistically significant positive influence on the extent of contributions that is insensitive to model specification. A test of the ordinal probit's parallel lines assumption suggests that this assumption holds for *CE News Coverage*. Nevertheless, allowing the coefficients to vary in Model 5 provides further evidence that as hypothesized, an increase in public concern has a positive effect at each contribution level. These findings are, to my knowledge, the first statistical evidence of the impact of public concern on these contributions and are the more striking because they hold up while accounting for a variety of other possible influences.

Second, as expected the variables representing strategic relationships have more mixed and contextual effects. In Table 2 the signs of *Former Colony*, *Region*, and *Contiguous Ally* are sensitive to model specification, while *Alliance* is consistently negative and significant. When their coefficients are allowed to vary for different contribution levels in Table 3, the reason becomes apparent. Here, coefficients on *Former Colony*, *Region*, and *Contiguous Ally* are insignificant, but negatively signed, for logistical/financial contributions (Equation 1). For limited troop contributions (Equation 2), all have positive signs, and *Contiguous Ally* has a significant effect. Finally, all three have a positive, significant effect on the most extensive contributions of over 1,000 troops (Equation 3). In addition, when these three variables – which individually have a similar impact on contributions – are combined into the single indicator *Any Strategic*, in Model 7, they have both a significant negative influence on financial/logistical contributions and a positive effect on major commitments of a state's own troops. In contrast, there are no observations in which *Alliance* equals 1 and the leader makes more than a logistical/financial contribution. Thus, *Alliance*'s effect is purely negative. These results appear to confirm both my expectation that these relationships might have mixed effects on leaders' contributions to peace operations, and that any positive effects would most likely be evident among the most extensive commitments.

Because the magnitude and statistical significance of each covariate's effect depend on the values of the other covariates and are difficult to interpret from the coefficient estimates, Figures 3 and 4 illustrate some of these effects graphically. First, based on Model 1, the graphs in Figure 3 show how the predicted probability that an observation falls in each category of *Peace Operation Commitments* varies with *CE News Coverage*. *CE News Coverage* ranges from about -3 (this represents a complex emergency that receives about one twentieth as much news

coverage as before its outbreak) to approximately 4 (a complex emergency that receives about sixty times as much coverage as before its outbreak). For these calculations, each of the strategic relationship variables were set to 0, and all other covariates were set at their means.

These graphs confirm that, even when none of the key strategic relationships are present, higher values of *CE News Coverage* are associated with more extensive contributions to peace operations. Over the range of *CE News Coverage*, the probability of a logistical/financial contribution increases from under 5% to about 30%, and then decreases again to about 25% when public concern is greatest. The probabilities of both limited and extensive troop contributions increase from approximately 0 to about 30% over the same range, with the probability of the latter increasing most quickly at the highest values of *CE News Coverage*.

[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Second, based on Model 7, Figure 4 presents the effect of *Any Strategic* on the predicted probability of each kind of contribution to a peace operation. In these graphs, the solid lines represent the effect of moving from 0 to 1 on *Any Strategic* on the predicted probability of observing each kind of contribution. Negative values indicate the outcome becomes less likely when *Any Strategic* = 1, and positive values indicate that it becomes more likely. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Each panel also shows how the effect of *Any Strategic* varies across the range of *CE News Coverage*. All other variables are held at their means.

These graphs further illustrate that the statistical results are consistent with the theory. Only in the bottom panel, which represents the most extensive troop contributions, does *Any Strategic* ever have a positive effect. What is more, this effect is only statistically significant at the 5% level for relatively high values of *CE News Coverage*, reflecting the fact that – at least in

these data – extensive troop contributions are most likely when public concern is relatively high. At the highest levels of public concern, the presence of a key strategic relationship can increase the probability of an extensive troop contribution by about 20 percentage points. The UK's 2000 intervention in Sierra Leone's civil war is an example of this dynamic at work. Although Sierra Leone was a former British colony through the entirety of its decade-long civil war, only when the war attracted significant attention among the British public in the late 1990s did the government begin to play a more active role in seeking peace and, eventually, intervene directly. These results presented in Figure 4 thus add to the sense that although strategic relationships can promote contributions to peace operations, their influence is highly contextual.

[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Robustness Checks

These results are robust to a variety of alternative model specifications, aside from those already noted. Results and further discussion of several of these are available in Appendix C. Briefly, I first use interaction terms as an additional test of whether the positive effects of public concern depend on the presence of additional, possible strategic motives for action. Confirming the patterns from Figure 3, I find that they do not. Second, I confirm that my results hold for a restricted sample that eliminates observations where peace operations occurred shortly after the outbreak of the complex emergency. Third, although there are strong theoretical reasons to treat *Peace Operation Commitments* as an ordered variable, I also tried a multinomial logit model. Failure to account for the ordinal information contained in *Peace Operation Commitments* has little impact on the effect of *CE News Coverage*, but the positive and statistically significant effects of strategic relationships on the most extensive troop contributions largely disappear with this specification. Though somewhat puzzling, if anything this result confirms the broader

conclusion that the effects of these relationships are mixed and context-specific.

In addition, clustering the models' standard errors on the potential intervener, the complex emergency, and the state where the complex emergency occurred in order to account for dependence between observations has a negligible impact on *CE News Coverage* and the strategic variables, but reduces or eliminates significance for some of the controls, including indicators of complex emergency type (Model 4). The main results also hold up with a measure of *CE News Coverage* based on full-text news searches (rather than the headline searches used here), with an alternate dependent variable that includes only peace operations initiated during the complex emergency (not during the year after it ended), and with the exclusion of right-censored observations involving complex emergencies that were still ongoing at the end of 2009. Finally, they also hold up for a series of models that I ran separately on individual potential interveners. For the United States, I also employed two additional measures of potential strategic incentives that were unavailable for the other countries – the number of US troops previously deployed to the country where a complex emergency occurs and the amount of military aid to that country. Both were negatively associated with contributions.

6. Conclusion

In complex emergencies, more than other conflicts, the will of a few highly capable Western democracies to contribute their financial and military resources has a tremendous impact on the prospects for peace operations to meet civilians' needs for protection and assistance. Yet previous studies have offered little insight into why these states contribute as much as they do to these operations, although this question is integral to our understanding of why the victims of some complex emergencies benefit from more extensive, and better-designed, international efforts to address their most pressing security and protection needs.

Drawing on an important debate in the literature about the motivating influence of strategic considerations and public pressure for humanitarian action, this article offers new insight into how these motives work – in particular, how they affect the extent of leaders' commitments to peace operations. Leaders may be motivated by both strategic incentives and public pressure, I argue, but depending on the source of their motivation, they are accountable to different audiences. In addition, strategic relationships, in particular, may promote either involvement in peace operations *or* a host of entirely different policy responses. These differences between public concern and strategic relationships as possible motivations for action should influence patterns in leaders' contributions in predictable ways. I expect that leaders facing public pressure for humanitarian action could have reasons to contribute to peace operations in a variety of different ways, depending on the strength of public pressure and opportunities to respond to it for a reasonable cost. In contrast, I expect important strategic relationships to promote involvement in these missions less consistently, but when they do so, to primarily encourage more ambitious troop contributions.

My analysis of American, British, French, and Australian contributions to peace operations in response to an original dataset of post-Cold War complex emergencies provides support for these expectations. First, while public concern about complex emergencies has played a major role in qualitative studies of humanitarian military action, thus far quantitative work on states' involvement in peace operations has ignored this motivation. My results suggest that this is an important oversight. Using an innovative original measure of public concern about complex emergencies in these four potential interveners, I find that such concern plays a consistent role in explaining contributions. As expected, an increase in public concern improves

the chances of financial and logistical commitments as well as both limited and extensive troop contributions. What is more, these results are robust to a wide variety of model specifications.

In contrast, a series of strategic relationships referenced in the literature as potential incentives for participating in peace operations have quite disparate effects on the ways in which leaders do so. In some cases these relationships may simply fail to capture strategic reasons to help restore peace and security in response to a complex emergency. Indeed, the results suggest that alliance relationships serve as a disincentive to such contributions: there are, in fact, no instances of an alliance relationship in which the potential intervener made more than a logistical or financial contribution. More often, however – as in the case of *Former Colony*, *Region*, and *Contiguous Ally* – it appears that they do have a positive effect, but that as expected, this effect exists only for the most extensive troop contributions. It occurs, moreover, only in the presence of substantial public concern and is also sensitive to model specification. Taken together, these results support my expectation that consistent evidence that strategic relationships encourage contributions could be difficult to pin down, but that *when* such relationships do have this effect, they can inspire leaders to accept a significant share of the burden of peace operations.

In sum, these results shed new light on our understanding of how leaders' motives for contributing to peace operations affect the ways that they do so. In particular, they call attention to the need to pay greater attention to domestic political influences on the major Western democracies' involvement in these missions. Still, although the extent of involvement by these states contributes significantly to a peace operation's prospects for meeting civilians' security needs, it is only part of the equation. Future research should examine how leaders' motivations interact with the costs of action to influence other important characteristics of the operations they design, such as their timing and political goals.

Tables and Figures

Table 1: Correlation Coefficients – CE News Coverage & Strategic Relationships

	Former Colony	Region	Contiguous Ally	Alliance	Any Strategic	Pre-CE Coverage
CE News Coverage	-.1475	.2203	.2379	-.0119	.1321	-.2376

Figure 1



Figure 2


Complex Emergency Headline News Coverage: New York Times
Yugoslavia / Kosovo
Sudan / Darfur
Bosnia
Croatia
Russia / Chechnya I
USSR / Azerbaijan - Armenia
Rwanda
Tajikistan
Afghanistan/Soviets
Indonesia / East Timor
El Salvador
Iraq/ Kurds II
India / Kashmir
Sierra Leone
Angola I
Burundi
Zaire / DRC I
iraq / Kurds I
Eritrea / War w/ Ethiopia
Ivory Coast
Somalia
Lebanon I / War
Liberia
Lebanon III / Israeli air attacks
Sri Lanka I
Colombia
Myanmar / Burma
Uganda II (LRA)
Indonesia / Aceh
Algeria
Kenya / Post-election violence
Peru / Shining Path
Sri Lanka II
Liberia II
Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh
Turkey / PKK
Russia / Chechnya II
Lebanon II / Israeli air attacks
Iraq/ Shiites
Nigeria / Inter-communal violence
Zimbabwe
Philippines / Govt. vs. NPA
Congo-Brazzaville
Philippines / Govs vs. Muslim insurgents
Pakistan / Govt. vs. Taliban
Angola III
Sudan / Southern inter-communal violence
Angola II
Mozambique
South Africa
Ethiopia / Civil War
DRC II
Afghanistan/civil war
Cambodia
Sudan / North-South civil war
Indonesia / Moluccas & Sulawesi
India / Northeast
Uganda I
-2
0
2
4

Table 2: Ordered Probit Estimates for Peace Operation Contributions

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
CE News Coverage	0.395***	0.364***	0.424***	0.483***
	(0.078)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.075)
Former Colony	-0.003	0.154	-0.042	0.057
	(0.361)	(0.321)	(0.374)	(0.349)
Region	-0.063	0.031	-0.162	0.202
	(0.391)	(0.397)	(0.426)	(0.340)
Alliance	-2.167***	-1.024*		-1.546**
	(0.552)	(0.546)		(0.602)
Contiguous Ally	0.307	-0.188	0.341	-0.184
	(0.293)	(0.252)	(0.304)	(0.234)
Mass Killing	1.100***	1.102***	0.960***	
	(0.220)	(0.223)	(0.231)	
Army	-0.332***		-0.294***	
	(0.067)		(0.075)	
Distance	-0.409		-0.391	
	(0.256)		(0.263)	
Democracy	-0.047*		-0.039	
	(0.027)		(0.025)	
Guerrilla War		-0.779***		
		(0.238)		
Population		-0.331***		
		(0.106)		
Mountains		-0.104		
		(0.083)		
Russia/China Contiguity			-1.506***	
			(0.264)	
Pre-1989	-0.301	0.049	-0.264	
	(0.265)	(0.287)	(0.264)	
Internationalized Civil				0.593**
				(0.241)
International Conflict				0.762***
				(0.270)
One-sided Violence				0.543*
				(0.308)
Cutpoint 1	-3.990*	-2.916***	-3.953*	0.405**
	(2.292)	(0.929)	(2.338)	(0.166)
Cutpoint 2	-3.217	-2.119**	-3.113	1.154***
	(2.280)	(0.891)	(2.321)	(0.180)
Cutpoint 3	-2.429	-1.289	-2.271	1.906***
	(2.266)	(0.896)	(2.304)	(0.199)
Observations	164	167	164	147
Pseudo R-squared	0.242	0.228	0.281	0.142

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The same models clustered on the potential intervener and on the complex emergency state are available – see robustness checks.

Table 3: Generalized Ordered Probits and Logits

	Model 5 (Probit)		Model 6 (Probit)		Model 7 (Logit)	
CE News Coverage			0.358***	(0.091)	0.598***	(0.152)
Eqn 1	0.568***	(0.105)				
Eqn 2	0.212*	(0.109)				
Eqn 3	0.417***	(0.111)				
Former Colony	0.016	(0.362)				
Eqn 1			-0.327	(0.286)		
Eqn 2			0.397	(0.369)		
Eqn 3			1.021**	(0.436)		
Region	-0.089	(0.399)				
Eqn 1			-0.640	(0.436)		
Eqn 2			0.187	(0.411)		
Eqn 3			0.839*	(0.438)		
Alliance	-2.348***	(0.518)	-0.931	(0.599)	-2.320***	(0.845)
Contiguous Ally			-0.210	(0.264)		
Eqn 1	-0.279	(0.316)				
Eqn 2	0.886***	(0.322)				
Eqn 3	1.019***	(0.361)				
Any Strategic						
Eqn 1					-1.233***	(0.417)
Eqn 2					0.412	(0.481)
Eqn 3					1.777**	(0.764)
Mass Killing	1.331***	(0.226)	1.221***	(0.230)	2.136***	(0.401)
Army	-0.382***	(0.067)				
Distance	-0.461*	(0.252)				
Democracy	-0.051*	(0.026)				
Guerrilla War			-0.786***	(0.244)	-1.476***	(0.465)
Population			-0.365***	(0.113)	-0.622***	(0.191)
Mountains			-0.103	(0.083)	-0.114	(0.150)
Pre-1989	-0.359	(0.267)	0.054	(0.308)	0.190	(0.542)
Constant						
Eqn 1	4.680**	(2.257)	3.331***	(1.002)	5.817***	(1.641)
Eqn 2	3.730*	(2.244)	2.307**	(0.952)	3.585**	(1.555)
Eqn 3	2.582	(2.229)	1.215	(0.965)	1.124	(1.618)
Observations	164		167		167	

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These models relax the parallel lines assumption of the ordinal probit and ordinal logit for *CE News Coverage* and most strategic variables. Model 5 does so for *CE News Coverage* and *Contiguous Ally*. Model 6 does so for *Former Colony* and *Region*, and Model 7 does so for *Any Strategic*. In each model, the cells labeled Eqn 1, Eqn 2, and Eqn 3 show the different coefficients for the variables where the equal slopes assumption is relaxed. Coefficients for Equation 1 show a variable's effect on the chance of a logistical or financial contribution, relative to none. Coefficients for Equation 2 show the effect on the chance of a limited troop contribution, relative to none. Coefficients for Equation 3 show the effect on the chance of a substantial troop contribution, relative to none. Interpretation of the other coefficients is as above.

Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities by CE News Coverage



Figure 4: Changes in Predicted Probabilities by Any Strategic



Appendix A
Post-Cold War Complex Humanitarian Emergencies and Peace Operations

CE Name	Start year	End year	All Peace Operations for Each Complex Emergency*
Afghanistan I / Soviets	1978	1991	UNGOMAP
Afghanistan II / Civil war	1992	2001	
Afghanistan II/ OEF & after	2001	Ongoing 2009	*Excluded from Analysis*
Cambodia	1979	1991	UNAMIC; UNTAC
India / Kashmir	1990	2004	
India / Northeast	1993	1998	
Indonesia / Aceh	1999	2004	
Indonesia / East Timor	1999	1999	INTERFET; UNTAET
Indonesia / Moluccas & Sulawesi	1999	2002	
Myanmar / Burma	1988	Ongoing 2009	
Pakistan / Govt. vs. Taliban	2004	Ongoing 2009	*Excluded from Analysis for USA only*
Philippines / Govt. vs. NPA	1986	1992	
Philippines / Govs vs. Muslims	1996	Ongoing 2009	*IMT*
Sri Lanka I	1983	2001	*IPKF*
Sri Lanka II	2006	2009	
Tajikistan	1992	1993	*CIS/PKF*; UNMOT
Bosnia	1992	1995	UNPROFOR/NATO support; Deliberate Force; IFOR
Croatia	1991	1995	UNPROFOR/UNCRO; UNTAES (1996); UNMOP (1996)
Yugoslavia / Kosovo	1998	2000	Allied Force; KFOR
Turkey / PKK	1992	1998	
USSR / Azerbaijan - Armenia	1988	1991	
Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh	1992	1994	
Russia / Chechnya I	1995	1996	
Russia / Chechnya II	1999	2004	
Sierra Leone	1991	2001	ECOMOG; UNOMSIL; UNAMSIL; Op. Palliser (UK)
Liberia	1990	1996	ECOMOG; UNOMIL
Liberia II	1999	2003	UNMIL; ECOMIL; JTF Liberia (US)
Algeria	1992	2003	
Burundi	1993	2004	*OMIB*; AMIB; ONUB; *SAPSD*
Mozambique	1982	1992	ONUMOZ
Angola I	1975	1990	UNAVEM I; UNAVEM II
Angola II	1992	1994	UNAVEM III (1995)
Angola III	1998	2002	MONUA
Somalia	1988	Ongoing 2009	UNOSOM I; Provide Relief; UNITAF; UNOSOM II; AMISOM; Anti-Piracy efforts
Uganda I	1987	1991	
Uganda II (LRA)	1996	2006	
Zaire / DRC I	1992	1997	
DRC II	1998	Ongoing 2009	MONUC; Artemis (EU); EUFOR RD-Congo; MINURCAT
Congo-Brazzaville	1997	1999	
Cote d'Ivoire	2002	2004	ECOMICI; UNOCI; Op. Licorne (Fr)
Rwanda	1990	1999	*MOG/NMOG I, II*; UNOMUR; UNAMIR; Op. Turquoise (Fr); Support Hope (US)
Sudan / North-South civil war	1983	2004	UNMIS (2005)
Sudan / Darfur	2002	Ongoing 2009	AMIS; UNAMID; EUFOR TCHAD/RCA; MINURCAT
Sudan / Southern inter-communal violence	2008	Ongoing 2009	
Eritrea / War w/ Ethiopia	1998	2000	UNMEE
Ethiopia / Civil War	1988	1992	
Nigeria / Inter-communal violence	1997	2006	
Kenya / Post-election violence	2008	2008	
Zimbabwe	2005	2008	
South Africa	1986	1995	
Peru / Shining Path	1983	1994	
Colombia	1985	Ongoing 2009	
El Salvador	1980	1990	ONUCA; ONUSAL (1991)
Iraq / Kurds I	1987	1989	
Iraq / Kurds II	1991	1993	Provide Comfort
Iraq / Shiites	1991	1998	Southern Watch
Kuwait	1990	1990	*Excluded from Analysis*
Iraq / US-led coalition	2003	Ongoing 2009	*Excluded from Analysis for USA & UK*
Lebanon / Civil war & Israeli invasion	1975	1993	MNF; UNIFIL
Lebanon / Israeli air attacks	1996	1996	UNIFIL
Lebanon / Israeli air attacks II	2006	2006	UNIFIL

*Operations without U.S., UK, French or Australian involvement in italics. Complex emergencies excluded from the analysis for failing to meet criteria laid out in the text also noted in italics. For more information on coding and sources for complex emergencies, peace operations, and commitments, please contact the author.

Appendix B
Measuring Public Concern: *Complex Emergency News Coverage*

This appendix provides greater detail about the construction of *CE News Coverage*. Newspapers used for the searches include the *New York Times* for the US, the *London Times* for the UK, *Le Monde* for France, and the *Sydney Morning Herald* for Australia. This measure seeks to isolate public concern about complex emergencies from leaders' efforts to promote peace operations they are already committed to, and from coverage of ongoing operations. It measures the natural log of the ratio of news coverage during a complex emergency to coverage of the same place over the five years *before* the complex emergency.[68]

For observations involving commitments to peace operations, *CE News Coverage* is based only on the period *before* the decision to participate and insofar as possible excludes coverage during the lead-up to these decisions.[69] For example, in Kosovo significant violence by the Serb army against Kosovar Albanians began in March 1998. Initial public discussion of the possibility of using force began in September 1998, while NATO's air campaign to evict the Serbs began in March 1999. Although extensive coverage of the humanitarian crisis continued throughout 1998, I use coverage only through August 1998 as the basis for an annual estimate of coverage that *would* have occurred during the entire year, had coverage continued at the same

[68] For most searches I used LexisNexis. For France I primarily used *Le Monde's* website (http://www.lemonde.fr) because coverage there begins in 1987, three years before LexisNexis. Still, because full-text coverage in *Le Monde* was impossible to come by any earlier than 1987, *CE News Coverage* is missing for 13 observations involving France. In addition, access to full-text coverage for all five years before the complex emergency was unavailable in some instances. In these cases I used whatever time period was available. I also used Google Scholar to conduct searches in the *Sydney Morning Herald* before 1986; ProQuest's *Historical New York Times* before 1980 for the *New York Times*; and the *London Times Digital Archive 1785-1985* for *London Times* searches before 1985.

[69] Since potential interveners sometimes contributed to more than one peace operation during a complex emergency and the dependent variable reflects the most extensive contribution, in a few cases *CE News Coverage* does include a period of time during the complex emergency in which the potential intervener was involved in a less extensive way in a peace operation. Wherever possible I avoided this. For example, because UNPROFOR expanded from Croatia to Bosnia in June 1992, for Bosnia I include coverage only through May of 1992 although the potential interveners' more extensive contributions in Bosnia came later. Where the complex emergency itself changed in fundamental ways that led to the new deployment, however – notably, in Rwanda in 1994 – including coverage until that point was unavoidable. Excluding these observations does not substantively affect the empirical results.

rate. This eliminates the possibility that the measure reflects increased coverage generated by the discussion of force after August, but ensures that the ratio compares two measures of 'annual' coverage. If anything, I under-estimate public concern about the violence in Kosovo, as much of this concern emerged in response to the growing violence during the fall and winter of 1998-99, when the possibility of military action was already being discussed. Finally, the ratio compares this 'annual' measure to average annual coverage of "Kosovo" from 1993-1997.

In a few cases, however – especially where a peace operation was initiated relatively shortly after the outbreak of a complex emergency – excluding coverage for a significant period before the decision to contribute was either not possible or not sensible. For example, in northern Iraq in 1991, the flight by Iraqi Kurds into the mountainous region on the Turkish border that precipitated the complex emergency began in earnest in March, and peaked in April. The initial decisions that initiated Operation Provide Comfort were taken the first week of April. Here, I use news coverage through March as the basis for the measure of coverage during the complex emergency. This approach, too, should if anything under-estimate the true extent of public concern because it uses average coverage during January – March 1991 to extrapolate for the whole year, although coverage in March was more intense than January – February. At the same time, because of the sudden nature of the emergency and the deployment of Provide Comfort, it is possible that news coverage in March reflects not only concerned citizens' clamoring for action but also elite debate. Therefore, as a robustness check I ran the statistical analysis without the observations involving these complex emergencies – East Timor, Côte d'Ivoire, Lebanon III, Iraq/Kurds II, and Bosnia. The results for *CE News Coverage* remain strong. See also note 45 and Appendix C, Section 2 (Table 6) for results and further discussion.

Overall, *CE News Coverage* is a promising, if imperfect, measure of public concern about complex emergencies. As discussed in the text, many of the complex emergencies known for attracting extensive interest and generating pressure on leaders to respond rank relatively high while several places involving significant strategic relationships rank relatively low. Comparable results across slightly different search terms also suggest that these results are not highly sensitive to the specific term. Still, there are certain limitations. Since it does not reflect the total volume of coverage, *CE News Coverage* cannot distinguish between complex emergencies that generate large and small volumes of coverage. This limitation is necessary to facilitate comparison across newspapers of different average sizes. In addition, certain other influences besides public concern may affect the measure. Core Cold War conflicts and those that occurred in Russia/the USSR appear to rate relatively high while places that had recently experienced major conflicts generate relatively less coverage. Thus, the civil war in Afghanistan in the 1990s attracted less coverage than Afghanistan received in the late 1980s, while Cambodia from 1979 – 1991 attracted fewer mentions than in 1974 – 1978. The statistical analyses account for some of these influences by controlling for complex emergencies that began before 1989 and that occurred in or next door to Russia or China.

Appendix C – Additional Results & Robustness Checks

This appendix presents additional results from some of the robustness checks discussed above.

1) Does Public Concern matter without other strategic incentives for action?

Figure 3 showed that even in the absence of any of the key strategic relationships included in the analyses above, *CE News Coverage* has a sizeable positive impact on the probability of various levels of contributions to peace operations. To further confirm this pattern, Table 5 presents the results of several ordered probit models that include interaction terms between *CE News Coverage* and the strategic variables. The critical thing to note here is that the coefficients on *CE News Coverage* – which represent its effect when the respective strategic relationships are absent – are consistently positive and significant. This is true even in Model 10, where all of the strategic variables found to encourage the most extensive contributions – *Former Colony*, *Region*, and *Contiguous Ally* – are absent. What is more, of the interaction terms, only *News*Region* is significant. Overall, these results do not provide significant evidence that the effect of public concern depends on other, strategic incentives for action. On the contrary, although such incentives may sometimes enhance *CE News Coverage*'s influence, public concern about complex emergencies can influence contributions even in their absence.

Table 5: Ordered Probits with Interaction Effects

	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
CE News Coverage	0.315***	0.288***	0.233**
	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.093)
Former Colony	-0.016	0.162	
	(0.386)	(0.322)	
News*Former Colony	0.096		
	(0.239)		
Region	-1.605*	-0.014	
	(0.938)	(0.385)	
News*Region	0.879**		
	(0.352)		
Alliance	-2.112***	-0.724	-1.057**
	(0.544)	(0.491)	(0.442)
News*Alliance		-0.176	
		(0.377)	
Contiguous Ally	0.353	-0.458	
	(0.295)	(0.439)	
News*Contiguous Ally		0.209	
		(0.227)	
Any Strategic			-0.344
			(0.319)
News*Any Strategic			0.225
			(0.173)
Mass Killing	1.152***	1.130***	1.089***
	(0.225)	(0.225)	(0.223)
Army	-0.336***		
	(0.068)		
Distance	-0.227		
	(0.264)		
Democracy	-0.041		
	(0.027)		
Gurrilla		-0.798***	-0.770***
		(0.238)	(0.234)
Population		-0.342***	-0.324***
		(0.114)	(0.105)
Mountains		-0.083	-0.102
		(0.089)	(0.088)
Pre-1989	-0.271	0.002	0.037
	(0.264)	(0.294)	(0.293)
Cutpoint 1	-2.445	-3.038***	-2.970***
	(2.348)	(1.003)	(0.915)
Cutpoint 2	-1.655	-2.238**	-2.172**
	(2.340)	(0.962)	(0.872)
Cutpoint 3	-0.832	-1.394	-1.338
	(2.330)	(0.963)	(0.865)
Observations	160	167	167
Pseudo R-squared	0.252	0.231	0.231

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Model 8 excludes observations for one complex emergency (Philippines II) in order to include the interaction between *CE News Coverage* and *Region*. All results also hold for additional models (not shown) including all five interaction terms at once, and including each interaction individually.

2) Restricting the Sample

Table 6 presents generalized ordered probit models using the same variable combinations as in Table 3, but without the observations with the most limited time between the outbreak of the complex emergency and the deployment of a peace operation. The results for *CE News Coverage* are comparable except that it no longer has a significant positive effect on mid-level contributions. In contrast, several of the positive effects for the strategic relationships disappear.

Table 6: Generalized Ordered Probits with a Restricted Sample

	Model 5+		Model 6+		Model 7+	
CE News Coverage			0.293***	(0.102)	0.304***	(0.096)
Eqn 1	0.604***	(0.121)				
Eqn 2	-0.175	(0.128)				
Eqn 3	0.432***	(0.166)				
Former Colony	-0.442	(0.405)	-0.530*	(0.316)		
Eqn 1			0.027	(0.433)		
Eqn 2			0.178	(0.595)		
Eqn 3						
Region	-0.426	(0.387)				
Eqn 1			-0.935*	(0.544)		
Eqn 2			-0.215	(0.546)		
Eqn 3			0.484	(0.587)		
Alliance	-2.185***	(0.524)	-0.557	(0.596)	-1.470***	(0.459)
Contiguous Ally			-0.413	(0.327)		
Eqn 1	-0.956**	(0.382)				
Eqn 2	1.448***	(0.485)				
Eqn 3	1.973***	(0.573)				
Any Strategic						
Eqn 1					-0.954***	(0.262)
Eqn 2					-0.001	(0.301)
Eqn 3					0.559	(0.388)
Mass Killing	1.416***	(0.255)	1.170***	(0.245)	1.255***	(0.239)
Army	-0.488***	(0.083)				
Distance	-0.658**	(0.315)				
Democracy	-0.096***	(0.033)				
Guerrilla			-0.531**	(0.247)	-0.601**	(0.244)
Population			-0.489***	(0.141)	-0.429***	(0.123)
Mountains			-0.049	(0.094)	-0.068	(0.090)
Pre-1989	-0.072	(0.292)	0.121	(0.304)	0.154	(0.293)
Constant	6.633**	(2.828)	4.204***	(1.208)	3.850***	(1.049)
	5.601**	(2.821)	3.243***	(1.144)	2.603***	(1.006)
	3.687	(2.787)	2.257**	(1.141)	1.412	(1.025)
Observations	145		148		148	

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. +: These models repeat Models 5 - 7 from Table 3, but with the exlcusion of observations for 6 complex emergencies: E. Timor, Bosnia, Croatia, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq/Kurds II and Lebanon III. Clustering these models on the complex emergency and the potential intervener produced comparable results.

3) Multinomial Logit Models

Although there are strong theoretical reasons to treat *Peace Operation Commitments* as an ordered variable, as a robustness check I also ran some multinomial logit models, which do not make this assumption. Table 7 presents the results of these, which are based on the variable combinations from Models 5 – 7 in Table 3. The results show that failure to account for the ordinal information contained in *Peace Operation Commitments* has little effect on *CE News Coverage*, which remains positive and significant except for the mid-level contributions in the second two models. On the other hand, the significant positive effects of the strategic relationships on the most extensive troop contributions disappear, and in some cases even the positive sign does as well. Though somewhat puzzling, if anything this result confirms the expectation that these relationships could have mixed and unpredictable effects.

Table 7: Multinomial Logits

	Model 5++			Model 6++			Model 7++		
	Eqn 1: Low	Eqn 2: Mid	Eqn 3: High	Eqn 1: Low	Eqn 2: Mid	Eqn 3: High	Eqn 1: Low	Eqn 2: Mid	Eqn 3: High
CE News Coverage	1.136***	0.726**	1.792***	0.738***	0.473	1.607***	0.526**	0.268	1.254***
	(0.312)	(0.292)	(0.318)	(0.261)	(0.330)	(0.306)	(0.232)	(0.269)	(0.283)
Former Colony	-1.036	-0.884	1.059	-1.158*	-0.324	1.493			
	(0.810)	(0.962)	(1.064)	(0.690)	(0.851)	(0.997)			
Region	-2.412**	-1.125	-0.730	-2.350*	-1.489	-0.066			
	(1.104)	(1.113)	(1.188)	(1.281)	(1.258)	(0.948)			
Contiguous Ally	-1.285	-0.332	-0.023	-2.343***	-1.256	-1.118			
	(0.833)	(0.774)	(0.989)	(0.690)	(0.963)	(0.854)			
Any Strategic							-2.211***	-0.909	0.396
							(0.575)	(0.677)	(0.866)
Mass Killing	3.226***	2.705***	2.902***	2.578***	3.530***	3.015***	2.140***	3.192***	2.872***
	(0.707)	(0.727)	(0.784)	(0.618)	(0.768)	(0.960)	(0.596)	(0.767)	(0.912)
Army	-1.176***	-0.801***	-0.999***						
	(0.242)	(0.226)	(0.250)						
Distance	-0.593	-0.416	-0.811						
	(0.699)	(0.718)	(0.798)						
Polity	-0.033	-0.141*	-0.082						
	(0.067)	(0.078)	(0.097)						
Guerrilla				-1.614***	-2.884***	-2.876***	-1.601***	-2.888***	-2.557***
				(0.499)	(0.844)	(0.833)	(0.478)	(0.766)	(0.810)
Population				-0.928***	-1.163***	-0.898**	-0.808***	-1.012***	-0.652*
				(0.252)	(0.431)	(0.407)	(0.241)	(0.367)	(0.372)
Mountains				0.150	-0.346	0.044	0.089	-0.434	-0.069
				(0.228)	(0.295)	(0.355)	(0.222)	(0.266)	(0.368)
Pre-1989	-0.428	-1.069	-0.758	-0.252	-0.006	-0.172	-0.038	0.207	-0.261
	(0.588)	(0.834)	(1.220)	(0.577)	(0.954)	(1.050)	(0.558)	(0.946)	(1.048)
Constant	7.429	4.477	6.194	7.658***	10.342***	4.733	6.771***	9.185***	2.753
	(6.308)	(6.629)	(7.157)	(2.285)	(3.651)	(3.575)	(2.244)	(3.207)	(3.007)
Observations	164	164	164	167	167	167	167	167	167

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ++: These models employ the same combinations of variables as Models 5 -7 in Table 3, except that they eliminate Alliance, which never equals 1 for any observation involving a mid or high-level contribution to a peace operation and therefore could not be included here. Clustering these models on the complex emergency and the potential intervener produced comparable results.

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