

Inclusion Diffusion: How gender norms and quotas go global
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In 1994, following a sixteen-year civil war, Mozambique held its first democratic election and elected nearly thirty percent women into government—among the highest percentages of women in government in the world—without the benefit of any democratic history and despite significant social gender inequalities. Importantly, Mozambique is not a unique case. In fact, Rwanda ranks number one *in the world* with fifty-six percent women in Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2009), and many other countries with serious gender inequalities rank among those states with the highest levels of women’s representation (as shown in Table 1). Thirteen of these top-ranked fifteen states, including Mozambique, have adopted gender quotas, which may account for why these countries have more women in office. But the puzzle remains as to why so many states with severe gender inequalities and non-democratic governments are adopting quotas as a strategy to promote women in government.

[Insert Table 1]

Quota scholars generally emphasize the importance of domestic explanations in explaining adoption-- local women’s movements and political parties adopt quotas for a variety of reasons--but comparative research has begun to show that “quotas appeared on political agendas in many countries around the same time” (Krook 2006a cf Krook 2009, 19). As scholars identify these temporal and spatial qualities of gender quota adoption, more recent work situates quotas within an international framework (Krook 2009), one in which both local and international women’s movements, political elites and international organizations play an important role in explaining adoption. This paper identifies how these interactions are indeed global and impacting the very way states define themselves as democratic.

Diffusion theories are useful for understanding practices and policies (such as gender quotas) that seem to ‘go global.’ Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) diffusion framework is useful for understanding processes of global diffusion and the ways in which norms shape state behaviors and how nonstate actors work to promote normative change. Their theory lays out three stages in “norm dynamics”: norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalization. The first two steps in this process will help illuminate how gender quotas have developed and spread.

However, studies of diffusion usually focus on one of two questions—how policies diffuse (Simmons 2004, True and Mintrom 2001) or how norms diffuse (Mitchell 2001, Finnemore 1996, Risse et

al 1999). This false dichotomy between policy and norm diffusion means we are missing an important theoretical, and subsequently empirical, question about diffusion: what is the relationship between norm and policy diffusion?

A goal of this paper is to clarify and test a theory of normative policy diffusion, using the case of gender quotas. Norms are ideas, prescriptions to shape behavior and socialize actors (Goertz and Diehl 1992, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In order to identify how norms diffuse, one must identify policies that represent such norms, for policies are the vehicles by which norms spread. Conversely, policies reflect social norms and are an effort to shape values and behaviors of various actors.

Gender quotas present a great opportunity to elucidate the relationship between norms and policies and the effects this interaction has on states. As social values regarding women and their roles in politics continue to evolve, we are presented with an opportunity to identify how these changing values shape states' approaches to gender. Additionally, as democracy has become the political standard for states, identifying how gender has both structured and been impacted by how we think and do democracy is also important.

I argue below that inclusion diffusion—the global spread of the norm of inclusion via gender quotas—is an important explanation for why democratic and democratizing states are adopting gender quotas, as such states are responding to a systemic push to make democracy more gender inclusive. In other words, as gender quotas spread, the norm of inclusion becomes stronger and as the norm of inclusion gets stronger, more states adopt gender quotas.

After demonstrating how diffusion fits within the literature on quota adoption, I utilize Finnemore and Sikkink's model of norm dynamics to explain inclusion diffusion, and then explicitly examine the ways in which norms diffuse via public policy. I identify Scandinavia as the site of norm emergence and estimate a multivariate model of global quota diffusion¹ ("norm cascade") across both democratic and democratizing states. Finally, I use predicted probabilities to test inclusion diffusion on the puzzling cases of Mozambique and Rwanda and find support for the dynamic shift gender quotas are having on states in an increasingly democratic system.

¹ I use diffusion rather than "norm cascade" only because it is the more common term among political science literature.

What are gender quotas?

Gender quotas allot a specific number of seats or percent of women to be included in the legislative electoral process. They vary on two dimensions, including the stage in the legislative process in which women are included and the degree of the mandate.² For example, some states reserve a specific number of seats in the legislature while other states create laws regarding the percent of women on candidate lists. Additionally, many states have voluntary political party quotas that still generate rules regarding candidacy, but are generated by the political parties, rather than the state (Dahlerup 2000b, Krook 2009).³

There is a general belief and some statistical evidence that as more women enter a governing body, its legitimacy and stability improves (Dollar et al. 2003; Swamy et al, 2003; World Bank *Engendering Development*, 2001). Such beliefs and evidence have shaped the norm of including women to the point that the inclusion of women has become an *objective* of democracy. So rather than just focusing on creating democratic institutions (free elections, different ruling bodies, infrastructure for rights and liberties), democratic and democratizing countries are also addressing the *composition* of these institutions. In other words, there has been a shift in how we *think* about and subsequently *do* democracy based upon evolving and developing norms about women, inclusion and democracy.

The relationship between democracy and gender is important for explaining gender quotas: “If structural barriers exist, compensatory measures must be introduced as a means to reach equality of result” (Sgier 1995). Feminist and women’s rights activists have and continue to argue that democracy includes barriers limiting women’s access to formal government power. Therefore, states need measures to rectify these barriers because democracy is not supposed to be overtly exclusive. To make this case, feminists have highlighted the importance of women to democracy.

Anne Phillips’ conceptualization of ‘revitalized democracy’ elucidates the general expectations that women in government will change its composition as part of a larger democratization process (1998, 238). This is reflected in her other reasons: women serve as role models and encourage younger

² I have developed a gender quota “fuzzy concept” based upon Dahlerup’s classification and Goertz’s concept-building structure to designate this idea. Please see the practices exercises for the book *Politics, Genders and Concepts* <http://libarts.wsu.edu/polisci/rngs/pdf/concepts-appendix.pdf> for explanation

³ An important note to this analysis is my oversimplification of gender quotas. I treat quotas as dichotomous, either one exists within a state or it does not. I do not differ between types of quotas, and I acknowledge that not all quotas are alike or equally productive. However, given the scope of this analysis, I am more interested in the idea of quotas being present in whatever form they may be, not how the quotas themselves vary.

women to take part in the political process; democracy is not really 'democratic' if it does not represent certain populations of the state; and women tend to bring a different set of interests to the process, often reflecting issues considered essential to women as a group (Henderson and Jeydel 2007; Burrell 1994, Welch 1985; Tamerius 1993, Forestal and Forestal 1996; Gertzog 1995; Bystydzienski 1995, 21; Olsen de Figueres, 1998).

The push for gender quotas is not the first time inclusion diffusion has altered the gender dynamics of democracy and democratization. The women's suffrage movement was also based upon the norm of inclusion in that women pushed for the right to vote by arguing their exclusion as undemocratic. This cumulative, global adoption of women's suffrage actually changed one of democracy's defining characteristics, so that today universal suffrage is part and parcel of our understanding of democracy. This norm of inclusion continues to evolve however, as gender quotas extend inclusion beyond women's right to *choose* decision-makers, to the right to *be* decision-makers.

Why quotas get adopted

Quota adoption is a complex and highly political process involving both domestic and international actors impelled by women working within and outside of formal political institutions to increase levels of representation. Among domestic explanations, the focus is often on how quotas can serve political parties and elites. Scholars have noted that, although some quotas are adopted because they already embody notions of equality and representation (Hassim 2002; Opello 2006; Araújo 2003; Meier 2004), others are adopted because they serve strategic purposes (Caul 2001; Matland and Studlar 1996; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Baldez 2004). For example, parties in need of bolstering support may argue they take gender more seriously- either to strengthen a previously existing advantage (Millard and Ortiz 1998; Schmidt 2003) or to gain an advantage (Kolinsky 1991; Stevenson 2000). In other cases it may be a response to internal party conflict (Bruhn 2003; Kittilson 2006 cf Krook 2009). Political elites do not necessarily have to care about gender, but can frame their positions within the importance of inclusive democracy and quotas as means to addressing these barriers.

Scholars focusing on less institutionalized democracies have found an important relationship between quotas and democratic transitions- countries want to design institutions to recognize underprivileged groups within society as a way to legitimate states' emerging democracy (Bauer and Britton 2006; Brown et al. 2002; Camacho Granados et al. 1997; Reyes 2002). Or, states may adopt

because they are directly encouraged, via influential international actors, to adopt (Bauer 2002; Ballington and Dahlerup 2006).

Leading scholars, however emphasize the international community as essential to identifying why countries adopt quotas because it helps explain not just any single quota, but quotas as a global phenomenon (Krook 2006b). This includes, as previously mentioned, how certain international actors directly influence states to adopt, especially post-conflict states. This also includes transnational emulation as an explanation for adoption, in which transnational movements share adoption ideas internationally and ‘tipping’ events, where specific events (such as conferences) provide those trying to implement quotas international momentum to do so (Krook 2009, 24).

The United Nations has acted as both a direct influence and a ‘tipping point’ catalyst. It has organized conferences on and for women’s rights, beginning in 1975, which is when quotas really first emerged. The Fourth World Conference on the Rights of Women (the Beijing Conference), held in 1995 is often cited as an important in promoting adoption (Htun and Jones 2002). The Beijing Conference in some cases, served as a catalyst for local groups already promoting quotas (Araujo and Garcia Quesada 2006), while in post-conflict states the UN and other international organizations directly pushed for quotas (Bauer 2002; Corrin 2001; Ballington and Dahlerup 2006).

Women’s and feminist groups work within and across states to share information on quotas and to generate strategies for adoption. This exchange is a key component of transnational emulation, as these feminist and women’s groups are often the sources and promoters of quota-related information and experience (Krook 2009, page 19). Within states and political parties, women will push for quotas if other parties have them (Connell 1998) or they will lobby male leaders to promote women as candidates (Abou-Zeid 2006). These domestic campaigns are often understood as part of transnational informal networks of organizational staff, politicians, scholars and activists working to promote quotas. Women working within various frameworks of political power- in the UN, in a political party, as an ngo worker or as a researcher- build networks as a means to disseminate and share experiences about how to get quotas passed.

Given the wide scope of states that have adopted and the various actors involved, it is imperative to assess the ways in which these interactions have changed the global political landscape, as this change is the global system is *also* an explanation for adoption. What I mean by this, is that states adopting gender quotas in post-2000 do so in a very different global political climate, one that has been

shaped by changing norms about women and democracy. As gender quotas scholars acknowledge diffusion is occurring, especially given the regional and temporal trends of adoption (Krook 2006b, page 312-313), clarifying how the system has changed is useful for understanding quotas as a phenomenon. Specifically, such an approach situates state-specific explanations in a larger context. Put another way: as states have adopted gender quotas, it has normatively and cumulatively altered the world system so that today's 'democracy' means something different than it did thirty years ago.

Quota emergence

Per the "norm dynamics" model, it is crucial to examine how this norm emerged.⁴ The first states to adopt gender quotas in the late 1970s and early 1980s, were all Scandinavian countries (Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Sweden) (Bystydzienski 1995, page 13; Krook 2006a).⁵ Because they were the first adopters they present the more likely candidates for the origin of gender quotas as a means to increase inclusion. All of these states adopted quotas after already having a strong contingency of women in the government, and highly organized feminist movements, so these domestic quotas movements were both top-down and bottom-up (Freidenvall et al 2006).

Scandinavia has historically supported 'justice' and 'equality' which accounts for the comparatively larger number of women in government, indeed they were among the first states to obtain universal suffrage.⁶ However, juxtaposed with notions of equality, is a deeply embedded patriarchal Nordic tradition that has created a tension between 'an official ideology of equality' and "institutionalized sexism" (Bystydzienski 1995, page 130). Bystydzienski cites a history of secular humanism in prioritizing justice and the need to minimize inequality among the late Viking tradition as a partial explanation for the Nordic focus on equality.

This tradition lent itself to participatory democracy, and although it still clashed with the 'masculine imperative,' women still were able to join governments before their peers in other states. Scandinavian women held government positions prior to WWII and their numbers have continuously increased. The strongest of the Scandinavian states consistently has been Norway (the first European country to enact a quota (Bystydzienski 1995, page 16; Krook 2006a)). During the early 1970s these

⁴ The earliest quota was adopted in India in the 1930s (Krook 2006a), but because it was an isolated event and not noted in the literature as essential to the quota movement, I do not consider it the beginning of the quota movement. This also extends to Taiwan in the 40s, China and Pakistan in the 50s and Ghana in the 60s.

⁵ Finland is the one exception, who coincidentally still does not have quotas, but historically had one of the highest percentages of women in government (Bystydzienski 1995, 14).

⁶ Finland- 1906, Norway 1913, Denmark and Iceland- 1915 and Sweden 1919 Bystydzienski 1995, 20.

countries first passed legislation regarding gender equality,⁷ after which political representation increased dramatically (Phillips 1995, page 59; Bystydzienski 1995, page 21).

Also important among Scandinavian countries are their institutional designs, which are considered 'gender-friendly.' They all have multiparty proportional representative systems where the parties have considerable power. Multimember districts seem to encourage parties to recruit more women into their fold in order to increase their appeal: and all of these states enacted party quotas.

Of importance among these countries is the relationship developed between institutionalized democracy (in terms of longevity and respect for citizens' rights) and gender inclusion. I am not claiming this is the only place where feminist groups were successfully engaging the 'state', but within these countries feminist groups were able to organize and demand access to a more substantial part of the political process with relative and systemically early 'success.' These domestic feminist groups functioning within democratic regimes were able to frame their argument by connecting the legitimacy of their democracies with levels of inclusion (equality).

Inclusion Diffusion

An examination of Table Two elucidates some of the temporal and spatial qualities of inclusion diffusion as well as the time-frame and cases of the data. As specified by the previous section, the presence of stable democracies, specifically Scandinavia, among first adopters (1975-1984) is expected. These states already have strong domestic feminist movements that can use already existing democratic institutions to create change. Because of qualities associated with civic culture, democratic nations may be more open to discussions about increasing legitimacy via increased gender representation.

[Insert Table Two]

Among later adopters (1985-1999) there is an expected pattern of adopters that have recently democratized, often classified as 'third-wave' democracies (Huntington 1991, Krook 2006a). These states are adopting quotas in a different system than their predecessors, one in which democratization has become essential for growth and international legitimacy. As democratization becomes the only game in town, the standards by which states qualify as democracies have also changed, in part via the previous adoption of quotas. In other words, inclusion in representation is now part of what it *means* to be democratic and democratize.

⁷ Finland did not pass its Equality Act until 1985.

Finally, among the latest adopters (2000-2004) are states that are not yet considered democracies, though many of them have experienced a democratic transition prior to adoption. At this point the systemic norm of inclusion is so strong that even if states lack domestic norms regarding gender equality, or a strong domestic feminist presence, states adopt because to become democratic means to include gender in the equation—they are no longer separate.

Histogram One identifies some of the qualitative patterns associated with inclusion diffusion. It illustrates how many states adopted quotas within five-year increments, illustrating a normal curve as expected in a diffusion pattern. While only six states adopted quotas by 1979, the number grew exponentially to seventy-three states with quotas by 2004 and eighty-eight today.⁹ Additionally, by 1990 the graph demonstrates a steady increase in adoptions by 2004. As expected, more states adopted quotas post-2000 than any other time period.

[Insert Histogram 1]

Additionally, Histogram One also identifies the U.N. Women's Conventions considered essential to diffusion. While it is important to make clear here that there were strong and prevalent feminist movements within and between states prior to 1975, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) presented one of the first forums for a transitional feminist network to formally organize and share ideas. It included state representatives, international organizations and feminist non-governmental organizations (FINGOS), giving women from all over the world have a forum to meet and talk and diffuse ideas, including where and how gender quotas were being used.

Although there were follow-up conferences every five years following CEDAW, the most important was the 1995 Beijing Conference. Much of the quota literature discusses its importance in creating further stipulations about women in getting women in formal positions of power and getting states to agree to work towards gender equality in government (Dahlerup 2006). A look at the above histogram supports its relevance in the diffusion process: the largest increase in number of states that adopted appears after the Conference.

⁹ This is a very conservative measure as I only use countries where I had actual years of adoptions. In reality, this percentage is over 50% today. Listed in the appendix are those states that have adopted for which I do not have specific years.

Graph 1 identifies one of my main variables of interest, which is the cumulative proportion of states that have adopted gender quotas. It is a simple construction: as the number of states in the system that have adopted quotas increases, given the number of states in the system, so has the strength of the norm (Goertz and Diehl 1992). By this measure, in 1974 only 4% of states have adopted gender quotas, but this jumps to 48% of states that have adopted by 2004, which is a substantial increase.

[Insert Graph 1]

Testing Diffusion

The spatial and temporal qualities in state adoption are what make diffusion such a viable explanation for adoption. Conceptually, this is somewhat intuitive. Diffusion means that there is a cumulative movement of adoption and this very process will affect a state's decision to adopt by creating precedent (even just because of numbers). In the quota case, I am most interested in diffusion because it helps explain why states with short democratic histories, if any democratic history at all, adopt quotas.

The shift involves how the definition of what democracy *is* has evolved during this time period so that notions of equality and inclusion have become part of the dialogue of democracy and qualities now expected *from* democracies.¹⁰ Below I present inclusion diffusion via hypotheses meant to test the interactive nature of system-level norms and the actors that make it such. As indicated from the Histograms, one of my main measures is the cumulative adoption of gender quotas, as such:

H1: As the proportion of states that have adopted quotas in the system increases, so does the likelihood of a state's adoption of a quota.

¹⁰ There is an important theoretical clarification I want to make here regarding my usage of the terms 'inclusion' and 'equality.' Because quotas essentialize gender by equating it with sex (quotas reflect 'body parts' rather than the complexities of socially-constructed gender), I am unwilling to think of it as part of an 'equality movement'. Many feminist scholars note that equality movements really want to alter institutions, not just the demographics within them (Squires 2007). Were quotas really fundamentally aimed at equality, they would insist on 50/50 ratios and include other intersectionalities such as class and ethnicity. Because they are not, however, I find the term inclusion more reflective of the primary goal of getting women *into* government without too much insistence about the composition of these women and the numbers necessary to create substantive impact. This distinction is not supposed to be an attack on quotas as a viable and effective way of increasing the representation of women, but because of the high level of variation among state implementations of quotas, inclusion notes the intent of getting more women in without some of the other theoretical implications that gender *equality* entails among International Relations literature.

Another important piece of this diffusion puzzle is who or what has shapes and influences it. International feminist non-governmental organizations (FINGOs) have produced a strong network across and between states (True and Mintrom 2001). As previously noted, women's movements are essential to all explanations of adoption. Getting more women in government is one of the goals these groups have pursued to increase gender equality throughout states (in addition to economic and educational policies, for example). The very notion of a network is essential here because diffusion often relies on networks to spread information (Krook 2009, page 25). In this case, these FINGOs were seminal in the spreading of quotas as an innovation to address gender bias in government. They utilized CEDAW and Beijing to promote inclusion through dialogue and an exchange of information and resources. This feminist network functions under the same democratic principles described earlier and are an important aspect of promoting inclusion because they have a vested interest in getting more women in government.

H2: As a state's FINGO membership increases, so does its likelihood of quota adoption.

These above hypotheses are part and parcel of one another, as FINGOs diffuse the information within, between and 'above' states, and as more states adopt, more momentum is added to quota innovation as an important policy for FINGOs to promote, thus I include an interactive variable in my model.

H3: There is an interactive effect between proportion of adopters in the system and FINGO membership in increasing the likelihood of a state's adoption.

Within the literature, scholars have noted the importance of democratic transitions to quota adoption (Bauer and Britton 2006; Brown et al. 2002; Ballington and Dahlerup 2006). Because this quota diffusion really seems to have moved from stable democracies to those democratizing (only two states were non-democratic and not transitioning), I expect any democratic shift to increase a state's propensity to adopt. Democratizing states learn what they 'should do' based upon such signals (Mitchell 2001), and increasing quota adoption among the system is a clear signal that is it proper behavior for a state in the process of becoming more democratic.

H4: If a state has experienced a democratic transition, its likelihood of adoption increases.

Within all quota literature is a focus on the importance of electoral system-type in adoption. States that have multimember electoral systems have fewer barriers to getting women in government because parties do not feel like they have as much to lose in promoting women as candidates as in a winner-take-all-system (Matland 2006). Also, multimember systems are based upon inclusiveness of groups while first-past-the-post systems are considered a major barrier to quota adoption (Dahlerup 2006) (the United States is a good example here). Per the literature, I expect having a proportional system is important in the decision to adopt, thus:

H5: A multimember electoral system increases the likelihood of quota adoption.

The potential alternative to inclusion diffusion is that such norms may just be a result of more democracies in the system. There are several studies regarding the effect of democracies in promoting democratic norms to more international norms, including Sara McLaughlin Mitchell's examination of how democratic norms have become international norms in third-party conflict resolution (2001). Although she examines how the proportion of democracies within the world system increases the likelihood for non-democratic regimes to exhibit democratic characteristics, extending this theory to include transitioning states is not a problem because it is still about the relationship between the system and its effect on states, so I include a variable indicating the proportion of democracies in the system.¹¹ I do want to provide a caveat here that I think the proportion of democracies in the system will affect the likelihood of adoption, but that even with this variable included, my main variables of interest will still be significant.

Another potential measure of diffusion I include is the effect one's neighbors have in promoting adoption of similar policies. These findings are common among American literature and state policy diffusion (Shipan 2008). The logic here is that as the number of a state's neighbors who have adopted quotas increases, so does the pressure to do likewise, again regardless of whether or not there is serious internal pressure. A state pays more attention and is more linked to its neighbor's policies than other non-contiguous and perhaps less similar (culturally, economically) states. So, if State A adopts a quota in time t , then State B is more likely to adopt at time $t + 1$ (or later). So I also include a measure of the proportion of one's neighbors who have adopted quotas.

¹¹ Mitchell notes other examples of shifting norms regarding human rights and honoring territorial boundaries (Kacowicz 1995), peaceful negotiation (Russett 1993) and the honoring of international agreements (Russett 1993).

Research Design

I utilize logit models to test my hypotheses. This includes odds ratios for general interpretation of variables and predicted probabilities to test the explanatory power of the overall model. Logit is preferred because it does not assume a linear relationship and allows me to test predicted probabilities on states over time, which is valuable for testing the explanatory power of my model.

The data set spans from 1975 to 2004.¹² I have a total of 156 countries in my model, seventy-three of which have adopted quotas.¹³ Because countries made it into my model if I could locate the specific start date, there are several countries that have adopted but are not included because I did not have the specific year.¹⁴

The data begin in 1975 when Norway adopted its quota. I chose this start date because Norway is part of the theoretical norm emergence and there was more precedence for democratic countries in Western Europe than anywhere else at this time. Prior to 1974 only five countries had adopted quotas (beginning in the 1930s), and it is not until the 1970s that we begin to see a noticeable shift in the quota acceptance.¹⁵

The dependent variable in the model is dichotomous- either a state has a quota, coded as a '1', or it does not, coded as a '0'. I have gathered this data from Mona Lena Krook's book, *Quotas for Women in Politics* (2009). For each year, I code a 0 or 1 for adoption, so that each state can have up to thirty observations.¹⁶ I am taking liberties with this variable construction, as I aggregate-up party quotas to the state level of analysis, and these are by no means the same as constitutional quotas. However, given the research question is about how quotas have spread and not which types of quotas have

¹² Since many of my variables come from the Polity IV dataset which ends in 2004, this is also the end of my dataset, which means I have excluded seven cases (China, Liberia, Mauritania, Portugal, Spain, Sudan and Zimbabwe) that have adopted between 2004 and 2007. I originally wanted to begin in 1974 with Belgium, but because the transnational feminist network variable ("FINGOS") beginning in 1975, I start then.

¹³ See Appendix A for list of countries in data set. My use of "system" here entails the countries listed in Polity IV, which excludes microstates (none of which have adopted quotas) and some other cases (such as Iceland, which adopted a quota in 1983).

¹⁴ There are potentially fifteen cases excluded from the model (though it may be fewer because I cannot distinguish among post-2000 adopters if they adopted before or after my end date of 2004). In addition, the levels of democracy vary among these cases so I am not concerned that this has created a selection effect within my model.

¹⁵ India adopted one in the 1930's, but then adopted another in 1990, so I am not including the first because it is such an outlier for this diffusion process and not cited in the literature as a legitimate case for the beginning of diffusion.

¹⁶ Except in the case of those countries that emerged during this time period (according to Polity IV), and those emerge in the data according to birth date.

spread, this paper does not make assumptions about the quality of the quotas, just that the policy is somewhere present in the political machinery of a state.

The first hypothesis measures norm diffusion. I use the proportion of states that have adopted quotas in the system. This is a cumulative measure and is calculated by dividing the number of states that adopted by the number of states in the system (Goertz 1992).

The second hypothesis utilizes a variable regarding transnational feminist networks- which I deem "FINGOS." I use True and Mintrom's data for measuring the network effect. This dataset contains observations on 157 countries between 1975 and 1998. An examination of the variable, however, shows little change after 1991 in the number of FINGO memberships, so I extend whatever number was in 1998 to 2004. I realize the liberty I have taken here with constructing data, but as there is no indication today that there are fewer FINGOS than 1998, but most likely more, this is still a conservative estimate of membership for those years after 1998.

The measure is constructed by first establishing how many FINGOs participated in the four Conferences (1975, 1980, 1985, 1995) whose title and activities clearly promoted women's rights, or were present in at least two conferences and listed their objectives as empowering women. This produced a list of seventy-seven organizations. They then cross-referenced them with the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, (1996/1997) and twenty-four organizations were dropped because they were not listed in the Yearbook, only participated in the 1995 Conference, or whose primary objectives were not promoting women's rights. Thus, the final number they have is fifty-two organizations. They then count each state's membership in these organizations (membership here refers to having a division within a state but not composed of official government representatives). States have a score ranging from 0-42 in the transnational feminist network membership, which is measured over this time period.

To measure democratization I used Polity IV data to assess when states make a democratic transition. This data identifies when regimes change, so I created a dichotomous variable whether or not a state experienced democratization prior to adoption. A change was considered a positive increase of two or more on the polity scale.

I also include a dichotomous variable for states that have a multimember representational system, which is created from the Inter-Parliamentary Union website on Electoral Systems.

To calculate the proportion of democracies in the system I used Polity IV scores to first determine states that are considered democratic (six or higher)¹⁷ and divided this number by the number of states in the system. And, for my 'neighbor diffusion' measure I first utilized the Correlates of War Contiguity Dataset to establish the contiguous neighbors for each state. I then generated a variable that counted the adoptions of neighboring states per year divided by the total number of neighbors a state has.

Results

[Insert Table 3]

The odds ratios model presents a strong case for inclusion diffusion. Most of the variables are positive and significant as specified in the hypotheses. The main variable of interest, the systemic norm of inclusion, when all is held constant, increases the likelihood of adoption by 13%. While this may not sound particularly impressive, a look at Graph 2 may better illustrate why this dynamic variable is indeed important. Graph 2 illustrates Rwanda's predicted probability of adoption over time, which is zero in 1975 and increases to nearly 15% by 2003. While an odds increase of 13% in 1975 does not change the likelihood of adoption much, in 2003 when Rwanda adopts the norm is 48%, so a 13% increase is much more substantial. This is evidenced by the exponential shape of the line graph. In other words, the system changes via a positive feedback loop where the cumulative adoption of gender quotas dynamically alters the system in which later adopters make decisions regarding whether or not to adopt. Thus, variables with seemingly little explanatory power early in the data gain in value because the world system is continually generating a stronger norm because states are responding to the positive loop.

[Insert Graph 2]

Feminist non-governmental organizational membership (FINGO) changes the odds of adoption by double this with 27% (again, when all other variables are held constant). The interaction term, while significant, is nearly 1, meaning it has no discerning effect on the odds of adoption or no adoption. This variable is more important for the predicted probabilities, discussed below.

¹⁷ See Mitchell 2001

If a state has experienced a democratic transition (regardless of whether it means the state actually becomes democratic or not), the odds of adoption increase 167%, lending merit to the argument that transitions may open “windows of opportunity” to adopt new social practices when perhaps other institutions are also being modified and evolving. And, as expected, having some type of multimember electoral system increases the odds of adoption 160%.

The potentially competing explanation of diffusion among neighbors is not significant, though this plays a potentially more important role in the predicted probabilities presented below. This is because this measure may still reflect some diffusion, and as there is some obvious clustering (Latin America particularly), neighbor adoption may matter in conjunction with other factors. And finally, the level of systemic democracy is not significant, lending some credence to the idea that it may be less about the numbers of democracies than the changing values among an evolving democratic system.

Graph Three presents a more substantive way to interpret the interactive nature of the model, specifically the interaction of the norm of inclusion and FINGO membership. It illustrates the effects inclusion diffusion has on the likelihood to adopt given certain levels of FINGO membership.

[Insert Graph 3]

The results again lend credence to the theory of inclusion diffusion. Those states with the minimum number of FINGO memberships (four), experience an increase in the likelihood of adopting a quota once the norm of inclusion has reached roughly 30%, and continue a positive climb beyond that. Those with ten memberships also follow roughly the same trajectory. Once states reach twenty fingo memberships, the slope is less significant, but still positive. Most states within this membership range are non-democracies, and according to the theory, likely to adopt later rather than earlier. As demonstrated by this graph, FINGOS working in such states may potentially face more resistance to adoption when fewer states have adopted, but as the system-norm gets stronger, these groups now have a precedent and stronger network from which to lobby and push states and political parties to change policies.

Additionally, the negative line on this graph also coincides with my expectations. States with high FINGO membership may indicate a stronger domestic women’s movement, and these states are also primarily industrialized and democratic. As in the norm emergence cases of Scandinavia, inclusion diffusion should not account for adoption, as these quota movements are more ‘bottom-up.’ And, as the norm gets stronger, even the presence of so many FINGOS becomes less important. In other words,

as diffusion becomes more important, higher levels of FINGO membership does not add to the likelihood of adoption.

Discussion

A more substantive way to address my theories is to actually apply the model to my cases to gauge where it provides explanation and where it does not. I generated predicted probabilities for specific countries using the inclusion diffusion model. Before examining some of these results, it is important to keep in mind there are seventy-two cases of adoption out of nearly 3500 observations, which generates a baseline that a country had a 2% likelihood of adoption. Given these parameters, the increases among some probabilities of adoption is substantial.

[Insert Graph 4]

A look at the predicted probabilities for quota adoption provides some support for my overall model. These predicted probabilities utilize the actual country-data, allowing me to test the explanatory power of the inclusion diffusion model. While there are perhaps some glaring inconsistencies, there is a noticeable difference in predictive power in 1975 versus 2004, as expected. Norway's likelihood of adoption is 1%, which coincides with the norm emergence part of the theory. These early Scandinavian cases (which all hover around 1%), are better explained by strong domestic feminist movements, and as this model does not measure such, this finding is not unexpected. Norway is member to 24 FINGOS in 1975, well above the world average, which may indirectly indicate such feminist presence.

A look at Rwanda, Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the importance of the norm of inclusion and the actors and factors that bolster it. All three states adopt in a system in which nearly half of the states have already adopted quotas and nearly 60% of states are democratic. All three experienced a democratization prior to adoption and all have below-average levels of FINGO membership. Again, given the baseline likelihood of adoption is 2%, inclusion diffusion increases the likelihood of adoption 6 times.

[Insert Table 4]

Inclusion diffusion's predictive power generally gains across the thirty-year timeframe: it is nearly zero in 1975, but increases to roughly 13% by 2004. Argentina, which adopted in 1991 presents one of the strongest findings- it also has one of the highest levels of FINGO membership and a strong

presence of neighbors with quotas. Thus, even though the systemic norm was not very strong, Argentina's regional norm was which may account for its 22% likelihood of adoption.

I include some of the less stellar findings as a way to gauge what factors in case-specific adoptions can affect the likelihood of adoption. As I began with Mozambique, inclusion diffusion did not explain adoption any better than the general probability. Such poor findings can serve as catalysts for more in-depth analysis of country-specific factors that may account for adoption. Uganda is another good example, as this model actually did worse than the baseline. Uganda adopted early on in the diffusion process (1989), it did not experience any democratization, nor did it have a proportional representation system, all of which were important to changing the odds of adoption. Such findings generate important research questions, such as what specific factors promoted Ugandan adopt so much earlier than other African countries? Are there regional effects going on, strong domestic feminist movements, or perhaps strong ties to Western Europe? Aili Mari Tripp's *Women & Politics in Uganda* address some of these very questions that help us to understand such 'outliers' in my model.

Conclusion

The goal of this paper is not to take away agency from domestic feminist groups working to promote change within their respective countries, but rather to think about the changing system in which they do so. So while Rwanda's quota may have seemed somewhat counter-intuitive, we can now perhaps understand it a bit better when the explanations for Western European quotas just do not seem to fit. The dynamics involved in inclusion diffusion are important for our understanding of policy and norm diffusion. It is important to think about how such un-similar cases can assume similar paths. Rather than just looking within states, it is also important to look 'up' and understand the dynamics of a democratizing world and how quotas have become part of this. Women were able to make inclusion a global issue: legitimacy is tied to access and since historically it has been denied it must now be addressed. Since this is the case, quotas are a way to spread inclusion through increased numbers in representation.

I found strong evidence for inclusion diffusion, the mutually reinforcing spread of inclusion and quotas. As Scandinavian countries first adopted, they addressed better inclusion through quotas, and as other countries adopted quotas to improve their own inclusion, this process cumulatively strengthened both the systemic norm and the way to achieve it. As the world system generally believes democracy is the only game in town, what it means to 'be democratic' has evolved, and in part because of inclusion

diffusion. The arguments regarding representation, the very core of what inclusion stands for, have shifted from 1975 to today. As there are only nine countries that have no women in government (according to IPU Women in Parliament), a state would be hard-pressed to declare itself democratic if there were no women in it, something rather commonplace in 1975.

My model of those factors most important to promoting a state's decision to adopt generated substantial predicted probabilities when I hypothesized they would- later rather than earlier. The lack of significance utilizing my model for Scandinavian countries demonstrates that these factors I listed were not the answer, which again demonstrates the changing nature of the system and how these women within these states utilized various means to promote more women in government. It seems that for those countries without long histories of stable democracy that there really is power in numbers: as more states adopted in the system, a state's likelihood of adoption did increase.

This study is important for another reason: the need to take non-governmental organizations seriously within International Relations. Often ignored because of their large numbers and foci, these organizations have become much more powerful through a more technologically connected world. Just because they do not have official state memberships, they still function at an important level between and within states. They are an essential element of inclusion diffusion because they promote policies such as quotas that reflect this norm and its relationship to democratization and democracy more generally.

Although I do not speculate the effectiveness of quotas themselves, this is where the dynamic diffusion of inclusion comes full circle. It is fine for states to adopt quotas because it is what they, as democratic/democratizing countries, are supposed to do but without any real sanctioning going on, some may ask, who cares? It can be an empty promise. This is where domestic and international feminist groups again come into the equation. These feminist networks that promoted change and put gender on the world agenda have to monitor states and figure out ways to hold them accountable.

Countries that have adopted quotas but do not have any specific date of adoption¹⁸:

Country (decade of adoption)

Cyprus (1990)

El Salvador (1990)

Equatorial Guinea (2000)

Ethiopia (2000)

Greece (1990)

Haiti (1990)

Lithuania (1990)

Luxemburg (1990)

Mali (2000)

Malta (2000)

Nicaragua (1990)

Slovakia (1990)

Tanzania (1960)

Thailand (2000)

¹⁸ Krook 2006a

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Table 1: **States Ranked According to Percent of Women in Government**

Ranking	State	Percent of Women in National Parliament	Quota?
1	Rwanda	56.3%	Yes
2	Sweden	47.0%	Yes
3	South Africa	44.5%	Yes
4	Cuba	43.2%	No
5	Iceland	42.9%	Yes
6	Argentina	41.6%	Yes
7	Finland	41.5%	No
8	Netherlands	41.3%	Yes
9	Denmark	38.0%	Yes
10	Angola	37.3%	Yes
11	Costa Rica	36.8%	Yes
12	Spain	36.3%	Yes
13	Norway	36.1%	Yes
14	Belgium	35.3%	Yes
15	Mozambique	34.8%	Yes
71	USA	16.8%	No

Taken from Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2009

* According to a Polity IV score of 6 or higher


Table 2: Quota Adoption among democracies and non-democracies and transitions prior to adoption

	1974-1979	1980-1984	1985-1989	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2004	2005-present ¹⁹
Democratic When Adopted	Norway Denmark Sweden ²⁰		Brazil Netherlands Belgium Germany (West) Austria Italy	Canada Argentina Mexico UK Ireland Slovenia Namibia Lesotho Botswana Australia	Costa Rica Panama Colombia Venezuela Ecuador Bolivia Paraguay France Spain Poland Czech Republic Kenya Israel Taiwan	Honduras Portugal Macedonia Croatia	
Non-democratic When Adopted	Egypt	Uruguay	Chile Uganda Philippines	Dominican Republic Eritrea Mozambique South Africa Nepal	Peru Armenia Senegal North Korea	Albania Bosnia Georgia Niger Ivory Coast Burkina Faso Ghana Cameroon Rwanda Somalia Djibouti Morocco Algeria Tunisia Iraq Jordan Bahrain Afghanistan Uzbekistan Indonesia	China Angola Burundi Liberia Sudan Zimbabwe Mauritania Yemen Kyrgyzstan
Experienced democratic transition prior to adoption			Brazil Chile Philippines	Eritrea Mozambique South Africa	Peru Czech Republic Slovenia Kenya Taiwan	Albania Macedonia Croatia Ivory Coast Burkina Faso Ghana Cameroon Rwanda Somalia Djibouti Indonesia	Burundi Liberia Sudan Mauritania Kyrgyzstan

¹⁹ Cases from 2005 to present are not included in data analysis due to data limitations

²⁰ Sweden's Liberal Party adopted a quota in 1972 (Dahlerup 2006)

Graph 1



Graph 2




Table 3: Odds Ratios and Change in Odds of Adoption


Table 3: Odds Ratios

Variable	Odds Ratio	Confidence Interval (95%)
Norm of inclusion	1.13*** (.04)	1.06-1.2
FINGO membership	1.26*** (.05)	1.17-1.37
Norm of inclusion*FINGO membership	.995*** (.001)	.992-.997
State Democratization	2.67*** (.82)	1.46-4.87
Multimember Electoral System		1.46-4.61
Neighbors Have Quotas	1.01 (.004)	1.0-1.01
Systemic Democracy	1.05 (.03)	.98-1.13

Obs: 3504

p ≤ .001 = ***

Graph 3



Graph 4




Table 4: Predicted Probabilities for Quota Adoption Utilizing Inclusion Diffusion Model

Country	Norway	Brazil	Netherlands	Uganda	Argentina	Mozambique	Hungary	Morocco	Rwanda	Portugal	Iraq	Afghanistan
Year of Adoption	1975	1986	1987	1989	1991	1994	1999	2002	2003	2004	2004	2004
Proportion of States With Quotas	4%	10%	11%	12%	13%	19%	34%	41%	44%	48%	48%	48%
Proportion of neighbors with Quotas	33%	11%	50%	20%	60%	33%	29%	66%	50%	100	0	16%
Democratization	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Proportion of Democracies in System	26%	32%	32%	35%	42%	48%	49%	54%	54%	58%	58%	58%
FINGOs	24	32	34	23	31	13	21	16	12	21	9	5
Multimember Electoral System	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Predicated Probability of Adoption	1%	12%	11%	>1%	22%	2%	7%	13%	13%	11%	12%	14%

Note: Given that adopting a quota is a rare, the baseline likelihood to adopt a quota is roughly 2%