

*Intergovernmental Organizations and the Determinants of  
Member State Interest Convergence*

Stacy M. Bondanella  
PhD Candidate  
Department of Political Science  
University of Pittsburgh  
[smb39@pitt.edu](mailto:smb39@pitt.edu)

Prepared for Journeys in World Politics 2008 Workshop,  
October 9-12, 2008, Iowa City, IA.

**Abstract:** This paper presents a general theory of how the interaction of state agents within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) leads to a convergence in member state interests over time. The theory is based on the notion that, all else being equal, IGOs that facilitate more interaction between individuals from various states are conducive to greater member state interest convergence over time because there are more opportunities for agents from one or more member states to persuade agents from other member states to accept new ideas that affect how they define their states' interests. I argue that such persuasion does not necessarily have to involve a shift in state identities, but can also involve a diffusion of ideas about cause-and-effect relationships. Also, by focusing on IGOs as structures within which state agents interact, I argue against a narrow focus on socialization defined as the induction of new members into community norms. I present three hypotheses regarding which institutional attributes are conducive to member state interest convergence and test them using an original IGO dataset. The findings are generally supportive of my theory, despite lack of support for one hypothesis.

*Acknowledgements:* Thanks to David Bearce, Pamela Blackmon, Steven Finkel, Sara Mitchell, Alberta Sbragia, Duncan Snidal, and Daniel C. Thomas for helpful comments and suggestions related to this project. Special thanks to Melissa Parker for her assistance with data collection.

## **Introduction**

This paper asks the question: *Which attributes of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are conducive to member state interest convergence as a result of their interaction within these institutions?* The idea that interests are endogenous to interaction is not novel. In fact, more than two decades ago, Stephen Krasner broached the issue of whether international regimes have feedback effects on the basic causal variables that have led to their creation, which include not only the distribution of power but also state interests (Krasner 1982: 500). Yet Institutional scholar continue to control for interests when examining the effects of IGOs on state behavior in order to counter Realist critiques. By doing so, they may be missing part of the effect of IGOs on behavior.

While there are other bodies of literature that relate to the question of how actor interests converge, the main proponents of treating interests as endogenous to interaction within international institutions have been Constructivist scholars studying socialization. This literature informs the theory that will be presented below, but is insufficient to answer the question of how IGOs lead to a convergence in member state interests and which attributes of IGOs are most conducive to this process. I begin by discussing this literature and other bodies of literature relating to interest convergence and explain why they are insufficient to answer the question of how IGOs lead to interest convergence. Then I will present my theory of how interaction within IGOs leads to a convergence of member state interests and therefore which attributes of IGOs are most conducive to interest convergence. Essentially, I argue that what matters most is the amount of interaction of state agents facilitated by IGO substructures. Finally, I present statistical

tests of the hypotheses derived from this theory. The results are generally supportive of my theory, despite the lack of support for one hypothesis.

### **Interests – Exogenous or Endogenous to Interaction?**

As noted above, appeals for treating interests as endogenous to interaction have come mainly from Constructivist scholars. These scholars' main critique of Realist and Institutionalist studies of IGO effects is that they treat interests as exogenous to the interaction of states within IGOs, with interests defined primarily in terms of material factors. One research agenda emanating from the Constructivist approach focuses on socialization, a macro-process through which state identities and ultimately state interests are transformed through their interaction with one another (e.g. Finnemore 1996; Beyers and Dierickx 1998; Checkel 1999; Johnston 2001; Kelley 2004; Checkel 2005; Hooghe 2005; Lewis 2005). However, that work consists almost exclusively of studies involving a small number of cases, which do not allow one to sufficiently control for the various factors that affect changes in state interests or to examine the effects of IGOs with varying attributes over long periods of time. There have been some large-N studies of socialization, but they have focused on the socialization of individuals within a particular IGO (Beyers and Dierickx 1998; Kelley 2004; Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005). Moreover, because of the level of analysis of these studies, they often fail to explain and test for a long-term convergence of *state* interests as a result of intra-IGO interaction, but rather explain only the socialization of individual state agents and/or the effect this has on particular bargaining outcomes.

In addition to restrictions in sample size, most studies of socialization have restricted their analyses to the effects of European institutions, which some argue to be a

“relatively easy case,” (Johnston 2005) for testing socialization theory (e.g. Beyers and Dierickx 1998; Kelley 2004; Beyers 2005; Gheciu 2005; Hooghe 2005; Lewis 2005; Schimmelfennig 2005). These studies have contributed in important ways to theorizing about how state interests may change as a result of interaction, but there is an open question as to whether the attributes of these European IGOs that they propose to be conducive to socialization can be found to have the same effects when present in IGOs across various regions.

Some rationalist scholars have begun to take more seriously the notion that interests may be endogenous to interaction by testing implications of Constructivist theory alongside their hypotheses about the effects of international institutions on state behavior (e.g. Gartzke et al. 2006; Mitchell 2006). However, while they allow for the possibility that interests are endogenous to interaction within IGOs, these studies are not aimed at explaining interest convergence and they do not delve into the question of *how* overlapping IGO membership might lead to interest convergence.

Bearce and Bondanella (2007) attempt to fill this gap in the literature and to rectify the shortcomings of existing socialization studies by testing the socialization hypothesis in a global sample, using a statistical model. They provide evidence that joint IGO membership leads states’ interests to converge over time. In this paper, I go beyond simply looking for evidence that IGOs lead to interest convergence and ask which institutional attributes of IGOs are most conducive to state interest convergence.

In addition to proposing a more generalizable theory and tests of state interest convergence, I argue that explaining state interest convergence requires more than a focus on socialization defined as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules

of a given community” (Checkel 2005: 804). First of all, one should not expect interest convergence only from new members. Norms change over time within a community of states and I argue that all actors are constantly subject to persuasion, which may lead to new beliefs affecting how they define their interests. Secondly, the interaction between state agents within IGOs, leading to persuasion, may not always involve community norms about appropriate behavior, but also the diffusion between member states of *ideas* regarding cause-and-effect relationships. As Campbell (1998: 384) points out, ideas can be either cognitive or normative: “At the cognitive level ideas are descriptions and theoretical analyses that specify cause-and-effect relationships whereas at the normative level ideas consist of values and attitudes.” A change in either of these types of ideas can lead to a change in interests. This means not only that interest convergence can result from the acceptance of new ideas as well as norms, but also that, in order to understand this process, one should focus on IGOs not only as existing communities into which new members are inducted, but also as structures within which individual states interact.

### **Explaining Interest Convergence**

In this section, I put forth a theory of how the interaction of individuals from different states within IGOs leads to a change in state interests and then I generate hypotheses about which IGO attributes are conducive to this process. Essentially, I argue that what matters most is the amount of interaction facilitated by the IGOs in which two states are jointly members. I begin by establishing what the term *interests* means for this study and then provide a brief definition of IGOs. Then I discuss persuasion, the causal process through which I propose that intra-IGO interaction leads to interest convergence. Finally, I present a general proposition regarding what it is about IGOs that makes them

conducive to interest convergence – the amount of interaction facilitated by the IGOs - from which I generate three hypotheses regarding specific attributes of IGOs that should facilitate greater interaction.

*What are “interests”?*

Before proceeding with a theory of how member state interests converge, it is important to establish what is meant by *interests*. When one is asked to define interests or to distinguish interests from preferences, one is almost unfailingly advised to see Frieden’s (1999) piece on preferences in search of an answer. However, Frieden (1999: 46, fn. 4) distinguishes only between *preferences* and *policy preferences*, defining preferences as “preferences over outcomes” and policy preferences as “preferences over strategies (policies)”. He argues that it is important to separate the strategic environment from an actor’s preferences. In other words, we cannot deduce an actor’s preferences by looking at their indicated preference (or actions) in a given situation because the strategic environment may lead the actor to indicate a preference for some policy that will get them closer to their preferred outcome than the policy for which they have the highest utility. To deduce an actor’s preferences, Frieden (1999: 61) suggest that one look at a prior “box”: "If we want to know a firm's preferences over trade protection, we start one level up, in a bigger box, in which the firm's properties and environment are known, and which lead it to order its trade preferences". He makes no distinction between interests and preferences, but only a difference between preferences and policy preferences.

One is still left searching for a clear definition of what interests/preferences are. Indeed, whether there is even a difference between interests and preferences depends on

how one defines interests. Even if we define interests as preferences over outcomes, the difference between interests and *policy* preferences is really a matter of the level of abstraction used to define interests. We can think of three points on a continuous ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1970). At the most abstract level, interests could be defined as what an actor values in terms of ultimate outcomes. For example, with regard to states' interests, it is commonly accepted that states want power, security, and wealth (Finnemore 1996). These interests represent the desires of states at their most abstract level. However, as Finnemore (1996: 1-2) points out, states have different beliefs about what constitutes power, security, and wealth and how they can best attain them. States' definitions of what constitutes and facilitates the attainment of these more fundamental desires would be lower on the ladder of abstraction. At the least abstract level would be specific and detailed policies that state decision-makers believe to be the best strategy for achieving those core desires in a given situation. All of these would be included in what I refer to as interests. However, as one moves down the ladder of abstraction, every type of interests becomes an expression of more fundamental (and abstractly defined) interests found higher on the ladder.

The implementation of (or voting on) specific policies is essentially behavior that expresses interests at the least abstract level. The difficulty, as Frieden (1999) points out, is to distinguish these expressions of interests from the strategic environment that may affect whether true interests are expressed or are rather masked by some strategy employed to obtain an outcome that brings one closer to achieving one's true interests. This does not mean that the interests found at this most abstract level (which could be called policy preferences) should not be included in the definition of interests. The

problem noted by Frieden is actually a matter of measurement, not of conceptual definition. In other words, one must be careful to control for factors in an actor's strategic environment, when trying to obtain a measure of true interests.

What is important in this paper is not to define interests at some level of abstraction, but to show that changes in material factors or strategic situations are not the only path ultimately leading to changes in state behavior as a result of IGO membership since changes in the ideas held by state decision-makers and the definition of state interests resulting from intra-IGO interaction may do so as well. Furthermore, the goal of this project is to determine which attributes of IGOs facilitate this process. Separating strategic behavior from interests, however, will be dealt with in the discussion of measurement.

### *Intergovernmental Organizations*

Having clarified what is meant by interests, I now move on to define another term that is essential to my theory: intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). IGOs are organizations that are created by three or more sovereign states to accomplish some common objective(s). To be considered an IGO for the purposes of this project, such organizations must hold regular plenary sessions at least once every ten years and possess a permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarters (Pevehouse et al. 2003). IGOs therefore bring together the agents of member states within various IGO bodies and they also bring together individuals from various member states to work within IGO secretariats. Through interaction within these bodies, state agents can persuade each other to accept new ideas, thus changing how they define their states' interests.

### *Persuasion and Ideational Change*

I argue that interaction within IGOs facilitates a process of persuasion, by which individuals from different states convince each other to accept new ideas that may change the way in which they define their states' interests. Following Gheciu's (2005: 981) definition, persuasion can be described as follows:

Persuasion typically occurs in social interactions between actors who have drawn different conclusions regarding the nature, merits, and/or implications of X action or policy, and in which one or more of those parties attempt, through arguments, to get their interlocutors to rethink their conclusions.

If an actor persuades another actor that X is in their interest because it leads to Y, which is something they value, then this constitutes a change in their interests. As noted above, it is commonly accepted that states want power, security, and wealth, but states have different beliefs about what constitutes power, security, and wealth and how they can best attain them (Finnemore 1996: 1-2). State agents can therefore be persuaded to change their beliefs about what types of actions or policies are in the best interest of their state.

I maintain that persuasion does not have to involve induction into community *norms* in order to lead to interest convergence. As stated above, IGO interaction can also lead to the acceptance of new ideas about cause-and-effect relationships from one or a subset of member states as a result of their interaction within the IGO. For the purpose of theorizing about state interest convergence, I categorize the new beliefs that actors can internalize as a result of IGO interaction into those involving: 1) norms about behavior within the IGO; 2) norms about appropriate behavior that constrain policy options on a specific issue or set of issues; 3) and ideas about cause-and-effect relationships.

First, state agents or IGO bureaucrats may be socialized to accept the norms of a given IGO or of a subset of member states within an IGO regarding their behavior within that organization. Since these new behavioral norms are specific to the context of one IGO and do not pertain to some specific issue that may be encountered within other fora, they should not have an effect on a state's definition of its interests.

Second, individuals may be persuaded to accept norms about appropriate behavior that constrain the policy options available to them. Once internalized, norms tell an actor which behavior is acceptable. An actor following a norm therefore behaves in a certain way because they believe that it is the right thing to do. In addition to the norms falling into the first category regarding behavior within an IGO, member states can come to internalize more general norms of behavior that reach beyond the context of the IGO. If certain actions are no longer viewed as appropriate, then this changes the set of policy options that the actor will even consider and therefore changes what they believe to be in their interest.

In addition to these two types of normative ideas, individuals from various states may also be persuaded to accept new ideas about cause-and-effect relationships (i.e. "cognitive ideas" to use Campbell's (1998) terminology) as a result of their interaction with individuals from other member states within IGOs. Once persuaded, these actors thus come to change their beliefs about certain cause-and-effect relationships. Unlike norms, these are not ideas about appropriate behavior, but rather ideas about how best to attain something they value or ideas that change what they believe to be of value to them.

When actors from different states interact within IGOs, they are likely to learn and be persuaded by others to take on new ideas about cause-and-effect relationships as

well as normative ideas about appropriate behavior. For example, agents from a state whose policies widely reflect a belief that free trade is good for one's economy could, over time, by interacting with agents from another state working on trade policy in various fora, come to persuade that state that pursuing freer trade policies would lead to economic prosperity for their state.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, this process of persuasion is more appropriately theorized with regard to pairs of states, rather focusing only on IGOs as whole communities that affect all of the member states' interests in the same way.

#### *What makes IGOs Conducive to Interest Convergence?*

I have argued that state interest convergence occurs through a process of persuasion of individual state agents that ultimately leads to a change in how states define their interests. So what is it about IGOs that facilitates these processes and, more specifically, which attributes of IGOs make state interest convergence more likely? Drawing on the social psychology literature, Constructivist scholars have proposed that socialization is more likely to occur under certain conditions. Interaction that is proposed to be conducive to socialization is described as necessarily intense, frequent, dense, systematic, long, sustained, time-demanding, and of long duration (Beyers 2005; Checkel 2005; Gheciu 2005; Johnston 2005; Lewis 2005). Although this fine-tuning of socialization theory is useful for lower levels of analysis, most of these conditions essentially condense into the same concept: the amount of interaction between state agents. Only if state agents are involved in frequent interactions for long periods of time can they be persuaded to accept new ideas, and only if this occurs can the new interests

---

<sup>1</sup> The idea that states should implement free trade practices could also be considered a norm, but it does not necessarily have to be accepted as the "appropriate" thing to do. Rather, this could be considered the best way to achieve economic prosperity.

they develop be transmitted to the state. I start with the proposition that more interaction should lead to greater interest convergence by providing more opportunities for persuasion, through which ideas are transmitted between actors leading to changes in state interests.

**Proposition 1: The more state agents from two states interact within IGOs, the more the states' interests will converge over time.**

Despite the above proposition, interaction may not always lead to interest convergence because interaction will not always lead to attempts at persuasion and such attempts may not always be successful. However, I maintain that increased levels of interaction between states within dense networks of IGOs should increase the possibilities for states to take on new ideas, leading to an increased likelihood of interest convergence on the whole. In order to test whether the above proposition holds, we need hypotheses regarding the effects of specific institutional attributes that should lead to increased interaction between individuals from different member states.

First, IGOs with more sub-structures should facilitate more interaction between member state agents and bureaucrats from various member states. The logic behind this expectation is twofold. The more structures for interaction that exist within an IGO, the more fora there are for interaction of state agents. Also, having a high number of sub-structures is an indication that an IGO is active, which means that IGOs with a high number of sub-structures are those that have sub-structures in which state agents interact frequently and intensely over a long period of time. Therefore, I make the following hypothesis:

**H1: The more IGOs with a large number of sub-structures to which two states jointly belong, the more their interests will converge over time.**

It may seem obvious that interaction within IGOs with more substructures would lead to greater interest convergence, but this is not a foregone conclusion for many IR scholars. It is important to note that the alternative hypothesis to Hypothesis 1, as for the more specific hypotheses that will be laid out below, is the null hypothesis, which would lead us to expect no relationship between the number of substructures of IGOs within which two states interact and changes in the similarity of their interests.

As noted above, in seeking to explain *state* interest convergence, it is not enough to focus only on factors that should be conducive to the acceptance of new ideas by individuals, but also to factors that make it more likely that those ideas will be translated into the definition of state interests, which will be reflected in state policies. More specifically than the number of substructures that an IGO has, which could include secretariat and technical divisions and other bodies that involve either international bureaucrats or only a small subset of state representatives, I propose that interest convergence will be more likely the more an IGO has structures for meetings of representatives of member states that have the power to change how the state's interests are defined and therefore how it approaches different issues.

IGO bodies for meetings of representatives of member states can involve heads of cabinet ministries/agencies, permanent representatives with ambassadorial status, other plenipotentiaries, parliamentarians, and heads of other state agencies. These representatives are involved in important ways in determining what is in the interest of their states in their specific domains and these people continue to interact with other

decision-makers in the domestic context as well. Therefore, representatives should be more likely to transmit the new ideas that they may obtain through intra-IGO interaction to other important actors at the state level and they should be more influential in applying them to the redefinition of state interests than individuals from different member states interacting within IGO structures such as the secretariat. Most individuals interacting within IGO secretariats or other permanent bodies that do not involve representatives of all member states do not return to the domestic policy-making forum on a regular basis (some never) and most are not in as important a position to affect the definition of state interests when they do. Based on this logic, I make the following hypothesis:

**H2: The more structures of IGOs in which representatives of two states interact, the more their interests will converge over time.**

It may be possible that only the high-level leaders in charge of government ministries or cabinet agencies have the ability to make a difference in how states' interests are defined since they are at the top level and are responsible for setting policy in their specific issue-areas. From this point forward, I refer to these heads of cabinet agencies and government ministries as "ministers". In order to assess the validity of this idea, I will test the independent effect of meetings of ministers of member states on the degree to which states' interests converge over time, based on the following hypothesis:

**H3: The more structures of IGOs in which ministers of two states interact, the more their interests will converge over time.**

That more interaction of high-level member state representatives is conducive to interest convergence is not an accepted fact. In fact, socialization scholars argue that the

internalization of new normative ideas is more likely to occur in less politicized, more insulated settings (Checkel 2005; Lewis 2005). This would apply to some meetings of representatives such as bodies that bring together permanent representatives, but not to many of the meetings of member state ministers. In addition, much of the literature relating to changes in interests focuses on IGO bureaucracies and epistemic communities of experts, rather than high-level leaders. Although the acceptance of new norms and ideas by individuals may be more likely with such bodies of experts, I argue that this is less likely to lead to interest redefinition at the state level because these individuals are not as likely return to the domestic policy-making arena and to have the power to implement new ideas.

The above hypotheses (summarized in Table 4.1) relate to attributes of IGOs that facilitate greater interaction between member states and are therefore provide more opportunities for persuasion of state agents to take on new ideas, but the hypotheses are increasingly specific as to which types of structures should be important in making IGO interaction conducive to member state interest convergence. The last two hypotheses condition which types of individuals are more likely to have the power to translate new ideas taken on at the IGO level into the definition of *state* interests, which are then pursued at the international level and which ultimately shape state policy.

**Table 4.1 about here**

**Testing IGO Attributes**

In this section, I will discuss a series of statistical tests that I have conducted in order to test the aforementioned hypotheses, present the results of these tests, and draw

conclusions from the findings. The unit of analysis is dyad-year and the sample includes all dyad-years for the period 1975-1996.<sup>2</sup> Since I am testing whether joint membership in IGOs with certain attributes leads to a convergence in state interests, I use the similarity in two states' interests as the dependent variable, using Gartzke's AFFINITY measure.

The AFFINITY measure is an S-score calculated using roll-call votes within the United Nation's General Assembly (UNGA) (Gartzke 1998; Gartzke and Jo 2002). The AFFINITY variable does not capture UNGA votes, but instead captures the similarity of the voting decisions of two states, which is calculated using an S statistic. Admittedly, this is not a perfect measure of interests. However, the AFFINITY measure sufficiently captures state interest similarity for the purposes of testing my theory. First, states are relatively free to vote their interests within the General Assembly due to the explicitly non-binding character of UNGA resolutions. Second, UNGA resolutions encompass a wide variety of issues and the AFFINITY score is calculated based upon all votes of each state across all of the issues addressed within each year. Therefore, high similarity of two states' voting portfolios should serve as a good indicator of their interest similarity. Furthermore, this is the measure widely used by Institutionalist scholars to control for interests when looking for the effects of IGOs on state behavior. Using the AFFINITY measure is therefore all the more appropriate for a paper that seeks to put into question the practice of controlling for interests while looking for the effects of cooperation within IGOs on state behavior.

A simple examination of AFFINITY measures presents some face validity. This measure scores dyadic interest similarity along a -1 to 1 range with higher values

---

<sup>2</sup> Although the data covers the period 1970-1995, the tests effectively cover 1975-1996 because of the five year time lag on the key independent variables, as will be discussed below, and the lack of data for the dependent variable past 1996.

indicating greater similarity (Gartzke and Jo 2002). Bearce and Bondanella (2007) illustrate this face validity by looking at the average AFFINITY score for dyads including the United States (US), based on the assumption that most readers will be familiar with the foreign policy interest of this state. Figure 4.1 reproduces the diagram from Bearce and Bondanella (2007) showing these average AFFINITY scores for 30 US dyads covering the range of AFFINITY values and containing states from all regions of the world. As one would expect, the United States-United Kingdom dyad scores relatively high in terms of interest similarity while US pairings with states like North Korea score relatively low.

**Figure 4.1 about here**

Despite the face validity of the AFFINITY measure, some may be concerned that the non-binding character of UNGA resolutions leads states to engage in strategic and symbolic bloc voting. To reduce bias that may result from bloc voting, however, one can model it directly by using dyadic fixed effects, thus removing its effect from the coefficient on the primary independent variable. To be more certain that bloc voting is not an issue, one can also show that the results do not differ significantly when the sample is constrained to exclude those dyads scoring at the ends of the AFFINITY range (i.e. cases near 1 where the two states almost always voted together and cases near -1 where the two states almost never voted together).

*Key Independent Variables*

To test the various hypotheses, I have coded all IGO-years for the period 1970-1995 based on the various attributes hypothesized to be conducive to interest

convergence<sup>3</sup> and then created various measures based on joint IGO membership. The descriptions of these IGO variables are summarized in Table 4.2 for ease of reference.

#### **Table 4.2 about here**

Hypothesis 1 states that the more IGOs with a high number of substructures to which two states belong, the more these states should experience interest convergence over time. In order to test this hypothesis, I created two different measures. First, I generated a count of the number of IGOs with more than nine substructures to which two states jointly belong (HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP).<sup>4</sup> Substructures that were counted here include all of the main organs of the IGO as well as committees, sub-committees, working groups, and secretariat and technical divisions.<sup>5</sup> If individuals from different member states interact more within IGOs with more structures, which results in a greater convergence in their interests over time, then the more such IGOs within which two states belong, the more their interests should be expected to converge over time.

I created the aforementioned variable to count joint membership in IGOs that meet certain criteria because my theory states that IGOs with more substructures should be more conducive to member state interest convergence. However, there are many ways in which one could define a “high” number of substructures and it is necessary to choose one in order to count joint IGO memberships with a dyad-year unit of analysis. But since my theory is essentially about the amount of interaction between two states within IGOs, this can be captured by pooling the different structures together. I thus also coded a variable that counts the total number of substructures of all IGOs to which the two states

---

<sup>3</sup> For detailed information on how IGOs were coded, see Appendix A.

<sup>4</sup> IGO-years with more than five substructures account for about 20% of the IGOs in the dataset.

<sup>5</sup> For more detailed information, see Appendix A.

jointly belong. This measure (JOINT IGO STRUCTURES) more accurately captures variation between dyad-years in terms of the number of structures within which they interact, but is not a count of IGOs themselves since the substructures of all IGOs to which two states belong are pooled together in the measure.

In addition to the proposition that more interaction leads to more opportunities for persuasion and thus more state interest convergence over time, the last two hypotheses to be tested in this chapter are more specific with regard to the types of substructures of IGOs that are conducive to interest convergence. These hypotheses are based on the idea that what is essential to interest convergence is interaction within IGO bodies that bring together representatives of all member states who have the power to influence how their states' interests are defined and ultimately to shape state policy.

Hypothesis 2 states that the more IGO bodies for meetings of representatives of all member states within which two member states' agents interact, the more similar those two states' interests should become over time. To test this hypothesis (H2), I created a variable that counts the total number of bodies for meetings of representatives of all member states (BODIES OF REPRESENTATIVES) within IGOs in which the two states in a dyad share membership. This variable includes bodies that bring together ministers, permanent representatives, other plenipotentiaries, national parliamentarians, or high-level leaders of government departments from all member states.

It is possible that member state ministers are in the best position to be vehicles for the transmission of new ideas into a redefinition of state interests. Therefore, I will test Hypothesis 3, which states that the more IGO bodies for meetings of ministers of all member states within which two member states' ministers interact, the more similar those

two states' interests should become over time. In order to test H3, I created a variable similar to the BODIES OF REPRESENTATIVES variable, except that it includes only bodies for meetings of ministers of all member states within IGOs in which both states are members (MINISTERIAL BODIES). In order to test the effects of MINISTERIAL BODIES in the same model with BODIES OF REPRESENTATIVES, I created a variable that counts all of the aforementioned structures for meetings of representatives except for member state ministers (BODIES OF NON-MINISTER REPS).

With regard to the three aforementioned variables (BODIES OF REPRESENTATIVES, MINISTERIAL BODIES, and BODIES OF NON-MINISTER REPS), it is important to note that the word "bodies" is used somewhat loosely here: if there is one formal IGO organ such as a Council, but there are two or more formations of the Council, each of which brings together certain ministers or representatives on a regular basis, then each formation is counted as a body. This is the case not only for the European Union (EU), but also for other IGOs as diverse as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UPEB). The reason for this coding choice is an attempt to give each "body" equal weight in terms of the amount of interaction that it facilitates. In other words, for the MINISTERIAL BODIES variable, an IGO with a Council of Ministers that brings together only ministers of agriculture three times a year would not receive the same weight as the EU's Council of Ministers, for which frequent meetings of Agriculture Ministers make up only one of up to 19 such formations in the 1990s.

### *Control Variables*<sup>6</sup>

My statistical model includes a number of control variables. First, I include a lagged dependent variable ( $AFFINITY_{t-1}$ ) on the right-hand side of the statistical model in order to control for temporal dependence. In addition to controlling for temporal dependence, this model specification is necessary because I seek to explain interest convergence, or the change in  $AFFINITY$  (i.e.  $\Delta AFFINITY$ ). Since  $\Delta AFFINITY$  is equal to  $AFFINITY_t - AFFINITY_{t-1}$ , I am actually estimating the mathematical equivalent of the  $\Delta AFFINITY$  model by including the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side. Rearranging terms by moving the latter term ( $AFFINITY_{t-1}$ ) to the right-hand side of the equation as a lagged dependent variable leaves the former term ( $AFFINITY_t$ ) on the left-hand side as the appropriate dependent variable.

$$\Delta AFFINITY = \text{Independent variables} + \text{Controls} + e$$

$$AFFINITY_t - AFFINITY_{t-1} = \text{Independent variables} + \text{Controls} + e$$

$$AFFINITY_t = AFFINITY_{t-1} + \text{Independent variables} + \text{Controls} + e$$

Scholars have shown domestic regime type to be a strong predictor of state interests as expressed through UNGA voting (see, for example, Oneal and Russett 1999). Also, socialization scholars argue that domestic factors may affect the degree to which states experience socialization within IGOs (Beyers 2005: 933). In order to control for the difference in domestic political systems within the dyad, I therefore include a measure of domestic regime difference, which is the absolute difference of the two overall Polity scores (Democracy – Autocracy) within the dyad-year (DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE) (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). To control for economic interactions, I include a measure

---

<sup>6</sup> Unless otherwise specified, control variables are taken from EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000).

of dyadic trade dependence (DYADIC TRADE DEPENDENCE) (Gleditsch 2002). This variable measures the trade dependence of the less dependent state. Bilateral trade dependence is total imports from the other state in the dyad plus total exports to that state, divided by the first state's gross domestic product (GDP).<sup>7</sup> Since North-South differences have been found to affect differences in state interests expressed through UNGA voting (Kim and Russett 1996), I also include a measure of relative economic development (RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT). Relative economic development is simply the GDP per capita of the poorer state divided by the GDP per capita of the richer state (Gleditsch 2002). Higher values of this variable therefore indicate more equal levels of economic development.

To address realist concerns, I include two measures of relative state power. First, I include a measure of relative economic size (RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE) (see Summers and Heston 1991; Maddison 1995). This is the natural log of the GDP of the larger state in the dyad relative to the GDP of the smaller state (Gleditsch 2002). I also include a measure of relative military power, which is the natural log of the more powerful state's capabilities divided by those of the other state in the dyad. Each state's capabilities are calculated using data from the Correlates of War's Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) (Singer et al. 1972), which weighs equally the states' military personnel, military expenditures, energy production, iron/steel production, nominal urban population, and nominal total population.

Since military alliances should affect states' interests, I control for joint military alliances by including a dummy variable coded 1 if the two states in the dyad had any

---

<sup>7</sup> Bearce and Bondanella (2007) also experimented with other trade specifications, including the sum of state 1 and state 2's trade/GDP ratios. All of these specifications produced a similar statistical result.

kind of alliance (ententes, neutrality pacts, and defense pacts) in that year and 0 otherwise (JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCE) (Gibler and Sarkees 2004). Since scholars have argued that national interests and therefore UNGA voting patterns have changed significantly since the end of the Cold War (Kim and Russett 1996)<sup>8</sup>, I also include a dummy variable coded 1 for all dyad-years prior to 1991 and 0 otherwise. Finally, to control for geopolitical factors as well as the possibility of spatial diffusion (i.e. the diffusion of ideas between neighbors that may affect how they define their interests) I also include a variable coded 1 if the two states in the dyad are contiguous and 0 otherwise (CONTIGUITY).

### *Model Specification*

The base model for each hypothesis test is a fixed effects model with robust standard errors clustered on the dyad.<sup>9</sup> Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in the models. It is also important to note that the key independent variables are lagged by five years for both theoretical and methodological reasons. Since I seek to explain state interest convergence, it makes sense that I look at the effect that membership in IGOs with certain institutional attributes has on interest similarity five years later. The acceptance of new ideas is expected to occur as the result of repeated meetings over long periods of time, which is consistent with theories of socialization discussed above (Checkel 2005: 807). Therefore, I expect the effects of interaction to take several years to be reflected in state interests. Indeed, when looking at the effects of

---

<sup>8</sup> Bearce and Bondanella (2007) found a significant positive relationship between the Cold War years and dyadic interest similarity.

<sup>9</sup> Fixed effects were used to control for factors specific to certain dyads that may affect interest convergence. A Hausman test also showed that this is the appropriate modeling choice.

structured IGOs on interest convergence, Bearce and Bondanella (2007) illustrated that the IGO effect increased with each additional time lag up to four years.

With regard to methodological considerations, it is important to use a long time-lag in order to avoid results that could be contaminated by reverse causality. Without a lag, one could argue that any supportive findings can be explained by the fact that states with more similar interests are more likely to form or join the same IGOs. While it is typical to use a one-year time lag to deal with potential endogeneity, it is more appropriate to use a longer time lag in the models herein for the reasons specified above.

**Table 4.3 about here**

*Findings*

Table 4.4 presents the results of the models used to test Hypothesis 1, which states that the more IGOs with a high number of substructures to which two states both belong, the more their interests will converge over time. The base model is laid out in Equation 1 below, with HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP as the key independent variable. (All other models in the paper are identical to Equation 1 except that they substitute one or more IGO variables in place of HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP.)

**Equation 1:**

$$\text{AFFINITY}_{\text{XT}} = \mathbf{B}_0 + \mathbf{B}_1 * \text{AFFINITY}_{\text{XT}-1} + \mathbf{B}_2 * \text{HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP}_{\text{XT}-5} + \mathbf{B}_3 * \text{DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE}_{\text{XT}} + \mathbf{B}_4 * \text{DYADIC TRADE}_{\text{XT}} + \mathbf{B}_5 * \text{RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT}_{\text{XT}} + \mathbf{B}_6 * \text{RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE}_{\text{XT}} + \mathbf{B}_7 * \text{RELATIVE MILITARY POWER}_{\text{XT}} + \mathbf{B}_8 * \text{JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCE}_{\text{XT}} + \mathbf{B}_9 * \text{COLD WAR}_{\text{XT}} + \mathbf{B}_{10} * \text{CONTIGUITY}_x + \mathbf{u}_x + e_{\text{xt}}$$

**Table 4.4 about here**

For this first test of Hypothesis 1, I use a measure of joint IGO memberships in IGOs that have more than nine substructures. The results for Model 1 (listed in Table 4.4) provide support for the hypothesis that membership in more IGOs with a high number of substructures should lead to greater interest convergence between two states five years later. The coefficient for HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP is positive and statistically significant (0.00083). Multiplying that coefficient by the standard deviation for this variable produces a substantive effect of 0.0034, meaning that a one standard deviation increase in the number of joint memberships in IGOs with more than nine substructures leads to a 0.0034 increase in the change in interest similarity five years later. Although this substantive effect may seem small, there are a few reasons why the effect is not insignificant. First, one should note that the dependent variable ranges only from -1 to 1. Also, the other variables in the model, including Realist control variables, have similar levels of substantive effects. Only three variables surpass the HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP variable in terms of substantive significance, the highest of which is RELATIVE MILITARY POWER, for which a one standard deviation increase is associated with a 0.016 unit increase in AFFINITY.

It is important to note that the theory put forth in Chapter 3 is not meant to replace Realist or Institutional theory. Like Liberal Institutional scholars, I do not question the explanatory power of Realist factors such as military power, but I seek to complement Institutional theory by adding one more pathway through which IGOs *also* influence state behavior. The fact that the HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP variable holds up in

the face of so many important control variables, provides strong support for the hypothesis that states that belong to more IGOs with a high number of substructures will experience greater interest convergence over time, rather than the null hypothesis that this joint membership has no significant effect. Therefore, the results of Model 1 provide support for the theory that more interaction within IGOs leads to greater interest convergence.

All of the control variables in Model 1 achieve statistical significance, with the exception of DYADIC TRADE and CONTIGUITY. The coefficient for DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE is negatively signed, indicating that dyads with more distant regime types are less likely to experience interest convergence over time. The coefficient for RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT indicates that dyads with more equal levels of economic development are more likely to converge in their interests over time. These two findings are consistent with the proposition that states that are already have some degree of similarity will experience even greater interest convergence over time than other pairs of states. The RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE and RELATIVE MILITARY POWER variables have positive coefficients, indicating that greater disparity in economic and military capabilities leads to greater levels of interest convergence over time. This is not surprising, given that these variables are included to control for any interest convergence resulting from coercion. A higher number of military alliances between two states is also associated with greater interest convergence over time, as indicated by the positive coefficient for JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCE. Finally the COLD WAR dummy has a positive coefficient, indicating that interest convergence is greater during the Cold War years.

In order to more accurately capture variation in the number of substructures within which each pair of states interact in each year, I run a second test of H1, using a measure of the total number of IGO substructures within which two states interact. The base model is the same as that laid out in Equation 1, except the JOINT IGO STRUCTURES variable is substituted for HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP. The results for Model 2 (listed in Table 4.4) also provide support for the hypothesis that interaction within more IGO substructures leads to interest convergence over time. The coefficient for JOINT IGO STRUCTURES is positive and statistically significant and a one standard deviation increase in this variable is associated with a 0.0051 increase in AFFINITY. This substantive effect is higher than that of the HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP variable, used in Model 1, which is likely due to the more accurate variation captured in this second measure. None of the coefficients for the control variables in Model 2 change signs or levels of statistical significance from the first model.

In order to assess these two measures comparatively, I included them both in Model 3. As the results listed in Table 4.4 indicate, the JOINT IGO STRUCTURES variable has a stronger signal, as it retains its positive coefficient and statistical significance, while the HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP changes signs but retains statistical significance. This is not surprising since these two measures are very highly correlated (0.95) and therefore may present problems of multicollinearity.

Model 4 is a test of Hypothesis 2, which states that the more bodies for meetings of representatives of all member states exist within IGOs to which both states belong, the more similar the two states' interests will become over time. The results from Model 4 (listed in Table 4.5) provide support for Hypothesis 2. The coefficient for the BODIES OF

REPRESENTATIVES variable (0.00020) is positive and statistically significant, which is consistent with the expectation that the more bodies for meetings of representatives of all member states within which representatives of two states both participate, the more similar their interests will become over time. A one standard deviation increase in the number of bodies for meetings of representatives within which two states participate is associated with a 0.0028 unit increase in AFFINITY. All of the control variables yield similar coefficients to those in the previous models and none of them changes signs, except for the Cold War dummy, which becomes negative.

**Table 4.5 about here**

Hypothesis 3 states that the more bodies for ministers of all member states that exist within IGOs to which two states jointly belong, the more those two states interests can be expected to converge over time. The results for this model (Model 5 in Table 4.5) do not provide support for the hypothesis that the more bodies within which member state ministers interact, the more two states interests will converge. The coefficient for the MINISTERIAL BODIES variable is positive as expected (0.00015), but is below the required level for statistical significance. Therefore, one cannot conclude with confidence that there is any relationship between the number of structures within which ministers of all member states interact and the degree to which interests converge. Even if the coefficient for MINISTERIAL BODIES had been significant, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the number of structures for meetings of ministers would be associated with a 0.0006 unit increase in the similarity of the two states' interests. This substantive effect is considerably smaller than that of the IGO variables tested in the other models.

Therefore, the results of Model 5 do not provide support for the hypothesis that meetings of member state ministers are conducive to member state interest convergence.

In order to test the effects of the number of bodies for meetings of ministers in the same model with similar bodies for meetings of other representatives, I used the variable BODIES OF NON-MINISTER REPS, which excludes bodies for meetings of ministers from the original BODIES OF REPRESENTATIVES variable. In Model 6, I test the number of bodies for non-minister representatives alone in the base model. BODIES OF NON-MINISTER REPS has a positive and statistically significant coefficient of 0.00027. Multiplying this coefficient by the standard deviation of the variable indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the number of BODIES OF NON-MINISTER REPS leads to a 0.0033 unit increase in AFFINITY. This effect is larger than that of the measure that included bodies for meetings of member state ministers, which indicates that the inclusion of meetings of ministers was dampening the effect of the BODIES OF REPRESENTATIVES variable.

Model 7 includes both BODIES OF NON-MINISTER REPS and MINISTERIAL BODIES. Having controlled for the number of bodies for meetings of representatives, the MINISTERIAL BODIES variable not only changes signs, but also moves even farther away from achieving statistical significance. Although this does not confirm the expectation set forth herein, this is consistent with socialization theory, which posits that meetings that are highly politicized should not lead to interest convergence (Checkel 2005; Lewis 2005).

Table 4.6 reproduces the results of Model 2 from Table 4.4 along with two other tests using the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable. In Model 8, I restricted the sample to those dyad-years for which the AFFINITY score was neither -1, which indicates perfect

dissimilarity, nor 1, which indicates perfect affinity. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is important to control for strategic behavior when examining a state's expressed interests. Although, as I explained above, AFFINITY is an appropriate measure of state interest similarity, I present these results in order to illustrate that the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable can still explain increases in interest similarity when controlling for possible cases of bloc voting in the sample. All of the other IGO variables retain their sign and substantive significance in this model, although I only present the results for the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable, since it is the most inclusive measure of the number of IGO substructures within which two member states interact. The results for Model 9 confirm that interaction within more IGO substructures has a positive and statistically significant effect on dyadic interest similarity. In fact, when restricting the sample in this way, the coefficient for the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable increases from 0.000026 to 0.000043.

**Table 4.6 about here**

The coefficients for the various control variables remain relatively stable, although the coefficient for RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT loses statistical significance. The coefficient on the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable even remains stable after restricting the sample to cases in which the AFFINITY score is between -0.7 and 0.7, therefore eliminating cases that come close to the extremes (Model 9). While Model 9 is obviously not the best model given that the sample was restricted based on values of the dependent variable, it indicates not only that the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable retains its significance in the absence of bloc voting but also that it does so in a

much smaller sample, whereas the RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE and RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT variables lose their statistical significance in this model.

### *Conclusion*

In this paper, I put forth a theory of how interaction within IGOs leads to a convergence in member state interests over time and tested three hypotheses drawn from that theory. My theory is based on the proposition that IGOs that facilitate more interaction between member state agents and bureaucrats from different member states are more conducive to an increase in member state interest similarity over time. The first hypothesis derived from that proposition is that IGOs with more substructures are more conducive to member state interest convergence over time. The second and third hypotheses are based on the same logic as the first, but specify that certain types of state agents are the most likely to transmit new ideas to the domestic context that actually translate into changes in state interest definition. Based on that logic, Hypothesis 2 states that the more bodies for representatives of all member states of IGOs to which two states jointly belong, the more interest convergence they would experience over time. The third hypothesis specifies that the more bodies for *ministers* of all member states of IGOs to which two states jointly belong, the more similar the two states' interests would become.

In order to test the three hypotheses, I created an original IGO dataset and generated several dyadic measures based on joint membership in IGOs with various attributes. Each of the first two hypotheses regarding IGO attributes and the degree to which IGOs with those attributes is associated with increases in member state interest similarity was supported by the respective test used to determine its validity. The

substantive significance of these IGO variables is similar in magnitude to that of other variables in the different models, and is only surpassed by the Realist control variables. This does not, however, weaken support for the theory being tested here, which was never meant to replace material factors as an explanation for changes in state interests, but rather to add another important factor back into the equation – interaction within IGOs and the resulting changes in ideas that affect the definition of state interests – and furthermore to determine which attributes of IGOs make this process most likely. As expected, the results indicate that IGOs with a high number of substructures as well as those with a lot of bodies for meetings of representatives of all member states are positively related with increases in member state interest similarity.


Tests of the third hypothesis, regarding the number of bodies for meetings of member states' ministers did not provide support for the hypothesis that the interaction of ministers alone are conducive to member state interest convergence. While the number of bodies for meetings of member state ministers was not too far from reaching statistical significance when modeled separately, it moves even farther from statistical significance when the number of bodies for meetings of other types of member state representative is properly controlled for. This could indicate that it is not meetings of ministers per se, but rather meetings of important state agents that matter for the transmission of new ideas between member states and the resulting convergence in member state interests. In fact, consistent with socialization theory, meetings of member state ministers may be too politicized to be conducive to persuasion and interest convergence.

Finally, I restricted the sample in order to ensure that these results would hold up while controlling for the possibility of bloc voting that could be reflected in the AFFINITY

variable. One can use expressed interests as an indicator of interests as long as one controls for strategic behavior. Therefore, I restricted the sample to exclude cases of extreme dissimilarity and of extreme similarity and the coefficients for all of the IGO variables remain positive and statistically significant.

The findings of the aforementioned tests are largely supportive of my theory that more interaction within IGOs leads to greater interest convergence over time and that IGOs with more substructures are therefore more conducive to member state interest convergence. These findings also show that IGOs that facilitate more interaction of high-level leaders are more conducive to interest convergence, although this effect may not be present if meetings are too politicized.

**FIGURE 4.1.** Average AFFINITY for thirty U.S. dyads



This figure originally appeared in Bearce and Bondanella (2007).

**TABLE 4.1: List of Hypotheses regarding IGO Attributes**

<b>Label</b>	<b>Hypothesis</b>
<b>H1</b>	The more IGOs with a large number of sub-structures to which two states jointly belong, the more their interests will converge over time.
<b>H2</b>	The more structures of IGOs in which representatives of two states interact, the more their interests will converge over time.
<b>H3</b>	The more structures of IGOs in which ministers of two states interact, the more their interests will converge over time.

**TABLE 4.2: List of IGO Variable Descriptions**

<b>Variable Name</b>	<b>Variable Description</b>
<i>High Structures IGO Membership</i>	Number of IGOs with more than nine total substructures in which two states share joint membership
<i>Joint IGO Substructures</i>	Total number of substructures of all IGOs in which two states share joint membership
<i>Bodies of Representatives</i>	Total number of substructures that bring together representatives of all member states of all IGOs in which two states share joint membership
<i>Bodies of Non-minister Reps</i>	Total number of substructures that bring together representatives of all member states <i>except for ministers/heads of cabinet agencies</i> of all IGOs in which two states share joint membership
<i>Ministerial Bodies</i>	Total number of substructures that bring together ministers/heads of cabinet agencies of all member states of all IGOs in which two states share joint membership

**TABLE 4.3: Descriptive Statistics**

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<i>Affinity</i>	0.83	0.29	-1	1
<i>High Structures IGO Membership (t-5)</i>	11.07	4.11	0	40
<i>Joint IGO Substructures (t-5)</i>	646.88	195.91	0	2125
<i>Bodies of Representatives (t-5)</i>	30.67	14.07	0	162
<i>Bodies of Non-minister Reps (t-5)</i>	28.88	12.27	0	116
<i>Ministerial Bodies (t-5)</i>	1.79	3.69	0	55
<i>Domestic Political Difference</i>	7.80	6.21	0	20
<i>Dyadic Trade</i>	0.0004	0.0028	0	0.20
<i>Relative Economic Development</i>	1.25	0.88	0	4.78
<i>Relative Economic Size</i>	2.35	1.75	0.00005	11.21
<i>Relative Military Power</i>	2.45	1.89	0	11.88
<i>Joint Military Alliance</i>	0.08	0.27	0	1
<i>Cold War</i>	0.70	0.46	0	1
<i>Contiguity</i>	0.037	0.188	0	1

**TABLE 4.4: Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
Constant	0.238** (0.007)	0.231** (0.006)	0.235** (0.007)
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)	0.658** (0.008)	0.657** (0.008)	0.656** (0.008)
<i>High Structures IGO Membership (t-5)</i>	0.00083** (0.00012)		-0.0016** (0.0003)
<i>Joint IGO Substructures (t-5)</i>		0.000026** (0.000002)	0.000052** (0.000005)
<i>Domestic Political Difference</i>	-0.0011** (0.0001)	-0.0011** (0.0001)	-0.0011** (0.0001)
<i>Dyadic Trade</i>	0.106 (0.207)	0.094 (0.207)	0.101 (0.206)
<i>Relative Economic Development</i>	0.0042** (0.0012)	0.0041** (0.0012)	0.0041** (0.0012)
<i>Relative Economic Size</i>	0.0070** (0.0011)	0.0069** (0.0011)	0.0071** (0.0011)
<i>Relative Military Power</i>	0.0086** (0.0011)	0.0086** (0.0011)	0.0082** (0.0011)
<i>Joint Military Alliance</i>	0.057** (0.005)	0.056** (0.005)	0.056** (0.005)
<i>Cold War</i>	0.0019** (0.0009)	0.0039** (0.0009)	0.0015* (0.0009)
<i>Contiguity</i>	-0.040 (0.043)	-0.040 (0.043)	-0.041 (0.043)
N	239,940	239,940	239,940
R <sup>2</sup> within	0.45	0.45	0.45
R <sup>2</sup> between	0.90	0.90	0.90
R <sup>2</sup> overall	0.83	0.83	0.83

Notes: Cell entries are ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses.

\* indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence.

\*\* indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

**TABLE 4.5: Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence**

	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>
Constant	0.244** (0.007)	0.251** (0.007)	0.243** (0.007)	0.243** (0.007)
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)	0.658** (0.008)	0.658** (0.008)	0.658** (0.008)	0.658** (0.008)
<i>Bodies of Representatives</i>	0.00020* (0.00004)			
<i>Bodies of Non-Minister Reps (t-5)</i>			0.00027** (0.00004)	0.00027** (0.00005)
<i>Ministerial Bodies (t-5)</i>		0.00015 (0.00010)		-0.000029 (0.000107)
<i>Domestic Political Difference</i>	-0.0010** (0.0001)	-0.0011** (0.0001)	-0.0010** (0.0001)	-0.0010** (0.0001)
<i>Dyadic Trade</i>	0.086 (0.206)	0.099 (0.206)	0.123 (0.206)	0.128 (0.207)
<i>Relative Economic Development</i>	0.0043** (0.0012)	0.0044** (0.0012)	0.0042** (0.0012)	0.0042** (0.0012)
<i>Relative Economic Size</i>	0.0071** (0.0011)	0.0073** (0.0011)	0.0070** (0.0011)	0.0070** (0.0011)
<i>Relative Military Power</i>	0.0084** (0.0011)	0.0081** (0.0011)	0.0085** (0.0011)	0.0085** (0.0011)
<i>Joint Military Alliance</i>	0.057** (0.005)	0.058** (0.005)	0.057** (0.005)	0.057** (0.005)
<i>Cold War</i>	-0.0013** (0.0006)	-0.0025** (0.0006)	0.0014** (0.0006)	-0.0014 (0.0006)
<i>Contiguity</i>	-0.041 (0.043)	-0.040 (0.043)	-0.041 (0.043)	-0.041 (0.043)
N	239,940	239,940	239,940	239,940
R <sup>2</sup> within	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45
R <sup>2</sup> between	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90
R <sup>2</sup> overall	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83

Notes: Cell entries are ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses.

\* indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence. \*\* indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

**TABLE 4.6: Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence**

	<b>Model 2 (Base model)</b>	<b>Model 12 (With restricted sample)</b>	<b>Model 13 (With restricted sample)</b>
Constant	0.231** (0.006)	0.149** (0.008)	0.107** (0.021)
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)	0.657** (0.008)	0.674** (0.007)	0.560** (0.009)
<i>Joint IGO Substructures (t-5)</i>	0.000026** (0.000002)	0.000043** (0.000004)	0.000049** (0.000012)
<i>Domestic Political Difference</i>	-0.0011** (0.0001)	-0.0013** (0.0001)	-0.0024** (0.0003)
<i>Dyadic Trade</i>	0.094 (0.207)	0.741 (0.423)	-3.033** (1.200)
<i>Relative Economic Development</i>	0.0041** (0.0012)	0.0021 (0.0018)	0.0057 (0.0055)
<i>Relative Economic Size</i>	0.0069** (0.0011)	0.0063** (0.0017)	-0.0034 (0.0054)
<i>Relative Military Power</i>	0.0086** (0.0011)	0.0132** (0.0019)	0.019** (0.004)
<i>Joint Military Alliance</i>	0.056** (0.005)	0.075** (0.007)	0.086** (0.012)
<i>Cold War</i>	0.0039** (0.0009)	0.0242** (0.0014)	-0.0169** (0.0034)
<i>Contiguity</i>	-0.040 (0.043)	0.009 (0.024)	0.036** (0.005)
N	239,940	157,924	46,702
R <sup>2</sup> within	0.45	0.47	0.41
R <sup>2</sup> between	0.90	0.87	0.50
R <sup>2</sup> overall	0.83	0.83	0.69

Notes: Cell entries are ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses.

\* indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

\*\* indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

## APPENDIX A

### CODING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In order to test my theory regarding how interaction within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) leads to member state interest convergence, I needed to code IGOs based on the number of various types of structures that they have. The units in the raw dataset are IGO-years, which includes all IGOs for the period 1970-1995. I used the IGO-years listed in the Correlates of War (COW) IGO dataset (Pevehouse et al. 2003) as a base for this dataset. Therefore, IGOs are defined as organizations whose members include three or more sovereign states, that have a permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarters, and that hold regular plenary sessions at least once every ten years (Pevehouse et al. 2003).

For each of the IGO-years in the dataset, I collected information regarding several variables that were used in this chapter: the total number of substructures, the number of bodies for meetings of representatives of all member states, and the number of bodies for meetings of ministers of member states. As noted above, the measures of the total number of substructures include all main bodies of the IGO in a particular year, including general/plenary assemblies, executive bodies, bodies for meetings of various types of representatives, tribunals, committees, subcommittees, working and study groups, and secretariat and technical divisions. Since my goal is to measure the amount of interaction between individuals from different states I counted all main divisions of secretariats or other technical divisions mentioned separately, rather than counting them all under one body as the secretariat, which would make them equivalent to bodies within small IGOs that truly do have only one office/division that serves as its secretariat.

There are some cases in which the entry for an IGO-year mentions only “committees” or “working groups” without giving a specific count of such structures. If the preceding and/or following years’ entries do give a more specific count, that number is used as an estimate of the number of committees, etc. in that year. If no more complete information is available, I counted one for each type of structure that is mentioned. In other words, if the entry mentions “committees” this means that there is at least one committee so I counted one more body. This is relatively unproblematic since the IGOs that do not give complete information tend to be those which do not have a lot of structures and the variable related to this measure counts joint dyadic membership in IGOs that have more than five substructures, rather than being a measure of all structures within which the two states interact. The dyadic level variables used for empirical analysis in this chapter are based on COW’s IGO membership data, but counts joint dyadic membership only for IGO-years in which the IGO meets the criteria of having more than nine substructures.

As mentioned in the text of the chapter, the data for the number of bodies for meetings of representatives of all member states and for the number of bodies for meetings of ministers of all member states include a count for each formation of each body. The purpose of this counting method is to give as even a weight as possible to each “body” in terms of the amount of interaction that it facilitates between state agents.

The data was drawn largely from the Union of International Association’s (UIA) *Yearbook of International Organizations*. However, during the 1970s, the *Yearbook* was not published for every year, but usually for two year periods (e.g. 1970-1, 1972-3, etc.). When structures changed from one edition to the next, I made an effort to find out in

which year it changed using later editions of the *Yearbook* as well as the IGOs' websites, when possible. If the exact year of the change was still uncertain, I applied the same information to both years of the two year period in which the *Yearbook* was published. For example, if the number of structures was different in the 1970-1 edition than in the 1972-3 edition, the information from the 1972-3 edition would be applied to both 1972 and to 1973. However, the main bodies of the IGOs are relatively sticky so this should not pose too much of a problem for the variables counting bodies for meetings of all representatives or bodies for meetings of ministers. The number of committees, technical divisions, and other bodies included in the variable counting the total number of substructures of the IGOs are a bit less sticky, but imputing the data to consecutive years for certain cases should not be too problematic. Furthermore, testing all three types of structures ensures that results do not depend on the use of a particular measure. Although each test is based on a particular hypothesis, they are all derived from the proposition that interaction within more substructures leads to greater member state interest convergence.

Finally, if data was missing altogether for an IGO-year and the number of bodies could not be discerned from later editions of the *Yearbook* or from the IGO's websites, then the IGO-year was coded as missing and was therefore not counted in the joint IGO membership variables. Since my variables are meant to code the amount of interaction that states have within IGOs, it is actually appropriate not to count IGO-years in which IGOs were not active enough for UIA to obtain information as to their activities or changes in their structures.

## References

- Bearce, David H., and Stacy Bondanella. 2007. "Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member State Interest Convergence." *International Organization* 61 (4):703-33.
- Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan Stam. 2000. "EUGene: A Conceptual Manual." *International Interactions* 26 (2):179-204.
- Beyers, Jan. 2005. "Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The Case of Council Officials." *International Organization* 59 (4):899-936.
- Beyers, Jan, and Guido Dierickx. 1998. "The Working Groups of the Council of the European Union: Supranational or Intergovernment Negotiations?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 36 (3):289-317.
- Campbell, John L. 1998. "Institutional analysis and the role of ideas in political economy." *Theory and Society* 27 (3):377-409.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1999. "Social Construction and Integration." *Journal of European Public Policy* 64 (4):545-60.
- . 2005. "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe." *International Organization* 59 (4):801-26.
- Finnemore, Martha. 1996. *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1999. "Actors and Preferences in International Relations." In *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, ed. D. A. Lake and R. Powell. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gartzke, Erik. 1998. "Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (1):1-27.
- Gartzke, Erik, and Dong-Joon Jo. 2002. "United Nations General Assembly Voting, 1946-1996. Version 3.0. <http://www.columbia.edu/~eg589/datasets>."
- Gartzke, Erik, Timothy Nordstrom, Charles Boehmer, and J. Joseph Hewitt. 2006. "Peace by the Numbers: Disaggregating IGOs in Time and Space." In *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association*. San Diego, CA.
- Gheciu, Alexandra. 2005. "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 'New Europe'." *International Organization* 59 (4):973-1012.
- Gibler, Douglas M., and Melinda Reid Sarkees. 2004. "Measuring Alliances: the Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data Set: 1816-2000." *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (2):211-22.
- Gleditsch, Kristian S. 2002. "Expanded Trade and GDP data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (5):712-24.
- Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane. 1993. "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework." In *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, ed. J. Goldstein and R. O. Keohane. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Hooghe, Liesbet. 2005. "Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission." *International Organization* 59 (4):861-98.

- Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2001. "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments." *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (4):487-515.
- . 2005. "Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing Beyond Europe." *International Organization* 59 (4):1013-44.
- Kelley, Judith. 2004. "International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions." *International Organization* 58 (3):425-57.
- Kim, Soo Yeon, and Bruce Russett. 1996. "The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly." *International Organization* 50 (4):629-52.
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables." *International Organization* 36 (2):497-510.
- Lewis, Jeffrey. 2005. "The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the European Union." *International Organization* 59 (4):937-71.
- Maddison, Angus. 1995. *Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992*. Paris: OECD Centre for Development Studies.
- Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 2002. "Polity IV Data Set [Computer file; version p4v2002]." Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. 2006. "Cooperation in World Politics: The Constraining and Constitutive Effects of International Organizations." In *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association*. San Diego, CA.
- Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. 1999. "Is the Liberal Peace Just an Artifact of Cold War Interests? Assessing Recent Critiques." *International Interactions* 25 (3):213-41.
- Pevehouse, Jon C., Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke. 2003. "Intergovernmental Organizations, 1815-2000: A New Correlates of War Data Set."
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics." *American Political Science Review* 64 (4):1033-53.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2005. "Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe." *International Organization* 59 (4):827-60.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." In *Peace, War and Numbers*, ed. B. Russett. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Summers, Robert, and Alan Heston. 1991. "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1987. NBER Working Paper No. R1562. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=227455>."
- Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy is what states make of it: social construction of power politics." *International Organization* 46 (2):391-425.
- . 1994. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *American Political Science Review* 88 (2):384-96.