INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
030:368, FALL 2008
TH 1:30 PM – 4:20 PM, 337 SH

INSTRUCTOR:
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Office Hours: Wednesday 2:00-4:30pm

COURSE DESCRIPTION:
Realists argue that the defining characteristic of the international system is anarchy, or the lack of a centralized world government. Yet, international politics is orderly and highly organized. The codified rules and regulations that create order in world politics, as well as the authority relationships that manage, monitor, and enforce these rules can be termed *global governance*. This includes a wide variety of arrangements, such as informal norms, ordering principles, treaties, international institutions and regimes, international organizations, and law. This course examines the sources of order and global governance in international relations theoretically and empirically, focusing on force, power, institutions, and norms. A variety of substantive areas of global governance are examined including international security, international law/legalization, international trade, the environment, and human rights.

REQUIRED TEXTS:
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. Basic Books.

Bull, Hedley. 2002. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Third Edition*. London: Macmillan.

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goldsmith, Jack L. and Eric A. Posner. 2005. *The Limits of International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*. Princeton University Press.

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press.

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge Univ. Press.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS:
Your final grade will be determined based on your performance on class participation (25%), weekly papers (25%), and a research paper (50%).

1) Class Participation (25%)
The quality of a graduate level seminar depends to a large extent on the efforts of the students. I expect that you will come to class each week prepared to discuss the required readings. Obviously it is impossible to participate in a seminar discussion if you are not in attendance. I expect no absences in the course, and I encourage you to discuss any circumstances with me that will preclude you from attending class.

To prepare for class discussions, keep in mind the following points:

a) What is the research question?
b) What is the researcher's theoretical argument? What assumptions underlie this theory?
c) Is the theory interesting? How does the argument fit into the literature? What does it tell us that we don't already know?
d) Evaluation of the theory:
   -If the theory is tested, what consequences are tested, how are concepts measured, and what methods are used? Do these make sense?
   -Is there any evidence (other than anecdotal) that supports the theory? Is there evidence that falsifies it? What might you expect to see that would make you think the theory might be 'wrong'? Does the author provide you with enough of a structure to say this? In other words, is the theory falsifiable?
e) What conclusions does the researcher draw? Does the researcher fully examine the implications of the theory? What are the most significant research findings?
f) To what degree do you think the researcher has answered his/her question? Is this a good example of research? Why or why not? What are the possibilities for related research? How can the research be extended or applied elsewhere?
g) How do the selections we read this week fit together? How do they fit into the course as a whole? Are we seeing progress in this research area?

2) Weekly Papers (25%)
Throughout the semester, you will submit a total of 7 one-page critiques of the weekly readings. You can use single-spacing, one inch margins, and no smaller than 11 point font. If there is a book for the week's readings, your critique should focus on that. If there are several articles and/or book chapters assigned, pick at least two related readings and discuss those in your critique. You will be allowed to drop your lowest paper grade.

3) Research Paper (50%)
Choose a research question that falls in the topical areas covered in this class and write a research paper addressing this question. The final product should take the form of a conference paper or journal article. Your paper cannot reproduce (in whole or in part) any of your previous work in a substantive course. The paper should be about 20-30 pages in length and be written in the professional style of the American Political Science Association. Your research paper should a) clearly identify your research question, b) review and synthesize the relevant literature, c) develop a theoretical argument and derive testable hypotheses, d) develop a research design to evaluate the

hypotheses empirically, and e) present an empirical evaluation of the hypotheses (using either statistical analysis of existing data sets or qualitative analysis of a few cases). You may use whatever methodology you feel is most appropriate to the issue and which you feel qualified to implement. I will not be impressed by incompetent quantitative analysis, nor will I penalize competent historical or case-study approaches.

The paper will be due in several stages:
Thursday, September 25th, Research Question (5%) (due in class): Submit a one page typed description of your research question, and explain how it fits into the general topical themes for the course. Provide an initial bibliography of at least 15 sources. I recommend searching for publications related to your topic on <http://scholar.google.com>.

Friday, October 17th, Research Design (10%) (due at 5:00p.m. in my mailbox): Submit five to seven typed pages (with a bibliography) that identify your research question, review the literature relevant to your question, discuss the method of analysis you intend to employ, and describe any data or historical sources you will use to evaluate your hypotheses.

Wednesday, November 19th, First Draft (15%) (due at 5:00p.m. in my mailbox): Submit the initial draft of your paper, with all key parts of the paper included (introduction, theory, research design, analysis, references). Each draft will be read by the instructor and two other students in the class. Each student should submit three hard copies of the paper to the instructor, who will then assign the student discussants for each paper. The two papers each student will discuss will be distributed in each student's mailbox on Thursday, November 20th.

Thursday, December 4th, Reviews (20%) (due at 12:00p.m. in my mailbox): Each student will write a typed review commenting on two other students' papers in the class. The reviewers will be assigned "blindly", so that the authors do not know who reviewed their papers. The reviews should take the form of a journal review, where you make specific recommendations about how to improve the paper. More detailed instructions, along with examples of reviews, will be distributed in class later.

Wednesday, December 17th, Final Draft (50%) (due at 5:00p.m. in my mailbox): Submit your final paper along with a memo responding to the reviewers' comments in the previous round. I will take into consideration how well you responded to others' criticisms when assigning a final grade. I will not accept any late papers under any circumstances! The final paper grade is based on the weighted component grades for each portion of the paper (research question, research design, first draft, reviews, and final draft).

CLASS SCHEDULE

Most of the course readings are available electronically through Iowa's library resources. If you are on campus or connected to Iowa's library remotely, you can search for the article using <http://scholar.google.com>. You can also search for the journal in the library's catalog. I will have copies of book chapters and articles not available electronically in my office that can be checked out with a student ID.

SECTION I: COOPERATION & ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS

Week #1 (August 28th): NO CLASS, APSA CONFERENCE, BOSTON

Week #2 (Sept. 4th): Order in World Politics

Required:

- Bull, Hedley. 2002. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Third Edition*. London: Macmillan.

Recommended:

Buzan, Barry. 1993. "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School." *International Organization*, 47(3): 327-52.

Dunne, Tim. 1999. "A British School of International Relations." Pp. 395-424 in Jack Hayward, Brian Barry, and Archie Brown (eds.), *The British Study of Politics in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

English school ISA section: http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/research/international-relations-security/english-school/

Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood. 1979. "International Legal Order as an Idea." *The American Journal of International Law*, 73(2): 244-266.

Waever, Ole. 1998. "The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations." *International Organization*, 52(4): 687-727.

Wrong, Dennis. 1994. *The Problem of Order: What Unites and Divides Society*. Free Press.

Week #3 (Sept. 11th): The Logic of Collective Action and the Demand for Cooperation

Required:

- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Chapters 1-2
- Oye, Kenneth. 1985. "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." *World Politics* 38(1): 1-24.
- Hardin, Garrett. 1968. "The Tragedy of the Commons." *Science* 162: 1243-1248.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Chapters 8-10
- Conybeare, John A.C. 1980. "International Organization and the Theory of Property Rights." *International Organization*, 34: 307-334.

Recommended:

Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperating Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics*, 38(1): 226-254.

Coase, R.H. 1974. "The Lighthouse in Economics." *The Journal of Law and Economics*, 17: 357-376.

North, Douglass. 1991. "Institutions." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5(1): 97-112.

Russett, Bruce and John Sullivan. 1971. "Collective Goods and International Organization." *International Organization* 25(4): 845-865.

Taylor, Michael. 1987. *The Possibility of Cooperation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wendt, Alexander. 1994. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *American Political Science Review*, 88(2): 384-396.

Week #4 (Sept. 18th): The Evolution of Cooperation
Required:

- Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 3-6, 10
- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. Basic Books. Chapters 1-4, 6-7

Recommended:
Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperating Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics*, 38(1): 226-254.
Morrow, James D. 1994. "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information." *International Organization*, 48(3):387-423.

SECTION II: SOURCES OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS

Week #5 (Sept. 25): Hegemonic Stability and International Organizations
Required:

- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 4-5
- Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1): 3-32.
- Jacobson, Harold K., William M. Reisinger, and Todd Mathers. 1986. "National Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations." *American Political Science Review*, 80(1): 141-159.
- Thompson, Alexander. 2006. "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission." *International Organization* 60: 1-34.

Recommended:
Carr, Edward Hallett. 1939. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*. New York: HarperCollins.
Kindleberger, Charles P. 1986. "International Public Goods without International Government." *The American Economic Review* 76: 1-13.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: Norton.
Modelski, George. 1987. *Long Cycles in World Politics*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Morgenthau, Hans. 1967. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Knopf.
Organski, A.F.K. 1968. *World Politics, 2nd edition*. New York: Knopf.
Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. 1980. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Week #6 (October 2nd): Week #4 (February 7th): Institutions I
Note: Brian Lai will be teaching this class.
Required:

- Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*. Princeton University Press.

Recommended:
Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. *Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Week #7 (October 9th): Institutions II
Required:

- Rochester, J. Martin. 1986. "The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study." *International Organization* 40(4): 777-813.
- Simmons, Beth A. and Lisa L. Martin. 2002. "International Organizations and Institutions". Pages 192-211 in Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization*, 55(4): 761-799.
- Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. "Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?" *World Politics* 57(1): 1-38.
- Barnett, Michael N. and Martha Finnemore. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations." *International Organization*, 53(4): 699-732.
- Duffield, John S. 2003. "The Limits of Rational Design." *International Organization*, 57(2): 411-430.

Recommended:
Claude, Inis. 1966. "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations." *International Organization*, 20(3): 367-379.
Gilligan, Michael J. 2004. "Is There a Broader-Deeper Tradeoff in Multilateral Agreements?" *International Organization*, 58(3): 459-484.
Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory." *International Security*, 20(1): 39-51.
Koremenos, Barbara. 2001. "Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility." *International Organization*, 55(2): 289-325.
Koremenos, Barbara and Duncan Snidal. 2003. "Moving Forward, One Step at a Time." *International Organization*, 57(2): 431-444.
Mansfield, Edward D. and Jon Pevehouse. 2006. "Democratization and International Organizations." *International Organization*, 60: 137-167.
Martin, Lisa L. and Beth A. Simmons. 1998. "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." *International Organization*, 52(4): 729-757.
Mearsheimer, John J. 1994-95. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security*, 19(3): 5-49.
Mitchell, Ronald B. 1998. "Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes." *International Studies Quarterly* 42: 109-130.
Mitchell, Ronald B. and Patricia M. Keilbach. 2001. "Situation Structure and Institutional

Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange." *International Organization* 55: 891-917.

Pevehouse, Jon. 2003. "Democratization, Credible Commitments, and Joining International Organizations." In Daniel W. Drezner (ed.), *Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of International and Domestic Institutions*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Russett, Bruce and John Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Week #8 (October 16th): Norms I

Required:

- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3, 6
- Finnemore, Martha. 1993. "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy." *International Organization* 47: 565-597.
- Haas, Peter M. 1989. "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control." *International Organization*, 43(3): 377-404.
- Bearce, David H. and Stacy Bondanella. 2007. "Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence." *International Organization* 61(4): 703-733.

Recommended:

Axelrod, Robert. 1986. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms." *American Political Science Review*, 80: 1095-1111.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* 52: 887-917.

Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed). 1996. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. 2002. "A Kantian System? Democracy and Third Party Conflict Resolution." *American Journal of Political Science*, October, 46(4): 749-759.

Morrow, James D. 1994. "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information." *International Organization*, 48(3):387-423.

Week #9 (October 23rd): Norms, Part II

Required:

- Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 3-4, 6-7
- Fearon, James D. and Alexander Wendt. 2002. "Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View." Pp. 52-72 in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Recommended:

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization*, 46(2): 391-425.

Week #10 (October 30th): Bargaining and Treaty Compliance

- Powell, Robert. 2002. "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5: 1-30.
- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization*, 49(3): 379-414.
- Fearon, James D. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization*, 52(2): 269-305.
- Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. "On Compliance." *International Organization*, 47(2): 175-205.
- Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" *International Organization*, 50(3): 379-406.
- Simmons, Beth A. 1998. "Compliance with International Agreements." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1: 75-93.

Recommended:

Cowhey, Peter F. 1993. "Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States." *International Organization*, 47(2): 299-326.

Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. 1996. "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations." *International Organization*, 50(1): 109-139.

Hurd, Ian. 1999. "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics." *International Organization*, 53(2): 379-408.

Kegley, Charles W., Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond. 1990. *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics*. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press.

Krasner, Stephen. 1991. "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier." *World Politics*, 43:336-366.

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 1999. "Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation." *American Journal of Political Science*, 43(4): 979-1002.

McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2000. "Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments." *International Organization*, 54(4): 809-824.

Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003. "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States." *American Political Science Review*, 47(1): 123-135.

Talberg, Jonas. 2002. "Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union." *International Organization*, 56(3): 609-643.

von Stein, Jana. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *American Political Science Review*, 99(4): 611-622.

SECTION III: TOPICS IN IO/COOPERATION

Week #11 (November 6th): Legalization and International Law

Required:

- Kahler, Miles. 2000. "The Causes and Consequences of Legalization." *International Organization*, 54(3): 661-683.
- Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance." *International Organization* 54(3): 421-456.
- Goldsmith, Jack L. and Eric A. Posner. 2005. *The Limits of International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapters 1-3, 6
- Raustiala, Kal. 2006. "Form and Substance in International Agreements." *American Journal of International Law* 99(3): 581-614.

Recommended:

Alter, Karen. 1998. "Who are the 'Masters of the Treaty'? European Governments and the European Court of Justice. *International Organization* 52: 121-147.

Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1998. *The New Sovereignty*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Garrett, Geoffrey, R., Daniel Keleman, and Heiner Schulz. 1998. "The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union." *International Organization* 52: 149-176.

Keohane, Robert. 1997. "International Relations and International Law: Two Optics." *Harvard International Law Journal* 38(2): 487-502.

Mattli, Walter and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 1998. "Revisiting the European Court of Justice." *International Organization* 52: 177-209.

Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood. 1979. "International Legal Order as an Idea." *The American Journal of International Law*, 73(2): 244-266.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Andrew S. Tulumello, and Stepan Wood. 1998. "International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship." *American Journal of International Law* 92(3): 367-397.

Special issue of *International Organization* on legalization, 54(3)

Week #12 (November 13th): International Institutions and Conflict Management

Required:

- Reinhardt, Eric. 2001. "Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(2): 174-195.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Paul R. Hensel. "International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 721-737.
- Allee, Todd and Paul K. Huth. 2006. "Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover." *American Political Science Review* 100(2): 219-234.
- Hansen, Holley, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Stephen C. Nemeth. "IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving Beyond the Global vs. Regional Dichotomy." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2): 295-325.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2003. "Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars." *International Studies Review* 5(4): 97-114.
- Pevehouse, Jon and Bruce Russett. 2006. "Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace." *International Organization*, 60: 969-1000.

Recommended:

Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 779-801.

Fischer, Dana D. 1982. "Decisions to Use the International Court of Justice: Four Recent Cases." *International Studies Quarterly* 26(2): 251-277.

Meyers, B. David. 1974. "Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organization of African Unity." *International Organization* 28(3): 345-373.

Week #13 (November 20th): International Economic Institutions

Required:

- Milgrom, Paul, Douglass North and Barry Weingast. 1990. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." *Economics and Politics* 2: 1-23.
- Martin, Lisa L. 1993. "Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions." *World Politics* 45(3): 406-432.
- Simmons, Beth A. 2000. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs." *American Political Science Review*, 94(4): 819-835.
- Rosendorff, B. Peter and Helen V. Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape." *International Organization* 55(4): 829-857.
- Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and WTO on World Trade." *International Organization*, 61: 37-67.
- Smith, James McCall. 2000. "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts." *International Organization* 54(1): 137-180.

Recommended:

Blaydes, Lisa. 2004. "Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC." *International Organization* 58(2): 213-237.

Busch, Marc and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. "Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement." *Journal of World Trade* 37(4): 719-735.

Goldsmith, Jack L. and Eric A. Posner. 2005. *The Limits of International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 5

Guzman, Andrew. 2004. "Global Governance and the WTO." *Harvard International Law Journal* 45: 303-351.

Martin, Lisa L. 1992. "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict." *International Security* 16(4): 143-177.

Simmons, Beth A. and Andrew Guzman. 2002. "To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the WTO." *Journal of Legal Studies* 31(1): S205-S235.

Steinberg, Richard H. 2002. "In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO." *International Organization* 56(2): 339-374.

Vreeland, James. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Yarbrough, Beth V. and Robert M. Yarbrough. 1992. *Cooperation and Governance in International Trade*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Week #14 (November 27th): NO CLASS, THANKSGIVING BREAK

Week #15 (December 4th): Environmental Institutions

Required:

- Mitchell, Ronald B. 1994. "Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance." *International Organization*, 48(3): 425-458.
- Young, Oran R. and Marc A. Levy. 1999. "The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes" in Oran R. Young (ed.), *Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Pp. 1-32.
- Ward, Hugh. 2006. "International Linkages and Environmental Sustainability: The Effectiveness of the Regime Network." *Journal of Peace Research* 43(2): 149-166.
- Hensel, Paul R., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Thomas E. Sowers II. 2006. "Conflict Management of Riparian Disputes." *Political Geography* 25: 383-411.
- von Stein, Jana. "The International Law and Politics of Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2): 243-268.
- Downs, George. 2000. "Constructing Effective Environmental Regimes." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 25-42.

Recommended:

Bernauer, Thomas. 1995. "The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: How We Might Learn More." *International Organization* 49: 351-377.

Haas, Peter M., Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy. 1993. *Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Helm, Carsten and Detlef Sprinz. 2000. "Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(5): 630-652.

Jacobson, Harold and Edith Brown Weiss. 1995. "Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords." *Global Governance* 1(2): 119-149.

Mitchell, Ronald. 1994. *Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Mitchell, Ronald and Patricia Keilbach. 2001. "Situation, Structure, and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange." *International Organization* 55(4): 891-917.

Ringquist, Evan and Tatiana Kostadinova. 2005. "Assessing the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: The Case of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(1): 86-102.

Young, Oran R. 1999. *Governance in World Affairs*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Young, Oran R. (ed.) 1999. *The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Week #16 (December 11th): Human Rights Institutions

Required:

- Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. "The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe." *International Organization* 54(2): 217-252.

- Hathaway, Oona A. 2002. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" *The Yale Law Journal* 111(8): 1935-2042.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression." *International Organization* 59: 593-629.
- Powell, Emilia J. and Jeffrey K. Staton. "Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation." Forthcoming, *International Studies Quarterly*.
- Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture." *International Organization* 62(1): 65-101.

Recommended:

Donnelly, Jack. 1986. "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis." *International Organization* 40(3): 599-642.

Goldsmith, Jack L. and Eric A. Posner. 2005. *The Limits of International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 4

Goodman, Ryan and Derek Jinks. 2003. "Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties." *European Journal of International Law* 14(1): 171-183. Note: this is a critique of Hathaway's (2002) study.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2005. "Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises." *The American Journal of Sociology* 110(5): 1373-1411.

Hathaway, Oona A. 2002. "The Cost of Commitment." *Stanford Law Review* 55: 1821-1862.

Keith, Linda Camp. 1999. "The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?" *Journal of Peace Research* 36: 95-118.

Neumayer, Eric. 2005. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(6): 925-953.

Risse, Thomas, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sikkink, Kathryn. 1993. "Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America." *International Organization* 47: 411-441.

Related Topics Not Covered

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