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# A Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Peace: The Ambiguous Case of the Spanish–American War\*

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This article uses the Spanish–American War, one of the only possible cases of war between democracies, to demonstrate the power of a constructivist approach for explaining the liberal peace. A ‘structural idealist’ argument suggests that the liberal peace must be conceived of as an ‘intersubjective consensus’ of the leaders and citizens of liberal states. A Gramscian perspective interprets the liberal pacific union as an effort by the United States to exercise its global leadership through an ideological hegemony rather than through coercion. US perceptions that Spain was not a liberal democracy in 1898 and US efforts to legitimate its expansionism as necessary for the spread of democracy to the island of Cuba explain how two states that appeared to share liberal characteristics could nevertheless find themselves at war. In the aftermath of the war, the contrasting experiences of the USA in the Philippines and Cuba demonstrated the utility of pursuing a liberal policy for legitimating an expansionist policy at home and abroad. US efforts to impose colonial rule in the Philippines generated opposition in the United States and an insurgent movement in the Philippines. US efforts to craft a protectorate relationship with a Cuban government chosen in US-sponsored elections, however, met with widespread support in the USA and was accepted by Cuban nationalists.

## 1. *The Liberal Peace*

Democracies don’t fight one another. No case comes closer to violating this empirical law of international relations than the Spanish–American War (Ray, 1995, p. 162; Russett, 1993, p. 19). Studies relying on the Polity III data set on political regimes point to this case as one of only a handful of cases of war between democracies (Farber & Gowa, 1995; Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997; Jagers & Gurr, 1995; Lake, 1992; Maoz, 1996). The relative rarity of war and democracy in the international system renders judgments about this war and several other ambiguous cases extremely important for establishing the statistical validity of the liberal peace (Spiro, 1994).

Advocates of the Kantian argument typically dispose of anomalies by claiming either that they did not represent cases of interstate war, or that one or both parties to the conflict were not

true democracies. This war does not count, according to Russett or Ray, because Spain was not a democracy in 1898 (Ray, 1993, 1995; Russett, 1993, pp. 16–23). This article seeks to move beyond the definitional debate to see what an in-depth case study of the behavior of the USA and Spain in this war can tell us about the democratic peace.

By the standards of the late 19th century, this could be considered a war between democracies. Spaniards and Americans, however, did not see themselves as being part of the ‘liberal pacific union’ envisioned by Immanuel Kant. Not only did Americans view Spain as being outside the moral realm of the pacific union, they overwhelmingly supported the war as a crusade to liberate Cuban ‘freedom fighters’ from Spanish tyranny.

This perception was crucial for the legitimation of a war fought to enhance the power and wealth of the United States. The USA fought to replace Spain as the dominant political and economic power on the island of Cuba. Within days of Commodore George Dewey’s victory over a Spanish fleet in Manila Harbor on 1 May 1898, the US government began devising plans for domination over the Philippines as well. USA’s imposition of colonial rule in the Philippines, however, generated substantial opposition at home and an insurgent movement in

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the Philippines. By contrast, US support for free and fair elections in Cuba to choose a nominally independent government proved popular in the USA and was accepted by most Cubans. US leaders, thus, discovered that the promotion of democracy and the idea of the liberal peace proved an effective way of building domestic and international support for an expansionist foreign policy.

This interpretation does not invalidate the liberal peace. Rather, it suggests that standard explanations of the liberal peace do not provide an adequate explanation of how the boundaries of that peace are determined. This article argues that the Spanish–American War can best be understood by ‘constructivist’ theories which focus on the power of global norms and shared identities in the international system. Two sets of factors drawn from constructivism are especially crucial for understanding this conflict: the presence or absence of a shared normative community and the capacity of powerful states to promulgate beliefs, both at home and abroad, that facilitate their pursuit of national interests.

First, the ‘structural idealist’ approach views the liberal pacific union as an ‘intersubjective consensus’ among liberal states that they belong to the same cooperative moral community (Wendt, 1994). This approach departs from the institutional explanation for the democratic peace which emphasizes the political constraints imposed by republican government that limit the ability of liberal states to go to war (Gaubatz, 1991; Lake, 1992; Morgan and Campbell, 1991). Instead, this account generally supports those who argue that liberal cultural norms of tolerance for self-determination and support for non-violent conflict resolution keep liberal states from fighting one another (Dixon, 1994; Doyle, 1983a; Russett, 1993). It suggests, however, that actors’ subjective judgments about the liberal status of potential allies or adversaries can often be more important than the concrete, objectively measurable characteristics of these states. Furthermore, the peaceful relations between liberal states are guided by a shared set of norms that transcend the cultural characteristics of individual states.

Second, a Gramscian argument interprets the idea of the liberal pacific union as an attempt by the American state to exercise an ‘ideological hegemony’ over its own citizens and subordi-

nate states (Cox, 1986; Gill, 1993; Robinson, 1996). Critics of the Kantian argument often emphasize power and national interest as an alternative to a focus on domestic political institutions and culture. The Gramscian approach, however, offers a way to integrate power considerations into an argument which still emphasizes the importance of shared liberal norms. Liberal ideology is an instrument used for the legitimation of US ‘leadership’ in the international system.

Neither of these constructivist approaches offers a complete understanding of the Spanish–American War or of the liberal peace. The structural idealist account underemphasizes the importance of the USA’s national interests in shaping its decision to go to war in 1898. It obscures the crucial role of US power in the construction of the liberal peace during the 20th century. The Gramscian argument, however, cannot account for the genuine consensus among many American citizens that the war to liberate Cuba was a just war according to American liberal values. It obscures the crucial role of the USA’s liberal culture in the exercise of US power. Combining these approaches, with apologies to Alexander Wendt, is that the liberal peace is what powerful liberal states make of it (Wendt, 1992).

## 2. *Constructivism and the Kantian Argument*

Advocates of the cultural argument have relied on statistical tests to prove the superiority of the cultural explanation of the liberal peace. Cultural attributes are difficult to measure, however, especially for historical cases. Scholars from this side of the Kantian debate, therefore, have not been fully successful at proving the cultural argument through these tests. Dixon (1994), for example, had to rely on the Polity data set, which measures the institutional characteristics of states, rather than their cultural values. Maoz & Russett (1993) used regime longevity and the level of political violence as proxies for cultural values. While it is plausible to suspect that liberal values are more prevalent in well-established democracies with low levels of political violence, there are limitations to the utility of these measures for capturing the essence of the normative dynamics of the liberal peace.

More broadly, it is not clear that measuring the attributes of individual states is the most appropriate tool for evaluating the normative argument. As Doyle (1983a) has emphasized, Kant believed that liberal states would have a special set of pacific relationships not only because of their individual characteristics, but because of their shared norms, understandings, and world-view. Reason would lead them to bind together around a common liberal program embodied in a shared respect for international and cosmopolitan law and in a formal federation of liberal states. Meanwhile, a distrust of the intentions of illiberal states and a desire to spread liberty to authoritarian regimes could lead democracies to be disproportionately likely to war against authoritarian states not perceived to be part of the pacific union (Doyle, 1983b).

The logic of the normative argument cries out for an analysis of the intersubjective consensus that binds liberal states together in their pacific union. Liberal states are peaceful towards one another not because they are individually and independently imbued with liberal values, but because they are part of a liberal system bound together by shared norms. The scholars working in the cultural school have certainly recognized the importance of the subjective element of the liberal peace. In their search for concrete, operational and reproducible indicators, however, contemporary advocates of the cultural argument have lost some of the initial focus of Doyle's work. A constructivist approach is ideally suited to restoring this focus.

The 'structural idealism' of Wendt (1992), Ruggie (1993), or Kratochwil & Koslowski (1994) can provide a more persuasive understanding of the liberal peace than the national attribute data and dyadic relationships that have been the focus of the empirical work to date. In Wendt's words, the pacific union may be an example of an 'intersubjective systemic structure consist[ing] of the shared understandings, expectations and social knowledge ... which define some of [states'] identities and interests ... The transnational convergence of domestic values,' such as 'the spread of democratic institutions' can be an example of a 'systemic process that may encourage collective identity formation' (Wendt, 1994, pp. 389–390). In the pacific union, liberal states are not purely self-

interested. Their identity is shaped by their relationship to other liberal states.

In this context, states' subjective perceptions of other states can be more important than the objective characteristics of those states (Hermann & Kegley, 1995; Oren, 1995; Owen, 1994; Risse-Kappen, 1996; Weart 1994). Do states view one another as members of the same moral community? Do they identify their own interest as being dependent on other members of the liberal community? Two states could have similar characteristics, but might not identify one another as being part of the same community. The Spanish–American War provides one example of this kind of normative division between two states that shared similar characteristics. The US covert interventions in Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973 provide other examples (Forsythe, 1992). Because of their commitment to socialist economic policies, Guatemalan and Chilean leaders saw themselves as exploited by the capitalist north rather than as part of a harmonious liberal community. Similarly, despite the fact that these states were electoral democracies, the USA did not view them as being part of the 'free world'.

As the examples above suggest, the United States appears as an antagonist in a number of the cases of possible conflicts, if not full-scale wars, between democracies. Realists have a simple answer for these seemingly anomalous cases: great powers have the capacity to coerce states, liberal or illiberal, throughout the globe. They exercise this power against liberal states when it is in their interest to do so. If liberal states have not recently fought one another, this is an artifact of the bipolarity and nuclear deterrence that caused 'the long peace' after World War II. In essence, realists argue that the democratic peace has reflected the USA's overwhelming power relative to its alliance partners during the Cold War and the shared fear of the USSR that bound these states together (Farber & Gowa, 1995, pp. 141–142; Layne, 1994; Mearsheimer, 1990).

The Gramscian perspective of Cox (1986), Gill (1993) and Robinson (1996) offers an explanation which can bridge the gap between the realist emphasis on power and the Kantian emphasis on shared norms. While all constructivists focus on the subjective and ideological dimensions of world politics, Gramscians also

emphasize the ability of actors with great material capabilities to shape the normative consensus that guides other actors. While Gramscians view global capitalism as the driving force in world politics, the basic conceptual tools of a Gramscian analysis need not be limited to a Marxist understanding of the world (Cox, 1993). Achieving ideological hegemony over subordinate actors can be just as useful for a state pursuing traditional realist goals of power and security as it can be for capitalists pursuing profit. The promotion of democracy as a tool for achieving hegemony applies to Athens' domination of the Delian League during the Peloponnesian War in much the same way that it applies to the USA's post-World War II leadership of the 'free world' (Bachteler, 1997).

From a Gramscian perspective, US leaders use the idea of the liberal pacific union to legitimate the exercise of US political and military power abroad. Within the USA, the promotion of democracy has become a central theme in forging a domestic consensus in favor of an expansionist foreign policy. Internationally, US leaders offer an appealing vision of a peaceful union of democratic states, under US leadership, that will bring liberty and prosperity to all like-minded states. When others accept this vision not just because it is being imposed by a more powerful state, but because they find it persuasive and compelling, this is an example of 'ideological hegemony' at work.

A combination of these approaches is needed to understand the Spanish–American War and its aftermath. From a structural idealist perspective, these two partially democratic states could go to war only because they did not view one another as being part of a larger community of liberal states. Indeed, many US Citizens genuinely viewed the war as a moral crusade to liberate Cuba from an autocratic Spain. From a Gramscian perspective, liberal rhetoric was used to legitimate this war of conquest to a skeptical US public. US leaders also learned from their contrasting postwar experiences in Cuba and the Philippines that the promotion of democracy was a more viable strategy for achieving hegemony over subordinate peoples than was colonial rule.

The examination of this case is divided into four parts. First, this article looks at how Spain's

nascent democracy shaped its policy in 1898. Second, the structural idealist approach is used to explain how US perceptions that Spain was not a democracy made it possible for the USA to go to war. The third section applies the Gramscian argument by looking at the material interests that underlay the USA's war to liberate Cuba. In the final section, the empirical focus shifts to examine the attempt by the USA to achieve an ideological hegemony over Cubans and Filipinos in the aftermath of the Spanish–American War.

### *3. Spanish 'Democracy' and the Decision to Go to War*

This article does not adopt the most extreme version of the constructivist approach, in which identities like 'democracy' are purely subjective and ultimately malleable. Certainly, some states are unambiguously democratic or autocratic. Nevertheless, there is a substantial subjective element to interpreting the regime characteristics of states that is missed by scholars who attempt to identify a definitive break point between democracies and non-democracies. Standards change over time. Many states simultaneously possess democratic and autocratic characteristics. At any given time, many are in an uncertain transition from one regime type to another.

Spain was such a state in 1898. In an era when the USA disenfranchised women, blacks, and Indians and subjected immigrant populations to corrupt political machines, Spanish democracy looked pretty robust in comparison. By today's standards, however, it would not be considered a democracy. Even by the standards of 1898, Spanish 'democracy' possessed significant autocratic political practices. Thus, Spain's political identity was sufficiently ambiguous that the political actors of that era could reasonably have chosen to identify it as democratic or non-democratic.

Between the restoration of the Bourbon Monarch Alfonso XII in 1876 and the outbreak of war in 1898, Spain was governed by eleven different parliamentary cabinets. Power alternated between two major contestants: the Liberal Conservatives led by Antonio Cánovas del Castillo and the Liberal Party led by Práxedes Sagasta. From 1890, parliamentary representatives were chosen in elections with

universal male suffrage. Anarchist, socialist, and regionalist parties began winning seats in urban constituencies after 1890, offering significant choices to the electorate. Spain also experienced increasingly vigorous associational participation at many levels. Madrid and other major cities possessed a strong and diverse free press. Anarchist and Communist labor unions gained strength in Barcelona, Bilbao, and other industrial centers. Rural chambers of commerce grew in number and strength, especially in northern Spain (Carr, 1980; Kern, 1974).

While the regent, Queen María Cristina, possessed important formal powers and played a limited role in the governance of the country, the civilian political leaders of the Cortes were the de facto rulers of Spain. These elected politicians governed in the name of the monarchy, but not under the full control of the monarch. Similarly, while the military was a powerful political institution, it did not govern the country. Only once during the Restoration had a military officer, General Arsenio Martínez Campos, held the premiership, and then only for six months in 1879.

If Spanish elections in rural districts had matched the free and fair character of electoral contests in many urban districts, Spain might have earned classification as a full-fledged democracy by the standards of 1898. A century of liberal land reforms, however, had created a powerful landed elite which used its economic and political power to dominate local electoral districts through a combination of fraud, intimidation, corruption and patronage (Kern, 1974, p. 33). Control over the local electoral machinery allowed these elites to guarantee the selection of their hand-picked candidates for the Cortes. Both major parties were little more than a network of local 'caciques' and their political machines.

Even the alternation in power of the two major parties resulted from fraudulent elections. Antonio Cánovas, the architect of the restoration system, encouraged the creation of the opposition Liberal Party. In its greater commitment to universal suffrage, anti-clericalism and free trade, the Liberal Party differed in important ways from the Liberal Conservatives, but it shared a broad commitment to the political, economic and social order of the restoration regime (Carr, 1980, p. 10). These parties en-

tered first into an implicit understanding that they would alternate in power and later agreed to the somewhat more overt *Pacto del Pardo* in 1883, which solidified the cooperative relationship between the two major parties (Kern, 1974, pp. 67–68). Elections were rigged to guarantee that the predetermined victor would achieve a parliamentary majority.

This characteristic of the Spanish regime suggests that Spain had not achieved the status of a fully consolidated democracy, but was in transition to democracy. Recent studies of democratization argue that explicit negotiated agreements among major power contenders are often necessary for the construction of new democracies (Karl, 1990; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Indeed, Cánovas created the *turno pacífico* for the same reason that modern democratic pacts are formed between contending political parties. Parties that were guaranteed their turn in power would not call upon the military to unseat the incumbents (Carr, 1980, pp. 7–10).

The formal power of the monarchy, the potential power of the military, and the corruption in the electoral system have led many scholars to conclude that Spain had not surpassed the minimum threshold to be considered a democracy (Carr, 1980; Kern, 1974; Ray, 1995, pp. 158–200). There is evidence, however, to suggest that Spain could be considered at least partially democratic or in transition to democracy at this time. The Polity III data set awarded it a score of six on its eleven-point democracy scale, a score which reasonably suggests that Spain was a borderline democracy in 1898 (Jagers & Gurr, 1995). At the least, Spanish democracy was sufficiently robust that the Spanish–American War cannot be easily discarded on the basis of coding error. Spain's often liberal behavior in the months leading to war provides more evidence in support of the idea that this could be considered a war between democracies.

Spain's behavior did not fully live up to the expectations of the Kantian argument. Rather than seeing itself as part of a community of liberal states, Spain consistently looked to the great monarchies of Europe to intercede on its behalf (May, 1961). Many Spaniards welcomed war with the USA and launched anti-US demonstrations throughout early 1898 (Offner, 1992).

Despite these shortcomings, Spain's nascent liberalism did shape its decisions leading to the war. This is most evident in the reaction of Spaniards to the war effort against the Cuban insurrection from 1895 to 1898. After an initial compromise offer, Cánovas pursued a war of extermination against the insurgent Cuban Liberating Army. He sent more than 200,000 troops to Cuba and appointed General Valeriano Weyler as Captain-General of Cuba, a man who has been labeled 'Butcher' Weyler for his conduct in an earlier civil war in Cuba, the Ten Years' War, 1868–78. During his two years as Captain-General (1896–7), Weyler pursued a brutal and expensive counterinsurgency strategy. At least 100,000 Cubans died of disease and starvation in *reconcentración* camps. Thousands more were killed by Spanish troops.

After a year and a half of this brutal strategy, Spanish policy took a significant liberal turn when Sagasta was named premier in late 1897 after Cánovas's assassination. Sagasta selected a progressive, Segismundo Moret, to be Minister for the Colonies. Moret sacked Weyler and replaced him with Gen. Ramon Blanco, who dismantled the *reconcentración* system, abandoned the aggressive military tactics of his predecessor and announced an amnesty for political prisoners.

More importantly, the Sagasta government made a significant offer of autonomy for Cuba (Fernández Almagro, 1968, pp. 29–34). All powers except foreign relations and war were to be vested in a Cuban parliament. Budgetary matters, trade regulations, and administrative authority would fall under Cuban control. Blanco replaced peninsular Spaniards who had held most important offices with local Cuban advocates of autonomy. Many of his new Ministers had to be summoned from the jail cells they had occupied throughout Weyler's tenure.

This shift in policy can be explained in part by the Kantian argument. Although most Spaniards wanted to retain Cuba, a majority had become disenchanted with the war. The war drained the Spanish treasury and Sagasta dared not raise additional resources through taxation (Pérez, 1983, p. 145). Draft evasion increased substantially. By late 1897, many Spaniards had become horrified by the extraordinary human costs of the war. Sagasta's Liberal Party had led the attack in the Cortes against the devastation

caused by Weyler's concentration camps (Offner, 1992). They were joined in opposition to the war by the reform faction of the Liberal Conservatives led by Francisco Silvela (Fernández Almagro, 1968, pp. 17–18). Even before Sagasta assumed office, domestic pressure had led Cánovas to beg Weyler to moderate his policies (Fernández Almagro, 1968, p. 13). In sum, the people who were forced to pay the costs of the war in lives and treasure made their opposition known. Politicians in the Cortes responded. This is precisely what Kant would have expected.

The move toward autonomy also reflected an attempt by the Spanish government to reach a negotiated settlement with the USA. Presidents Grover Cleveland and William McKinley had both proposed that Spain grant Cuba an autonomy comparable to Canada's relationship with Great Britain. When Sagasta began to implement his autonomy scheme, McKinley urged that 'Spain be left free to conduct military operations and grant political reforms'. He pleaded with Congress to extend to Spain a 'reasonable chance to realize her expectations and to prove the asserted efficacy of the new order of things to which she stands irrevocably committed' (Pérez, 1983, p. 147).

Many scholars suggest that Spain was merely trying to buy time with its reform policies and was not serious about meeting US demands (Gould, 1980; Morgan, 1965). However, if any major actor in Spain believed that the USA and Spain might be part of a community of liberal states, it was Sagasta's Liberal Party. At the very least, Spanish officials realized that accepting a liberal solution to the crisis in Cuba was likely to reduce tensions with the liberal USA. At most, this was a genuine attempt to find common ground around a liberal program.

One fact needs to remain clear in assessing whether Spain behaved as a liberal state in 1898: Spain did not start the war. The USA did. Mansfield & Snyder (1995) have argued that states in transition are likely to be more aggressive than either mature democracies or stable autocracies. If transitional Spain had started the war, this ambiguous case could be explained by their argument. Because the USA was the aggressor, the constructivist argument provides a better lens for understanding this case.

#### 4. Structural Idealism, US Perceptions of Spanish Democracy, and the US Decision to Fight

US citizens almost universally viewed Spain as a non-democracy. This perception removed the moral constraints that might have prevented the USA from going to war with Spain. It also generated considerable enthusiasm for a war to liberate Cuba. The USA, however, did not exclude Spain from the democratic camp for the same reasons contemporary scholars challenge its democratic credentials. Neither the fraudulent nature of some Spanish elections nor the *turno pacífico* led the USA to conclude that Spain was not a liberal state. Many of the most vigorous advocates of *Cuba Libre* were products of the parts of the US political process that most resembled Spanish democracy. Sen. John Morgan, a champion of recognizing Cuban independence and granting the Cuban rebels 'belligerency' rights, was one of many southern Democrat supporters of *Cuba Libre* who had successfully disenfranchised southern blacks in the pivotal US elections of 1896. Rep. William Sulzer, one of the most eloquent supporters of the Cuban cause, was a product of New York's Tammany Hall: hardly one who would consider ballot stuffing by a local political machine to be undemocratic. The fact that the USA ignored Spain's most undemocratic qualities provides one of the most convincing pieces of evidence for looking at the liberal peace as an inter-subjective consensus rather than an empirical law.

The US indictment of Spanish democracy was two-fold. First, the USA viewed Spain as a decadent old world monarchy (Owen, 1994). The central theme of three years of congressional debates and resolutions was that the USA should support the Cuban cause because they were fighting for democracy and freedom against Spanish monarchical tyranny. Sulzer summed up the character of the debate when he said in 1896:

Mr. Speaker, these brave, noble, heroic Cuban patriots are fighting a battle of republicanism against monarchy; of democracy against plutocracy; home rule against the bayonet; the sovereignty of the individual against the sanctity of the king; the ballot against the throne; American liberty against foreign tyranny, and above all and beyond all they are fighting a battle for the rights of man (Congress, 1896, p. 2349).

The Cubans were portrayed as the moral equivalent of the founding fathers of the USA. Cuba is fighting for 'the same principles that we contended for at Bunker Hill, Bennington, Princeton and Yorktown – the principles of local self-government and the doctrine that taxation without representation is tyranny', according to Sen. Gallinger (Congress, 1896, p. 2248).

This message was skillfully reinforced by the 'Cuban Junta' in New York, which gave voice to tens of thousands of Cubans who had emigrated to the USA in the wake of the Ten Years' War. This group focused its energy on lobbying Congress to recognize the belligerency rights and independence of the Cuban insurgents. Most participants in the propaganda campaign, including the leader of the Junta Tomás Estrada Palma, were white, English-speaking, middle class, naturalized US citizens. These expatriates consciously emulated the US model and frequently drew comparisons between their struggle for freedom and the American Revolution against British colonial rule (Rubens, 1932, pp. 326–329). Some even favored annexation or the establishment of a US protectorate over the island (Pérez, 1983, pp. 110–137). They were successful in building support for their cause because they projected a peculiarly North American message.

A wide variety of groups became champions of the Cuban cause. The American Federation of Labor, spurred on by the Cuban-born members of the cigar makers' union, voted to ask the US government to recognize Cuban belligerency rights (Foner, 1972, p. xxv). Patriotic groups like the Grand Army of the Republic held rallies in support of the Cuban cause while Protestant ministers welcomed the opportunity to expel Catholic Spain from the island (May, 1961, pp. 69–82). Both northern blacks and southern white jingoes voiced their support. All of these groups equated the Cuban struggle with the American Revolution.

Second, the USA also attacked Spanish democracy for the practice of its colonial rule in Cuba. Sen. William Allen's denunciation of Spanish rule spoke for many in Congress:

Your treatment of the Cubans for the last 50 years has been brutal and inhuman; you have shocked the moral sense of the civilized world; . . . you have stifled the cries of the Cubans for liberty and have drenched every acre of their soil with the blood of innocent men, women and

children and now in the spirit of our free institutions, the people of the United States, being the chief guardians and advocates of popular liberty upon this hemisphere, will require you to relax your hold upon these people and give them that freedom and right of self government that is inalienable to all people (Congress, 1896, p. 2252).

The brutality of the war effort was a central theme of the press coverage of the war. The Cuban Junta provided a constant flow of news stories on the conflict to the sensationalist New York papers at a regular 4 p.m. 'peanut club' at the offices of the Junta (Rubens, 1932, pp. 204–205; Wisan, 1934). Their reports, which emphasized the rape and murder of Cuban civilians by Butcher Weyler's soldiers, were then sent out over the news wires to papers all over the country and became the principal source of news on Cuba for much of the country. The constant bombardment of the public with stories of Spanish atrocities convinced most readers that Spanish rule in Cuba was inherently brutal, repressive, and illiberal (Wisan, 1934, pp. 88–98, 187–237).

Some US citizens focused on the broader and more devastating impact of disease and starvation in the reconcentration camps. In an important speech which helped push the country to war, Sen. Redfield Proctor declared at the end of his fact-finding trip to Cuba that Spain's reconcentration policies had led to a state of affairs that:

... is not peace nor is it war. It is desolation and distress, misery and starvation ... Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water and foul food or none, what wonder that one-half [of the *reconcentrados*] have died and that one-quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved ... To me the strongest appeal is the spectacle of a million and a half people ... struggling for freedom and deliverance from the worst misgovernment of which I have ever had knowledge (Congress, 1898, pp. 2916–2919).

Because members of Congress and their constituents identified with the Cuban cause, Congress voted overwhelmingly in 1896 and 1897 in favor of recognizing the insurgents as the government of an independent Cuba and granting them belligerency rights, allowing them to purchase arms in the USA. The pressure for war against Spain increased dramatically on 22 February 1898, when the USS *Maine* blew up in Havana harbor. Even though the blast was

accidental, most US citizens accused Spain of launching an attack on the USA.

Until March 1898, the president had counted on the party discipline imposed on the House of Representatives by Speaker Thomas Reed to postpone the stampede toward war with Spain. On 29 March 1898, however, a revolt by House Republicans threatening to join the Democrats in a vote for Cuban independence compelled the president to ask Congress for a declaration of war (Offner, 1992, pp. 150–154). On 13 April 1898, the House overwhelmingly approved an open-ended war resolution (Congress, 1898, pp. 3819–3821).

The Senate took an even more pro-Cuban line in debating the declaration of war, voting 51–37 in favor of recognizing the independence of the Cuban Republic. The Senate then approved an amendment offered by Sen. Henry Teller which stated 'that the US hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people' (Congress, 1898, p. 3993). A House-Senate conference committee then agreed to a compromise that maintained the Teller Amendment while removing the recognition amendment from the final declaration of war (Congress, 1898, p. 4062).

What this experience shows is that the USA did forge a 'collective identity' consistent with the liberal argument that transcended purely national self-interest. It identified with the Cubans rather than with Spain, however. It empathized with the Cubans because they saw them as the moral equivalent of the USA's founding fathers fighting for liberty against colonialism.

Imperialism was probably the most fundamental barrier to establishing a collective identity among the liberal states of the late 19th century (Blank, 1996). For Britain and France, the problem was their competition for imperial possessions. For the USA, its colonial past led it to be extremely wary of cooperation with imperialist European states, regardless of how liberal they appeared. The same sentiments that brought about war with Spain had taken the USA to the brink of war with Great Britain three years earlier (Owen, 1994). The threshold at

which the USA would have fought Spain might have been higher if the issue at stake had been anything other than a practice as undemocratic as Spain's colonial domination over Cuba.

In sum, Spaniards and US citizens did not see themselves as part of the same moral community. They did not view one another as part of the liberal pacific union. There was no inter-subjective consensus. This dissensus helped cause this war between democracies. Most crucial, of course, was that the United States did not view Spain as a partner in the liberal peace.

### *5. The USA's Material Interests and the War With Spain*

The Spanish–American War was not simply a case of mistaken identity, however. This was a war of conquest. The United States began a war to liberate Cuban freedom fighters from Spanish tyranny and somehow managed to acquire an empire stretching from the Caribbean to the Pacific in the process. The USA took the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Guam from Spain. It annexed Hawaii. Within months of its victory, it was trying to deny power to the Cubans for whom it had ostensibly fought the war. In the greatest example of the limitations of a purely idealist explanation, the McKinley Administration engaged in the brutal imposition of colonial rule in the Philippines. Its counter-insurgency war against Philippine freedom fighters bore a striking resemblance to Butcher Weyler's strategy in Cuba. While pure idealism played a crucial role in the US decision to go to war, this idealism was also used to legitimate a policy which served the material interests of the United States, as a Gramscian approach would expect.

The USA fought Spain to keep potentially hostile powers from acquiring Cuba and the Philippines. The Monroe Doctrine had enshrined the exclusion of European powers from the western hemisphere as a central principle of American grand strategy. Consequently, the first article of the Platt Amendment, which codified the protectorate relationship the USA would forge with Cuba, demanded that, 'the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty . . . with any foreign power . . . which will impair . . . the independence of Cuba . . . or permit [them] to obtain control over any portion of

said island' (Congress, 1901, p. 2954). Within two months of Dewey's victory, his squadron faced a group of 'neutral' German naval vessels who threatened to claim the Philippines if the USA were to withdraw (Gould, 1980, pp. 114–115; Trask, 1981, pp. 377–388).

The USA also intervened to pursue its economic interests, which were considerable and direct in Cuba (Pérez, 1983). The insurrection had disrupted Cuban exports of sugar and tobacco to the USA and had endangered US-owned sugar plantations. US exporters supported the war to dismantle the colonial preferential tariffs that kept their goods out of Cuba. New opportunities for economic gain emerged after the war as the USA became Cuba's dominant trading partner and US investors poured nearly two billion dollars into Cuba by World War I, a total greater than in any other country. The United States had very few economic ties with the Philippines prior to 1898. These islands were most important as a gateway to the huge potential market in China (LaFeber, 1963). After Dewey's victory, US policy-makers also began to consider the economic benefits of control over the Philippines' exports and access to its market.

Enhancing the capabilities of US naval forces provided another important material interest for the war with Spain. The Navy hoped to keep European powers from challenging US naval domination of the Caribbean. Thus, the Platt Amendment insisted that Cuba lease Guantanamo Bay as a coaling station (Congress, 1901, p. 2954). Protecting the USA's Pacific coast and maritime trade to Asia required coaling stations throughout the Pacific. The aftermath of the war provided the USA with a series of naval bases that greatly enhanced US capabilities in the Pacific. The importance of this factor is reflected in the fact that the USA nearly decided to ask Spain only for a coaling station at Subic Bay after its victory (Gould, 1980, p. 117).

There was also a broader sense that an expansionist foreign policy was a natural response to the USA's growth as a world power. For many, the annexation of Cuba was seen as an extension of the manifest destiny expansionism that had dominated the formation of the continental republic. Cuba was, after all, 'a mere extension of our Atlantic coast line', according to Sen. Albert Beveridge (Pérez, 1983, p. 269). Many

of McKinley's senior advisors and the military commanders of the occupation government favored annexation (Healy, 1963; Pérez, 1983; State, 1901, pp. 687–688). Although Commodore Dewey attacked Manila Harbor primarily to encourage Spain to surrender quickly in Cuba, this attack was also designed to give the USA 'a controlling voice, as to what should become of the [Philippine] Islands, when the final settlement was made' (Gould, 1980, p. 95). Advocates of a 'large policy' for the USA, Teddy Roosevelt foremost among them, believed that the USA should assert its status as a great power by acquiring a colonial empire, beginning with the Philippines.

Thus, material interests pushed the United States to control Cuba and the Philippines after the Spanish–American War, but how would it exercise that control? McKinley's war message of 11 April 1898 indicated his lack of support for an independent Cuba. McKinley suggested that the USA would intervene as a neutral 'to place hostile constraints on both parties'. He came out against both a recognition of the Cuban Republic and a recognition of the rebels' belligerency rights because, 'to commit this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation toward the organization so recognized' (State, 1901, pp. 757–759).

McKinley hesitated to support an independent Cuba because he agreed with his Minister to Spain, Stewart Woodford, who stated that, 'I do not believe that the population is today fit for self government . . . acceptance of a practical protectorate over Cuba seems to me very likely the assumption of the responsible care of a madhouse' (State, 1901, p. 687). When asked his opinion about self-government for the Cubans, Commander of the US expeditionary force, General William Rufus Shafter, replied, 'Self-government! Why these people are no more fit for self-government than gun-powder is for hell!' (Healy, 1963, p. 36). McKinley feared a stable anti-US government almost as much as he feared chronic instability. The rebels of the Liberating Army fought for a radical notion of independence which the spiritual leader of the revolution, José Martí, proclaimed would involve independence from the USA as much as from Spain (Foner, 1972, p. 13). Furthermore,

the insurgent strategy against Spain had been to destroy the sugar economy of Cuba (Foner, 1972, pp. 14–34). McKinley did not want to make any 'embarrassing commitments' to a movement that Grover Cleveland's Secretary of State, Richard Olney, had dismissed as a gang of arsonists (Atkins, 1926, pp. 213–214).

McKinley's analysis of the capabilities of the Filipinos to govern their own affairs was equally pessimistic. He could not leave the Filipinos to themselves, McKinley explained to a group of ministers, 'for anarchy and bloodshed would follow in the wake of native ignorance and inability to govern; so there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ died' (Morgan, 1965, p. 96).

The USA's material interests demanded that friendly and stable governments ruled in Cuba and the Philippines. The McKinley Administration's belief that neither nation could produce such a government led it to exercise direct political control over both possessions. Within a year, however, McKinley was pursuing very different policies in these two cases. The Gramscian approach can help to explain these divergent paths. More importantly, it can help illuminate the consequences of failing to assert an ideological hegemony over subordinate states.

#### 6. *Ideological Hegemony and the US Occupations of Cuba and the Philippines*

The USA asserted naked domination over Filipinos and was met with armed rebellion in the Philippines and substantial domestic opposition. It pursued a more liberal policy in Cuba, at least partially in tune with the rhetoric that had legitimated the war. This policy was more successful in dampening opposition to US domination in Cuba and in crafting a domestic consensus in support of US policy. Neither of these outcomes was predetermined. Rather, they reflected a difficult struggle and trial and error process through which the USA began to construct a new identity for itself as a global power.

US forces began preparing for a long-term occupation of Cuba by informing their Cuban

allies that, 'interference from any quarter would not be permitted. The Cuban insurgents . . . must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States' (State, 1902, p. 230). To impose its authority, the USA posted more than 45,000 troops in Cuba, a force three times the size of the one that had engaged the Spanish at Santiago (War, 1904, pp. 16–17). By the end of the first year of the occupation, however, McKinley had decided to turn Cuba into a US protectorate to be governed by a president and legislature chosen in free and fair elections (War, 1904, pp. 41–44). Gen. Leonard Wood, the head of the occupation government, supervised municipal elections in June 1900 and elections for a constitutional convention in September 1900. In January 1902, the USA turned over the island to Cuba's first elected president, Tomás Estrada Palma.

McKinley shifted to this pro-democratic policy, in part, to build domestic support for the intervention. In the compromise that had brought the USA into the war, McKinley made a commitment to Cuban independence without recognizing the Cuban rebels as the government of that island. While the Teller Amendment gave the Administration substantial room to maneuver in crafting a Cuban government to its liking, it also closed off the options of immediate annexation or colonial rule. McKinley was constrained even by his own rhetoric. In December 1897, he had stated unequivocally that, 'I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression' (State, 1898, p. xx).

When Spain urged the USA to assume sovereignty over Cuba in the Paris treaty negotiations, McKinley replied that, 'we must carry out the spirit and the letter of the resolution of Congress' (State, 1901, p. 927). The president did not want to derail an established compromise by openly breaking with the will of Congress. When the actions of his occupation government raised doubts about McKinley's commitment to fulfill the Teller Amendment, Congress voted overwhelmingly in favor of an amendment to forbid the granting of franchises or concessions by the occupation government, in order to avoid the kind of penetration which would mean 'that the US would not get out of Cuba in a hundred years' (Congress, 1899, pp. 2807–2812). Over the next three years, as

McKinley made strides toward granting independence to an elected government in Cuba, congressional action was conspicuous mostly by the absence of attacks on his policy. The champions of *Cuba Libre* in the media and interest group community also gave their tacit support.

Convincing Cuban freedom fighters that they should acquiesce to US political and economic domination posed a more daunting challenge to the McKinley Administration. Fortunately, the Teller Amendment and support for free and fair elections in Cuba proved to be a useful tool for achieving US control over the island at a minimal cost. The Cuban Liberating Army initially refused to demobilize in the face of the US military occupation. The Commanding General of the Liberating Army, Máximo Gómez, maintained the integrity of his army as a guarantee of Cuban independence. In February 1899, McKinley sent a special representative to General Gómez to assure him that the US occupation would not last longer than required to 'pacify' the island in line with the terms of the Teller Amendment (Pérez, 1983, pp. 262–263). Convinced by this pledge, Gómez agreed to disband the Liberating Army by the summer of 1899. 'We should aid by every pacific means in completing the work of the Americans', Gómez argued. 'We must forget past antipathies and disagreements and unite all elements completely . . . We must make the presence of foreigners on our soil unnecessary by our behavior . . . to demonstrate to them the legitimate desires and sufficient capacity to govern ourselves' (Pérez, 1983, p. 294).

Without a credible pledge that it would fulfill the terms of the Teller Amendment, the USA could have found itself at war with the Liberating Army. Instead, the Cubans disbanded their army to convince the USA that they were worthy of self-government. US officials still wanted to annex Cuba, but they realized that forcible annexation could lead to war with remobilized veterans of that army. Gen. Wood embodied the solution to this dilemma. 'Forcible annexation he had refused to consider; annexation by guile he had effectively opposed; but annexation by acclamation had been his dream from the beginning' (Hagedorn, 1931, p. 371). Wood wanted to prepare the Cubans for independence in such a manner that they would

want to join the union of their own free will. As Secretary of War Elihu Root explained, 'It is better to have the favors of a lady with her consent, after judicious courtship, than to ravish her' (Pérez, 1983, p. 279).

In essence, the USA employed a Gramscian strategy designed to achieve domination over Cuba through the establishment of an ideological hegemony over the island's inhabitants. Wood attempted to create a coalition of local elites who would see annexation to the USA as the appropriate destiny for Cuba. The most crucial element of this coalition was the Cuban expatriate community. A majority of the Cubans chosen to serve in the occupation government were the English-speaking, naturalized US citizens associated with the Cuban Junta (Pérez, 1983, pp. 284–301). These Cubans possessed strong separatist credentials acquired during the war with Spain, but, like President Estrada Palma, warmly embraced the idea of a close relationship with the USA.

Root and Wood sought to legitimize this path by ensuring that the 'better elements' of Cuban society, rather than the most radical proponents of *Cuba Libre*, were selected by the Cuban people in 'free and fair' elections. They constructed an electoral law that allowed only male property-owners, literates, and Liberating Army veterans to vote because they believed that universal adult male suffrage would lead to victories by the most revolutionary elements of the Liberating Army. Wood took the extra step of encouraging the formation of a pro-USA political party and campaigning for its candidates.

Rather than elect the 'best men' to represent them, however, the Cubans sent representatives of 'the extreme and revolutionary element' connected to the Liberating Army to the Constitutional Convention in September 1900. 'I should say that we have about ten absolutely first class men and about fifteen men of doubtful qualifications and character and about six of the worst rascals and fakirs in Cuba', Wood reported to Washington (Healy, 1963, p. 148). The electoral victories of the most radical elements of the Cuban revolutionary coalition signaled a defeat for the purest expression of the US effort to assert an ideological hegemony over Cuba. These elections, however, effectively demobilized the most dangerous opponents of US domination over Cuba. Their

victories caused the strongest advocates of Cuban independence to support a protectorate relationship with the USA. In February 1901, the Senate passed the Platt Amendment, which in addition to the provisions noted above gave the USA the right to intervene at its discretion to protect stable 'constitutional' government in Cuba (Congress, 1901, p. 2954).

Congress supported this amendment because it reflected a reasonable compromise for members who wanted either to fulfill the promise of the Teller Amendment or to continue US domination over the island. This solution, which was attached as an appendix to the Cuban constitution, was also accepted by most Cubans. The USA failed in its most ambitious Gramscian project of annexation by acclamation, but the relative peace with which Cubans accepted US domination stood in stark contrast to the US experience in the Philippines.

The initial relationship between the US military and the Philippine rebels was strikingly similar to the US relationship with the Liberating Army in Cuba. Commodore Dewey had brought the exiled Emilio Aguinaldo back to the Philippines in hopes that he could help in the war effort, but within weeks US officials were trying to exclude his forces from participating in the defeat of Spain (State, 1904, pp. 743–754). In October 1898, McKinley announced that he would demand that Spain cede the entire Philippine archipelago to the USA. On 21 December 1898, McKinley wrote a proclamation to the people of the Philippines explaining that the USA intended to assert its sovereignty over the whole archipelago and to institute a military government. Although McKinley promised the Filipinos that the occupation government would pursue policies of 'benevolent assimilation' he did not promise the liberation from colonial rule that Aguinaldo's followers desired (State, 1904, p. 719). There was no Teller Amendment for the Philippines that could assuage the fears of Filipino nationalists that the USA intended to replace Spain as colonial master. Because of this, the USA soon found itself fighting a brutal counter-insurgency war there.

Fighting broke out between US occupation forces and the army of the Philippine Republic on 4 February 1899. After the 1900 US presidential elections, Gen. Arthur MacArthur,

Commander of US forces in the Philippines, began herding Filipinos into concentration camps in order to 'protect' them from the insurgents and empty the countryside of potential supporters of the republic. By disrupting existing patterns of subsistence agriculture, MacArthur denied the rebels crucial food supplies. By turning the countryside into a 'howling wilderness', he created free-fire zones in which anyone discovered would be shot (Welch, 1979, pp. 24–42). In March 1901, US troops captured Aguinaldo, dealing a substantial blow to the insurgency. By mid-1902, the defeat of the insurgency was announced and William Howard Taft was named the first civilian governor of the Philippines, ushering in a period of colonial rule that would not end until 1946.

The USA had won the war, but at a great cost. Tens of thousands of Filipinos died fighting for their independence. The USA had suppressed the rebellion but it had not won the allegiance of its new subjects, who clearly did not consent to colonial domination. More US citizens died fighting the Philippine Republic than had died fighting Spain. The Philippine war also generated substantial opposition within the United States.

There was no Teller Amendment for the Philippines because there was no mobilized domestic opposition to annexation prior to McKinley's decision to take the islands. There was no expatriate community of Filipinos in the USA lobbying against colonial rule. Mobilized opposition to USA colonialism gathered steam only after the islands had been taken. By early 1899, opposition to McKinley's colonial policy nearly killed the Treaty of Paris ending the Spanish–American War. After vigorous debate, the Senate ratified the treaty by one vote in February 1899. Senator George Frisbie Hoar, the most famous of the anti-imperialists in the Senate, explained his opposition to McKinley's policy in the Philippines by proclaiming that:

We crushed the only republic in Asia. We made war on the only Christian people in the East. We converted a war of glory into a war of shame. We vulgarized the American flag. We introduced perfidy into the practice of war. We inflicted torture on unarmed men to extort confession. We put children to death. We established *reconcentrado* camps . . . We baffled the aspirations of a people for liberty (Beisner, 1968, p. 162).

McKinley's policies opened up substantial fissures in the American political elite. Prominent leaders of both parties, including former Presidents Grover Cleveland and Benjamin Harrison, McKinley's first Secretary of State, John Sherman, and a variety of Senators, Cabinet officials and Governors, announced their opposition to colonial rule. These anti-imperialists argued that imperialism undermined democracy at home and abroad and violated the fundamental principles upon which the USA had been founded. On 15 June 1898, members of many of New England's elite families met at Boston's Faneuil Hall to form the Anti-Imperialist League, the group which provided the most consistent organized opposition to McKinley's policies in the Philippines. The financial support of industrialist Andrew Carnegie guaranteed that the message of the League would be disseminated nationwide (Tompkins, 1970).

Colonial rule in the Philippines also gave the Democrats one of their central campaign issues for the 1900 elections. William Jennings Bryan, national leader of the Democratic and Populist parties, advised his allies in the Senate to approve the Treaty of Paris and then force Republicans to vote against a resolution supporting Philippine independence, thus placing the Republicans on record as opponents of basic US ideals. Bryan subsequently made imperialism a central issue in his 1900 campaign, speaking almost exclusively about the issue in his acceptance speech at the 1900 Democratic convention (Bryan, 1900, reprint, 1976). Although Bryan lost the 1900 election, the domestic dissensus about US colonial policies did not die down until McKinley's successors took steps toward dismantling the colonial regime in the Philippines.

### *7. The Spanish–American War and the Evolution of the Pacific Union*

Each part of the constructivist argument for the Spanish–American War provides broader lessons for understanding the evolution of the liberal pacific union. The structural idealist approach suggests that this war between democracies could occur only because the antagonists did not see each other as part of a larger community of liberal states. The US perception that

Spain was not a democracy allowed it to go to war with that country.

More broadly, there is no evidence to suggest that any of the liberal states of that day saw themselves as being part of a larger community. There was no liberal pacific union in 1898 because there was no intersubjective consensus around the importance of a shared liberal identity. The origins of such a collective identity can be seen in the democratic coalitions forged during the two world wars and in the western alliance against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Today, there is probably no greater fulfillment of the Kantian vision than the European Union. The main point of the structural idealist argument is that the liberal peace does not emerge naturally from shared liberal characteristics. It must be constructed.

The broad lesson of the Gramscian approach is that the liberal peace cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of the central role of US power in constructing the pacific union. Throughout the 20th century, the USA has possessed the power to help shape the moral boundaries of the liberal community. Thus, partially liberal Spain was painted in starkly autocratic terms when the USA needed to legitimate going to war against it. The ambiguous regime of Wilhelmine Germany was treated to the same kind of demonization when Wilson decided to enter World War I 'to make the world safe for democracy' (Oren, 1995). During the Cold War, elected governments that identified with the socialist camp, like those of Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1973 or Nicaragua under the Sandinistas, were excluded from the pacific union. Meanwhile, the USA pushed to have the elected governments of repressive anti-communist states like the Dominican Republic after America's 1965 intervention or El Salvador during the 1980s included in the free world. US leaders have usually been more successful in convincing the US public that such states belonged in the liberal club than they were in convincing other international actors.

The United States has not possessed unlimited power to stretch the definitions to include every state that served US interests or exclude all states that opposed those interests. US policy-makers tried hard to convince people that the Shah of Iran, Anastacio Somoza of Nicaragua and Ngo Dinh Diem of South

Vietnam deserved membership in the free world. In the end, the US people thought that support for such dictatorships violated the USA's liberal values. The citizens of those countries blamed US imperialism for the tyrannical regimes that repressed them. Often, the USA's liberal allies would oppose US policy toward those countries. On the other side of the coin, when unambiguously liberal Costa Rica up-ended the USA's Central American policy during the 1980s, the Reagan Administration was constrained in what it could do in response.

In a more crucial legacy of the Spanish-American War, the USA learned how to use the promotion of democracy and the idea of the liberal pacific union to achieve its material interests. Promoting the war as necessary for the liberation of Cuba from Spanish tyranny helped build a powerful domestic consensus in the USA in favor of the war. By granting independence to a freely elected government in Cuba, the USA convinced many Cubans that it was in their interest to pursue policies in the interest of the United States. Although the USA failed in its most ambitious efforts to assert an ideological hegemony in favor of annexation by acclamation, Cubans accepted US leadership much more readily than did Filipinos. Thus, the promotion of democracy served to legitimate US expansionism at home and abroad.

The success of the US occupation of Cuba, in comparison to the Philippine experience, led US policy-makers to emulate the Cuban rather than the Philippine model in subsequent interventions in the Third World. After the debacle in the Philippines, the United States would never again try to impose colonial government on a subordinate people. By the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, the USA had taken definitive steps towards eventually granting the Philippines its independence. Teaching Central Americans and the inhabitants of Caribbean isles to 'elect good men' became the centerpiece of US interventions in the Caribbean Basin between 1898 and 1934 (Drake, 1991). The USA promoted democracy, or at least the liberalization of allied regimes, during nearly every one of its 20th-century military interventions in the Third World (Peceny, 1995).

The US occupations of Japan and West Germany after World War II provide excellent examples of the Gramscian dynamic at work.

The United States convinced large numbers of Japanese and German citizens that it occupied their countries as liberators, not conquerors (Smith, 1994). The US occupation governments worked from the premise that a magnanimous policy designed to create prosperous liberal capitalist democracies would encourage these countries to be willing partners of the USA in the postwar order. Indeed, these two countries did become crucial allies and friends of the United States in the free world coalition against the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, institutions created under US leadership, like NATO, GATT, and the European Community helped make the liberal pacific union a reality in the western world. The Clinton Administration continues this Gramscian tradition by pursuing 'democratic enlargement' in order to create a world more congenial to US material interests. Today, however, we are trying to convince Russians that liberal capitalist democracy represents the liberation of the Russian people, not their domination by the victor of the Cold War.

In conclusion, the liberal pacific union is 'an enduring social fact' of international relations (Wendt, 1994). But, it is real in large part because the leaders and citizens of liberal states believe it to be true and because the most powerful country on earth has a material interest in making it so.

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