Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace

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The problem of war has plagued international society for centuries. As increasing interdependence fostered international organizations, the world community has attempted to respond to violence in a collective manner with a variety of different approaches. Today, international organizations have come to regard preventive diplomacy, or as it is more popularly known, peacekeeping, as their primary alternative in settling international disputes. Nevertheless, international organizations have not always relied on peacekeeping to redress conflict nor was it the intention of their founders to employ such a strategy.

Although there are examples of multilateral intervention in conflict prior to the twentieth century, the first comprehensive effort to address security concerns by an international organization only dates back to the League of Nations in 1920. The League provided for a collective security system, whereby an act of war would bring political, economic, and possibly military sanctions against the aggressor. The failure of the system, culminating in World War II, was foreshadowed by the League's ineffectiveness in Manchuria and Ethiopia.

Although faith in a collective security arrangement was shaken, this strategy for peace was not abandoned by the framers of the United Nations Charter. Article 43 of the Charter provides for members' contributions to supply armed forces in the conduct of collective security actions. Following other attempts at halting conflict, such as economic sanctions, collective security was to be the centerpiece

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1 See especially Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
of the UN efforts to deal with the problem of war. The agreements necessary to implement the provisions of Article 43, however, were never successfully negotiated. Thus, the lack of available military forces makes UN threats against aggression appear somewhat hollow. Furthermore, the absence of consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council virtually precludes any form of military enforcement action.

Only the Korean police action in the early 1950s approximates the kind of collective security operation envisioned by the founders. The Korean action avoided a Security Council veto by virtue of the Soviet boycott of that body. In addition, the General Assembly, through the Uniting for Peace Resolution, took on the major responsibilities for authorizing the operation. The recurrence of either of these conditions so as to permit a similar operation is now so unlikely that the Security Council stalemate has effectively signaled an end to collective security as a viable option. In early 1963, Secretary-General U Thant sounded the death toll for collective security:

The idea that conventional military methods—or to put it bluntly, war—can be used by or on the behalf of the United Nations to counter aggression and secure the peace, seems now to be rather impractical.2

The gradual abandonment of a collective security strategy led the UN to seek other means to insure international peace and security. The Suez Crisis presented the United Nations with a difficult problem. Observation forces were insufficient to ensure disengagement, and collective enforcement action would risk a confrontation between four world powers. The solution was to create the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to facilitate withdrawal of troops, prevent a recurrence of hostilities, and act as a barrier separating the protagonists. A new strategy of peacekeeping had been created.

Although the creation of a peacekeeping force is not mentioned in the Charter,3 the UN has relied heavily on this approach since 1956. One reason is that the membership has found it easier to achieve consensus on a peacekeeping operation than on collective security. Peacekeeping brands no state as the aggressor and is not designed to influence the military balance in the area. Indeed, consent of the host state is necessary before the peacekeeping unit is deployed. Thus, one side in a dispute does not necessarily benefit from the UN action, and in this respect peacekeeping is less controversial than collective security or any other punitive action.


3 The legal basis for authorizing peacekeeping operations has long been a hotly debated issue in the legal community. An excellent summary and analysis of the various legal positions on the matter can be found in Dan Ciobanu, "The Power of the Security Council to Organize Peacekeeping Operations" in Antonio Cassesse, ed., United Nations Peacekeeping: Legal Essays (Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978), 15–53.
In addition, the positive commitment required of UN members is fairly small. Troops are usually drawn from only a few countries (on a voluntary basis) and the mission is relatively safe for those involved. Although it would be a gross overstatement to say that no controversy exists over peacekeeping operations, there is a broader basis of support in international organizations for this technique than other methods for securing international peace.

The International Peace Academy defines peacekeeping as:

the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace.

The primary goal of a peacekeeping operation is to halt armed conflict or prevent its recurrence. It achieves this goal by acting as a physical barrier between hostile parties and monitoring their military movements. A secondary purpose of peacekeeping is to create a stable environment for negotiations, which could lead to resolution of the underlying conflict. The operation can defuse tensions between the parties by giving each side time to cool-off without fear of imminent attack. In theory, this should make them more willing to negotiate and offer concessions.

If peacekeeping operations are effective, they can help resolve conflict without bloodshed—a valuable accomplishment indeed. Nevertheless, no approach to peace is ideally suited to every situation. One approach may be a complete success under one set of conditions, but a total failure under another. Variations in the implementation of a program can also influence success rates. The purpose of this article is to identify and analyze the conditions that contribute to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Our initial focus is on the characteristics of the operations themselves; the elements of organization, impartiality, and logistics, among others, are considered. Second, the level of cooperative behavior exhibited by interested parties is assessed, as is its impact on the operations’ effectiveness. From an analysis of this multiplicity of factors in a comparative case study, we hope to gain a more complete picture of when and how peacekeeping operations should be used.

Identifying the conditions enabling a peacekeeping operation to be successful has theoretical as well as practical utility. Most studies of international intervention in crises fail to differentiate the various forms that intervention has taken.

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4 Chapter 14 of Inis Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971) provides an authoritative comparison of preventive diplomacy and other approaches to peace available to international organizations.


As a result, there is little basis for ascertaining the relative utility of different approaches to peace in different situations. In addition, the numerous volumes on peacekeeping have almost exclusively offered idiographic historical accounts. There have been few efforts to study specific strategies to insure peace and develop generalized conclusions. This study is an initial attempt to fill those theoretical gaps.

Determining the situations appropriate to peacekeeping could help avoid costly mistakes or missed opportunities in the future. Plans formulated under Security Council Resolution 435, but currently in abeyance, provide for a peacekeeping force in Namibia; the troops would police a cease-fire and supervise the elections that would lead to Namibia's independence. In addition, regional or international peacekeeping has been suggested as part of plans to solve instability in Chad and Northern Ireland, and various proposals for a Mideast peace include a peacekeeping component. This study can hopefully offer insights into the appropriateness of these and other proposed peacekeeping operations.

The recent peacekeeping experience in Beirut demonstrates that this approach to peace is no longer exclusively exercised by international or regional organizations. The terrible loss of life in that mission reveals that national decision makers may not fully understand such operations. Our analysis can offer some rough guidelines to policy makers in international organizations and national capitals on peacekeeping and its effectiveness. We begin by specifying the cases of preventive diplomacy to be studied and estimating their overall effectiveness.

**CASES**

The analysis of preventive diplomacy is inherently limited by the comparatively small number of historical examples. In contrast, scholars studying interstate conflict have the benefit of investigating a large number of incidents in their search for generalized patterns. We, therefore, must be content with comparing a few peacekeeping operations in the hope of discovering common problems and successes. Nevertheless, the cases chosen must be sufficiently similar so as to permit meaningful comparison, yet demonstrate enough variation in order to allow some conclusions about the important factors affecting peacekeeping.

We have decided to concentrate on six peacekeeping operations, including the earliest and most recent examples: The United Nations Emergency Force, with operations conducted after the Suez Crisis (UNEF I) and following the Yom Kippur War (UNEF II); the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC); the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); and the Multinational Force of American, British, French, and Italian troops stationed in Beirut (MNF).

The selection of these cases was guided by a number of principles. First, we wished to focus on those operations that were deployed to maintain cease-fires...
with military interposition forces. Consequently, we ignore observer and other civilian forces. In those instances, the performance of the missions played only a minor role in the maintenance of peace. Second, we looked only at operations that were sent to conflicts prior to final resolution of the disputes between the parties. Because some significant conflict remains, we are better able to assess the impact of the operations on conflict reduction and peace maintenance. Finally, we purposely ignored operations that resembled occupying forces more than peacekeeping troops and whose purpose was to preserve the hegemony of a regional power. Examples of such operations were the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) in the Dominican Republic and the Syrian intervention in Lebanon following the 1975 civil war. We are then left with the six operations noted above that are consistent with our purposes. Beside confining our analysis to those operations that neatly correspond to the goals of preventive diplomacy, we have chosen our sample so that it has a number of attractive features.

First, the sample enables the analyst to consider international intervention in two different settings: civil and interstate conflict. The sample cases include operations sent into an area wrecked by internal instability, as well as those that concerned themselves primarily with the separation of warring states. Whether preventive diplomacy is more appropriate to one kind of conflict than another can be a subject for inquiry. Another feature of the sample is that different operations within the same geographic area (the Middle East) involving many of the same protagonists can be compared. In effect, the environmental context is held constant to some extent, and the effect of differences in the conduct of the operations can be assessed. Indeed, two different segments of the same operation (UNEF I and UNEF II) make for almost a perfect analysis of this kind.

Finally, comparisons are possible between operations conducted by an international organization and one conducted by a multilateral grouping of nations without international sanction. Whether peacekeeping should become a primary option in national foreign policy or whether such operations should be exclusive to international bodies can be judged. Before considering the factors affecting success in peacekeeping operations, we offer a brief description and evaluation of each sample case.

Estimating a peacekeeping operation's success is a difficult problem. It seems to us, however, that a successful operation should achieve two things in particular. First, the operation should prevent a renewal of armed hostilities between the disputing parties. Maintaining the cease-fire is its primary function and a prerequisite to attempts at reconciling the protagonists. Second, the peacekeeping operation should facilitate a final, peaceful resolution to the dispute. This often can be a monumental task, and the blame for failure cannot always rest solely on the operation itself. Nevertheless, unless the underlying sources of conflict are resolved, the threat of renewed war is always present. Thus, in evaluating each operation, we focus primarily on the first criterion of success, but recognize the importance of the second and devote a section at the conclusion of this study to the problems inherent in attaining final conflict resolution.
UNEF I

UNEF I was the first real peacekeeping operation, extending its functions beyond those of mere observation. It grew out of the Suez crisis in 1956, when a means was needed to stop the war between Britain, France, Israel, and Egypt. Because of the direct involvement of permanent members of the Security Council, the UN General Assembly took the initiative, using the same technique as it had six years before with respect to Korea, a Uniting for Peace Resolution. A peacekeeping force was set up to separate the combatants and supervise the withdrawal of British and French troops in the area. Finally, the peacekeeping forces acted as a barrier to Arab-Israeli engagement, patrolling parts of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip.

That the Six Day War occurred in 1967 may be evidence of UNEF’s failure. Nevertheless, this ignores that the operation achieved almost eleven years of peace with few violent incidents in a highly volatile area of the world. Despite many terrorist attacks and threats against Israel from other parts of the Middle East, the area patrolled by UNEF I was comparatively calm. To that extent, the operation was quite successful.

That the president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, asked UNEF I to withdraw and war soon followed demonstrates that the peacekeeping operation did little to resolve the underlying sources of conflict. UNEF I apparently removed some of the urgency for conflict resolution and perhaps contributed to prolonging the dispute, albeit without armed interaction.9

ONUC

As was the case with many African states, the Congo (now Zaire) was ill-prepared for its 1960 independence from colonial domination. Domestic instability soon led to the intervention of its former colonial master, Belgium; the Congolese government requested assistance from the United Nations to redress this infringement of its sovereignty. Fresh from its initial success in the Middle East, the UN created the ONUC force in 1960, giving Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold wide latitude in its use.

Initially, ONUC was designed to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian troops and help the central government maintain law and order. The situation, however, became more complicated when the province of Katanga sought to secede, and the

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central government split among factions. The peacekeeping forces were then additionally charged with maintaining the territorial integrity of the Congo (that is, stopping the secessionist movement in Katanga) and preventing the outbreak of a full-scale civil war. In 1963, ONUC became part of a military effort, actively engaging in limited military combat, to defeat secessionist forces in Katanga. ONUC forces finally withdrew in 1964 with the outward signs of conflict resolved.

In a certain sense, ONUC was a successful operation. It did prevent Katanga from seceding and managed to avert a full-scale civil war. In addition, the operation helped gain a meeting of Congo's National Assembly, and some sense of political normality was restored. On the other hand, this was far from a textbook operation. There was a great deal of bloodshed during the four years of ONUC's mission, some of it caused by the use of military force by the peacekeeping forces. Thus, while ONUC might be called a success, it is difficult to attribute all of that success to the principles of peacekeeping.

UNFICYP

The next incidence of UN peacekeeping again involved the difficult transition to independence for a new state—Cyprus. At first, British, Turkish, and Greek troops were deployed to keep peace on the island. Their action was far from successful as ethnic rivalries bordered on civil war, and Turkey threatened military intervention. UN sponsored troops were deployed in 1964 to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to supervise the cease-fire in a buffer zone separating the Greek and Turkish communities on the island. The forces were also charged with various law-and-order and humanitarian functions.

UNFICYP remains in place today, evidence of its success in preventing war as well as its failure in promoting a permanent settlement. The presence of peacekeeping troops has helped avert civil war when tensions were high, and there has been a gradual decrease in the number of shooting incidents over the life of the operation. UNFICYP was even able to diffuse a 1974 crisis when Turkey occupied the northern portion of the island. Yet, the hostility between the Greek and Turkish communities lingers, and the necessity for an interposition force has not lessened. Thus, it must be said the UNFICYP has been and is only a qualified success.

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12 See Security Council Resolution 186, 4 March 1964; and Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, vol. 4. The original mandate has been generally renewed at six month intervals.
13 For more information on UNFICYP, see James Boyd, “Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping,” In-
After six years in abeyance, UNEF was reconstituted in 1973 as a part of the cease-fire agreement for the Yom Kippur War. UNEF II was designed to monitor the cease-fire and the disengagement of Arab and Israeli troops much as its predecessor, UNEF I, had in earlier years. The force was again withdrawn, as it had been in 1967, but this time it was because of peace and not war. The Camp David Accords, signaling an end to war between Egypt and Israel, resolved most of the disagreements over the Sinai. The need for a peacekeeping force diminished, although an observer group was still stationed in the area and a comprehensive Middle East peace was as elusive as ever.

In general, UNEF II was as successful as its predecessor in preserving the cease-fire. There were few violent incidents in the patrol area; the primary exception occurred when a UNEF aircraft crashed in Syria after being hit by anti-aircraft fire. Unlike other peacekeeping missions, however, there was an agreement between the parties for resolving the conflict. Although it may be incorrect to give the UNEF any direct credit for the peace treaty, certainly their presence made negotiations between the sides easier.

Although initial attempts at peacekeeping were, on the whole, quite successful, the most recent operations have yielded different results. The need for UNIFIL began with the persistant terrorist attacks launched against Israel from Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon. Israel sent troops six miles deep into Lebanon (and later extended even further) in response to the hijacking of a bus, with the aim of destroying those terrorist strongholds. The fear of major war in the area prompted the UN to establish a peacekeeping force there in 1978. UNIFIL was supposed to supervise the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and assist the Lebanese government in reestablishing sovereignty over the area. The force patrolled a wide area with the purpose of stopping terrorist activity.

The UNIFIL mission has been a failure. During the first four years of the operation, terrorist activity in the area continued, seemingly unabated; retaliatory strikes by Israel were also commonplace. Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 and overran...
UNIFIL positions as the Israeli forces advanced all the way to Beirut. Israel cited UNIFIL's unwillingness or inability to perform its mission as partial justification for the invasion. The latest indignity suffered by UNIFIL is the kidnapping of some of its personnel by a local militia. UNIFIL continues its presence in southern Lebanon, but there is no sign that the problems in the area are any closer to resolution than before.17

MNF

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, beside all but destroying UNIFIL, created a new opportunity for peacekeeping in Beirut. Israel demanded that all Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters leave the city, but was opposed to UN supervision of the exodus. A multinational force of American, French, and Italian troops were sent in to supervise the withdrawal. The short-term operation was highly successful, and the MNF quickly withdrew. A series of events occurred, however, that precipitated the redeployment of MNF troops. Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel was assassinated, the IDF moved into West Beirut, and a massacre occurred in two Palestinian refugee camps. The MNF was sent back into Beirut to act as an interposition force between competing militias and to aid the central government in establishing control over the country. British forces soon joined the effort.

The MNF mission is by most accounts a complete failure. The civil war escalated during MNF's presence, so much so that the peacekeeping troops had to be withdrawn because their safety could not longer be guaranteed and the political costs were judged to be too great. Many lives were lost in the exchange of fire between the troops and rival militias; suicide terrorist attacks also took their toll on the peacekeeping forces. The problems in Lebanon continue today, and the MNF was apparently little help in alleviating the conflict. Indeed, the MNF was itself a point of contention between various Lebanese factions, and its mere presence was another stumbling block to agreement.18

INTERNAL FACTORS

In this section we look at the internal operations of the peacekeeping mission and determine their effect on its success or failure. It is not our intention to focus on all aspects of a peacekeeping operation, but rather to concentrate on the important elements that could affect whether the mission's purpose is achieved or not.


The five factors below are those most frequently cited in reports, debates, and scholarly works on preventive diplomacy. In addition, our analysis of the six cases indicates that these factors deserve consideration, if only to dispel or confirm some of the conventional wisdom surrounding peacekeeping.

**Financing**

Peacekeeping operations can be quite expensive; money is needed for supplies, equipment, salaries, and various administrative costs. In the United Nations system, peacekeeping operations are not funded from the regular budget. They require a special authorization from the organization or rely on voluntary contributions. When groups of nations form a peacekeeping mission, appropriations are dependent upon each national contribution, subject to the constraint of domestic political forces. Financing is a problem for any collective action, particularly when the coercive mechanism to enforce contributions is weak.19 A peacekeeping operation could be terminated prematurely if its source of funding were cut off. Its area of operation or its efficiency could also be severely limited if funds were insufficient.

Almost all of the UN operations studied here had difficulties with financing. Operating expenses exceeded expectations, and there was a persistent problem with nations refusing to contribute their assessed share. At the end of 1983, the debt from peacekeeping was approximately $205 million, or 68 percent of total UN indebtedness. Attempts to rectify the problem have failed. In 1964 the United States attempted to suspend noncontributing members under Article 19 of the Charter. When the United States withdrew its effort, the only legal means of pressuring recalcitrant members was effectively abandoned for political considerations. The MNF endured threats of a cutoff of funds by the Congress of the United States, but was apparently unaffected by the financial actions of other countries in the consortium.

Although the operations experienced financial difficulties, these did not seem to adversely affect the conduct of missions. Large deficits did not prevent the UN from continuing the operations, and the consequences of the financial problems were minor. For example, UNEF II was unable to purchase certain mine-sweeping equipment because of financial constraints. The UN operations benefitted from large voluntary contributions from some nations. These tended to hold down the deficits and allowed the operations to continue. A notable exception among the operations was ONUC. It was a very expensive operation, and the high cost produced constant pressure to complete the mission. It may be that this pressure encouraged the UN to use military force against Katanga and thereby complete its mission. Financial considerations were certainly important in the decision to with-

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draw from the Congo, even though some analysts thought it wise to continue the mission for a little while longer.

Overall, finances were an irritating problem for peacekeeping missions, but in no case were any of the operations seriously hampered by the difficulty. Financial support of a peacekeeping operation is to some degree a barometer of the political support for the operation. Financial problems themselves apparently will not jeopardize the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy, but they could be the official cause of death were enough political support withdrawn.

Geography

Another consideration in the success or failure of preventive diplomacy is the locus of deployment. Where the operation is located can influence the effectiveness of its patrols. If the size of the area is great, the monitoring of conflicting parties’ action could be problematic; the margin for error in detection and verification would increase. The vulnerability of the peacekeeping forces to hostile fire also could damage their effectiveness and possibly draw them into the military struggle.

In our six cases, geographic considerations were important in the success or failure of each operation. The most successful operations had certain geographic advantages. The two UNEF missions were located in mostly desert terrain in sparsely populated areas. This allowed for easy observation of military movements and infiltration attempts. This advantage clearly outweighed the minor problems encountered with desert transportation. UNFICYP was fortunate to be located on an island separated from Greece and Turkey, who might have more easily instigated trouble had they been contiguous by land to Cyprus. In these three instances, geography assisted in the prevention of conflict.

A number of general rules can be derived by looking at those missions that were less than successful. First, when the peacekeeping troops did not separate the combatants by a significant distance, the results were adverse. The French troops in the MNF were stationed at the so-called Green Line separating East and West Beirut. Their presence was not enough to halt sniper fire or artillery attack over their heads. The buffer zone was much too narrow to effectively separate the rival militias. UNIFIL encountered a similar problem over a larger geographic area as political considerations prevented it from taking its desired positions. They were unable to prevent rocket attacks or retaliatory raids by either the Israelis or the Palestinians, as each side was still close enough to do damage to the other.

Another geographic problem concerned logistics. If the area of deployment did not permit easy observation of the combatants, problems could arise. UNIFIL had to patrol a very rural portion of Lebanon, and it was rather easy for guerrilla fighters to infiltrate the area. ONUC operated in such a large geographic area that it was difficult to monitor all the activities around them, much less supply their own troops in an orderly fashion. A final rule is that the vulnerability of peacekeeping positions to attack can undermine their neutrality and complicate their
mission. The MNF forces of the Americans and French were located in areas open to attack. The American position was at the Beirut airport on low ground and subject to attack from the surrounding hills. The attacks on French and American positions led them to take an active role in combat, contrary to the basic principles of preventive diplomacy.

In general, geographic considerations were important to the success of peacekeeping missions. It appears that the peacekeeping forces ideally should be placed in an area that is relatively invulnerable, yet is easy to patrol and separates the combatants at a distance capable of preventing armed exchanges. Nevertheless, a favorable location is no guarantee that the mission will turn out well. At best, one might hope that a particular deployment will prevent violent incidents that could escalate and renew the warfare.

Clarity of the Mandate

A frequently cited problem, especially in light of the truck-bomb tragedy in Lebanon, is the absence of a clear mandate for a peacekeeping mission. A clearly defined mandate restricts the latitude of action given the mission, thereby limiting both the controversy over possible actions and the potential manipulation of the force by interested parties. A clear mandate also may generate greater public support in that the populace can identify and understand the purpose of the operation.

In practice, the most successful missions have begun with clear mandates. Nevertheless, the causal links between mandate clarity and operation success are not clear. Some missions had problems emanating from their mandates, but it is not evident whether these were sufficient to do serious damage. The MNF had very few guidelines to follow in its second deployment. American forces had no clear idea of what to do beyond holding down positions around the airport. This not only undermined public and congressional support, but perhaps led the force to undertake military actions that were inconsistent with the concept of peacekeeping. ONUC also experienced some problems because of its mandate. The

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20 For example, both Weinberger, “Peacekeeping Options” and Nelson, “Multinational Peacekeeping” give primary importance to this factor.

21 Unlike a UN operation, there is no authorizing resolution stating the mandate of MNF’s operation. The closest one comes to a statement of the mandate came from Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes: “The MNF is to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide the MNF presence requested by the Government of Lebanon to assist it and Lebanon’s armed forces in the Beirut area” (quote taken from Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, book II, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983, 1202). This is still vague and quite in contrast to the first deployment of MNF, when the guidelines for supervising PLO withdrawal were fairly specific.

22 Problems with the mandate were complicated by the lack of training in peacekeeping measures for the military personnel. MNF troops were primarily combat personnel, unaccustomed to holding down a defensive position without firing at an enemy force. For a description of peacekeeping training, see Richard Swift, “United Nations Military Training for Peace,” International Organization 28 (Spring 1974): 267–280.
secretary-general was granted enormous power in the conduct of that operation, and his actions led to an erosion of support for the mission among UN members. Furthermore, the ONUC mandate was modified several times, leading to confusion and additional erosion of support.

It is evident from these six cases that a clear mandate is useful for a peacekeeping operation. Yet, that clarity is often only a reflection of the underlying political consensus on the mission. A clear mandate often can generate little support in the deliberative bodies that authorize such operations. In controversial situations some operations would never have taken place without a vague mandate. The operations that had a vague mandate can attribute their major problems to something other than the mandate itself. In short, the importance of a clear mandate is probably overestimated, for it is merely a surrogate for the political consensus underlying it.

Command and Control

Any organizational program needs to have a smooth method of operation. A peacekeeping mission can be jeopardized if it makes mistakes, cannot carry out its duties effectively, or lacks coordination. The most common command and control problem in over six cases was language. By organizing forces from many different nations, it was often difficult for commanders to communicate on a one-to-one basis (much less in any larger aggregation) with their subordinates.

A central command can solve coordination problems, and four of our sample operations were set up on this fashion. ONUC was somewhat disorganized because it lacked a central command. It did, however, have a coordinating body to ensure that the forces were not working at cross purposes. ONUC's only problem occurred when it was unclear who gave orders for a particular maneuver during the operation. The MNF was linked only through liaison officers. The sharing of intelligence and the mapping of joint strategy correspondingly suffered.

Most peacekeeping operations have run smoothly, with command and control problems affecting the efficiency, but not the overall success, of the missions. Language problems can be cumbersome, but there is an inherent tradeoff in making a peacekeeping force representative versus making it efficient. Most of the command and control problems should dissipate in the future. From the benefits of experience, the UN can now send trained personnel into the field and choose from among many experienced individuals to direct the peacekeeping units. Should

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24 An excellent operations manual detailing the mechanics of setting up and conducting a peacekeeping operation is International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984).
any collective effort be launched by a group of nations, they too should learn from
the mistakes of the MNF. Other than an unprecedented case of complete incompe-
tence, command and control problems are unlikely to ruin a peacekeeping operation.

**Neutrality**

An essential component of the preventive diplomacy strategy is that the forces
should not work to the benefit of either side. Historically, military personnel from
nonaligned countries were used to guarantee this neutrality. Two informal rules
have arisen in choosing troops for the peacekeeping force. The first is to never
allow forces from a state involved in the conflict to participate in the operation.
A second rule is to bar troop contributions from major power nations or their
allies. In these ways it was hoped that the conflicting parties would regard the peace-
keeping forces as unbiased and disinterested. Because the host state's consent is
necessary to deploy peacekeeping forces, the failure of the host state to approve
a particular force composition prevents that operation from taking place.

In our sample those operations that were staffed almost entirely from disin-
interested, nonaligned nations had the least difficulty. Nevertheless, we found the
Cyprus operation was equally effective, despite being composed primarily of troops
from NATO countries, including those of ex-colonial power Britain. This seems
to indicate that troops from nonaligned countries are not a prerequisite for success.
Nevertheless, they are no guarantee of it either; Israel claimed UNIFIL was guilty
of aiding the Palestinian cause and took violent action. The MNF operation had
terrible difficulties arising from the perceived unfairness of the troops. Many of
the factions in Lebanon regarded U.S. troops as supporters of their two principal
enemies in the dispute, the Gemayel government and Israel. This immediately sub-
jected the forces to distrust and later to hostile fire. These suspicions seemed to
be confirmed when the United States helped to train Lebanese government troops
and shelled surrounding villages. The French encountered a similar response from
the militias. The Italian contingent was regarded as neutral by all sides, owing to
its behavior during the operation (which included numerous humanitarian acts)
and the political stance of its government. As a result, they generally were not
the subject of protest or attack.

Overall, drawing peacekeeping personnel from nonaligned countries is desir-
able, but it is not a necessary condition for successful completion of the mission.
Neutrality in peacekeeping is determined more by behavior and situation than by
force composition. To the extent that the troops' behavior is perceived as biased
and that it undermines the cooperation between conflicting parties, the peace-
keeping mission could be ruined. Furthermore, troops supplied by a given country
may be regarded as neutral in one situation (for example, Tanzanian troops in Latin
America), but not necessarily under a different scenario (the same troops in
Namibia). All things being equal, however, a nonaligned force is more desirable
than any other. The nonaligned force is more likely to be accepted by all sides
and will be less likely to take actions that may be interpreted as unfair by one or more of the parties.

**RELEVANT ACTORS**

Common sense and the previous analysis tell us that the manner in which a peacekeeping operation is conducted is not the sole determinant of success or failure. In this section, we consider the behavior of a number of relevant actors with an eye to estimating their impact on peacekeeping operations. First, we investigate the actions of the primary disputants or host state(s) in the conflict. We then consider other states, which may be regional powers or neighboring countries that take an active role in the conflict. Because peacekeeping operations often deal with instability in the host state(s), we also analyze the behavior of subnational groups. Finally, the policies of the superpowers are weighed. They have the global power, not to mention a dominant role in the Security Council, to dramatically influence a peacekeeping mission.

**Primary Disputants**

Before peacekeeping troops are deployed on a nation's territory, they must have the consent of that nation's government. If it is an interstate conflict, the other disputant(s) must usually agree to refrain from military force. A successful peacekeeping operation, however, depends on more than this initial level of cooperation. It would seem that the conflicting states also must not try to exploit the peacekeeping troops for their own advantage and refrain from incidents that could lead to a return of open warfare. If one side is not sincere in its support of peacekeeping or changes its policy over the course of the operation, the mission could be doomed.25

In practice, the maintenance of cooperation between the primary disputants has not been a severe problem. In both UNEF operations Egypt was generally cooperative with the peacekeeping forces. Israel demonstrated a less cooperative attitude, but at no time did it initiate violent opposition. The disagreements were minor disputes concerning the use of troops from nations that did not recognize the Israeli state. The other operations had similar results, as the host state(s) usually did little to hinder the mission. In one instance, the Cyprus National Guard blocked access to certain areas, but this problem was short-lived. The major exception to this pattern of cooperative behavior was Israel's actions toward UNIFIL. Israel

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25 Of course, if the host state formally withdraws consent, the peace operation is terminated. This occurred in 1967 as Egypt asked UNEF I forces to leave. Despite some suggestions to the contrary by members of the international community, U Thant complied with this request. See Jack Garvey, "United Nations Peacekeeping and Host State Consent," *American Journal of International Law* 64 (April 1970): 241-269.
initially refused to turn over territory where the UNIFIL forces would patrol. Its subsequent behavior, including the 1982 invasion, showed a complete disregard of the force and its mission.

We tend to agree with David Wainhouse that "where cooperation of the parties is not sustained and whole-hearted, a positive result will be difficult to obtain." Nevertheless, the initial level of agreement needed to establish the force has usually persisted; problems from the primary disputants have not been empirically important in the failure of the missions. Our analysis has discovered that while cooperation from the disputants is a necessary condition for success, it is not a sufficient one. This is particularly relevant when the host state has a very weak government. Although the Congolese government supported ONUC, the split among factions prevented it from fully aiding the operation. The Lebanese government support for UNIFIL and MNF had little impact because that government did not have *de facto* control over the areas where the troops were deployed.

**Third Party States**

Third party intervention can play a prominent role in international conflict. Allies of the conflicting parties may take certain actions (for example, supplying arms, diplomatic pressure) that may assist or hinder resolution of the conflict. Peacekeeping operations are subject to these same benefits and constraints. Neighboring states or regional powers may have a stake in the outcome of the conflict and consequently may take actions in support of or contrary to the goals of the peacekeeping mission.

Among our sample cases, five involved significant intervention by third party states. UNEF II was the only operation that was not significantly affected by the actions of a third party state. It may be coincidental, but this mission not only kept the peace, the conflict was resolved by treaty. The other operations all experienced negative effects from the actions of other states. UNEF I was terminated after Syria and Jordan pressured Egypt into joining their military action against Israel. It is unlikely that without that pressure Egypt would have expelled the peacekeeping force and gone to war with Israel at that time. In the Congo, Belgium encouraged the secessionist movement, and Belgian mercenaries joined in the armed struggle. A similar situation occurred in Cyprus as Turkey promoted the founding of a secessionist Turkish-Cypriot state on the island. On various occasions Turkey also made threats against the Greek majority there. The peacekeeping operations were severely jeopardized or complicated in each case.

Not surprisingly, the failed missions (MNF and UNIFIL) faced strong opposition from neighboring states. Syria played a critical role in each operation's downfall. Syria supplied weapons and other support to PLO fighters in southern Leb-

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anon, helping them to infiltrate UNIFIL lines and attack Israeli positions. Syria opposed MNF through its allies among the factions in Beirut. It supplied weapons and pressured the Shi'iite and Druse factions not to accept a solution involving the MNF. There is also some indication that Syria, Iran, and possibly Libya had a hand in supporting terrorist attacks against the peacekeeping forces. Given its influence in Lebanon, Syria could have been a positive influence for MNF, but its actions were a major factor in the mission's failure.

It was difficult to detect any positive pressure in support of peacekeeping from this kind of analysis. Third party intervention was primarily negative and proved critical in damaging certain operations. Yet, this noncooperation from third party states is not automatically fatal to a mission. For example, UNFICYP survived despite the actions of Turkey. A peacekeeping operation can be destroyed if the third party state encourages violence from another state of subnational group and/or undertakes violence itself. A large portion of the blame for the UNIFIL and MNF failures must be borne not by the primary disputants, but rather by hostile third states.

Subnational Groups

Just as other states might influence peacekeeping operations, so too might subnational groups in the host or neighboring states. The behavior of these groups could be particularly important when peacekeeping forces are thrust into areas of internal instability. Preventive diplomacy may be viewed unfavorably by groups seeking to topple the government of the host state; preservation of peace and the status quo favor the established government.

Subnational groups played little role in either UNEF operation, but were detrimental in the other operations. The PLO never really accepted UNIFIL, claiming that Palestinians had a right to operate in the disputed area. Consequently, they smuggled weapons into UNIFIL's patrol area and launched attacks against Israeli targets. Following the 1982 invasion, UNIFIL has continued to have difficulty dealing with uncooperative local militias, particularly the South Lebanese Army. ONUC faced problems from the Katanga independence movement and various tribal groups that supported factional leaders in the central government.

Perhaps the best example of how subnational groups can destroy a peacekeeping operation is the tragedy of the MNF. Lebanon consisted of a large number of competing factions, none of which actually supported the MNF presence. Even the Christian Phalangists were less than enthusiastic about the operation, as they continued battles with Moslem factions. The Shi'iite and Druse factions opposed the MNF; they felt it was a shield for the Gemayel government. Part of their demands for a resolution to the conflict was a withdrawal of the peacekeeping forces. Terrorist groups were at times just as damaging as those of third party states. When those states and subnational groups acted in unison to undermine the operation, not even the support of the host state could save the operation.
Superpowers

An analysis of peacekeeping success should not ignore the behavior of another group of third parties—the superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union (along with the other three permanent members of the Security Council) have the power to veto a resolution that initially authorizes a UN peacekeeping operation. Because the initial authorization is usually for a specified time period, the operation and its mandate will again be subject to that power if renewal is necessary. Beyond their powers in the United Nations, the superpowers can use their political, economic, and military power to influence the actors in the area of conflict. In these ways the superpowers have the potential to rescue or destroy peacekeeping operations.

The United States has proved quite helpful to the cause of preventive diplomacy. Its political support was often the driving force behind the creation of peacekeeping operations. Later, the United States provided logistical support and other voluntary contributions to keep the operations running smoothly. Its support of the MNF troops, through the bombing of suspected terrorist bases, proved counterproductive, because it increased hostility against the operation. The Soviet Union was reluctant to offer political and financial support for ONUC and other operations, but demonstrated little active opposition in the way of military action or vetoing resolutions. It did resupply Syria during the MNF’s operation and vetoed a resolution authorizing a UN force to replace MNF. Yet, the MNF was too badly damaged already to say that the Soviets’ actions were decisive.

It is easy to attribute a great deal of influence to the superpowers in any area of world politics. Nevertheless, in the UN peacekeeping operations studied here, their actual influence was less than conventional wisdom might predict. The superpowers clearly played an important role in setting up some of these operations. Of particular note was their ability to halt the 1973 Mideast war and install UNEF II forces. The success of the operations once in place, however, was only marginally affected by superpower behavior. At best, they helped supply the operations and gave them some political support. At worst, they complicated an operation’s efficiency and increased its controversy. The superpowers have a great potential to do good or harm to peacekeeping. While their behavior must be considered in any evaluation of peacekeeping, we have found that thus far, their actual influence has been overrated.

Conclusions

International peacekeeping has had a mixed record of success over the past thirty years. The main reason for the failure of peacekeeping operations has been the
opposition of third party states and subnational groups. By refusing to stop violent activity and in some cases attacking the peacekeeping forces, these two sets of actors can undermine a whole operation. The failure of UNIFIL and MNF can be attributed to this as can many of the problems encountered by other operations. This leaves us with something of a tautology: peacekeeping is successful only when all parties wish to stop fighting. Peacekeeping forces can do certain things (remain neutral) to ensure that desire for peace continues. Nevertheless, peacekeeping will fail or be severely damaged if peace is not initially desired by all parties.

Although the primary disputants and the superpowers each had a great deal of power to destroy a peacekeeping operation, our study revealed that neither group generally took strong action in opposition to the operation. To set up a peacekeeping force, the host state(s) must grant its (their) approval, indicating some desire to stop fighting. If the peacekeeping force was organized by the United Nations, the Security Council would likely have to approve it; superpower acquiescence is the minimum requirement for this. Therefore, once a peacekeeping operation is authorized, there is already confirmation that it is not opposed by the primary disputants or the superpowers. Operations opposed by either of these two groups will likely never come into being.

The internal characteristics of a peacekeeping operation were generally found to have a relatively minor impact on the mission’s success. A clear mandate was useful, but hardly critical in determining the outcome. When the mandate was vague, the underlying political consensus was already shaky, and the mission experienced support problems with the various interested parties. The same conclusion is appropriate with respect to the financing and organization of the peacekeeping force. Problems with funding and command structure served to make the operation less efficient, but not necessarily less successful. Budget deficits were ameliorated by voluntary contributions or ignored. Command and control difficulties were never serious enough to jeopardize any of the operations.

Two aspects of the operations did have an impact on their success: geography and neutrality. Peacekeeping operations performed best when their areas of deployment adequately separated the combatants, were fairly invulnerable to attack, and permitted easy observation. The absence of these conditions undermined confidence in the operation and allowed minor incidents to escalate. The neutrality of the peacekeeping forces was also significant. If the peacekeeping force is perceived as biased, support from interested parties was likely to be withheld or withdrawn. As we have seen, this is enough to ruin the operation. Neutral behavior is not always linked with nonaligned force composition. The likelihood, however, that a force composed from nonaligned countries will take action favoring one party (or be perceived as doing so) is much less.

From these findings, we can draw a few guidelines regarding the use of a preven-
tive diplomacy strategy. Peacekeeping is most appropriate in a conflict in which all parties are willing to halt hostilities and accept a peacekeeping force. Consideration must be given to more than just the primary disputants; other interested states and subnational groups deserve attention. If these latter two actors oppose the operation, then the peacekeeping option might be reconsidered unless the opposition is minor or would not involve violent activity. This criterion may confine peacekeeping operations to conflicts that involve relatively few actors, for the probability of consensus will decrease as the number of interested parties increases.

Implementation by an international organization is to be preferred to a multilateral grouping of nations. The UN in particular now has extensive experience with peacekeeping and is more likely to conduct an efficient operation. More importantly, however, an international organization will be better able to acquire consent from the host state(s) and approval from interested parties. It is not that a multinational peacekeeping force cannot succeed, but rather problems with perceived bias (justified or otherwise) will be more likely and its moral authority will not be as great.

Once it has been established that the relevant actors will support a peacekeeping operation, the UN command should give special attention to taking a proper geographic position, as well as continuing its policy of neutral force composition. Although the issues of mandate, financing, and command should not be ignored, neither should problems with them hold up the operation.

The findings of this study do more than confirm conventional wisdom about peacekeeping, although in some cases they do that too. The importance of the mandate and the role of the superpowers is considerably less than has been assumed. Analysts have also probably overestimated the importance of the primary disputants and the operation's command structure once there is an agreed-upon cease-fire. Yet, as is prominent in the literature on conflict and peacekeeping, the importance of third parties, neutrality, and geography is reaffirmed. Regardless of whether the guidelines laid down here conform to prior expectations about peacekeeping, they bear repetition. We know that policy makers too often ignore or forget these guidelines, with the MNF being the most recent example of neglect. According to these guidelines, the number of peacekeeping operations would be limited, but the rate of success should be positively affected.

28 Although we look at peacekeeping operations as presently constituted, there have been many proposals for improvement. Representative of these efforts and ideas are Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984); and Alastair Taylor, “Peacekeeping: The International Context” in Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response (Ontario: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), 1-40.

29 Certain nations, such as Israel and South Africa, may object to peacekeeping operations directed by the United Nations, because of the perceived bias of that institution toward their interests. In that event, a multinational force may be more appropriate. In general, however, its advantages over a UN force are minimal. See Frank Gregory, The Multinational Force: Aid or Obstacle to Conflict Resolution, Conflict Study, no. 170, Institute for the Study of Conflict (London: Eastern Press, 1984).
Is Peacekeeping Appropriate for Civil Instability?

It is clear that "peacekeeping has been less problematic and generally operated more smoothly when the danger has arisen from the threat to the peace by external aggression." For two reasons, peacekeeping is most successful when two nation-states are the only protagonists. First, it is much easier to gain agreement between two sets of interests than among many more. Second, peacekeeping forces are better able to monitor the behavior of only two parties separated by identifiable boundaries. Civil instability may involve many groups operating freely within their own country. In this way, the peacekeeping strategy is best applied to interstate conflict involving two nations.

Peacekeeping is not impossible in civil conflict, but there are certain hurdles to its successful use under those conditions. Peacekeeping tends to favor the challenged government. A cease-fire halts pressure on the government and may win it political capital with a populace longing for stability. Peace means continued domination by the status quo elites in the eyes of rebel groups. Unless that perception can be changed, subnational groups will view the peacekeeping operation as hostile to their interests. Unfortunately, some operations (ONUC and MNF) have included provisions for strengthening the central government in their mandate. Before a peacekeeping force is sent to an area of civil internal unrest, it must have at least the tacit acceptance of relevant subnational groups there. To do this, its mandate should not include functions that give any advantage to the challenged government. This will be quite difficult without losing the approval of the central government. Agreement will also be complicated as the number of contending parties increases. Sometimes, it may be almost impossible to patrol areas where many different groups operate, much less balance competing interests among them.

Peacekeeping encounters certain problems when applied to civil strife. Success is still possible, but it will be much more difficult. Under these guidelines, the number of civil conflicts appropriate to preventive diplomacy will be few. The alternative, however, is the certainty of problems and the high probability of failure.

Does Peacekeeping Promote Conflict Resolution?

Some of the peacekeeping operations studied here prevented violence successfully, but only one facilitated the peaceful resolution of the underlying conflict; UNEF II was terminated after the implementation of the Camp David Accords. The breakthrough between Egypt and Israel can be explained by reference to the leadership of Anwar Sadat and the intervention of the United States, rather than the efforts of UNEF II. UNEF II surely aided the process by helping prevent military conflict, but overall its role was comparatively small.

Other evidence suggests that peacekeeping may have a detrimental impact on negotiations for resolution of the conflict. Peacekeeping removes much of the pressure from a conflict situation. This may allow each side to cool off, but more often it has taken away the immediate need for a resolution. Parties no longer feel compelled to solve the conflict in a rapid fashion. As a result, they may harden their positions and refuse to make the concessions that often come with a need to resolve a crisis.\textsuperscript{31} The status quo under peacekeeping also may become a desirable outcome itself for the parties; it offers a halt to the fighting without loss of face. Nations can still hold out the hope that the international environment will change and their goals will be achieved. UNEF I lasted eleven years under just such a hope. UNFICYP is now in its twenty-fourth year, and there are no signs that negotiations will soon lead to an agreement.

Peacekeeping can apparently do little beyond offering a halt to the fighting. Attempts to tie the peacekeeping operation to the negotiation process may be proven to be counterproductive. Focus on the peacekeeping operation may overshadow the mediation efforts.\textsuperscript{32} Controversy over the conduct of the operation could also poison the negotiations.\textsuperscript{33} On the other hand, a failure at mediation might adversely affect the peacekeeping component.

There are no easy solutions to this apparent dilemma. As long as preventing bloodshed is a top priority, peacekeeping will continue to be a viable means of international intervention. Scholars and diplomats must devise new means of resolving underlying conflict once the violence is stopped.

\textbf{Some Final Notes}

We offer a few caveats and considerations on this analysis of preventive diplomacy. We are limited in anticipating how and where the peacekeeping strategy might be applied next. The superpowers did not play a critical role in the five UN operations studied here, but this is not to say that they can not or will not in the future. In addition, a multinational operation sponsored by nonaligned countries (such


\textsuperscript{32} Wainhouse, \textit{International Peace Observation}, argues that the mediation and peacekeeping functions are best combined where the general principles of a political settlement have already been agreed upon and the chief problem is implementation.

\textsuperscript{33} The agreement to station peacekeeping troops can be an important building block to an overall agreement. Yet, if one nation believes that the other is not living up to the peacekeeping agreement or is in some way manipulating the peacekeeping force, it may refuse to seriously negotiate on the other issues; see Fred Iklé, \textit{How Nations Negotiate} (New York: Praeger, 1964).
as Finland or Sweden) may offer a more desirable alternative than those offered here. Without empirical referents, such a judgment is premature. The future may breed new variations of peacekeeping that overcome the difficulties cited. It is our sincere hope that it does.

Finally, we have seemed to imply that no peacekeeping operation is better than an unsuccessful one. But, is this really correct? If peacekeeping can halt fighting and stop bloodshed, even for a short time, is this enough to justify a peacekeeping operation? The answer requires a value judgement. How a failed mission affects future operations is an empirical question. Both deserve serious consideration.*

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